Aklujkar, Ajok. 2001. "The Word Is the World: Nondualism in Indian Philosophy of Language." Philosophy East and West no. 51
"The meanings in which the word 'word' can be taken, the interpretations that the relevant meanings would necessitate of the
'word-equals-world' thesis, and the extent to which Bhartrhari can be said to be aware of or receptive to these interpretations are considered. The observation
that more than one interpretation would have been acceptable to Bhartrhari naturally leads to a discussion of his notion of truth, his perspectivism, and his
understanding of the nature of philosophizing as an activity in which language pays a basic role and epistemology and ontology are interdependent. The
difference of Bhartrhari's thinking from that of the Vedantins of Sankara's tradition is identified, and a brief comment on the history of vivarta and
parinama as philosophical terms is offered."
Arnold, Daniel. 2001. "Intrinsic Validity Reconsidered: A Sympathetic Study of the Mimamsaka Inversion of Buddhist Epistemology." Journal
of Indian Philosophy no. 29:589-675.
———. 2001. "Of Intrinsic Validity. A Study on the Relevance of Purva Mimamsa." Philosophy East and West no. 51
Balcerowicz, Piotr. 2001. "The Logical Structure of the Naya Method of the Jainas." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 29:379-403.
Bandyopadhyay, Nandita. 1988. "The Concept of Contradiction in Indian Logic and Epistemology." Journal of Indian Philosophy no.
"The article seeks to introduce to the students of philosophy the concept of contradiction in Indian philosophy. contradiction and
contrariety fall under the common class of opposition called "Virodha". the former means "pervasion of mutual negation by two predicates," the latter means
"pervasibility of two predicates by their mutual negation." Vontradiction is a purely logical relation, while contrariety is semilogical. The author suggests
that contradiction and contrariety should better be called, respectively, "absolute contradiction" and "relative contradiction", both being based on
contradiction of identity. Some formidable Indian philosophers argue that contradiction (including contrariety) is a purely logical category, for contradiction
of facts is impossible."
Banerjee, Hiranmoy. 1972. "On a Mistranslation of the Terms ' Visesya' and ' Prakara'." Philosophy East and West
no. 22 (1):93-96.
"The translation of the Nyāya terms, ' Visesya' and ' Prakara' as 'subject' and 'predicate' is mistaken. This mistake is
the progenitor of the philosophical mistake that a particular can possibly be a predicate. In 'ram is possessed of a stick', the stick is the '
Prakara', but being possessed of a stick is the predicate. This inclusion of relation in the predicate is alleged to lead to an infinite regress, for
the predicate's relation to the subject should be included in it ad infinitum. There is, however, a tie and not a relation between the subject and the
predicate. A relation, being a universal, is a prediate of particulars whereas a tie binds together entities of heterogeneous types."
Barlingay, Surendra Sheodas. 1965. A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic. Delhi: National Publishing House.
Barua, Beninadhab. 1921. A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy. Calcutta: University of Calcutta.
Reprinted: Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1970.
Berriedale, Keith Arthur. 1921. Indian Logic and Atomism: An Exposition of the Nyāya and Vaicesika Systems. Oxford: Clarendon
Reprinted: New York, Greenwood Press, 1968 and New Delhi, Oriental Books Reprint Corp., 1977.
Bharadwaja, Vijay K. 1987. "Implication and Entailment in Navya-Nyāya Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 15:149-154.
"It is argued against the claim that there exist in the concept of "Vyapti" and "Paramarsa" the two notions of implication and entailment in
the Navya-Nyāya logic. Also, it is suggested that the "Pancavayava-Vakya" form of "Anumana" does not represent the deductive model of inference."
———. 1990. Form and Validity in Indian Logic. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study.
Bhattacharya, Chandidas. 1987. "Can There Be Empirical Evidence for General Truth?"Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 15:333-347.
Bhattacharya, Kamaleswar. 2001. "A Note on Formalism in Indian Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 29:17-23.
Bhattacharyya, Hari Mohan. 1994. Jaina Logic and Epistemology. Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & Co.
Bhattacharyya, Krishnachandra. 1956. Studies in Philosophy. Calcutta: Progressive Publishers.
Two volumes edited by Gopinath Bhattacharyya
Bhattacharyya, Sibajiban. 1955. "Daniel H. H. Ingalls on Indian Logic." Philosophy East and West no. 5 (2):155-162.
———. 1961. "The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Doctrine of Qualities." Philosophy East and West no. 11 (3):143-151.
———. 1974. "Some Features of Navya-Nyāya Logic." Philosophy East and West no. 24 (3):329-342.
"Navya-Nyāya developed a technical (non-symbolic) language tied to a realistic ontology, but this became the language of all serious
discourse in India -- of all philosophies, grammar, law, medicine. The problem is primarily to explain how this was possible. The answer suggested is that
Navya-Nyāya developed a language for 'describing' cognitions by stating not merely the objects recognized, but also the 'mode of cognition of the object'. This
necessitated the development of special concepts like the concept of limitor (Avacchedaka). in ontology, Navya-Nyāya made extensive use of Occam's razor to
decide which abstract terms stood for abstract entities, and which, though abstract grammatically, still denoted entities identifiable as concrete
———. 1990. "Some Features of the Technical Language of Navya-Nyāya." Philosophy East and West no. 40 (2):129-149.
"The technical language of Navya-Nyāya uses concepts like limitor, determiner, etc., to deal with sentences expressing cognition like
perception, inference, memory, belief, doubt, supposition. As such sentences are not extensional, Navya-Nyāya distinguishes between what is cognised and the
mode under which what is cognised is cognised. Limitor, in the technical language, determines the mode of cognition and is also used to express quantity of
cognition, universality, particularity, etc. The concept of determiner is used to show what predicate is asserted of what subject in the same cognition."
Biardeau, Madeleine. 1964. Thèorie De La Connaissance Et Philosophie De La Parole Dans Le Brahmanisme Classique. Paris: Mouton &
Bilimoria, Purusottama. 1985. ""Jnana" and "Prama": The Logic of Knowing. A Critical Appraisal." Journal of Indian Philosophy no.
"The thrust of this paper is to investigate the relative difference between "Jnana" and "Prama", two crucial concepts in Indian epistemology,
since more recent treatment of them would seem to be confused. Utilizing the framework developed by Nyāya and Advaita, it is argued that the former describes a
wide range of cognitive processes, such as 'cognition', 'judgment', 'remembering', 'doubting', etc., while the latter defines the bounds of cognition in
respect of its truth-value. A theory of knowledge is developed that accounts for the rise of 'true' knowledge in terms of the 'psyche-activity' involved and
the set of criteria ("Pramanya") that renders a "Jnana" as a "Prama". The intensional structure of such a judgment, it is argued, involves a complex
qualified-qualifier relation in conformity with the property-content relation of the objective correlate."
Bossche, Frank van den. 1995. "Existence and Non-Existence in Haribhadra Suri's Anekanta-Jaya-Pataka." Journal of Indian Philosophy
"In part I of the article the author explains how the problem of negation has led the Jains to accept non-existence as well as existence as
constituents or 'Dharmas' of every real object in the world and to formulate the first dialectical principle of the "Anekanta-vada" doctrine: 'Sad-asad-rupam
vastu' or 'every real object possesses a mode as an existent and as a nonexistent'. In part II of the article the author explains, using mereology as a logical
tool, how Haribhadra Suri defends the Jain viewpoint in his 'Anekanta-jaya-pataka'."
Bronkhorst, Johannes. 2001. "The Peacock's Egg: Bhartrhari on Language and Reality." Philosophy East and West no. 51
"Bhartrhari was not only a clever and well-informed philosopher but also a conservative Brahmin who maintained his own tradition's
superiority against the philosophies developed in his time. He exploited a problem that occupied all his philosophical contemporaries to promote his own ideas,
in which the Veda played a central role. Bhartrhari and his thought are situated in their philosophical context. As it turns out, he dealt with issues that
others had dealt with before him in India and suggested solutions to existing problems. Indeed it becomes clear that he was both a philosopher who dealt with
current problems and challenges and a traditionalist who used the philosophical debate of his time to gain respectability for his own Vedic tradition."
Butzenberger, Klaus. 1996. "On Doubting What There Is Not: The Doctrine of Doubt and the Reference of Terms in Indian Grammar, Logic and
Philosophy of Language." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 24:363-406.
Cardona, George. 1975. "Paraphrase and Sentence Analysis: Some Indian Views." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 3:259-281.
Chakrabarti, Arindam. 1992. "On Knowing by Being Told." Philosophy East and West no. 42 (3):421-439.
———. 1997. Denying Existence. The Logic, Epistemology and Pragmatics of Negative Existentials and Fictional Discourse. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
See the Appendix: "The problem of the nonexistent in Indian philosophy of logic and language" pp. 211-245.
———. 2000. "Against Immaculate Perception: Seven Reasons for Eliminating Nirvilkalpaka Perception from Nyāya." Philosophy East
and West no. 50 (1):1-8.
"Besides seeing a rabbit or seeing that the rabbit is grayish, do we also sometimes see barely just the particular animal (not as an animal
or as anything) or the feature rabbitness or grayness? Such bare, non-verbalizable perception is called "indeterminate perception"(nirvikalpaka
pratyaksa) in Nyāya. Standard Nyāya postulates such pre-predicative bare perception in order to honor the rule that awareness of a qualified entity must
be caused by awareness of the qualifier. After connecting this issue with the Western debate concerning the "myth of the given," seven distinct arguments are
presented showing that the very notion of such indeterminate perception is epistemically otiose and that the Nyāya theory of perception is better off without
———. 2001. "Reply to Stephen Phillips." Philosophy East and West no. 51 (1):114-115.
Chakrabarti, Chandana, and Chakrabarti, Kisor Kumar. 1981. "Toward Dualism: The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Way." Philosophy East and West no.
Chakrabarti, Kisor Kumar. 1975. "The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theory of Universals." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 3:363-382.
"The paper consists in three parts. The first part gives an exposition of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory that universals are real entities
distinct from and independent of the particulars to which they may be related. Various arguments for the theory are stated. The distinctive features of the
theory are brought out by way of comparison and contrast with the views of Aristotle and Plato in particular. The second part discusses some objections to the
theory. The third part explains the so called 'preventive conditions for universals' together with their bearings on recent philosophical developments."
———. 1976. "Some Comparisons between Frege's Logic and Navya-Nyāya Logic." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no.
"This paper consists of three parts. The first part deals with Frege's distinction between sense and reference of proper names and a similar
distinction in Navya-Nyāya logic. In the second part we have compared Frege's definition of number to the Navya-Nyāya definition of number. In the third part
we have shown how the study of the so-called 'restrictive conditions for universals' in Navya-Nyāya logic anticipated some of the developments of modern set
———. 1978. "The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theory of Negative Entities." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 6:129-144.
"The paper consists in three parts. The first part criticizes the attempt of some major Indian and Western philosophers like Plato, Cook
Wilson, the Buddhists, the Prabhakaras, etc., to dispense with negative entities and builds up the case for them. The second part is devoted to their
classification and contains additional arguments in favour of negative entities of particular kinds. The third part discusses some problems of a specialized
nature such as the criteria for distinguishing one negative entity from another."
———. 1985. "Some Remarks on Indian Theories of Truth." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 12:339-356.
"Some of the points sought to be established are (1) an overly pragmatic reading of the concept of truth in Indian philosophy should be
avoided; (2) notions similar to that of knowledge as justified true belief and to the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths are found in Indian
philosophy; (3) confirmation of truth through an inferential process, when properly analyzed, does not lead to an infinite regress and that (4) in some cases
truth is known immediately."
———. 1995. Definition and Induction. A Historical and Comparative Study. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
———. 1999. Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind. The Nyāya Dualist Tradiiton. Albany: Sate University of New York Press.
Chakraborti, Mihir K., Lowe, Benedikt, Mitra, Madhabendra Nath, and Sarukkai, Sundar, eds. 2008. Logic, Navya-Nyāya and Applications.
Homage to Bimal Krishna Matilal. London: College Publications.
Chapple, Christopher Key. 2000. "Sources for the Study of Jaina Philosophy: A Bibliographic Essay." Philosophy East and West no. 50
"Primary titles in the area of Jaina philosophy are identified, focusing on English-language materials published in the Twentieth century.
Included is a brief survey of individual books and book series, with more extensive commentary on two important books published within the past five years:
Nathmal Tatia's translation of Umasvati's "Tattvarthasutra" (that which is) and Nagin J. Shah's translation of Nyāyavijayaju's "Jaina Darsana" (Jaina
philosophy and religion)."
Chatterjee, Satischandra. 1939. The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge. A Critical Study of Some Problems of Logic and Metaphysics. Calcutta:
University of Calcutta.
Reprinted 1950, 1965 and 1978.
Chatterjee, Satischandra, and Datta, Dhirendramohan. 1939. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy. Calcutta: University of
Seventh edition 1968
Coward, Harold G., and Kunjunni, Raja K., eds. 1990. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 5. The Philosophy of the Grammarians.
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Cox, Collett. 2004. "From Category to Ontology: The Changing Role of Dharma in Sarvastivada Abhidharma." Journal of Indian
Philosophy no. 32:543-597.
Dasgupta, Probal. 1981. "Modern Indian Work at the Logic-Linguistics Boundary." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 9:217-225.
"The mainstream Western logico-linguistic assumption that wh-words ("who", "when",...) in constituent questions manifest a wh-quantifier
reflects features of Western languages, which position wh-words clause-initially. Languages like Sanskrit, Hindi, and Bangla form indefinite expressions
systematically by adding an existential element to interrogative K-words, suggesting that K expresses a variable and not a quantifier. Further probing
indicates that existential and universal quantifiers are based respectively on free and bound variables. Independent linguistic arguments show that these
proposals work better than the quantifier theory of questions even for Western languages. Frege and Felix Cohen have, on logical grounds, already argued for a
Dasgupta, Surendranath. 1922. A History of Indian Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reprinted Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1975.
———. 1982. Philosophical Essays. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Daye, Douglas Dunsmore. 1979. "Circularity in the Inductive Justification of Formal Arguments (Tarka) in the Twelfth-Century Indian
Jaina Logic." Philosophy East and West no. 29 (2):177-188.
Dixit, Krishna Kumar. 1971. Jaina Ontology. Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology.
———. 1975. "Indian Logic. Its Problems as Treated by Its Schools." In. Vaishali (Muzaffarpur): Research Institute of Prakrit, Jainology, and
Dravid, Raja Ram. 1972. The Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Second revised edition 2001.
Faddegon, Barend. 1918. The Vaiçesika-System, Described with the Help of the Oldest Texts. Amsterdam: J. Muller.
Rreprinted Wiesbaden, M. Sändig, 1969.
Franco, Eli, and Preisendanz, Karin, eds. 1997. Beyond Orientalism. The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Impact on Indian and
Cross-Cultural Studies. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Frauwallner, Erich. 1961. "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic." Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für
indische Philosophie für das indologische Institut der Universität Wien no. 5:125-148.
———. 1973. History of Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Introduction by Leo Gabriel. Translated from the original German (1953) by V. M. Bedekar.
Two volumes: 1. The philosophy of the Veda and of the Epic. The Buddha and the Jina. The Samkhya and the classical Yoga-system.. 2. The
nature-philosophical Schools and the Vaisesika system. The system of the Jaina. The Materialism.
Ganeri, Jonardon. 1986. "The Hindu Syllogism: Nineteenth-Century Perceptions of Indian Logical Thought." Philosophy East and West
no. 46 (1):1-16.
"Following H. T. Colebrooke's 1824 'discovery' of the Hindu syllogism, his term for the five-step inference schema in the Nyāya-Sutra,
European logicians and historians of philosophy demonstrated considerable interest in Indian logical thought. This is in marked contrast with later historians
of philosophy, and also with Indian nationalist and neo-Hindu thinkers like Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan, who downgraded Indian rationalist traditions in
favor of 'spiritualist' or 'speculative' texts. This article traces the role of these later thinkers in the origins of the myth that Indian thought is
spiritual and a-rational. The extent to which Nineteenth-century European philosophers were aware of Colebrooke's 'discovery' is documented, and then their
criticisms of the Hindu syllogism and its defense by orientalists like Ballantyne and Muller are examined."
———. 1995. "Vyadi and the Realist Theory of Meaning." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 23:403-428.
"Vyadi, a celebrated Indian linguist, endorses a version of the realist theory of meaning, that the meaning of a word is the object for which
it stands. As applied to generic nominals like "(the) cow", Vyadi's thesis faced two much rehearsed objections: 1) if, for each token utterance, a separate
meaning rule must be given, then the number of such rules will be "limitless", and the word will be radically homonymous; 2) if only some finite set is given,
use of the word to refer outside this set will be "aberrant". These arguments significantly resemble certain Davidsonian constraints on a theory of meaning.
The application of Vyadi's theory to proper names is also examined."
———. 1996. "Meaning and Reference in Classical India." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 24:1-19.
"In another paper, I discussed the grammarian Vyadi's realist' theory of meaning, and showed how its failure to distinguish between the
concepts of meaning' and reference' laid open his theory to a series of powerful objections. Later grammarians and Naiyayikas were forced to seek new, more
sophisticated, accounts of the semantics of proper names and nominals, and in doing so introduced important innovations in the theory of meaning. I would like
in this paper to discuss the contributions of these authors, especially to our understanding of the relation between the meaning of a term and its reference,
and to the semantics of context-sensitive expressions."
———. 1999. Semantic Powers. Meaning and the Means of Knowing in Classical Indian Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 2001. Philosophy in Classical India: The Proper Work of Reason. New York: Routledge.
———, ed. 2001. Indian Logic. A Reader. Richmond: Curzon.
———. 2003. "Ancient Indian Logic as a Theory of Case-Based Reasoning." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 31:33-45.
Gangopadhyay, Mrinal Kanti. 1971. "The Concept of Upadhi in Nyāya Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 1:146-166.
———. 1984. Indian Logic in Its Sources. On Validity of Inference. New Delhi: Munhsiram Monoharlal.
Gerow, Edwin. 1984. "Language and Symbol in Indian Semiotics." Philosophy East and West no. 34 (3):245-260.
Gillon, Brendan S. 1997. "Negative Facts and Knowledge of Negative Facts." In Relativism, Suffering and Beyond. Essays in Memory of Bimal
K. Matilal, edited by Bilimoria, Purusottama and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, 128-149. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
"Negative facts have perplexed Western philosophers ever since the time of Plato.' But the philosophers of Europe and America have not been
the only philosophers to have been perplexed by them; classical Indian philosophers too have pondered their nature. My interest here is to explore how the
reflections of these classical Indian philosophers, transposed into the contemporary philosophical idiom, might enrich current metaphysical thinking about
negative facts; and what I shall conclude is that at least one of these philosophers has a view of negative facts and knowledge of them, which, when so
transposed, is very plausible indeed.
I shall begin by asking the fundamental ontological question of whether or not negative facts exist and then sketch various replies which
European and American philosophers have given to it. Since these replies have not led to any decisive answer to the question, I shall then ask two other
questions: the more specific ontological question of whether or not absences-surely paradigmatic examples of negative facts-exist; and the related
epistemological question of what is known when the absence of something is said to be known. Answers to these questions comprise an important part of classical
Indian philosophy; and I shall outline their answers to them, concluding that the most plausible answers to these questions are those of Jayanta Bhatta, who
maintained that absences do indeed exist and that they are known not only by inference but also by perception."
Glashoff, Klaus. 2004. "On Stanislaw Schayer's Research on Nyāya." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 32:295-319.
Gokhale, Pradeep P. 1982. "The Terms Padartha and Prameya in the Context of Nyāyasutra." Philosophy East and
West no. 32 (2):207-211.
"In this paper an attempt has been made to show that the Vaisesika concept of "padartha" as 'a type of object in this world' is not properly
applicable to the sixteen terms mentioned by Gautama in Nyāya-Sutra III. Traditionally "artha" (in Gautama's list of "prameyas") was identified with "padartha"
of Vaisesika's. But identification of Gautama's "prameya" or "artha" with Vaisesika "padartha" is misleading. The sixteen terms of Nyāya are also not
'categories' in the technical sense. Gautama's definition of 'padartha' has linguistic import rather than ontological."
———. 1992. Inference and Fallacies in Ancient Indian Logic: With Special Reference to Nyāya Buddhism. New Delhi: Sri Satguru
Gopalan, Subramania. 1973. Outlines of Jainism. New Delhi: Wiley Eastern Private.
Gradinarov, Plamen. 1990. Phenomenology and Indian Epistemology: Studies in Naya-Vaisesika Transcendental Logic and Atomism. New
Delhi: Ajanta Books International.
Grimes, John. 1989. A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy. Sanskrit Terms Defined in English. Albany: State University of New
New and revised edition 1996.
Guha, Dinesh Chandra. 1968. Navya Nyāya System of Logic. (Some Basic Theories and Techniques). Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya
Second revised edition with the title: Navya Nyāya System of logic: theories and techniques, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1979.
Gupta, Bina. 1980. "Are "Hetvabhasas" Formal Fallacies?"Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 8:135-147.
"The first part of the paper examines the "Hetvabhasas" of the Nyāya school. The second part analyzes the differences between Indian and
Western conceptions of fallacy and deals with the question whether the Indian account of the "Hetvabhasas" is totally devoid of the notion of formal fallacy as
it is understood in the West. I have suggested that though the "completed" Nyāya inference includes the properties of formal validity, the notion of
"Hetvabhasa" presents only the necessary conditions for satisfactorily completing such an inferential process. Thus, while the Nyāya inference adequately
accounts for the validity of the final "product" of inference, the Nyāya "Hetvabhasas" account for the inferential process leading up to a sound product of
Halbfass, Wilhelm. 1988. India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Translation of: Indien und Europa. Perspektiven ihrer geistigen Begegnung - Stuttgart, Schwabe, 1981.
———. 1992. On Being and What There Is. Classical Vaisesika and the History of Indian Ontology. Albany: State University of New York
Hamilton, Sue. 2001. Indian Philosophy. A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ho, Chien Hsing. 1996. "How Not to Avoid Speaking -- "a Free Exposition of Dignaga's Apoha Doctrine"." Journal of Indian Philosophy
Houben, Jan E.M. 2000. "Language and Thought in the Sanskrit Tradition." In History of the Language Sciences. An International Handbook
on the Evolution of the Study of Language from the Beginnings to the Present, edited by Auroux, Sylvain, Koerner, E.F.K., Niederehe, Hans-Josef and
Versteegh, Kees, 146-156. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
———. 2000. "The Establishment of Sanskrit Tradition." In History of the Language Sciences. An International Handbook on the Evolution of
the Study of Language from the Beginnings to the Present. Vol. I, edited by Auroux, Sylvain, Koerner, E.F.K., Niederehe, Hans-Josef and Versteegh, Kees,
113-157. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Ingalls, Daniel Henry Holmes. 1951. Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
———. 1955. "A Reply to Bhattacharya." Philosophy East and West no. 5 (2):163-166.
Jha, Ujjwala. 2002. Mimamsa Philosophy of Language. Delhi: SRI Satguru Publications.
Jha, Vashishtha Narayan. 1992. Relations in Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.
Joshi, N.V. 1977. Indian Philosophy: From the Ontological Point of View. Bombay: Somalya Publications.
Joshi, Rasik Vihari. 1979. Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan.
Joshi, S.D. 2001. "Syntactic and Semantic Devices in the Astadhyayi of Panini." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 29:155-167.
Kellner, Birgit. 2001. "Negation - Failure or Success? Remarks on an Allegedly Characteristic Trait of Dharmakirti's Anupalabdhi-Theory." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 29:495-517.
King, Richard. 1999. An Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Kunjunni, Raja K. 1969. Indian Theories of Meaning. Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre.
Larson, Gerald James. 1980. "The Format of Technical Philosophical Writing in Ancient India: Inadequacies of Conventional translations." Philosophy East and West no. 30 (3):375-380.
Larson, Gerald James, and Bhattacharya, Ram Shankar, eds. 1987. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 4. Samkhya: A Dualist Tradition
in Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.