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Alexander of Aphrodisias' logic: Annotated bibliography

Bibliography on Alexander of Aphrodisias

1. Sharples, Robert W. 1975. "Aristotelian and Stoic Conceptions of Necessity in the *De Fato* of Alexander of Aphrodisias." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 20:247–274.
 "I(n chapter IX of his treatise *De fato* Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. 200 A.D.) argues that the occurrence of some things contingently is incompatible with the view of those who say that everything occurs of necessity (174.30-175.2). The whole of this part of the treatise is devoted to pointing out the difficulties in the view those who assert a theory of universal causal determinism; and, just as Alexander claims that those who hold such a view cannot preserve chance or 'what is up to us' except by giving these terms strained and unusual meanings (172.4-16, and cf. 172.20-6; 181.7-12), so here he asserts that the occurrence of some things contingently is incompatible with the assertion that everything occurs of necessity, if the proper, (175.2) sense of 'contingently' is that those things occur contingently which can also not happen (175.2-3)." (pp. 247-248, notes omitted)
2. ———. 1975. "Responsibility, chance, and not-being (Alexander of Aphrodisias *mantissa* 169-172)." *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* no. 22:37–64.
 Abstract: "In this article I propose to give a translation and discussion of a passage(2) which occurs in the so-called second book of the treatise *de anima* by the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. A.D. 200), rechristened *de anima libri mantissa* by the Berlin editor Ivo Bruns. It has frequently been mentioned by scholars discussing Alexander's *de Fato* - references to these discussions will be given in the course of what follows - and has recently been the subject of a special study;(3) but it has not, as far as I am aware, been fully translated into any modern European language.(4)
 It is I think of particular interest. I will first give a translation and then proceed to discuss the passage."
 (2) *Supplementum Aristotelicum* 11.i (ed. I. Bruns, Berlin 1887) 169.33-172.15. (169.34-39 and 170.2-7 are nos. 111 and 76 respectively in A. Gercke, *Chrysippea*, Jahrb. f. Klass. Phil. Supplbd. 14 (1885) 691-781.)
 (3) P. Merlan, "Zwei Untersuchungen zu Alexander von Aphrodisias, I: Eine eigenartige Erklärung des ἐφ' ἡμῖν", *Philol.* 113 (1969) 85-88. On the opening section in particular cf. also P. L. Donini, *Tre Studi sull' aristotelismo nel II secolo d. C.* (Torino 1974) 165-8.
 (4) There is however quite a full paraphrase in French in J. F. Nourrisson, *De la liberté et du hasard: Essai sur Alexandre d'Aphrodise suivi du Traité du Destin*, etc. (Paris 1870) 61-67. There are two Renaissance Latin translations of *de anima II* which include our text, one by Angelus Caninius Anglarensis (Venice 1546 etc.), the other by an as yet unidentified author and extant only in manuscript; cf. F. E. Cranz, "Alexander of Aphrodisias", in P. O. Kristeller, ed., *Catalogus Translationum et Commentariorum*, I 86 and II 412, 414.
3. ———. 1978. "Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Fato*: some Parallels." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 28:243–266.

"As was first pointed out by Gercke,(1) there are close parallels, which clearly suggest a common source, between Apuleius, *de Platone* 1.12,2 the treatise *On Fate* falsely attributed to Plutarch, Calcidius' excursus on fate in his commentary on *Plato's Timaeus*, and certain sections of the treatise *de Natura hominis* by Nemesius." (p. 243, some notes omitted)

(...)

"To elucidate this I propose to discuss various alleged parallels in turn, considering also certain parallels between Alexander and other later authors. (Reference will be made, in addition to the *de fato*, to the last section of the *de anima libri mantissa* attributed to Alexander. This draws on the *de fato* at certain points, but its authenticity is doubtful; I hope to discuss this elsewhere)." (p. 245, note omitted)

(1) A. Gercke, 'Eine platonische Quelle des Neuplatonismus', *RbMus.* 41 (1886), 266-91.

4. ———. 1979. "Dr. John Fell, editor of Alexander of Aphrodisias?" *Liverpool Classical Monthly* no. 4:9–11.
5. ———. 1980. "Alexander of Aphrodisias' second treatment of fate? *De anima libri mantissa*, pp. 179-186 Bruns." *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* no. 27:76–94.

"There are attributed to the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (floruit early 3rd century A.D.) two works concerned with the establishment of an Aristotelian doctrine of fate, εἰσαμμένη. One is his well-known treatise *To the Emperors concerning Fate and Responsibility*; the other is the last section of the collection of passages appended to his treatise *de anima*, named *de anima libri mantissa* by Bruns (mantissa= "worthless addition").(2) The passages in this collection frequently reflect themes found in Alexander's major treatises, and clearly reflect the activity of his school; but in some cases at least it seems that they may be the work of pupils rather than of Alexander himself.(3) In the case of the text that concerns us, however, there seems no strong reason to doubt Alexander's authorship; it is in any case the question of its chronological relationship to the treatise *To the Emperors* that is of most importance, rather than that of its authorship, as will be seen. For convenience' sake I will refer to the author of both works as "Alexander", but this should not be taken as a categorical assertion that they are by the same author. And, for the sake of simplicity, "de fato" will henceforth be used only to refer to the treatise *To the Emperors*, and "mantissa" will, unless otherwise indicated, refer to the last text in that collection, the one with which we are concerned." (p. 76)

(2) Respectively I. Bruns, ed., *Supplementum Aristotelicum* 2.2 (Berlin 1892) 164-212, and id. *Supplementum Aristotelicum* 2.1 (Berlin 1887) 101-186.

(3) See also Bruns 1892 (above, n. 2) i-xiv, especially ix-xii; P. Moraux, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Exegete de la noétique d'Aristote* (Lieège 1942) 19-28, 132-142, "Alexander von Aphrodisias quaest. 2.3", *Hermes* 95 (1967) 161 n. 2, and "Le De Anima dans la tradition grecque", in *Aristotle on Mind and the Senses: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristotelicum*, eds. G.E.R. Lloyd and G.E.L. Owen (Cambridge 1978) 304 f.; P. Merlan, "Zwei Untersuchungen zu Alexander von Aphrodisias", *Philologus* 113 (1969) 85-88; B.C. Bazan, "L'authenticité du de intellectu attribué à Alexandre d'Aphrodise", *Rev. philos. de Louvain* 71 (1973) 476-478; R.W. Sharples, "Responsibility, chance and not-being (Alexander of Aphrodisias mantissa 169-172)", *BICS* 22 (1975) 41 f.
6. ———. 1982. "Alexander of Aphrodisias. Problems about Possibility I." *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* no. 29:91–108.

"The concept of possibility is one that has been of central interest in ancient and modern philosophy alike, not least because of its bearing on the question of determinism and of whether anything could in fact have happened otherwise than it did - or can in fact happen otherwise than it will. One of the most important works in the ancient discussion of determinism and related issues is the treatise *On fate* by the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (floruit ca. 200 A.D.) -

important as a source, even though a biased one, for the determinist position of the Stoics; for the breadth and thoroughness of the way in which it treats the topic, bringing out many important issues; and for its influence on later writers.(1) Among the *quaestiones* attributed to Alexander are a number which relate to the topic of possibility; these have never been translated into English, and in view of the importance of the topic and of their alleged author it seems useful to make them more widely available. Whether any individual passage is by Alexander himself or by a pupil,(2) the aim is the same - to take a case where the apparent implications of an Aristotelian doctrine seem to conflict with our natural assumptions, and to try to resolve the difficulty; this has been a fruitful exercise for philosophers in almost every century from Aristotle's to our own, and there is no little interest in observing the attempts of our predecessors. Accordingly, in this article and in a sequel to appear in *BICS* 30 (1983) I have translated a number of these *questiones*(3). There are also some discussions of possibility in Alexander's commentary on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* which are "questiones" in all but name - indeed, one of them begins "I investigated";(4) these too I have included. And, finally, an important part in ancient discussion of possibility was played by what became known as the debate "Concerning the Possibles"; an important source for this - and one of the earliest - is a passage in Alexander's commentary on the *Prior Analytics*, and I have therefore translated this and some later passages too, as providing an introduction to the whole topic." (p. 91)

(1) See my edition, translation and commentary, Alexander of Aphrodisias: *To the Emperors on Fate and Responsibility*, etc. (forthcoming); and also my "Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato: Some Parallels", *CQ* n.s.

(2) See Bruns, *SA* 2.2 i-xiv; P. Moraux, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Exègète de la noétique d'Aristote* (Liège and Paris 1942) 19-24 (but also his remarks at *Hermes* 95 (1967) 161 n. 2); R.B. Todd, "Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Alexandrian *quaestiones* 2.12", *Philologus* 116 (1972) 293-305.

(3) In this article, *quaestiones* 1.19 and 2.15, and in the sequel 1.18, 1.23, and 2.20. For *quaestio* 1.4, which differs from these in that it is more closely concerned with the place of possibility in a deterministic system, see my article "An ancient dialogue on possibility: Alexander of Aphrodisias, *quaestio* 1.4", *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 64 (1982) 23-38.

(4) Alexander, *in an. pr.* 161.3 (below, section 2).

7. ———. 1982. "Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Time*." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 27:58–81.

"The treatise *On Time* by Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Aristotelian commentator (c.200 A.D.), has never been the subject of any detailed philosophical study, in spite of the interest of its subject matter and the importance of its author. It enables us to see how Aristotle's theory of time was handled and modified by one of the most important of his ancient followers; and it is also of significance as one stage in the series of discussions of time which begins with Plato and continues to the Neoplatonists and beyond.

The Greek original is lost. The work survives in an Arabic translation made by Hunain ibn Ishaq in the ninth century, published by A. Badawi in *Commentaires sur Aristote perdus en grec et autres épîtres* (Beirut 1971; 19-24), and in a Latin translation from the Arabic made by Gerard of Cremona in the twelfth century, published by G. Thery in 'Autour du décret de 1210: II, Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Aperçu sur l'influence de sa noétique' (*Bibliothèque Thomiste* 7, 1926, 92-97). (,,)

I have here translated Gerard's Latin version into English; this is the first English rendering of the treatise to have appeared." (p. 58)

8. ———. 1982. "Alexander of Aphrodisias *On divine providence*: Two problems." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 32:198–211.

"The position on the question of divine providence of the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. A.D. 200) is of particular interest. It marks an attempt to find a *via media* between the Epicurean denial of any divine concern for

the world, on the one hand, and the Stoic view that divine providence governs it in every detail, on the other.(2) As an expression of such a middle course it finds a place in later classifications of views concerning providence.(3) It is also of topical interest: Alexander's fullest discussion, in his treatise *De providentia* (*On Providence*) (surviving only in two Arabic versions), has only recently been edited and translated,(4) although some aspects of his position had long been known from other texts preserved in Greek.(5)" (p. 198)

(2) *De providentia* I. 1-9. 2 Ruland, cf. 31. 11 ff. (cf. Bibliography). All references to this work are by Ruland's pagination, and unless otherwise indicated are to the upper of his two texts; cf. below, n. 14, and nn. 42-4. I should stress that my knowledge of the Arabic versions derives entirely from Ruland's translation and from discussions in the other secondary literature, and that it is on Ruland's German that my translations are based, except where otherwise indicated.

(3) Notably in Maimonides' *Guide of the Perplexed*, 3. 17. I suspect that the position formulated and attacked at *Nemesius de natura hominis* 44, PG 40. 800a ff. Migne, may owe something to Alexander; cf. especially 804a and the objection, peculiarly appropriate against a Peripatetic, brought at 804 b. I hope to discuss this issue more fully elsewhere.

(4) By Ruland; the outlines of the work were however previously known from references in later literature (notably in Maimonides *Guide* 3. 16 and 3. 17) and from modern summaries, especially that by Thillet. Cf. Bibliography.

5 Especially *quaestiones* I. 25 and 2. 21 (cf. Bibliography).

References

H.-J. Ruland, *Die arabischen Fassungen von zwei Schriften des Alexander von Aphrodisias*, diss. Saarbrücken (1976).

P. Thillet, 'Un traité inconnu d' Alexandre d' Aphrodise sur la providence dans une version arabe inédite', in *L'homme et son destin*, Actes du 1er congrès internat. de philos. médiévale (Louvain, 1960), 313-24.

9. ———. 1982. "An Ancient Dialogue on Possibility; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Quaestio* 1.4." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 64:23–38.
"In a series of papers which were of great importance both for modern logic and for the study of ancient logic, the Polish logician Jan Lukasiewicz drew attention to many points concerning the relation between logical considerations and the problem of determinism(1). Three points in particular are relevant to the present paper." (p. 23)
(...)
"All these points, together with many others, are illustrated by the text here translated for the first time, as far as I know, into any modern language. It employs the first of the three points in polemic against determinism; and, by combining it illegitimately with the second, it produces conclusions which are even more paradoxical. And it is in the final section of this text that the view of the Sea-Battle paradox which was Standard in later antiquity makes, as far as I know, its first appearance.
The text is included among the *quaestiones* attributed to the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. 200 A. D.)." (p.24)
10. ———. 1982. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on the compounding of probabilities." *Liverpool Classical Monthly* no. 7:74–75.
11. ———. 1983. "Alexander of Aphrodisias. Problems about Possibility II." *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* no. 30:99–110.
"Conclusion
The interest of these *quaestiones* is twofold. Firstly they are of interest as historical documents, for the evidence they provide of the development of ideas and for their relation to the works of thinkers both earlier and later. But, secondly, they are of interest as attempts to clarify thought on the topics with which they are concerned, and to remove difficulties. And in this respect we can see them as essentially

engaged on similar tasks to ourselves today; for it is a feature of the history of philosophy that the historical and the timeless aspects are always combined in it. The basic questions remain the same; and answers are not necessarily either better or worse because they are more recent, though it is true that those who come later can profit by the experience- and the mistakes! - of their predecessors. That in itself, however, is sufficient justification for the study of the history of philosophy. If we criticise the attempts of our predecessors to answer certain questions, that is not to be taken as an assertion that we can necessarily answer them any better; but rather as a hope that others may learn by comparing our predecessors' solutions and our criticisms, and thus be enabled to improve on us both." (p. 106, a note omitted)

12. ———. 1983. "The unmoved mover and the motion of the heavens in Alexander of Aphrodisias." *Apeiron* no. 17:62–66.
"In the *De caelo* Aristotle argued that the heavenly spheres move with a circular motion because it is their nature to do so.(1) But in other works he explains their continuous circular motion by their desire directed towards the Unmoved Mover.(2) Modern scholars have debated whether these two explanations represent two different and incompatible stages in Aristotle's development, or whether, on the contrary, the latter is a completion, rather than a contradiction, of the former.(3) And a related question is whether Aristotle throughout held that the heavenly spheres had souls (as the theory of the Unmoved Mover, at least, requires), or whether there was a stage in his thought when he regarded them as moved only by their own inanimate nature.(4)" (p. 62)
(1) *De caelo* 1.2, especially 269 a 5ff., 30ff.; cf. 2.1 284 a 27ff.
(2) *Metaph.* A 7 1072 a 23 - b 13; cf. *Physics* 8.5-6.
(3) Compatible stages: H. von Arnim, *Die Entstehung der Gotteslehre des Aristoteles* (Vienna, 1931), 10f. Completion rather than contradiction: for example, W.K.C. Guthrie, *The Development of Aristotle's Theology*, I, CQ 27 (1933), 167, and introduction to *Aristotle: On the Heavens* (Loeb, 1939), especially xviii, xxx; W.D. Ross, *Aristotle's Physics* (Oxford, 1936) 94-100, especially 98.
(4) Ross, *op. cit.* 97f.; Guthrie, *introduction to Aristotle: On the Heavens*, xxxi-xxxvi. E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* 3. 14 (Leipzig, 1903) 827f. n.5 regarded the doctrine of an ensouled heaven as altogether un-Aristotelian; but cf. *De caelo* 2.2 258 a 29, 2.12 292 a 18-21, and W.D. Ross, *Aristotle: Metaphysics* (Oxford, 1924) cxxxvi f.
13. ———. 1985. "Ambiguity and opposition: Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Ethical Problems*, 11." *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* no. 32:109–116.
The eleventh of the *Ethical Problems* attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias is one of a number of items in this collection which are concerned with questions relating to voluntary and involuntary action, and thus with discussions in the first half of the third book of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. Problem 11 differs from the others in this group, however, in that its immediate concern is with an issue of logic, rather than of ethical philosophy. And it is of particular interest for two reasons.
Firstly, from the historical point of view, the issue with which this text is concerned, that of whether one of a pair of opposites can have several senses if the other does not, is one that exercised both other commentators on the *Ethics* and also Alexander himself in his commentary on Aristotle's *Topics*. It therefore gives us the opportunity of tracing the discussion of a particular theme in Peripatetic philosophy, and what is more of doing so in the earliest period from which we have first-hand evidence for the Aristotelian commentators.
(...)
Secondly, from the philosophical point of view, the issue discussed in this text relates to the wider one of when it is and is not correct to say that a term is used in two different senses. That was an issue which Aristotle himself did much to clarify; as what follows will show, it continued to be discussed in later antiquity and in Islamic philosophy; and it is still a topic of debate among philosophers and philosophers of science at the present day." (p. 109, notes omitted)

14. ———. 1987. "Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation." In *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, vol. 36.2: *Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. II. Teilband: Philosophie (Platonismus, [Forts.]; Aristotelismus)*, edited by Haase, Wolfgang, 1176–1243. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. "A particular difficulty for our study is the almost complete loss of the relevant literature. This is in large measure due to the character of that literature, much of which consisted of commentaries on Aristotle's works or discussions of problems arising out of them. Such writings were by their very nature liable to be superseded as each generation reread Aristotle in the light of its own needs and preoccupations. The only writings by professed Aristotelians of this era to have survived in their original form are a commentary on parts of the 'Nicomachean Ethics' by Aspasius (second century AD) and the 'De mundo' wrongly attributed to Aristotle himself, to which one can doubtfully add the pseudo-Aristotelian 'De virtutibus et vitiis' with its doublet, falsely ascribed to Andronicus of Rhodes. In addition two treatises by Nicolaus of Damascus, originally perhaps parts of the same work, have survived through being translated into Syriac or Arabic. Besides these we only have fragments quoted by later writers; the chief sources are the commentaries on Aristotle's works written by Alexander of Aphrodisias in the third century and by Ammonius (the son of Hermias), Philoponus and Simplicius in the fifth and sixth. The last-named is especially generous with quotations and sometimes gives a synopsis of the views of earlier interpreters on particular problems; the introduction of his commentary on the 'Categories' (pp. 1-2) includes a survey of the work of earlier commentators. The information they provide is sufficient to give us an idea of the problems which interested the earlier Aristotelians and the kind of answer they gave, but usually not to reconstruct their arguments in full." (p. 1080, notes omitted)
15. ———. 1987. "Could Alexander (follower of Aristotle) Have Done Better? A Response to Professor Frede and Others." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 5:197–216.
 "In her article 'Could Paris (son of Priam)(1) Have Chosen Otherwise(2) Professor Dorothea Frede, discussing my edition of Alexander of Aphrodisias' *de Fato*(3), raises issues which deserve further discussion.
 So too has Professor Nicholas White.(4) The points they make have a bearing on general questions of method in the study of ancient philosophy, and are worth discussing for that reason as well as for their own intrinsic interest." (p. 197)
 (1) Paris was also known as Alexander; so Alexander (of Aphrodisias), *de Fato* XVI. 187. 16 Bruns.
 (2) *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, II (Oxford 1984), 279-92; henceforth cited as 'Frede'. Cf. also her article 'The dramatisation of determinism', *Phronesis*, XXVII (1982), 276-98. I do not understand Frede's reference on 285 n 13 of her *Oxford Studies* article to my views on Ch. XXXV of *de Fato*.
 (3) London (Duckworth) 1983. Since the publication of this the Budé edition by Professor Pierre Thillet has also appeared (Paris, 1984; cf. my review of this at *Classical Review* 36 (1986) 33-35).
 (4) *Philosophical Review (PhRev)*, XCIV (1984), 31.
16. ———. 1989. "The Criterion of Truth in Philo Judaeus, Alcinous and Alexander of Aphrodisias." In *The Criterion of Truth: Essays in honour of George Kerferd*, edited by Huby, Pamela and Neal, Gordon, 231–256. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
 "In this paper I propose to examine the views of three figures from this period on one of the major questions of post-Aristotelian and perhaps of all philosophy, that of the criterion of truth, or the source of our knowledge. It gives me great pleasure to offer this study to George Kerferd, one of the leading ancient philosophy specialists of our day and a personal friend, as a contribution to his *Festschrift*." (p. 231)
 (...)

"There is as a matter of fact some evidence for Alexander's interest in contemporary Platonism, and there is also evidence which suggests that he did hold that God had awareness of earthly things, at least in universal terms. But there is no suggestion of this idea either in *On the Soul* (where the objects of the Supreme Intelligible's thought seem to be the other Unmoved Movers) or in *On the Intellect*; and thus it does not seem that the Active Intellect can be described as in any real sense a criterion of truth for Alexander." (p. 243, note omitted)

17. ———. 1994. "On Body, Soul and Generation in Alexander of Aphrodisias." *Apeiron* no. 27:163–170.

"The Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (c.200 AD) has been criticised for defining soul as the product of the mixture of the bodily elements, a view which has been criticised for making form dependent on matter rather than the reverse and for being un-Aristotelian in doing so. Alexander's account of soul in his treatise *de Anima* works upwards from the simple bodies or 'elements' to progressively more complex compounds, of which living creatures are the most complex. This approach certainly suggests that form is something that emerges from or supervenes upon arrangements of matter. But it is one thing to recognise that Alexander's emphasis is different from Aristotle's, and another to suggest that his views are actually inconsistent with Aristotle's. Even while developing this analysis, Alexander insists that it is the form of each thing that determines its nature and argues that form (and matter) are substances in their own right, not just because they are parts of the composite substance. And a number of texts attributed to Alexander⁶ argue that soul is not in body 'as in a substrate', that is in the way in which one thing can be in another separately existing thing; for the organic body of which soul is the form cannot exist as such in the first place without soul." (pp. 164-165, notes omitted)

(...)

"However, Aristotle himself asserts that 'a human being is produced by a human being and the sun.'³⁰ The combination of the two causes, the heavenly movement and the father, is present in Aristotle himself; there is no need to suppose that Alexander saw them as alternatives or that he did anything other than combine them in Aristotelian fashion." (p. 170)

(30) Aristotle, *Physics* II 2,194b13; cf. Metaph A 5 1071a15 and GA [*Generazione Animalium*] IV 10,777b35.

18. ———. 1998. "Alexander and pseudo-Alexanders of Aphrodisias, Scripta minima: Questions and Problems, makeweights and prospects." In *Gattungen wissenschaftlicher Literatur in der Antike*, edited by Kullmann, Wolfgang, Althoff, Jochen and Asper, Markus, 383–403. Tübingen: Narr.

"The works attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias, who lived and worked at the end of the second century A.D. and the beginning of the third, are conventionally divided into two groups. First there are the commentaries on works of Aristotle, of which five (on *Prior Analytics I*, *Topics*, *Meteorology*, *On Sensation* and *Metaphysics A-Δ*) survive in whole or in part; in addition, extensive parts of the *Physics* commentary have recently been discovered by Marwan Rashed in the margins of a Paris MS.(2) Other commentaries are known from secondary reports. Of the remainder of the works attributed to Alexander, most of what survives in Greek was edited by Ivo Bruns in two fascicles of the *Supplementum Aristotelicum* which accompanied the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*.(3)

These scripta minora can however be further divided into two groups. There are the major treatises, Alexander's work *On the Soul* occupying 100 quarto pages in the standard edition, for example, the treatise *On Fate* approximately half that. And there are also collections of minor texts.(4) It is the latter that I have labelled *scripta minima* for the purposes of this discussion."(p. 383)

(2) Parisinus supp. gr. 643. M. Rashed, Alexandre d'Aphrodise et la "Magna Quaestio": Rôle et indépendance des scholies dans la tradition byzantine du corpus aristotelicien, *Les Etudes Classiques* 63, 1995, 295-351; id., A "new" text of

- Alexander on the Soul's Motion, in: R. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle and After*, London 1997.
- (3) *Supplementum Aristotelicum* 2.i (Berlin 1887) and 2.ii (1892).
- (4) There is good reason to think that there were once other such collections now lost. Cf. the reference to σκολιά λογικά at Alexander, In an. pr. 250.2; on the "explanation and summary of certain passages from (Aristotle's) On sensation and what is sensed" referred to in a scholion on *Quaest.* 1.2 (Sharples, below, n. 10, 1196-7), see further below, n. 96.
- (10) R.W. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation, *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, vol. II.36.1 (Berlin 1987), 1176-1243,
19. ———. 1999. "On being a τόδε τι in Aristotle and Alexander." *Méthexis* no. 12:77–87.
 "For Aristotle, what primarily exists is individual substances. These substances are indeed, with the exception of the unmoved movers of the heavenly spheres, compounds of form and matter, and they have form in virtue of being members of species.(2)" (p. 77)
 (...)
 "Perhaps, then, consideration of the first section of the *mantissa* attributed to Alexander may lead us to question whether *Notes on Eta and Theta* are right in holding that "to say that ... fire is not τόδε τι ['this-something'] is not to say that it is a stuff without qualities or attributes, but that it is not a reidentifiable something" (my emphasis).(39)
 Rather, the criteria for being a τόδε τι may sometimes after all have to do with definability rather than with reidentifiability. As Charlton indeed remarks in the passage quoted in § 1 above, "The phrase T68E Tt may sometimes mean rather 'a particular sort of thing' than 'a particular individual'. (40)
 (2) At least according to one reading of Aristotle, which the writings attributed to Alexander follow. Cf. R.W. Sharples, "Species, Form and Inheritance: Aristotle and After", in A. Gotthelf (ed.), *Aristotle on Nature and living things: philosophical studies presented to David M. Balme*, Pittsburgh: Mathesis, 1986, 117-128.
 (5) *Notes on Eta and Theta of Aristotle's Metaphysics*, recorded by Myles Bumyeat and others, Oxford: Sub-Faculty of Philosophy, 1984, 131-2, on Metaphysics e 7, 1049a18-b2 (below, at n.25).(...)
 (7) W. Charlton, "Aristotle on Identity", in T. Scaltsas, D. Charles and M.L. Gill (eds.), *Unity, Identity and Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, at 48-49. (...)
 (39) Above, n. S.
 (40) Above, n. 7.
20. ———. 1999. "The Peripatetic School." In *Routledge History of Philosophy. Volume II: From Aristotle to Augustine*, edited by Furley, Davd, 147–187.
 "The history of Aristotelianism as a separate tradition in the ancient world comes to an end with Alexander and Themistius. Part of the reason for Alexander's having no distinguished followers in his own school is undoubtedly the decline in interest in formal higher education in the third century by contrast with the second. But that does not on its own explain why Aristotelianism declined where Platonism did not. Once again, as in the third century BC, the lack of a distinctive doctrinal appeal may have played a part; where Platonism had a radical and distinctive message, Aristotelianism appealed to scholars and, on a different level, to common sense. The difference was that, where Aristotelianism in the Hellenistic period lacked a distinctive identity except in so far as the pursuit of enquiry itself provided one, the revived Aristotelianism of the Empire was limited in its scope by being too closely tied to the exposition of the Aristotelian texts. More might indeed have been made of those texts and their implications; but if Alexander had developed his ideas concerning intellect further, he would, as already indicated, have been adopting a position not unlike that of the Neoplatonists themselves." (p. 168)

21. ———. 2000. "Alexander of Aphrodisias *Quaestio* 2.21: a question of authenticity." *Elenchos* no. 21:361–379.
22. ———. 2000. "The unity of the virtues in Aristotle, in Alexander of Aphrodisias, and in the Byzantine commentators." *Etica e Politica*:1–20.
Abstract: "Aristotle's argument in *Nicomachean Ethics* 6 for the mutual implication of the virtues by one another is developed, and others added to it, in a repertory of arguments for this thesis in section 18 of the *De anima libri mantissa* (Supplement to the Book On the Soul) attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias. The last part of this is echoed in no.22 of the *Ethical Problems* attributed to Alexander; nos. 8 and 28 of the same collection are also relevant. A distinction can be drawn between the mutual implication of the virtues and the unity of virtue in some stronger sense; the arguments in the texts attributed to Alexander are examined to see whether they imply the latter more clearly than Aristotle's own argument does, and the conclusion is drawn that some do so because of the use they make of the conception of the noble as the goal of virtuous action, or of virtue as a whole of parts. The treatment of Aristotle's argument in the Byzantine commentaries is characterised by a preoccupation with the special status of practical wisdom."
23. ———. 2002. "Aristotelian Theology After Aristotle." In *Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, Its Background and Aftermath*, edited by Frede, Dorothea and Laks, André, 1–40. Leiden: Brill.
"There has been no shortage of discussion among modern scholars as to just what Aristotle's own views on god were. I cannot hope to reproduce that whole debate here, let alone develop it further. The identification of certain central questions will here be purely preliminary to consideration of how these are reflected in discussions of Aristotle's views in the subsequent half-millennium. On a strict interpretation of "Hellenistic philosophy" it is indeed only the first three of those five centuries that are strictly relevant. However, interpretations of Aristotle's position from the first two centuries of the Roman Empire reflect those developed in the Hellenistic period; and the views developed by Alexander of Aphrodisias and his school around the turn of the third century A.D., much more fully documented than what had preceded, are developments of, and reactions to, the preceding debate.(5) Moreover, in terms of the contrast between Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic theology developed by Runia [*] elsewhere in this volume, Alexander's treatment, just because it keeps so closely to the Aristotelian texts and the problems they raise, falls on the "Hellenistic" side of the divide, in spite of its later date." (p. 2)
[*] *The beginnings of the end: Philo of Alexandria and Hellenistic Theology*, pp. 281–316.
(5) On the general history of the Peripatetic school in the Hellenistic period see Wehrli, F., 'Der Peripatos bis zum Beginn der römischen Kaiserzeit', in: Flashar, H., ed., *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, begründet von Friedrich Ueberweg: *Die Philosophie der Antike*, 3, Basel: Schwabe, 1983, 459–599; in the Imperial period, Moraux 1973, id. 1984, and Gottschalk 1987. I have attempted an overview of the entire period in 'The Peripatetic School', in D.J. Furley, ed., *From Aristotle to Augustine*, London: Routledge 1999 (Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. 2), 147–187.
References
Gottschalk, H.B., 'Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World from the Time of Cicero to the End of the Second Century A.D.', in *ANRW* II 36.2 (1987), 1079–1174.
Moraux, P., *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen I*, Berlin 1973.
——— *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen II*, Berlin 1984.
24. ———. 2002. "Alexander of Aphrodisias and the End of Aristotelian Theology." In *Metaphysik und Religion: zur Signatur des spätantiken Denkens. Akten des Internationalen Kongresses vom 13.-17. März 2001 in Würzburg*, edited by Kobusch, Theo and Erler, Michael, 1–21. München · Leipzig: K. G. Saur.

"This paper will be concerned with two distinct though related aspects of Alexander's thought about the divine; firstly the nature of god's own intellectual activity and of the connection between his thinking and ours; second that of the sense in which and extent to which the universe is for Alexander governed by divine providence. The connection between the two points in terms of the genesis of Alexander's own position is indirect(4): he is, as we shall see, prompted to construct an "Aristotelian" theory of providence by the need to defend Aristotelianism against attack, and is very probably influenced in the way in which he does so by the fact that he regards the *De mundo* as a genuine Aristotelian work(5).

Since for Alexander providence is the result of the movement of the heavens itself caused by their desire for the Unmoved Mover, its effects - though not, as we shall see, its status as providence - are completely independent of the question whether or not the Unmoved Mover is itself aware of the world.

(...)

The second point to be emphasised at the outset is that, especially on the first topic but also on the second, the nature of our sources is in various ways less than satisfactory; it is a matter of piecing together an account from various pieces of information, and many of the questions that we would like to have answered must remain unanswered." (p. 2)

(4) I am grateful to Daniel Schulthess for pressing the need to clarify this point.

(5) Cf. Moraux, *Alexander von Aphrodisias Quaest. 2.3* 160 n. 2; Sharpies, *Quaestiones 1.1-2.15* 94 n. 307.

References

Moraux, P., *Alexander von Aphrodisias Quaest. 2.3*, in: *Hermes* 95 (1967) 159-169.
Sharpies, R.W., *Alexander of Aphrodisias: Quaestiones 1.1-2.15*, London 1992.

25. ———. 2003. "Threefold providence: the history and background of a doctrine." *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement* no. 78:107–127.

"Three texts from antiquity preserve a distinctive classification of providence into three levels. In probable order of composition it appears in the work *De Platone* attributed to Apuleius (fl. c.160 AD), in the treatise *De fato* attributed to Plutarch but certainly not by him, and in the treatise *De natura hominis* by Nemesius of Emesa (c.400 AD)." (p. 107)

(...)

"The doctrine found in these texts is clearly and explicitly derived from Plato's dialogues; in particular, the distinction between primary and secondary providences is based on that at *Timaeus* 41c and 42e between the creation carried out by the Demiurge himself and the part of it that he delegates to the secondary gods, and the notion of an aspect of providence concerned with human affairs is based on *Timaeus* 42e, though the specific link with *daemones* derives from other texts." (p. 109, notes omitted)

(...)

"The present paper will therefore attempt to examine some of these in order to put the Platonist doctrines into their intellectual context; it will also attempt a partial classification of some views concerning providence held in the late Hellenistic and Roman periods, with a view both to clarification of the Platonist texts and to the larger project of a history of ancient theories of providence."(p. 110)

26. ———. 2003. "Pseudo-Alexander on Aristotle, *Metaphysics Lambda*." In *Alessandro di Afrodizia e la 'Metafisica' di Aristotele*, edited by Movia, Giancarlo, 187–218. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.

Conclusion

What then can we regard as established concerning the author of the pseudo-Alexander commentary on Λ ?

1. He is neither identical with the genuine Alexander, nor did he use the genuine Alexander's commentary.

2. There are reasons to suppose that he used, and therefore wrote later than, both Simplicius and the *De intellectu* attributed to Alexander.

3. On some of the issues which are most controversial today in the interpretation of Λ , or of Aristotle's thought generally (notably the nature of the Unmoved Mover's thinking in the first case, and the question of individual forms in the second) pseudo-Alexander follows the Aristotelian text so closely that it is difficult to attribute to him any definite position. Similarly on issues which had already been topics of discussion, such as the relation between Unmoved Movers and sphere-souls, pseudo-Alexander follows Aristotle's text closely without consideration of alternative views.
 4. Pseudo-Alexander is influenced by Platonism but does not regard himself as a Platonist.
 5. Contrasts drawn between the naturalism of Alexander and the mysticism of pseudo-Alexander have rested on a one-sided reading of the former and have involved a failure to recognise passages in the latter borrowed directly from the former." (p. 214)
27. ———. 2004. "Alexander of Aphrodisias: What is a Mantissa?" In *Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries (Vol. One)*, edited by Adamson, Peter, Baltussen, Han and Stone, M.W.F., 51–69. London: Institute of Classical Studies, University of London.
 "Conclusion
 The answers to many questions about the *Mantissa* remain obscure; the origins of some of the arguments the texts contain, the circumstances in which the collection was assembled, and the earlier stages of its transmission before the copying of V, our earliest extant MS. It is to be hoped however that even the foregoing brief discussion will have helped to show the interest of the material contained in the collection, and its relevance to the study of Alexander's thought, and thus to an important stage in the transmission of Aristotelian philosophy to the commentators of late antiquity." (p. 66)
 28. ———. 2005. "Implications of the new Alexander of Aphrodisias inscription." *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* no. 48:47–56.
 Abstract: "Abstract The new inscription dedicated to his father by the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias does not help us in establishing his dates more precisely. It does, however, show conclusively for the first time that his post was at Athens, and strongly suggests that at the end of the second century AD the term diadokhos 'successor' was applied to the imperially appointed holders of the chairs of philosophy at Athens. It also provides us with a possible candidate for the authorship of works attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias but not apparently by him, notably *On fevers*."
 29. ———. 2005. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on universals: two problematic texts." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 50:43–55.
 Abstract: "Two texts that raise problems for Alexander of Aphrodisias' theory of universals are examined. *De anima* 90.2-8 appears to suggest that universals are dependent on thought for their existence; this raises questions about the status both of universals and of forms. It is suggested that the passage is best interpreted as indicating that universals are dependent on thought only for their being recognised as universals. The last sentence of *Quaestio* 1.11 seems to assert that if the universal did not exist no individual would exist, thereby contradicting Alexander's position elsewhere. This seems to be a slip resulting from the fact that species with only one member are the exception rather than the rule."
 30. ———. 2005. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Nature and Location of Vision." In *Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought: Themes from the work of Richard Sorabji*, edited by Salles, Ricardo, 345–362. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
 "The so-called second book of the treatise *On the Soul (De anima)* by Alexander of Aphrodisias is a collection of short discussions on a range of topics, more or less closely connected with psychology. Since 1887 it has commonly been known by the title *Mantissa* given to it by its editor Ivo Bruns, *Mantissa* originally being an Etruscan word meaning a makeweight, something the trader puts in to balance up

the scales. One sequence of discussions in the *Mantissa*, §§9–14, consists of a series of refutations of non-Aristotelian theories of vision, followed in §15 by an exposition of Aristotelian doctrine and in §16 by a discussion of the Aristotelian account of colour. I have attempted to say something about the relations of these texts to one another, and also to Alexander's commentary on Aristotle's *On Sensation* (*De sensu*), in an earlier paper.(2)

Vision is also discussed by Alexander in the first book of his treatise, *De anima*, which, unlike the *Mantissa*, is a single and self-contained discussion, structured in a similar way to Aristotle's own treatise *De anima*.

The topic of vision was one in which Alexander's teacher Sosigenes had a special interest, writing a work *On Vision* in at least eight books.(4)" (pp. 345-346, some notes omitted)

(2) R. W. Sharples, 'Alexander and pseudo-Alexanders of Aphrodisias, scripta minima. Questions and Problems, Makeweights and Prospects' ['Alexander and pseudo-Alexanders'], in W. Kullmann, J. Althoff, and M. Asper (eds.), *Gattungen wissenschaftlicher Literatur in der Antike* (ScriptOralia 95) (Tübingen: Gunter Narr, 1998), 383–403.

(4) Alexander, *In meteor.* 143.12–14, cf. Themistius, *In de an.* 61.23–4; P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, ii (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984), 359.

31. ———. 2005. "An Aristotelian commentator on the naturalness of justice." In *Virtue, Norms, and Objectivity: Issues in Ancient and Modern Ethics*, edited by Gill, Christopher, 279–293. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
"The question of whether justice or 'what is right', *dikaiousunê* or *to dikaion*,(1) is a matter of nature or convention is a central one in ancient Greek thought from the time of the Sophists onwards. It has a particular importance in the context of ancient eudaimonistic ethics. Justice in the more general sense of the term is, Aristotle argues, the aspect of virtue concerned with our behaviour towards other people;(2) and in a system of thought which assumes, as ancient eudaimonistic ethics does, that I should act in my own true self-interest, the question whether and why it is in my own interest to treat other people justly is nothing less than the question of the basis of morality." (p. 279)
(...)
"The text we shall be considering also shows how an interpreter or interpreters of Aristotle could draw upon the different and more universal perspectives and agendas of Hellenistic philosophy.
This text is §19 of a collection transmitted in the MSS as Book 2 of the treatise *On the Soul* by the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. ad 200), and labelled *Mantissa* ('makeweight' or 'supplement') by its nineteenth-century editor Ivo Bruns." (pp. 281-282, a note omitted)
(1) The Greek terms cover the meanings of both the English ones; indeed, 'general' justice as described by Aristotle is close to the archaic English 'righteousness'. In the major part of this chapter, 'right' and 'just(ice)' should both be understood as translating the Greek terms as they apply to actions. The connection is that performance of 'just' actions is a necessary, though not in Aristotle's view sufficient, condition for being a 'just' person (*EN* 2.4, 1105b5–9).
(2) *EN* 5.1, 1129b25–30.
32. ———. 2007. "Peripatetics on fate and providence." *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement* no. 94:595–605.
"Issues relating to fate and providence are not prominent among Peripatetics of as far as our evidence goes; it is Alexander of Aphrodisias who really develops themes as far as the Peripatetic tradition is concerned. Nevertheless, earlier views examination, for this enables us to assess, in so far as the evidence allows, what found in the tradition of his school, and is also relevant to consideration of interaction between the Peripatetics and other schools. Both topics are prime examples of Aristotle did not himself discuss as such, but where Peripatetics found themselves formulate positions for him to match those of other philosophical schools." (p. 595)

33. ———. 2010. "Peripatetics." In *The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity: Volume I* edited by Gerson, Lloyd P., 140–160. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 "What, finally, did later ancient philosophy take from the Peripatetic tradition? The answer must be, in the first instance, interpretations of Aristotle's text, since some of his works continued to be part of the standard Platonist philosophical curriculum. But beyond that, the philosophical agenda continued to be influenced by the issues that concerned the Peripatetics discussed in this chapter; and they provided later thinkers with ideas to incorporate (as with the notion of the divine intellect making use of our intellects), or to react against (as with arguments for the mortality of the human soul)." (p. 160, a note omitted)
34. ———. 2012. "Alexander on *Physics* 2.9." *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* no. 55:19–30.
 Abstract: "In this paper, Bob Sharples considers a report regarding Alexander in Simplicius' *Physics* commentary, which touches on the problem of hypothetical necessity and how it relates to unqualified necessity. Simplicius seems to think that for Alexander, necessity imposed by matter is not purposive. This is why bricks do not necessarily give rise to a brick house. He here exploits the genuinely Aristotelian idea that form and end account for the matter, rather than vice versa; yet Alexander will have been motivated also by his opposition to the Stoics."
35. ———. 2016. "The school of Alexander?" In *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence*, edited by Sorabji, Richard, 89–118. New York: Bloomsbury.
 Second revised edition. First edition London: Duckworth 1990, pp. 83–111.
 "It is not my concern here to give a full enumeration of the works attributed to Alexander or to classify them in detail. That has been done elsewhere both by myself and by others. Rather, I will proceed to a discussion of what the works can tell us about the context in which they arose. It will be helpful to start with consideration of the relation of Alexander's works to those of his predecessors, teachers and contemporaries." (p. 91)
 (...)
 "The impression given by the writings attributed to Alexander is one of lively philosophical discussion. The opinions of his predecessors and of his near contemporaries from other philosophical schools play a part in this; but it is difficult to believe that some at least of the texts here considered do not reflect the activity of Alexander's own philosophical school. This makes it all the more odd that we know so little about any pupils of Alexander, and that as far as our information goes he seems to mark the end of a distinctive and continuous Peripatetic tradition." (pp. 117–118)
36. Sirkel, Riin. 2011. "Alexander of Aphrodisias's Account of Universals and Its Problems." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 49:297–314.
 "The aim of this paper is to explore Alexander's account of universals, the difficulties it entails and the possible solutions to those difficulties. I focus on presenting a broad picture of Alexander without delving into particular and often controversial interpretive issues. I begin by analyzing the Aristotelian definition of a universal as that which is predicated of many things. In the second part of the paper, I will outline Alexander's distinction between being a form and being a universal, as I understand it. In the third and fourth parts, I consider two problems this distinction introduces, viz. the problem about the ontological status of the form, and that of the universal. In the last part of the paper, I will briefly examine Boethius's solution to the problem of universals, which he claims to take from Alexander, and which clarifies some of the problems raised by Alexander's account." (p. 298)
37. Sorabji, Richard. 2017. "A Neglected Strategy of the Aristotelian Alexander on Necessity and Responsibility." In *Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows*, edited by Harte, Verity and Woolf, Raphael, 240–256. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"A justly influential author, Michael Frede, has treated as an orthodoxy, needing no discussion, an interpretation of Alexander, put forward earlier in an objective spirit, in a seminal article by Susanne Bobzien(1).

She discussed the Stoics' opponent, Alexander of Aphrodisias, who held the Aristotelian chair in Athens 500 years after Aristotle's death, at or soon after 200 AD. He was the greatest defender of Aristotelianism, and at a time when Aristotelianism needed defending against the refurbished versions of Stoicism and Platonism. Her interpretation of Alexander on this subject has now been treated not only as an orthodoxy, but as a ground for a sustained onslaught on Alexander as caught in a hopeless tangle, which will, I am afraid, mislead some readers, if nothing is said on the other side. I will draw attention to two small passages of Alexander, mentioned but not discussed in Bobzien's enlightening treatment, which I think may suggest that he had an entirely different strategy. I also disagree with the other objections raised against Alexander, and will try to fill out the picture of his approach, as I see it. But first I should give the context of Bobzien's interpretation; I will come to what I think is a mistaken use of her interpretation later." (p, 240)

(1) Bobzien 1998a (=Sorabji 2016: 125–59).

References

Bobzien, S. (1998a) 'The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free Will Problem', *Phronesis* 43: 133–75. Reprinted in Sorabji 2016: 125–59.

Sorabji, R. (ed.) (2016) *Aristotle Re-Interpreted: New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators*. London.

38. ———. 2023. "Philoponus and Alexander in Historical Context on Relations between Matter and Form Inside and Outside Philosophy of Mind." In *The History of Hylomorphism: From Aristotle to Descartes*, edited by Charles, David, 245–254. New York: Oxford University Press.

"John Philoponus, the Christian commentator on Aristotle in Alexandria of the 6th century CE, elucidated several relations between matter and form, most of them, but not all, from the context of philosophy of mind. He drew several of these relations from discussions by earlier philosophers. The soul or its activities had been said to be a harmony or blend of bodily items, or else to *follow* such a blend or harmony, or to *supervene* on it. I think I can now explain Philoponus' contribution better than before.(1)" (p. 245)

(1) My previous contributions on Philoponus were in Sorabji (2000: ch. 7, 2003: ch. 7, 2005: 199–203, 2010: 33–4).

References

Sorabji, R. (1987), 'Mind-Body Relation', in R. Sorabji, ed., *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science*, London (see also Sorabji 2010).

Sorabji, R. (2000), *Emotion and Peace of Mind*, Oxford.

Sorabji, R. (2003), 'The Mind-Body Relation in the Wake of Plato's Timaeus', in G. Reydam-Schils, ed., *Plato's Timaeus as Cultural Icon*, Notre Dame, 152–62.

Sorabji, R. (2005), *The Philosophy of the Commentators 200–600 AD, vol. 1: Psychology*, Cornell (discussion on Philoponus at pp. 199–203).

Sorabji, R. ed. (2010), 'Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science', *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, supplementary volume 103: 33–4 (revised 2nd edition of Sorabji 1987)

39. Tieleman, Teunis Lambertus. 1996. "The hunt for Galen's shadow: Alexander of Aphrodisias, « De anima » 94.7-100.17 Bruns reconsidered." In *Polyhistor: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy Presented to Jaap Mansfeld on his Sixtieth Birthday*, edited by Algra, Keimpe A., Van der Horst, Pieter Willem and Runia, David T., 265–283. Leiden: Brill.

"In the following pages, I will reconsider the relation between the closing section of the *De an.* and what is to be found in Galen's writings, most notably the *PHP* [*On the doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*]. I shall argue that Alexander does respond to specific arguments he had read in Galen. Meanwhile Accattino's critique may stand as a reminder of the strict criteria needed for assessing 'parallels' in terms of historical relations.

Mere resemblances are not good enough. Many current arguments and ideas used in the controversy over the regent part were traditional and hence not confined to Galen and Alexander.

(...)

"My argument is structured as follows. I shall begin by presenting some observations on the overall design and strategy of Alexander's demonstration (§ 2). Next I shall compare his arguments concerned with the nutritive and other faculties of the soul with the relevant passages in Galen (§ 3). This is followed by a few observations on Alexander's rebuttal of two encephalocentric arguments at the end of his demonstration (§ 4). Finally I shall draw some conclusions with special reference to Alexander's dialectical procedures (§ 5)" (pp. 267-268)

References

Accattino, P. (1987) 'Ematopoiesi, malattia cardiaca e disturbi mentali in Galeno e in Alessandro di Afrodisia', *Hermes* 115: 454-473.

40. Todd, Robert B. 1972. "Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Alexandrian *Quaestiones* II,12." *Philologus* no. 116:293–305.
 "In this article I shall examine in detail one brief text with the following questions in mind: (1) what is its relation to authentic works of Alexander? and (2) what contribution does it make to the exegesis of Aristotelian doctrine? In this way we may not be able to determine its authenticity, but we shall go a long way towards establishing its *raison d'être* in the Alexandrian corpus," (p. 293, a note omitted)
41. ———. 1973. "Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De mixtione* 11,226,13. An emendation." *Hermes* no. 101:278–282.
42. ———. 1974. "Lexicographical Notes on Alexander of Aphrodisias' Philosophical Terminology." *Glotta* no. 52:207–215.
 "Here I shall confine myself to examining Alexander of Aphrodisias' use of two groups of words. The first is a set of non-Aristotelian epistemological terms that he uses to describe various concepts in Aristotle's theory of knowledge; and the second a group of terms, partly borrowed and partly developed by himself, that are employed to describe major metaphysical concepts in the Aristotelian system: substance, form, matter, and potentiality. In each of these cases the lexicon [*] entry is deficient. This is unfortunate since although much of the vocabulary of the Greek commentators is necessarily parasitic on that of the author they are discussing, it is important to acknowledge occasions on which this pattern is broken. In particular is this necessary in the case of as relatively early an author as Alexander of Aphrodisias who drew on a well-established philosophical tradition.⁶) The words I shall discuss are for the most part sufficiently familiar for the indices to have recorded a large number of instances, and in only one case are they entirely silent. By examining contexts as thoroughly as possible I have tried to offset any residual deficiencies that they may possess. Although I shall concentrate here on Alexander of Aphrodisias my account could in a very large measure be extended to the vocabulary of the later commentators who in this, as in other areas, were greatly in Alexander's debt. I shall therefore also include some evidence of their usage." (p. 208)
 [*] Hereafter I shall refer to *A Greek-English Lexicon*, compiled by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, revised by H. Stuart Jones (9th ed.; Oxford 1940, with a supplement, 1968) simply as "the lexicon".
 (6) Although only the commentary of Aspasius (c. 100 A. D.) on the *Nicomachean Ethics* is extant (*Commentaria*, XIX-i) it is a reasonable assumption that Alexander's vocabulary was influenced by that of earlier second century commentators such as Adrastus, Herminus, or Sosigines.
43. ———. 1976. "Two displaced passages in Alexander of Aphrodisias *De anima*." *Eranos* no. 74:28–31.
44. ———. 1976. *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics: A Study of the De Mixtione with Preliminary Essays, Text, Translation and Commentary*. Leiden: Brill.

"The importance of Alexander of Aphrodisias in the Aristotelian tradition in Western philosophy is well established. This reputation however rests almost exclusively on his very influential interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of the active intellect. The subject of the present study, the *de mixtione*, is a treatise in which he deals with the philosophically less important topic of the mixture of physical bodies. My aim is to show that both as an exposition of Aristotelian thought and as an extended discussion of Stoic physics it offers an excellent opportunity to observe the development of Peripatetic scholasticism in the face of ideas developed in post-Aristotelian philosophy. In this way I shall try to establish the largely unacknowledged importance of Alexander's contribution to the Greek philosophical tradition." (*Preface*, p. XI)

45. ———. 1976. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on de Interpretatione 16a 26-29." *Hermes* no. 104:140–146.
 "At de interpretatione 16a 26-29 Aristotle makes the brief assertion that names (ονόματα) exist by convention and not by nature. In his note on this text Ammonius, the fifth century Alexandrian commentator, reports that Alexander of Aphrodisias had proposed the following syllogism, presumably in his own commentary on this work which is no longer extant: ονόματα and ρέματα are sounds' (φωναί), sounds exist by nature, therefore so do ονόματα and ρέματα. Ammonius then proceeds to offer a refutation of this argument. Although he does not explicitly attribute this subsequent reasoning to Alexander I shall try to show in this note that he must be offering an account of the earlier exegete's thought, for all the essentials and some of the details of Ammonius' report can be paralleled in some philosophically interesting ways from texts in other Alexandrian works." (p. 140, notes omitted)
46. ———. 1982. "Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De anima* 76.16. Michael of Ephesus' text defended." *Liverpool Classical Monthly* no. 7:48–49.
47. ———. 1984. "Alexander of Aphrodisias and the case for the infinite universe. Quaestiones III.12." *Eranos* no. 82:185–193.
48. Torrijos Castrillejo, David. 2017. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate, Providence and Nature." *Forum. Supplement to Acta Philosophica* no. 3:7–18.
 Abstract: "To study the influence of divinity on cosmos, Alexander uses the notions of 'fate' and 'providence,' which were common in the philosophy of his time. In this way, he provides an Aristotelian interpretation of the problems related to such concepts. In the context of this discussion, he offers a description of 'nature' different from the one that he usually regards as the standard Aristotelian notion of nature, i.e. the intrinsic principle of motion and rest. The new coined concept is a 'cosmic' nature that can be identified with both 'fate' and 'divine power,' which are the immediate effect of providence upon the world.
 In the paper it is exposed how the conception of providence defended by Alexander means a rejection of the divine care of the particulars, since the divinities are only provident for species. Several texts belonging to the Middle Platonic philosophers will convince us that such thinkers (and not directly Aristotle) are the origin of the thesis that will be understood as the conventional Aristotelian position, namely that divinity only orders species but not individuals."
49. Towey, Alan. 1991. "Aristotle and Alexander on Hearing and Instantaneous Change: A Dilemma in Aristotle's Account of Hearing." In *The Second Sense: Studies in Hearing and Musical Judgement from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century*, edited by Burnett, Charles, Fend, Michael and Gouki, Penelope, 7–18. London: Warburg Institute.
 "Aristotle's account of hearing,(1) despite its considerable influence on subsequent thought,(2) has usually been discussed only as part of a wider treatment of some other subject in the context either of ancient music(3) or of Aristotle's general psychology.(4) Yet there is much to be said for a study that concentrates specifically on hearing. Such an approach accords well with Aristotle's own advice that accounts seeking to embrace different psychological capacities in a general survey are less informative than ones which are focused on the peculiar differences of each.(5)

More significantly, despite this apparent emphasis on autonomous explanations for each sense modality, it is clear that Aristotle himself took hearing to be in certain important respects paradigmatic of sense perception generally. (6)" (p. 7)

(1) I shall concentrate on Aristotle himself, in particular his discussions of hearing in the *De anima*, edited with introduction and commentary by W. D. Ross (Oxford, 1961), and the *De sensu et sensibili* from Aristotle, *Parva naturalia*, edited by W. D. Ross (Oxford, 1955); also the commentary on the latter by the Aristotelian commentator, Alexander of Aphrodisias (floruit 205 AD), *In librum De sensu commentarium*, edited P. Wendland, *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca*, 3. 1 (Berlin, 1901), and Alexander's own treatise *De anima*, edited by I. Bruns in Alexander, *Praeter commentaria scripta minora*, Supplementum Aristotelicum, 2.1 (Berlin, 1887). I shall not consider the Pseudo-Aristotelian *Problemata*, beyond noting that Book XI contains an account of hearing close in some respects to the account given by Alexander. For a discussion of the *Problemata* see the article by Burnett in this volume. All translations of Aristotle are, except where otherwise stated, from *The Complete Works*, edited by J. Barnes, 2 vols (Princeton, 1984). Translations of Alexander are my own.

(2) See especially the chapters by Burnett and Frangenberg in this volume.

(3) There is a useful treatment in E. A. Lippman, *Musical Thought In Ancient Greece* (Columbia, 1964), pp. I 18-20; see also A. Barker, *Greek Musical Writings* (Cambridge, 1984-9), II, pp. 74-80.

(4) The standard account remains J. I. Beare, *Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition* (Oxford, 1906).

(5) *De anima* 11. 3-4, 414^b25-415^a16. Aristotle is referring to nutrition, perception and thought, but the same principle will apply to the five senses which constitute perception. See Alexander, *De anima*, p. 40.3-15.

(6) See pp. 8-10 below.

References

Charles Burnett, *Sound and its Perception in the Middle Ages*, same volume, pp. 43-69.

Thomas Frangenberg, *Auditus visu prestantior: Comparisons of Hearing and Vision in Charles de Bovelles's Liber de sensibus*, same volume, pp. 71-94.

50. ———. 2019. "The Physiology of Vision in Alexander's Commentary on the *De sensu*." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 39:211–223.
"I consider how far the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle's *De sensu* (henceforth *IDS*) presents a coherent account of the workings of the eye while at the same time assessing the extent to which Alexander was aware of the work of Galen in this area. These two questions are linked. Galen's account of the workings of the eye in *De methodo medendi* (*MM*), *De usu partium* (*UP*), and above all *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* (*PHP*), is characterised by its anatomical detail. The account presented in *IDS* is in contrast devoid of anatomical detail. And yet in other areas various studies have argued the case for seeing Alexander as responding to Galen. If Alexander when he wrote *IDS* was mindful of Galen's contribution to the subject of visual physiology, his apparent disregard for the fruits of Galen's dissections of the human eye requires explanation." (p. 211, two notes omitted)
51. Tuominen, Mitra. 2010. "Receptive Reason: Alexander of Aphrodisias on Material Intellect." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 55:170–190.
Abstract: "According to Alexander of Aphrodisias, our potential intellect is a purely receptive capacity.
Alexander also claims that, in order for us to actualise our intellectual potentiality, the intellect needs to abstract what is intelligible from enmattered perceptible objects. Now a problem emerges: How is it possible for a purely receptive capacity to perform such an abstraction? It will be argued that even though Alexander's reaction to this question causes some tension in his theory, the philosophical motivation for it is a sound one. Rather than a calculation of actualities and potentialities, the doctrine of receptivity is supposed to explain how human beings come to grasp universal aspects of reality in an accurate manner."

52. Tweedale, Martin. 1984. "Alexander of Aphrodisias Views on Universals." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 29:279–303.
 "Alexander's views on universals are, it seems, quite important history philosophy. When Boethius gives in his second commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*(1) his solution to the problem of universals as he conceived it, he claims to be adopting Alexander's approach."
 (...)
 "However, it is not at all straightforward to determine what Alexander's theory of universals or common items exactly was, and this for several reasons. First of all, the view as we find it in Greek texts attributed to Alexander seems not entirely coherent, and the interpreter naturally feels unsure whether he has understood it properly. Secondly, doubt has been cast on the authenticity of some of the more important of these texts.
 Finally, commentators, both ancient and modern, have ascribed an extreme anti-realist view to Alexander that, as we shall see, is not borne out by the texts we possess, authentic or not.
 In the following I shall try to surmount these difficulties, to the extent that this is possible on our present knowledge, and give an account of what Alexander's view probably was, or at least what it would have appeared to Boethius and Avicenna to be, and then go on to locate the philosophical difficulty it leaves unresolved. For my overall estimate of Alexander's theory is that it is not entirely satisfactory and probably did not appear so to thinkers such as Boethius and Avicenna." (pp. 279-280)
 (1) pp. 164-7 of *In Isagogen Porphyrii Commentorum, editionis secundae, fiber primus*. Ed. by S. Brandt in *Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii In Isagogen Porphyrii Commenta*, vol. 48 of *Corpus Scriplorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* (Vienna/Leipzig, 1906).
53. Twetten, David. 2023. "Why the Prime Mover Is Not an Exclusively Final Cause. Alexander of Aphrodisias and Averroes." In *Contextualizing Premodern Philosophy: Explorations of the Greek, Hebrew, Arabic, and Latin Traditions*, edited by Krause, Katja, López-Farjeat, Luis Xavier and Oschman, Nicholas A. , 29–55. New York: Routledge.
 "The argument of this chapter is, first, that Alexander of Aphrodisias is not the source of the "final cause only" interpretation,(13) since the greatest commentator on Aristotle, in fact, takes Aristotle's prime mover to be an efficient cause.(14) For Alexander, celestial ensoulment, rather than being a threat to the prime mover's efficiency, is precisely that through which efficiency is discovered. Second, Averroes largely agrees with Alexander on the causality of the heavens and Aristotle's god, and, where Averroes disagrees, he is closer to Aristotle's mind than is Alexander. I make these points largely by lining up, successively, the surprisingly parallel teachings of the two great commentators, then by introducing considerations from the text of Aristotle that lend support to their readings.(15)" (p. 30)
 (13) Syrianus is the first I have found for whom Aristotle's prime mover is a final cause only. Syrianus, *In Metaphysica commentaria*, ed. Kroll, B.1, 8.30–33 and 10.20–11.9; M.5, 117.16–20. 14 Berti, "Da chi è amato," 70, aptly observes that the creationist/emanationist reading of Aristotle has been an obstacle to a contemporary appreciation of the efficiency of Aristotle's prime mover. Accordingly, when Simplicius famously criticizes Alexander for taking god to be a final cause, not efficient, of the heavens, we readily imagine Simplicius to be ascribing the "exclusively final cause" interpretation to Alexander. On the contrary, Simplicius repeatedly ascribes to Alexander efficiency over the motion, though not over the very being, of the heavens. For discussion, see Sharples, "Aristotelian Theology," 19 n. 94; Twetten, "Aristotelian Cosmology," 335–37. Nevertheless, an investigation of what "efficient causality" means is clearly in order, as I undertake in a preliminary way below.
 (15) I treat other parallel argumentation in Alexander and Averroes in Twetten, "Whose Prime Mover," 379–90.

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54. Weidemann, Hermann. 1996. "Alexander of Aphrodisias, Cicero, and Aristotle's Definition of Possibility." In *Studies on the History of Logic: Proceedings of the III. Symposium on the History of Logic*, edited by Angelelli, Ignacio and Cerezo, María, 33–41. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"My strategy in this paper is as follows: First I shall examine what may be called Aristotle's definition of possibility. Then I shall explain the use that Alexander of Aphrodisias makes of this definition in an interesting argument of his. And finally I shall try to show that the soundness of this argument depends on a conception of truth that is tacitly presupposed by Aristotle and strongly rejected by Cicero. Some glimpses beyond will round off the picture." (p. 33)

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