Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1968. "Indian Theories of Knowledge and Truth." Philosophy East and West no. 18:321-333.
———. 1968. The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation. The Semantics and Ontology of Negative Statements in Navya-Nyāya Philosophy.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
———. 1970. "Reference and Existence in Nyāya and Buddhist Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 1:83-108.
"This Nyāya-Buddhist controversy over the empty subject term may well recall to a modern mind the Meinong-Russell controversy about
'existence' and 'denotation'. The Nyāya and the Buddhist logicians worried over the logical and the epistemological problem connected with the issue. The Nyāya
interpreted "the rabbit's horn" not as a singular term but as a predicate complex attributing 'hornness' to something that belonged to the rabbit. "The
rabbit's horn does not exist" ascribes the absence of hornness to something belonging to a rabbit, and is true. This analysis is closer to Russell's theory of
description. The Buddhist, on the other hand, is prepared to allow some sort of 'fictional existence' to "the rabbit's horn" which is perhaps not very
different from Meinong's 'theory of objects'. In epistemology the Nyāya believed that any object of cognition (which is expressible in words) must be either
real or analyzable into constituents which are ultimately identifiable with some real entity or other. Only a complex object can be fictional. The Buddhists,
however, hold that the objects of erroneous cognition are fictional."
———. 1971. Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis. The Hague: Mouton.
Second revised edition with a new preface by Jonardon Ganeri and the additions and changes made by Matilal in his personal copy: Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2005.
———. 1974. "A Note on the Nyāya Fallacy Sadhyasama and Petitio Principii." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 2:211-224.
"When H. N. Randle (in 1930) interpreted 'sadhyasama' as petitio principii, he made a mistake. Unfortunately, many scholars accepted randle's
interpretation. It has been shown that Randle was wrong about this interpretation. 'Sadhyasama' can be correctly translated as a fallacy of being in the same
predicament with yet-to-be-proven proposition. Petitio is a different fallacy, as it has been described by Aristotle. Some general comments have been made on
the notion of fallacy, and on the distinction between 'formal' and 'non-formal' fallacies."
———. 1975. "Causality in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School." Philosophy East and West no. 25 (1):41-48.
"The meaning of "cause" is much wider in some Indian philosophical schools than in the West. the Buddhist terms, "hetu" and "pratyaya", cover
an unusual variety of causal notions. The Vaisesika notion of cause is said to be closer to commonsense. A causal substrate in this system approximates the
notion of "material" cause in Aristotle, but the "non-substantial" cause is a unique notion in this system. The Nyāya critique of causation (in Udayana) can be
profitably compared and contrasted with that of David Hume. It has been further argued in the paper that Mill was a poor defender of Hume against Reid, and
that the Navya-Nyāya analysis of the 'unconditionality' criterion was slightly better than that of Mill."
———. 1977. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Wiesbaden: O. Harrasowitz.
A history of Indian literature: vol. 6, II.
———. 1977. "Ontological Problems in Nyāya, Buddhism and Jainism: A Comparative Analysis." Journal of Indian Philosophy no.
"The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika believed that we can achieve a satisfactory explanation of 'what there is' if we can analyse and classify the concrete
objects of our experience into 'substance', 'quality' and 'action'. The Buddhist thought reality to be in perpetual flux and thus the objects of experience are
synthetic and analysable into what they called "dharmas". The Jainas compromised by saying that reality is 'many-sided', both substantial (when we take the
Nyāya point of view) and ever fluctuating (when we take the Buddhist position). In Whiteheadean terms, it is a combination of 'process' and 'reality'. A
comparison, in some details, of these three Schools is attempted in the paper."
———. 1981. "Error and Truth. Classical Indian Theories." Philosophy East and West no. 31 (2):215-224.
"Classical Indian theories of error are discussed to show their relevance to the philosophical problems of the Cartesian epistemologists in
general and the British empiricists in particular. The concept of "alambana" and "pratibhasa" as discussed by the Ssautrantika-Yogacara School is explained and
the views of the "sense-data" philosophers are discussed in this connection."
———. 1985. Logic, Language and Reality. An Introduction to Indian Philosophical Studies. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
———. 1986. Perception. An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 1990. The Word and the World. India's Contribution to the Study of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 1998. The Character of Logic in India. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Edited by Jonardon Ganeri and Heeraman Tiwari
———. 2002. Mind, Language, and World. New York: Oxford University Press.
Edited by Jonardon Ganeri
Matilal, Bimal Krishna, and Chakrabarti, Arindam, eds. 1994. Knowing from Words. Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of
Understanding and Testimony. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Matilal, Bimal Krishna, and Shaw, Jaysankar Lal, eds. 1985. Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective. Exploratory Essays in
Current Theories and Classical Indian Theories of Meaning and Reference. Dordrecht: Reidel.
McCrea, Lawrence. 2000. "The Hierarchical Organization of Language in Mimansa Interpretive Theory." Journal of Indian Philosophy no.
Mehta, Mohan Lal. 1954. Outlines of Jaina Philosophy. The Essential of Jaina Ontology, Epistemology and Ethics. Bangalore: Jain
Mejor, Marek. 2003. "Contribution of Polish Scholars to the Study of Indian Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 31:9-20.
Misra, Ganewar. 1990. Language, Reality, and Analysis. Essays on Indian Philosophy. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
Mohanty, Jitendra Nath. 1961. "Reflections on the Nyāya Theory of Aavayavipratyaksa." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 1:30-41.
———. 1980. "Indian Theories of Truth: Thoughts on Their Common Framework." Philosophy East and West no. 30 (4):439-451.
"The peculiar features of Indian theories of truth, according to this paper, are: (I) a theory of cognitive occurrent; (II) absence of a
theory of meaning as distinct from reference; (III) a consequent position that avoids the extremes of logicism and psychologism; (IV) a restricted theory of
necessary truths, a fallibilism with regard to empirical truths and infallibilism with regard to moral truths; (V) a close connection between cognitive
enterprise and practice; and (VI) reliance on reflective analysis of the cognitive situation."
———. 1980. "Understanding Some Ontological Differences in Indian Philosophy." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 8:205-218.
"Taking up the pluralistic realism of Nyāya Vaisesika and monistic idealism of Advaita Vedanta, the paper enquires into the origins of this
ontological difference. While the theory of "Pramanas" (or theory of knowledge) was used to certify the ontology, the epistemology itself was incorporated into
the ontology. No absolute point of beginning is available for a system, both the systems claim to give accounts of ordinary language and ordinary experience.
The search for an extra-systemic evidence is frustrating."
———. 1984. "Pramanya and Workability -- Response to Potter." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 12:329-338.
———. 1992. "On Matilal's Understanding of Indian Philosophy." Philosophy East and West no. 42 (3):397-406.
———. 1992. Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought. An Essay on the Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking. New York: Oxford
———. 2000. Classical Indian Philosophy. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
From the Preface: "This is a book that I always wanted to write, but the project had to be postponed up until this stage in my life. Having
learned Indian philosophy under two great Sanskrit Pandits -- the late Mm. Yogendranâth Tarkavedântatirtha and the late Pandit Ananta Kumar Tarkatirtha -- I
wanted to convey to Western scholars something of the education I had received. Hopefully, I have succeeded in doing so in some measure. There are gaps that I
would like to fill, and there are topics on which I would like to elaborate, should there be an opportunity to do so in the future. For the present, I am glad
to be able to send this manuscript to the press."
Contents: Preface IX; 1. Indian philosophy: a historical overview 1; Part 1: Theory of knowledge (Pramana Sastra) 2. Theory of
knowledge (Pramana-Theory) 11; Part 2: Metaphysics (Prameya Sastra) 3. The Categories (Padharta-s) 41; 4. the Self (Atman) 59; 5. Central metaphysical issues 73; Part 3: Philosophy of politics, law and morals (Dharma Sastras) 6. State, society, and law 95;
7. Moral philosophy 105; Part 4: Religion and art: 8. Philosophy of religion 125; 9. Aesthetics of Rasasasta 133; Part 5: Beyond the
Pramana-Prameya distinction 10. Beyond the Pramana-Prameya distinction 141; Appendix 1: A note on Navya-Nyāya analysis of cognition 147;
Appendix 2: Some general features of the Indian theories of knowledge 149; Appendix 3: The classical Darsanas (Systems) 153; Appendix 4: Glossary of
important Sanskrit terms 159; Bibliography 167; Index 175; About the Author 181.
———. 2001. Explorations in Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Two volumes: 1. Indian philosophy; 2. Western philosophy
Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, Saha, S.R., Chatterjee, Amita, Sarkar, Tushar Kanti, and Sibajiban, Bhattacharyya. 2009. "Indian Logic." In The
Development of Modern Logic, edited by Haaparanta, Leila, 903-961. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mukherjea, A.K. 1976. "The Definition of Pervasion ("Vyapti") in Navya-Nyāya." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 4:1-50.
Mullick, Mohini. 1976. "Implication and Entailment in Navya-Nyāya Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 4:127-134.
"My attempt is to produce some evidence to show that the notions of implication and entailment are clearly distinguished in Navya-Nyāya
logic. This is done by examining the nature of the Navya-Nyāya syllogism and showing that the Naiyayikas were aware of various definitions of material
implication but rejected them as definitions of vyapti (implication), not because they led to inferential paradoxes but to semantic ones; they in fact never
confused implication with entailment. The entailment relation is contained in their notion of "paramarsa" and appears as the last premise in the argument which
immediately precedes and thus 'causes' the conclusion."
Nicholson, Hugh R. 2004. "Specifying the Nature of Substance in Aristotle and Indian Philosophy." Philosophy East and West no. 54
"Aristotle struggles with two basic tensions in his understanding of reality or substance that have parallels in Indian metaphysical
speculation. The first of these tensions, between the understanding of reality as the underlying substrate (to hupokeimenon)and as the individual
"this"(tode ti), finds a parallel in the concept of dravya in Patanjali's Mahâbhasya. The second tension, between the understanding
of reality as the individual this and as the intelligible essence of the individual this (to ti en einai) , corresponds to an ambiguity in
the concept of vastu in Kumarila's Slokavarttika."
Nieuwendijk, Arthur. 1992. "Semantics and Comparative Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 20:377-418.
"The paper takes up the question as to which logical framework is most suitable for a formal interpretation of Navya-Nyāya logic. It is
claimed that, for this purpose, the framework offered by extensional first-order predicate logic is inadequate. This claim is established by discussing three
well-known difficulties: the interpretation of the notion of Jnana, the question whether contraposition is a law of NavyaNyāya logic, and the interpretation of
the Navya-Nyāya scheme of inference. Next, the interrelatedness of these difficulties is pointed out, and, carrying through the analysis, it is examined
whether situation semantics offers a suitable alternative framework."
Oetke, Claus. 1996. "Ancient Indian Logic as a Theory of Non-Monotonic Reasoning." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 24:447-539.
"The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that the most ancient varieties of "Indian logic" are significantly related to theories associated
with the term "non-monotonc logic" in so far as they try to account for reasoning relying on the ability to use general rules subject to exceptions and
indicate a conception of context-dependent validity implying that valid inferences or arguments can lose this status in the context of additional information.
On that background it is possible to give a theoretical justification for a number of features of Indian theories of inference which previously appeared
theoretically ill motivated and which were often explained by historical coincidences."
———. 2003. "Indian Logic and Indian Syllogism." Indo-Iranian Journal no. 46 (1):53-69.
Padmarajiah, Y.J. 1963. A Comparative Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge. Bombay: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal.
Pandey, Sangam Lal. 1974. Pre-Samkara Advaita Philosophy. Allahabad: Darshan Peeth.
Second edition 1983
Pandeya, Ram Chandra. 1963. The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Perrett, Roy W. 1984. "Self-Refutation in Indian Philosophy." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 12 (3):237-264.
———. 1985. "A Note on the Navya-Nyāya Account of Number." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 13:227-234.
"I maintain (contra Ingalls) that the Navya-Nyāya account of number as a property of classes should be understood intensionally, not
extensionally. Such a theory is closer to Frege's earlier views than to Russell's and also has certain advantages over Russell's theory. However it seems that
Navya-Nyāya cannot provide a criterion of identity for such intrinsically intensional properties; and this difficulty is particularly important for
Navya-Nyāya, given its epistemological and metaphysical realism."
———. 1999. "Is Whatever Exists Knowable and Nameable?"Philosophy East and West no. 49 (4):401-414.
"Naiyayikas are fond of a slogan, which often appears as a kind of motto in their texts: "Whatever exists is knowable and nameable". What
does this mean? Is it true? The first part of this essay offers a brief explication of this important Nyāya thesis; the second part argues that, given certain
plausible assumptions, the thesis is demonstrably false."
———, ed. 2001. Indian Philosophy. A Collection of Readings. Vol. I. Epistemology. New York: Garland.
Vol. 1: Epistemology; Vol.2: Logic and philosophy of language; Vol. 3: Metaphysics; Vol. 4: Philosophy of religion; 5. Theory of value.
"Volume 1: Epistemology isconcerned with the nature and scope of Indian pramâna theory, i.e. that part of Indian philosophy
concerned with the nature and sources of knowledge. Indian philosophers developed a causal theory of knowledge and acknowledged the existence of a number of
valid ways of knowing, including perception, inference and testimony. The Indian Pramâna theorists thus discussed many issues that have also occupied
Western epistemologists, often offering importantly different perspectives on these matters. They also sometimes addressed various interesting questions about
knowledge that are unfamiliar to Western epistemologists.
The selections in this volume discuss Indian treatments of epistemological topics like the means of knowledge, realism and anti-realism,
truth, knowledge of knowledge, illusion and perceptual error, knowability, testimony, scepticism and doubt."
———, ed. 2001. Indian Philosophy. A Collection of Readings. Vol. Ii. Philosophy of Language. New York: Garland.
"Volume 2: Logic and Philosophy of Language isconcerned with those parts of Indian pramana theory that Western philosophers
would count as logic and philosophy of language. Indian philosophers and linguists were much concerned with philosophical issues to do with language,
especially with theories of meaning, while the Indian logicians developed both a formalised canonical inference schema and a theory of fallacies. The logic of
the standard Indian inferential model is deductive, but the premises are arrived at inductively. The later Navya-Nyāya logicians went on to develop too a
powerful technical language, an intentional logic of cognitions, which became the language of all serious discourse in India.
The selections in this volume discuss Indian treatments of topics in logic and the philosophy of language like the nature of inference,
negation, necessity, counterfactual reasoning, many-valued logics, theory of meaning, reference and existence, compositionality and contextualism, the
sense-reference distinction, and the nature of the signification relation."
———, ed. 2001. Indian Philosophy. A Collection of Readings. Vol. Iii. Metaphysics. New York: Garland.
"Volume 3: Metaphysics is concerned with the complement to pramana theory, i.e. prameya theory. Whereas the
pramanas are the means of knowledge, the prameyas are the knowables, cognisable entities that constitute the world. With respect to the
number and kinds of such entities, there was a very wide variety of opinion among classical Indian philosophers - including variants of monism, dualism and
pluralism about both entities and kinds. Many metaphysical topics were debated, but two of the most important were causation and the nature of the self. The
competing theories offered about these two issues also raised other questions about the metaphysics of wholes and parts, substances and properties, and
universals and particulars.
The selections in this volume discuss Indian treatments of topics in metaphysics like ontology, constructionalism, universals, negative
facts, mereology, causation, relations, freedom and determinism, and theories of the self."
Perszyk, Kenneth J. 1983. "'Virtue Is Not Blue': Navya-Nyāya and Some Western Views." Journal of Indian Philosophy no.
"The primary aim is to construct, within the Navya-Nyāya system, an analysis of sentences such as 'virtue is not blue', which they would
claim are meaningful. There is a discussion of their important distinction between meaningful sentences and sentences which generate or have the ability to
generate a cognition, and their concept of negation. The secondary aim is to compare their analysis with certain Western philosophers, especially those who
follow the theory of types."
———. 1984. "The Nyāya and Russell on Empty Terms." Philosophy East and West no. 34 (2):131-146.
"The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how the Navya-Nyāya school of Indian philosophy determines the truth or falsity of a sentence
which contains an empty term, and to point out some similarities and differences between its method of analysis and truth-value determinations of such
sentences and that of Bertrand Russell."
———. 1984. "Negative Entities and Negative Facts in Navya-Nyāya." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 12:265-276.
"The purpose of this article is to discuss the Navya-Nyāya's thesis that absence is an ontological category, which is to say that there are
negative entities, and its corollary that there are negative facts. The Nyāya resists all attempts to eliminate negative facts in favour of positive facts. In
addition, we see that no atomic sentence can have a negative subject-term."
Phillips, Stephen H. 1995. Classical Indian Metaphysics. Refutation of Realism and the Emergence of "New Logic". Chicago: Open
———. 2001. "There's Nothing Wrong with Raw Perception: A Response to Chakrabarti's Attack on Nyāya's Nirvikalpaka Pratyaksa." Philosophy East and West no. 51 (1):104-113.
"As part of its direct realism in the epistemology of perception, classical Indian Nyāya posits indeterminate perception where a qualifier is
grasped immediately without being grasped as qualifying its qualificandum, the thing whose property it is. Contemporary philosopher, Arindam Chakrabarti,
argued in Philosophy East and West 50, no. 1 (January 2000) that Nyāya would best eschew such "indeterminate perception." This paper offers a defense drawing
on the classical texts. It is explained in particular that while there is no claim of direct, apperceptive evidence for raw perception, there is an argument
that ties up all verbalizable cognition, including verbalizable perception, as having the qualifier it presents as available through previous experience. But
with a first-time perception of something as, say, a cow, the cognizer's memory not informed by previous cow experience could not possibly provide the
qualifier, cowhood, and the best candidate seems its perception in the raw."
Phillips, Stephen H., and Chakrabarti, Arindam. 2004. Epistemology of Perception: Gangesa's Tattvacintamani, Jewel of Reflection on the
Truth /About Epistemology). The Perception Chapter (Prataksa-Khanda). New York: American Institute of Buddhist Studies.
Transliterated text, translation, and philosophical commentary.
Potter, Karl H. 1954. "Are the Vaisesika "Gunas" Qualities?"Philosophy East and West no. 4 (3):259-264.
———. 1963. Presuppositions of India's Philosophies. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
———, ed. 1970. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 1. Bibliography. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Second revised edition 1983; Third revised edition 1995.
———. 1974. "On the Realistic Proclivities of Navya-Nyāya as Explicated by Bhattacharyya." Philosophy East and West no. 24
———. 1975. "Some Thoughts on the Nyāya Conception of Meaning." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 3:209-216.
———, ed. 1977. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 2. Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology. The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to
Gangesa. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Second edition 1995.
———, ed. 1981. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 3. Advaita Vedanta up to Samkara and His Pupils. Delhi: Motilal
———. 1984. "Does Indian Epistemology Concern Justified True Belief?"Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 12:307-328.
"I endeavor to show that J. N. Mohanty's claim of incommensurability among Indian epistemological theories is based on a justified true
belief account of knowledge; that "Pramanya" doesn't mean truth but rather workability; that Indian theories of knowledge are not predicated on noncognitivism
in values as Western ones are; that the claim incommensurability among Indian epistemological theories is a result of imposing on them shortcomings in
contemporary Western ways of thinking."
———, ed. 1999. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 8. Buddhist Philosophy from 100 to 350 A.D. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
———, ed. 2003. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 9. Buddhist Philosophy from 350 to 600 A.D. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Potter, Karl H., Buswell, Robert Jr., Jaini, Padmanabh S., and Ross, Reat Noble, eds. 1996. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 7.
Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Potter, Karl H., and Sibajiban, Bhattacharyya, eds. 1993. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 6. Indian Philosophical Analysis.
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika from Gangesa to Raghunatha Siromani. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Pradyot, Kumar Mukhopadhyay. 1984. Indian Realism. A Rigorous Descriptive Metaphysics. Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi.
Prasad, Jwala. 1958. History of Indian Epistemology. Delhi: Munshiram Monoharlal.
Prasad, K.S., ed. 2002. The Philosophy of Language in Classical Indian Tradition. New Delhi: Decent Books.
Prets, Ernst. 2001. "Futile and False Rejoinders, Sophistical Arguments and Early Indian Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no.
Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli, and Moore, Charles A., eds. 1957. A Source Book in Indian Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University
Raja, Kunhan C. 1960. Some Fundamental Problems in Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Ranade, Ramachandra Dattatraya. 1926. A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy Being a Systematic Introduction to Indian
Metaphysics. Oriental Book Agency: Oriental Book Agency.
Randle, Herbert Niel. 1930. Indian Logic in the Early Schools. A Study of the Nyāyadarsana in Its Relation to the Early Logic of Other
Schools. London: Oxford University Press.
Reprinted New Delhi, Oriental Books Reprint Corp., 1976.
Rao, K.L.Seshagiri. 1970. "On Truth: A Hindu Perspective." Philosophy East and West no. 20 (4):377-382.
"The article shows how the Hindu tradition and specially Vedanta has come to express its own experience of truth. It views the problem of
truth ontologically: ultimate truth cannot be 'known' like a finite object; it is in fact the 'knower' himself, Atman, the unconditioned being. Both
absolutistic and theistic interpretations of Atman/Brahman are considered. It concludes: truth is spiritual reality, being of our being and the meaning of all
Rastogi, Maharaj Narain. 1983. The Theories of Implication in Indian and Western Philosophy. A Critical Study. Delhi: Bharatiya
Foreword by Irving M. Copi
Ratnakirti, Dhirendra Sharma. 1969. The Differentiation Theory of Meaning in Indian Logic. The Hague: Mouton.
Reyna, Ruth. 1984. Dictionary of Oriental Philosophy. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers.
Riga, Peter J. 1970. "On Truth: A Catholic Perspective." Philosophy East and West no. 20:369-376.
Sastri, Kuppuswami. 1932. A Primer of Indian Logic According to Annambhatta's Tarkasamgraha. Mylapore: The Kuppuswami Sastri
Second edition 1951; Third edition 1961; Fourth edition 1998
Sastri, Pothukuchi Subrahmanya. 1975. Indian Idealism. Epistemology and Ontology. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan.
Scharf, Peter M. 1996. The Denotation of Generic Terms in Ancient Indian Philosophy. Grammar, Nyāya and Mimamsa. Philadelphia:
American Philosophical Society.
Schuster, Nancy. 1972. "Inference in the Vaisesikasutras." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 2:341-386.
"Conflicting statements appear in the Vaisesikasutras about how knowledge of imperceptible entities is attained. Passages from the Sutras are
compared with the Samkhya Sastitantra, the Nyāyasutras, Nyāyabhasya, and other early texts. Impact of the Sastitantra on Vaisesikasutras and Nyāyabhasya was
strong. Contradictions within Vaisesikasutras reveal the compilers' grappling with the Samkhya theory over a period of time. Bias in favor of direct perception
dominates the Vaisesika text."
Seshagiri, Rao K.L. 1970. "On Truth: A Hindu Perspective." Philosophy East and West no. 20:377-382.
Sharma, Chandradhar. 1960. A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy. London: Rider & Company.
Shastri, Dharmendra Nath. 1964. Critique of Indian Realism. A Study of the Conflict between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist Dignaga
School. Agra: Agra University.
———. 1976. The Philosophy of Nyāya Vaisesika and Its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignaga School (a Critique of Indian Realism).
Delhi: Bharatiya Vidy Prakashan.
Third edition 1997.
Shastri, Gaurinath Bhattacharyya. 1959. The Philosophy of Word and Meaning. Some Indian Approaches with Special Reference to the
Philosophy of Bhartrhari. Calcutta: Sanskrit College.
Shaw, Jaysankar Lal. 1978. "The Nyāya on Existence, Knowability and Nameability." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 5:255-266.
"One of the aims of this paper is to discuss the different senses of the term 'existence' as used by the Nyāya philosophers. This discussion
leads us to a discussion on absence or negation and its role in logic. A discussion on empty terms has also been introduced in this context. According to the
Nyāya, existence, knowability and nameability are considered as universal properties. The distinction between these universal properties has been discussed in
this context. I have also discussed the question whether the Nyāya has used redundant terms in designating the same imposed property by using three different
terms. A distinction between different senses of the term 'property' has also been discussed in this context."
———. 1980. "The Nyāya on Cognition and Negation." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 8:279-302.
"The aim of this paper is to discuss the Nyāya concept of negation and the different types of negation. This discussion involves a discussion
of the Nyāya concept of cognition, relation and meaning. The Nyāya has drawn a distinction between qualificative and non-qualificative cognition. A
qualificative cognition can be represented by the form "arb". The Nyāya concept of negation cannot be said to be a term-negation, or a sentence-negation, or a
propositional function negation. The conclusion is that the Nyāya concept of negation does not correspond to any Western concept of negation."
———. 1991. "Universal Sentences: Russell, Wittgenstein, Prior, and the Nyāya." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 19:103-119.
"The aim of this paper is to discuss I) whether the following sentences have the same meaning, II) whether they have the same truth-value,
III) whether there is some assertion common to all of them, and IV) if there is some such assertion, whether it can be defined. 1) all men are mortal, 2)
whoever is a man is mortal, 3) wherever there is humanity, then there is mortality, 4) if anyone is a man, then he is mortal, 5) if humanity is present
somewhere, then mortality is also present there."
———. 2000. "Conditions for Understanding the Meaning of a Sentence: The Nyāya and the Advaita Vedanta." Journal of Indian Philosophy
———. 2003. Some Logical Problems Concerning Existence. Calcutta: Punthi Pustak.
———. 2003. The Nyāya on Meaning: A Commentary on Pandit Visvabandhu. Calcutta: Punthi Pustak.
Siderits, Mark. 1987. "The Sense-Reference Distinction in Indian Philosophy of Language." Journal of Chinese Philosophy no.
———. 1991. Indian Philosophy of Language. Studies in Selected Issues. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Sinha, Jadunath. 1938. Indian Realism. London: Kegan Paul.
Reprint: Dehli, Motilal Banarsidass, 1999.
———. 1952. A History of Indian Philosophy. Calcutta: Sinha Publishing House.
Two volumes: 1952-1956.
Smart, Ninian. 1964. Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy. London: Allen and Unwin.
Reprinted: Atlantic Highland, Humanities Press, 1976; Second revised edition: Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1992.
Staal, Frits. 1973. "The Concept of 'Paksa' in Indian Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 2:156-165.
"The customary assumption that the Indian concepts of hetu, sadhya and paksa correspond to the Aristotelian middle, major and minor terms,
respectively, is incorrect. The concept of paksa is used ambiguously in Indian logic, where it denotes either the term whose property is the sadhya, or the
relation between that term and the sadhya. Another ambiguity of the Sanskrit originals, between paksa as used and paksa as mentioned, is resolved in a Chinese
———. 1975. "The Concept of Metalanguage and Its Indian Background." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 3:315-354.
"In Indian culture the concept of metalanguage originated early in the context of linguistics and speculations on language; in the West, late
in the context of logic. This is related to the grammatical character of Indian culture and the mathematical character of Western culture. Connections are made
between metalinguistic notions and technical, in particular poetic and ritual languages; Mantras; the origin of phonetic writing; communication and
metacommunication among animals and men; and the origin of language."
———. 1988. Universals. Studies in Indian Logic and Linguistics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Taber, John A. 1989. "The Theory of the Sentence in Purva Mimansa and Western Philosophy." Journal of Indian Philosophy no.
"The Mimansa school of Indian philosophy developed two distinct theories of the relation of the meaning of a sentence to the meanings of the
words that comprise it, the Anvitabhidhana or "qualified designation" theory and the Abhihitanvaya or "designated relation" theory. Both of these theories, I
attempt to show, turn on the observation that the meanings of individual words change in different sentences. I go on to suggest that an appreciation of this
fact can lead to a solution of the problem, first raised by Frege, of the change of meaning of terms in intensional contexts."
———. 2004. "Is Indian Logic Nonmonotonic?"Philosophy East and West no. 54 (2):143-170.
"Claus Oetke, in his ''Ancient Indian logic as a theory of non-monotonic reasoning,'' presents a sweeping new interpretation of the early
history of Indian logic. His main proposal is that Indian logic up until Dharmakirti was nonmonotonic in character-similar to some of the newer logics that
have been explored in the field of Artificial Intelligence, such as default logic, which abandon deductive validity as a requirement for formally acceptable
arguments; Dharmakirti, he suggests, was the first to consider that a good argument should be one for which it is not possible for the property
identified as the ''reason'' (hetu) to occur without the property to be proved (sadhya) -- a requirement akin to deductive validity. Oetke's
approach is challenged here, arguing that from the very beginning in India something like monotonic, that is, deductively valid, reasoning was the ideal or
norm, but that the conception of that ideal was continually refined, in that the criteria for determining when it is realized were progressively sharpened"
Tachikawa, Musashi. 1971. "A Sixth-Century Manual of Indian Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 1:111-145.
"This article consists of four parts: explanations of basic technical terms as an introduction, a translation of the Nyāyapravesa, notes to
the translation, and a romanized text based upon Dhruva's edition. This work is Samkarasvamin's introduction to Dignaga's logic, and deals with means of proof,
fallacious means of proof, means of refutation, perception, inference, fallacious perception and fallacious inference."
Tarkatirtha, Visvabandhu. 1991. "The Nyāya on the Meaning of Some Words." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 20:41-88.
Translated by Jaysankar Las Shaw.
"The aim of this paper is to discuss the views of Nyāya philosophers on meaning. This paper deals with the meaning and reference of proper
names, and general terms. It also deals with the meanings of homonymous expressions, and discusses the question whether demonstrative pronouns are homonymous
terms. Different uses of personal pronouns have been mentioned. The section on the quantifier 'all' deals with different uses of it. Similarly, the section on
interrogative pronoun deals with as many as seven uses of an interrogative pronoun. This paper ends with the discussion of the meaning of a sentence."
Tiwari, Heeraman. 1994. "One and Many: The Early Naiyayikas and the Problem of Universals." Journal of Indian Philosophy no.
"The problem of universals in Indian philosophy is as old as c. 400 b. C. In his great work, Astadhyayi, the grammarian Panini introduced the
problem of universals while discussing the meaning of a noun. Later, the Nyāya and Vaisesika systems of Indian philosophy discussed the universals in great
detail. The present article deals with the early Nyāya view of universals. The article is divided in two parts: one gives a brief general introduction to the
problem; the other contains a fresh translation of the Nyāya-Sutras 2.2.58-70 and Vatsyayana's commentary on them. The translation is also supplied with
discussions and analysis. The article tries to demonstrate that the Nyāya system extends the debate about word and meaning which was inaugurated by early
Sanskrit grammarian (viz., Panini, Patanjali etc.)."
Tripathi, R.K. 1969. "The Central Problem of Indian Metaphysics." Philosophy East and West no. 19 (1):39-43.
"The main argument of my article is to show that the question regarding the metaphysical status of relation is the central problem of Indian
metaphysics as it is this that determines the nature of the major systems. four possible alternatives have been discussed: a) relation is as real as the terms
(pluralistic realism like the Nyāya etc.), b) the terms are real but the relation (between Prakrti and Purusa) is false (Samkhya dualism), c) the falsity of
relation means the falsity of one of the terms also (Advaita Vedanta and Vijnanavada), d) the falsity of relation entails the falsity not only of one term but
of both the terms (Madhyamika). I have treated the relation between identity and difference as most basic."
Umesha, Mishra. 1957. History of Indian Philosophy. Allahabad: Tirabhukti Publications.
Vattanky, John. 1993. "The Referent of Words: Universal or Individual, the Controversies between Mimansakas and Naiyayikas." Journal of
"One of the most important problems discussed in Nyāya philosophy of language is whether words denote an individual or a universal. On this
point there are basically two schools of thought which oppose one another, i.e., the Mimansakas and the Naiyayikas. The texts of Muktavali, Dinakari and
Ramarudri dealing with this topic give a brilliant summary of the long drawn out conflict between the two Schools. The authors of these texts established the
Nyāya position that the denotative function of words is in the individual as qualified by the universal and the present essay examines these arguments and
———. 1995. Nyāya Philosophy of Language. Analysis, Text, Translation and Interpretation of Upamana and Sabda Sections of Karikavali,
Muktavali and Dinakari. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.
———. 2003. A System of Indian Logic: The Nyāya Theory of Inference. Analysis, Text, Translation and Interpretation of the Anumana Section
of Karikavali, Muktavali and Dinakari. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
"Nyāya is the most rational and logical of all the classical Indian philosophical systems. In the study of Nyāya philosophy, Karikavali with
its commentary Muktavali, both by Visvanatha Nyāyapancanana, with the commentaries Dinakari and Ramarudri, have been of decisive significance for the last few
centuries as advanced introductions to this subject. The present work concentrates on inference (anumana) in Karikavali, Muktavali and Dinakari, carefully
divided into significant units according to the subject, and translates and interprets them. Its commentary makes use of the primary interpretation in Sanskrit
contained especially in the Ramarudri and Subodhini. The book begins with the Sanskrit texts of Karikavali and Muktavali; followed by English translation of
these texts. Next is given the Sanskrit text of Dinakari which comments on the first two texts, followed by its English translation. Lastly, the book contains
a commentary on all the texts included."
Vidyabhusana, Satis Chandra. 1909. History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic. Calcutta.
Reprint: New Delhi, Oriental Books Reprint Coropration, 1977.
———. 1921. A History of Indian Logic (Ancient, Mediæval and Modern Schools). Calcutta: Calcutta University.
Reprint: Dehli, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2002.
Wada, Toshihiro. 2001. "The Analytical Method of Navya-Nyāya." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 29:519-530.
Wayman, Alex. 1974. "Two Traditions of India -- Truth and Silence." Philosophy East and West no. 24:389-403.
Williams, Paul. 1999. "Indian Philosophy." In Philosophy 2. Further through the Subject, edited by Grayling, Anthony C., 793-847.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zilberman, David B. 1988. The Birth of Meaning in Hindu Thought. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Edited by Robert S. Cohen.
———. 2006. "Analogy in Indian and Western Philosophical Thought." In, edited by Gourko, Helena and Cohen, Robert S. Dordrecht: Springer.
Zimmermann, Francis. 1998. "Le Sens Des Mots Selon Les Logiciens (L'analyse Du Padartha)." Histoire Épistemologie Langage
"A comparison between the analysis of padârtha (the object of the word) by the Nyâya tradition and the Theory of Incorporais by Stoicism
leads us to significantly modify the metaterminology in use among the sanskritists who specialize in the interpretation of Ancient Logic texts. Specifically,
if we make use of the philosophical and grammatical terminology that we have inherited from the Stoicians in order to translate and comment Nyâyasûtra II.
2.58-69, which deal with padârtha, we not only recognize the hierarchy «letter-syllable-word-utterance» that pervaded the whole structure of ancient
grammar, but at the same time we bring to light the realistic and vitalistic ontology (we might call it a physiology of notions) which was the framework within
which the grammatical theory was evolved."