Bandyopadhyay, Nandita. 1979. "The Buddhist Theory of Relation between Prama and Pramana." Journal of Indian Philosophy no.
"The article seeks to introduce Dharmakirti's theory of identity between Prama and Pramana, i.e., valid knowledge and its means. Knowing is
nothing but feeling an object-shape stamped upon knowledge. This cognitive object-stamp is the immediate means to knowledge, being the direct measure of its
object and as such is not really different from the structure of knowledge itself. The difference is thus only an analytical abstraction having no causal
import. Many other systems, even Kumarila Mimansa, on close examination, are reduced to the same position, barring the Nyāya which firmly holds the
Bharadwaja, Vijay K. 1984. "Rationality, Argumentation and Embarrassment: A Study of Four Logical Alternatives (Catuskoti) in
Buddhist Logic." Philosophy East and West no. 34 (3):303-319.
Bugault, Guy. 1983. "Logic and Dialectics in the "Madhyamakakarikas"." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 11:7-76.
Cheng, Hsueh-li. 1984. Empty Logic: Madhyamika Buddhism from Chinese Sources. New York: Philosophical Library.
Reprinted: New Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1991.
Chi, Richard S.Y. 1969. Buddhist Formal Logic. London: Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.
Part I. A study of Dignaga's Hetucakra and K'uei-chi's Great commentary on the Nyāyapraveda.
Reprinted Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1984; contains "A Bibliography of Indian and Buddhist Logic" pp. 181-222.
———. 1974. "Topics on Being and Logical Reasoning." Philosophy East and West no. 24 (3):293-300.
———. 1976. "A Semantic Study of Propositions, East and West." Philosophy East and West no. 26 (2):211-223.
———. 1984. "Buddhist Logic and Western Thought." In Buddhism and American Thinkers, edited by Inada, Kennet K. and Jacobson, Nolan
P., 111-119. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Chinchore, Mangala. 1987. "Some Thoughts on Significant Contributions to Buddhist Logicians." Journal of Indian Philosophy no.
"The paper attempts to show that the difference between "Nyāya" and Buddhism is not merely verbal, but has varied philosophical implications,
due to which Nyāya-Buddhist controversy occupies a very important position in the history of indian philosophical thought. This is vindicated with reference to
some of the important and significant issues, viz. "sahtana" (the doctrine of universal flux), "anityata/ksanikata" (the doctrine of impermanence), and "vyapti
(avinabhava-niyama)", which indicate marked differences between them in the field of metaphysics, epistemology, and logic."
Conze, Edward. 1953. "The Ontology of the Prajnaparamita." Philosophy East and West no. 3 (2):117-129.
———. 1963. "Buddhist Philosophy and Its European Parallels." Philosophy East and West no. 13 (1):9-23.
———. 1963. "Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy." Philosophy East and West no. 13 (2):105-115.
Daye, Douglas Dunsmore. 1975. "On Logic and Algebraic and Geometric Logic." Philosophy East and West no. 25 (3):357-364.
———. 1975. "Remarks on Early Buddhist Protoformalism (Logic) and Mr. Tachikawa's Translation of the "Nyāyapravesa"." Journal of Indian
Philosophy no. 3:383-398.
"I discuss some important logical points of translation concerning seven Sanskrit metalogical terms (paksa, hetu, drstanta, rupya,
viruddha, viruddhavyabhicari and ubhayatravyabhicara), and some proto-formal theories in light of the probable theoretical formalistic expectations of
non-specialists in Buddhist logic, e.g., non-formal criteria in the evaluation rules for determining the legitimacy (not validity) of inference schemas.
Additional comments are made on the developmental stages and proto-formalized virtues and limitations of this early Pramana Yada text."
———. 1977. "Metalogical Incompatibilities in the Formal Inscription of Buddhist Logic (Nyāya)." Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic no. 28 (2):221-231.
———. 1979. "Empirical Falsifiability and the Frequence of Dar'sana Relevance in the Sixth Century Buddhist Logic of Sankaravamin." Logique et Analyse no. 86.
———. 1979. "Metalogical Clichés (Proto-Variables) and Their Restricted Substitution in Sixth Century Buddhist Logic." Notre Dame Journal
of Formal Logic no. 20:549-558.
"This paper answers the question: are there variables in early Buddhist logic (Nyāya)? Thus the article describes 1) the implicit rules and
sources for the correct substitution of 6th century Buddhist metalogical clichés (proto-variables), 2) some differences between such clichés and modern
variables, 3) various metalogical theories and the crucial function of metaphysical presuppositions, and 4) offers a translation into the first order predicate
———. 1981. "Aspects of the Indian and Western Traditions of Formal Logic and Their Comparisons." In Buddhist and Western Philosophy,
edited by Katz, Nathan, 54-79. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.
———. 1988. "On Translating the Term "Drstanta" in Early Buddhist Formal Logic." Philosophy East and West no. 38
"The discussion of problems in the translation of "Nyāya/Pramana Vada" terms into their possible English target expressions remains relevant
for philosophers because to translate such terms is to presuppose some implicit interpretations of formalistic logic. This takes us beyond the confines of
traditional Indology to philosophical questions about comparative formal logics."
Eckel, Malcolm D. 1978. "Bhavaviveka and the Early Madhyamika Theories of Language." Philosophy East and West no. 28
"Evidence from Bhavaviveka's Orajnapradipa and Tarkajvala is used to show that Bhavaviveka makes an important contribution to the
understanding of Nagarjuna's arguments about the foundations of language. Bhavaviveka's arguments are then compared and contrasted with those of Candrakirti
Ellingson-Waugh, Ter. 1974. "Algebraic and Geometric Logic." Philosophy East and West no. 24 (1):23-40.
Fujinaga, Sin. 1990. "Determining Which Jaina Philosopher Was the Object of Dharmakirti's Criticisms." Philosophy East and West no.
Galloway, Brian. 1989. "Some Logical Issues in Madhyamaka Thought." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 17:1-35.
"In this paper we should like to argue that the "Prasajya" negation of the Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy is not the same as that
of the non-Madhyamaka schools (that is, that the distinction between "Prasajya" and "Paryudasa" negation is not drawn in the same way). We should also like to
argue that the terms and concepts of elementary set theory, employed in conjunction with the elementary predicate calculus, are useful in the explication of
the laws of the excluded middle and of contradiction and also in the clarification of the "Catuskoti". Finally we shall defend the Madhyamika Nagarjuna against
two charges that have been laid against him to the effect that he has been guilty of certain errors of reasoning."
Gillon, Brendan S. 1997. "Negative Facts and Knowledge of Negative Facts." In Relativism, Suffering and Beyond. Essays in Memory of Bimal
K. Matilal, edited by Bilimoria, Purusottama and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, 128-149. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
"Negative facts have perplexed Western philosophers ever since the time of Plato.' But the philosophers of Europe and America have not been
the only philosophers to have been perplexed by them; classical Indian philosophers too have pondered their nature. My interest here is to explore how the
reflections of these classical Indian philosophers, transposed into the contemporary philosophical idiom, might enrich current metaphysical thinking about
negative facts; and what I shall conclude is that at least one of these philosophers has a view of negative facts and knowledge of them, which, when so
transposed, is very plausible indeed.
I shall begin by asking the fundamental ontological question of whether or not negative facts exist and then sketch various replies which
European and American philosophers have given to it. Since these replies have not led to any decisive answer to the question, I shall then ask two other
questions: the more specific ontological question of whether or not absences-surely paradigmatic examples of negative facts-exist; and the related
epistemological question of what is known when the absence of something is said to be known. Answers to these questions comprise an important part of classical
Indian philosophy; and I shall outline their answers to them, concluding that the most plausible answers to these questions are those of Jayanta Bhatta, who
maintained that absences do indeed exist and that they are known not only by inference but also by
Gupta, Rita. 1980. "The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness and Its Presuppositions." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 8:47-68.
"The article first examines the arguments with the help of which philosophers like Dharmakirti established the doctrine of momentariness. The
article later proceeds to examine some of the basic presuppositions of the doctrine which are: (I) causal efficacy must be the intrinsic property of a cause,
(II) there is no such thing as an unrealized capacity, (III) causal efficacy is the hall mark of the real as opposed to the unreal, and (IV) the identity of a
thing is destroyed not only if it happens to be concurrently invested with two contradictory properties, it is destroyed even if the contradictories
characterize the thing (at different times)."
———. 1985. "Apoha and the Nominalist/Conceptualist Controversy." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 13:383-398.
Herzberger, Hans G. 1975. "Double Negation in Buddhist Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 3:3-16.
"The Apoha doctrine of Dignaga and his followers, presents a fascinating logical puzzle. While rejecting the classical law of double
negation, it nevertheless requires a partial semantic equivalence between expression and their double negations. None of the principal nonstandard concepts of
negation (classical, intuitionistic, three-valued) can do justice to this complex position. this paper undertakes a semantic reconstruction of the Apoha
doctrine, using methods derived from Emil Post's work on the foundations of many-valued logic, especially the notion of a "two-fold" proposition."
Herzberger, Radikha, and Herzberger, Hans G. 1997. "Two Truths, or One?" In Relativism, Suffering and Beyond. Essays in Memory of Bimal
K. Matilal, edited by Bilimoria, Purusottama and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, 278-300. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
"Thomas Mann begins his essay on Schopenhauer by telling us that the pleasures of metaphysics are mainly aesthetic.
Without sharing that high degree of philosophical detachment, we acknowledge that the present essay was motivated by aesthetic as well as
historical concerns. Because it is part of an effort to understand Indian philosophers as particular individuals with distinctive problem situations and
doctrines it is properly classified as historical. Because it aims to locate particular doctrines within larger philosophical, visions, it might also be
classified as aesthetic. Our essay develop's a long perspective going back to the early origins of pramâna theory. Drawing the reader back in time
puts us in a better position to trace historical sources for certain important ideas of Dharmakirti and Dinnaga, and to contrast the treatment of those ideas
in their respective philosophical systems."
Huntington, C.W.Jr. 1983. "A "Nonreferential" View of Language and Conceptual Thought in the Work of Tson-Kha-Pa." Philosophy East and
West no. 33 (4):325-339.
"Part one of the work briefly describes Wittgenstein's theory of nonreferential meaning, as presented in Gudmunsen's "Wittgenstein and
Buddhism". This theory is then applied to the interpretation of an essay by Tson-kha-pa dealing with the "two truths." Part two is an annotated translation of
the Tson-kha-pa piece."
Inada, Kennet K. 1988. "The Range of Buddhist Ontology." Philosophy East and West no. 38 (3):261-280.
"The essay aims at the achievement of a proper understanding of Buddhist reality based on the Buddha's original enlightenment. It expands on
the three aspects: the locus of reality, its nature and function, and its implication. This reality is a dynamic and open ontology, one that focuses on the
momentary nature of ordinary experience. It is a unique ontology which finally affirms the universal nature of the doctrine of emptiness which, in turn, opens
up new directions in both ideological and cultural pursuits."
Lance, Factor R. 1983. "What Is the "Logic" in Buddhist Logic?"Philosophy East and West no. 33 (2):183-188.
"In opposition to a contemporary interpretation of the influential Buddhist logic text, "Nyāyapravesa" (Introduction to logical methods,
circa 600 a. D.) which holds that its argument forms are not deductive and hence not comparable to Western notions of logic, I argue that its basic syllogisms
are retroductive-deductive pairs. A Nyāya syllogism is virtually identical with the retroductive form expounded by C.S. Peirce and N. Hanson."
Lindtner, Christian. 1981. "Atisa's Introduction to the Two Truths, and Its Sources." Journal of Indian Philosophy no.
"This paper presents a survey and an annotated translation (from Tibetan and Sanskrit) of the main Buddhist documents from II-X century a. D.
dealing with the 'two truths', or two degrees of reality: a relative and an absolute. The former is the empirical world known to us through the senses and the
usage of language. Submitted to sustained critical analysis it proves to be devoid of logical and ontological foundation. Enlightened individuals realizing
that there is thus in fact only one truth -- the absolute -- nevertheless avail themselves of the convention of language in order to indicate what cannot be
communicated but only 'personally intuited.' Thus the relative truth is pedagogically indispensable."
Liu, Ming-wood. 1993. "A Chinese Madhyamaka Theory of Truth: The Case of Chi-Tsang." Philosophy East and West no. 43
"Chi-tsang (549-623) was the key figure in the revival of Chinese Madhyamaka in the late sixth century, and his teaching is commonly
acknowledged to be the apex of the development of Madhyamaka thought in China. This essay attempts to examine the conception of truth underlying a number of
ideas generally considered as central to Chi-tsang's thought, including "refutation of falsehood", "revelation of truth" and "two truths"."
Loy, David. 1984. "How Not to Criticize Nagarjuna: A Response to L. Stafford Betty." Philosophy East and West no. 34
Manchester, Rogers Katherine. 2009. Tibetan Logic. Ithaca: Snow Lions Publications.
Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1970. "Reference and Existence in Nyāya and Buddhist Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 1:83-108.
"This Nyāya-Buddhist controversy over the empty subject term may well recall to a modern mind the Meinong-Russell controversy about
'existence' and 'denotation'. The Nyāya and the Buddhist logicians worried over the logical and the epistemological problem connected with the issue. The Nyāya
interpreted "the rabbit's horn" not as a singular term but as a predicate complex attributing 'hornness' to something that belonged to the rabbit. "The
rabbit's horn does not exist" ascribes the absence of hornness to something belonging to a rabbit, and is true. This analysis is closer to Russell's theory of
description. The Buddhist, on the other hand, is prepared to allow some sort of 'fictional existence' to "the rabbit's horn" which is perhaps not very
different from Meinong's 'theory of objects'. In epistemology the Nyāya believed that any object of cognition (which is expressible in words) must be either
real or analyzable into constituents which are ultimately identifiable with some real entity or other. Only a complex object can be fictional. The Buddhists,
however, hold that the objects of erroneous cognition are fictional."
Matilal, Bimal Krishna, and Evans, Robert D., eds. 1986. Buddhist Logic and Epistemology. Studies in the Buddhist Analysis of Inference
and Language. Dordrecht: Reidel.
McDermott, Charlene Senape A. 1969. An Eleventh-Century Buddhist Logic of Exists. Dordrecht: Reidel.
———. 1970. "Empty Subject Terms in Late Buddhist Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 1:22-29.
"One defense of the central tenets of Buddhist metaphysics by the Eleventh century logician, Ratnakirti, culminates in his development of a
system broad enough to accommodate null subject terms -- an achievement proleptic of contemporary free logics. The article is intended as an implicit argument
in favor of the utilization of formal logical structures as tools for explication in comparative philosophy."
Mortensen, Chris. 2004. "Dharmakirti and Priest on Change." Philosophy East and West no. 54 (1):20-28.
Competing accounts of change and motion are given by the seventh-century Buddhist logician Dharmakirti and the contemporary analytical
philosopher Graham Priest. They agree on much, but disagree on the issue of the Law of Non-Contradiction. Priest takes Dharmakirti's side, appealing to current
space-time theory, while making some qualifications."
Nakamura, Hajime. 1958. "Buddhist Logic Expounded by Means of Symbolic Logic." Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies no.
———. 1987. Indian Buddhism. A Survey with Bibliographical Notes. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
First edition: Japan 1980.
Chapter V. Logicians pp. 294-311.
Ng Yu, Kwan. 1987. "The Arguments of Nagarjuna in the Light of Modern Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 15:363-384.
Payne, Richard K. 1987. "The Theory of Meaning in Buddhist Logicians: The Historical and Intellectual Context of Apoha." Journal of
Indian Philosophy no. 15:261-284.
Perdue, Daniel E. 1992. Debate in Tibetan Buddhism. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications.
Potter, Karl H., ed. 1999. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 8. Buddhist Philosophy from 100 to 350 A.D. Delhi: Motilal
Potter, Karl H., Buswell, Robert Jr., Jaini, Padmanabh S., and Ross, Reat Noble, eds. 1996. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 7.
Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Rajnish, Mishra. 2000. "Buddhist Theory of Meaning." In Signs and Signification. Vol. Ii, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh and Manetti,
Giovanni, 337-358. New Delhi: Bahri Publications.
Robinson, Richard H. 1967. "The Classical Indian Axiomatic." Philosophy East and West no. 17 (1-4):139-154.
Santina, Peter Della. 1987. "The Madhyamaka Philosophy." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 15:173-185.
"The paper attempts to provide a brief but complete history of the conceptual development of the Madhyamaka system in India from Nagarjuna to
Shantarakshita and Kamalashila, including the controversy between the Prasangika and the Svatantrika Schools and the emergence of the synthetic
Yogacara-Madhyamaka school. The Madhyamaka system represents the quintessence of the critical attitude in Buddhist philosophy. Nonetheless, in the course of
its development, it exhibited logical and idealistic tendencies as well as analytical ones."
Sharma, Dhirendra. 1968. "Buddhist Theory of Meaning (Apoha) and Negative Statements." Philosophy East and West no. 18
Shaw, Jaysankar Lal. 1974. "Empty Terms: The Nyāya and the Buddhists." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 2:332-343.
"The purpose of this paper is to explain the Buddhists' conception of empty term, which is linked up with their conception of Sunyata, and to
answer some of the questions raised by certain contemporary writers on Nyāya and Buddhism. Moreover, the aim is to show an important function of language which
is embedded in the Buddhist philosophy as a whole. A comparison between Russell and the Nyāya has been drawn, and some of the questions raised by Quine have
been discussed in this context."
———. 1978. "Negation and the Buddhist Theory of Meaning." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 6:59-77.
"The aim of this paper is to explain and reconstruct the Buddhist theory of meaning which is formulated in terms of double negation. The
Buddhist theory of meaning requires two types of negation for expressing the meaning of an expression. This discussion leads us to an investigation of the
different senses of negation used in Indian logic. The first section deals with the different classifications of negation. The second section deals with
professor Herzberger's explication of the Buddhist theory of meaning. According to our positive thesis the theory of meaning can be reconstructed in terms of
two senses of negation."
Siderits, Mark. 1979. "A Note on the Early Buddhist Theory of Truth." Philosophy East and West no. 29 (4):491-499.
———. 1980. "The Madhyamaka Critique of Epistemology (First Part)." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 8:307-336.
"A stock objection to the Madhyamaka project of establishing a null ontology is that any knowledge claim requires the existence of objects of
knowledge. Here I describe the Nyāya formulation of this objection. Nagarjuna's response, that the theory of knowledge cannot supply us with metaphysical
truths, is examined in detail. Finally, I consider the Nyāya defense of epistemology, concluding that it misses the point of Nagarjuna's objection."
———. 1981. "The Madhyamaka Critique of Epistemology (Second Part)." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 9:121-160.
———. 1985. "Word Meaning, Sentence Meaning and Apoha." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 13:133-152.
"I show that the Buddhist philosophers Santaraksita and Kamalasila subscribed to the Indian equivalent of the context principle, according to
which a word has meaning only in the context of a sentence. I then discuss the manner in which they used the Buddhist exclusion (Apoha) theory of meaning to
answer two major objections to that account of word meaning: the "hermeneutic circle" objection, and the objection that this account cannot explain our ability
to understand novel sentences."
Stcherbatsky, Fedor Ippolitovich. 1930. Buddhist Logic. Leningrad: Academy of sciences of the U.S.S.R.
Two volumes (1930-1932).
Vol.2 includes "A short treatise of logic (Nyāya-bindu) by Dharmakirti with its commentary (Nyāya-bindu-tika) by Dharmottara translated from
the Sanscrit text edited in the Biblioteca Buddhica."
Reprinted: New York, Dover Publications, 1962; Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1992.
Steinkellner, Ernst, ed. 1991. Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition. Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakirti
Conference, Vienna, June 11-16, 1989. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Tillemans, Tom J.F. 1984. "Two Tibetan Texts on the "Neither One nor Many" Argument for "Sunyata"." Journal of Indian Philosophy no.
"This is my third article in a series on a Buddhist Madhyamaka argument for "voidness", that is the impossibility of entities existing
themselves. For the previous two articles, see E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher (eds.) "Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist religion and philosophy", Vienna
1983, and "Etudes de lettres", 3, University of Lausanne 1982. The present article consists of an annotated translation and a critical edition of sections from
two Tibetan texts."
———. 1989. "Formal and Semantic Aspects of Tibetan Buddhist Debate Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 17:265-297.
———. 1999. Scripture, Logic, Language. Essays on Dharmakirti and His Tibetan Successors. Boston: Wisdom Publications.
Contents: Series Editor's Preface: E. Gene Smith; Acknowledgments and notes on the bibliographic sources; Abbreviations; Introduction;
Scripturally based argumentation. 1. Dharmakirti, Aryadeva and Dharmapala on scriptural suthority 27; 2. How much of a proof is scripturally based inference?
37; 3. Pre-Dharmakirti Commentators on the definition of a thesis 53; Logic; 4. On Pararthanumana, Theses and syllogisms 69; 5. On Sapaksa 89; 6. Formal and
semantic aspects of Tibetan Buddhist debate logic 117; 7. Dharmakirti and Tibetans on Adrsyanupalabdhihetu 151; 8. What is the Svadharmin in Buddhist logic?
171; 9. Is Buddhist logic non-classical or deviant? 187; Philosophy of language; 10. On the so-called difficult point of the Apoha theory 209; 11. What can one
reasonably say about nonexistence? (with Donald S. Lopez, Jr.) 247; Bibliography 285; Index 301.
Tillemans, Tom J.F., and Lopez, Donald S.Jr. 1998. "What Can One Reasonably Say About Nonexistence? A Tibetan Work on the Problem of
Asrayasiddha." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 26:99-129.
Tucci, Giuseppe. 1929. "Buddhist Logic before Dinnaga (Asanga, Vasubandhu, Tarka-Sastras)." Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great
Britain and Ireland:451-488.
Waldo, Ives. 1975. "Nagarjuna and Analytic Philosophy." Philosophy East and West no. 25 (3):281-290.
Walser, Joseph. 1998. "On the Formal Arguments of the Akutobhaya." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 26:189-232.
"Though the Madhyamika school of Buddhism begins with Nagarjuna's Mula Madhyamakakarika, modern scholar's interpretations of this work rely
heavily on the commentaries of Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka and Candrakirti. These commentaries each reflect the so-called "Svatantrika-vs-Prasangika" debate,
which became a Madhyamika preoccupation in later times. There are, however, two earlier commentaries which have been largely ignored. This article will
demonstrate that one of these commentaries, theAkutobhaya, gives us a rendering of Nagarjuna's logic that is perhaps closer to Nagarjuna's own milieu than
post-Dignaga commentaries, such as those of Candrakirti and Bhavaviveka. In this article, I show the ways that the formal argumentation of the Akutobhaya
differs from the post-Dignaga logic and seems to conform more closely to an earlier standard set by the early Nyāya and Samkhya schools of logic. The result of
this difference in logical methodology is subtle, but nevertheless has ramifications for Madhyamika doctrine."
Watanabe, Fumimaro. 1983. Philosophy and Its Development in the Nikayas and Abhidhamma. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Wayman, Alex. 1999. A Millennium of Buddhist Logic. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
"This is volume one of texts (from Sanskrit and Tibetan sources) of the two planned volumes on Buddhist Ligic (the second volume to be on
topics and opponents). This first volume is in two parts: Part I (Introductory) has Asanga's rules of debate, Dharmakirti's Nyāyabindu with Kamalasila's
commentary, and Santi-pa's treatise on 'inner pervasion. Part II, devoted to the Dignaga-Dharmakirti system, has five sets of eleven verses, then a study of
Bu-Ston's commentary on Dharmakirti's Pramanaviniscaya, and finally Tsong-kha-pa's Mum sel on the seven books of Dharmakirti. The 'Millennium' goes from Asanga
to Tsongkha-pa. The texts here included began to be translated in the 1970s, were all in draft renditions in the 1980s, and were brought to their present
condition in the 1990s. Doubtless the present volume took longer than originally anticipated, and hopefully this published result will compensate for the many
years of delay."
Williams, Paul M. 1980. "Some Aspects of Language and Construction in the Madhyamaka." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 8:1-45.
"The word 'Prajnapti' in the Madhyamaka designates the status of an entity which has no existence apart from that postulated to fulfill the
requirements of linguistic reference. the 'prajnapti' is the referent of a term with no ultimate referent, and is created by language due to the requirement
that all terms have referents in order to be meaningful. 'Samjna' involves the classification of a perceptual given in terms of a verbalized subject-predicate
formula. The requirement for a referent of the terms involved is fulfilled through the operation of 'Kalpana', and this constructive operation seen as the
creation of a semi-permanent entity is referred to under the aspect of 'Parikalpa'. The paper also treats 'Prapanca' and, briefly, 'Drsti'."
———. 1981. "On the Abhidharma Ontology." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 9:227-257.
"The Sarvastivada ontology maintained that all of which could be an intentional object of consciousness and verbally characterized must
exist. Existing solely with self-essence was necessary in order to allow for imagination, memory and the atemporal referring of uniquely individuating
descriptions. These entities are primary existents and are constructed into the spatio-temporal everyday world. For a primary existent to be spatio-temporally
instantiated is the same thing as for it to be effective, and this sort of existence was radically distinguished from existing simply possessed of
self-essence. Secondary existence is constructed out of these as the sort of existence required by non-uniquely individuating intentional acts."