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Bibliography of Intercultural and Comparative Philosophy: A-Den

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Bibliography

1. Abe, Masao. 1975. "Non-Being and *Mu* - the Metaphysical Nature of Negativity in the East and the West." no. 11:181-192.
Reprinted in Masao Abe, *Zen and Western Thought*, London: Macmillan, pp. 121-134.
"In Volume I of his Systematic Theology, Paul Tillich says, 'Being precedes nonbeing in ontological validity, as the word "nonbeing" itself indicates.'(1) Elsewhere, he says 'Being "embraces" itself and non being' ,(2) while 'Nonbeing is dependent on the being it negates. "Dependent" points first of all to the ontological priority of being over nonbeing.(3) Tillich's statements reflect a tendency among some Christian thinkers to take God as Being itself. The same understanding of the relation of being to non-being can be discerned in major strands of Greek philosophy in the ideas of *to on* and *me on*.
(...)
An objection must be made to this understanding of being, however, for in reality there is no ontological ground on which being has priority over non-being. It is assumed that being embraces both itself and non-being. But the very basis on which both being and non-being are embraced must not be 'Being' but 'that which is neither being nor non-being'. That being has priority over" is somehow superior to,

- and more fundamental than, non-being, has been assumed, perhaps uncritically, not only by Tillich in particular but for quite some time by the West in general." (p. 121)
- (1) Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, vol. I, (The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 189.
- (2) Paul Tillich, *The Courage to Be*, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1957), p. 34.
- (3) *Ibid.*, p. 40.
2. ———. 1985. *Zen and Western Thought*. London: Macmillan.
 Edited by William R. LaFleur.
 Foreword by John Hick.
 "The selection of essays constituting this book were written at one time or another during the past eighteen years. The focus is on Zen, Buddhism, and the comparative study of Buddhism and Western thought. The essays were selected primarily to present my understanding of Zen, especially its philosophical and religious significance in its encounter with Western thought. Some address themes with which I was asked to deal, while others elucidate subjects I myself wanted to explore. Several were directed to Japanese readers and hence were originally written in Japanese. Others were directed to a Western audience and were written in English. The selection includes addresses which were originally delivered orally and are hence somewhat informal in comparison to the more academic articles. Accordingly, the book was not written systematically with a consistent intention. Heeding the advice of the editor, Professor William R. LaFleur, I have tried to select and compile the essays in such a way as to make the work as systematic as possible. The result is the book now before you." (p. XXI)
3. ———. 1997. *Zen and Comparative Studies*. London: Macmillan.
 Edited by Steven Heine.
 Part two of a two-volume sequel to *Zen and Western Thought*.
 "The title of this collection of essays, which I wrote over a period of two decades, highlights the sharp contrast and conflict as well as the areas of compatibility and complementarity between Zen and comparative studies. In Part One, Fundamentals of Zen, I elucidate the meaning of Zen as a self-transmission of mind in its own terms. These essays take up the topics of 'ordinary mind is Tao,' life and death and good and evil, emptiness, selfhood, and education. On the other hand, in the essays in Part Two, Zen, Buddhism, and Western Thought, I situate Zen in a comparative philosophical context through discussions of the Aristotelian notion of Substance, Whitehead's notion of process, and Plato's idea of Form (*eidōs*). Focusing on the problem of death, the article on 'The Problem of Death in the East and West' tries to elucidate the essential characters of Platonism, Christianity and Buddhism, especially Zen, through a systematic comparative approach.
 In Part Three, Current Issues in Buddhism, I pick up a number of contemporary topics such as monotheism versus monism, time and self, human rights and religious tolerance from the angle of comparative studies. Finally, Part Four, Zen and Japanese Culture, attempts to clarify the role of Zen in terms of the intellectual history of Japan from ancient literature and Tokugawa Shinto thought to modern philosophy." (pp. XII-XIV)
4. Agbakoba, Joseph C. Achike, and Ajah, Anthony C., eds. 2016. *Universalism, Relativism, and Intercultural Philosophy*. Washington, D. C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
 Nigerian Philosophical Studies IV.
 Contents: Joseph C.A. Agbakoba: Preface V-VI; Matthew C. Chukwuelobe & Anthony C. Ajah: Introduction 1;
 Part I. On the Equality of Cultures and the Fear of Hegemony
 1. Jibrail Bin Yusuf & Hashir A. Abdulsalam: Time, Knowledge and the Clash of Civilizations: An Islamic Approach 23;
 Part II. Globalization and the Question of Cultural Identity

2. Uduma Oji Uduma: *Between Universalism and Cultural Identity: Revisiting the Motivation for an African Logic* 39; 3. Dorothy U. Olu-Jacob: *Intercultural Philosophy, Africa's Predicament and Globalization: Finding the Missing Link* 65; Part III. Cultural Ontology and Social Organization
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6. Marietta Stepanyants: *Philosophy and Inculturation: The Context of Universalism* 131; 7. Francis M. Isichei: *Universalism and Relativism in Philosophy: Nature, Problems, and Contemporary Significance* 149; 8. Martin F. Asiegbu: *Intercultural Philosophy: Toward an Adequate Cross Cultural Dialogue between African Philosophy and Western Philosophy* 161; 9. Benjamin Ewelu: *Intercultural Philosophy – A Quest for Unity in Diversity: What Can African Language Contribute?* 183; 10. Edward J. Alam: *Reflections on Intercultural Philosophy: Avoiding the Extremes* 201; Part V. On the Possibilities of Intercultural Communication
11. William Sweet: *Migrating Texts and Traditions in Intercultural Philosophy* 211; 12. Anthony C. Ajah: *Communicative Rationality and Cross-Cultural Communication* 235; Part VI. Hermeneutics as the Role of Philosophy, and as a Principle of Intercultural Encounters
13. Evaristus E. Ekweke: *Intercultural Philosophy in Consultation with a Hermeneutic Approach to Natural Science: An African Perspective* 259; Index 273-276.
5. Allen, Douglas, ed. 1997. *Culture and Self: Philosophical and Religious Perspectives, East and West*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
 Edited with the assistance of Ashok Malhotra.
 Contents: Preface IX; Douglas Allen: Introduction XI-XV;
 Part 1: Multiple Asian and Western Perspectives
 1. Douglas Allen: *Social Constructions of Self: Some Asian, Marxist, and Feminist Critiques of Dominant Western Views of Self* 3; 2. Alan Roland: *How Universal Is Psychoanalysis? The Self in India, Japan, and the United States* 27;
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 Part 3: Indian and Western Perspectives
 6. Ananyo Basu: *Reducing Concern with Self: Parfit and the Ancient Buddhist Schools* 97; 7. Ashok K. Malhotra: *Sartre and Samkhya-Yoga on Self* 111;
 Part 4: Japanese and Western Perspectives
 8. Graham Parkes: *Nietzsche and Nishitani on Nihilism and Tradition* 131; 9. Mara Miller: *Views of Japanese Selfhood; Japanese and Western Perspectives* 145; *Bibliography* 163; *About the Book and Editor* 173; *About the Contributors* 175; *Index* 177-184.
 "Traditional scholars of philosophy and religion, in both the East and the West, have often placed a major emphasis on analyzing the nature of self. But with a few significant exceptions, they have dismissed or devalued the role of culture in their specific formulations of "the self," arguing instead for some view of an objective, ahistoric, universal self. When they have cited cultural conditionings and variables, moreover, these scholars have usually described them as subjective, illusory, and distorting influences, thus obscuring the deeper, underlying, objective view of "the self" that transcends all such particular historical and cultural expressions."
 (Introduction, p. XI)
 (...)

- "The chapters of this book—with their primary emphasis on comparative philosophy, religion, and culture—have been divided into four parts: Multiple Asian and Western Perspectives, Chinese and Western Perspectives, Indian and Western Perspectives, and Japanese and Western Perspectives. Included among these analyses are Vedanta, Samkhya-Yoga, and other Hindu approaches; Buddhist, Confucian, Taoist, and other Indian, Chinese, and Japanese perspectives; Cartesian and other dominant Western perspectives; and Marxist, Nietzschean, Sartrean, feminist, and other challenges to dominant Western interpretations of culture and self." (Introduction, p. XII)
6. Allinson, Robert E. 2001. "The Myth of Comparative Philosophy or the Comparative Philosophy *Malgré Lui*." In *Two Roads to Wisdom? Chinese and Analytic Philosophical Traditions*, edited by Mou, Bo, 269-291. La Salle, IL: Open Curt.
- "Comparative philosophy" such as it has been practiced is normally "comparative-inclusive," "comparative-exclusive," or a mixed type.(8)
 (...)
 Comparative exclusive philosophy, practiced as a discipline separate from philosophy proper can be classified into two streams.(10) One stream, represented by the positive comparativist, searches for likenesses and unlikenesses between the two traditions but normally shows a preference for the likeness. This stream, while searching for positive correlations, does not generally attempt to borrow from the content or the methodology of the other tradition or lend the content or the methodology of its own tradition to the other tradition. Generally speaking, the positive comparativist searches for analogues of Western concerns, issues, and methodology in Chinese philosophy. Normally, the positive comparativist does not first find issues, concerns, and methodologies in the Chinese tradition that are borrowed for use within the Western tradition.
 The standpoint of the positive comparativist is a stand-alone standpoint in which parallel developments in each tradition may be noted, but normally there is no active expropriation of issues, concerns, or methods found originally the other tradition and consequent alteration of methods in one's own tradition.
 Another stream, represented by the negative-exclusionist comparativist (for future reference, for convenience's sake these types will be referred to as negative or positive comparativists), possesses the tendency to find that the traditions or the terms compared are incommensurable. This stream also remains intact within the secure boundaries of its own philosophical heritage. Negative comparativists are not completely negative since, irrespective of the internal inconsistency in approach this implies, generally consider that Western categories are useful in understanding the other tradition even though the other tradition remains alien to one's own." (pp. 271-272, some notes omitted)
 (8) This set of types is not intended to be an exhaustive classification of types but it does represent a good starting point for investigations. (...)
 (10) This is not intended as an exhaustive classification of comparative philosophy but only as an identification of two tendencies. (...)
7. Ames, Roger T. 1990. "Directory of Comparative Philosophers." *Philosophy East and West* no. 40:73-97.
 Second part: vol. 41, pp. 537-556.
 "One important function of *Philosophy East and West* is to keep our readership informed on the progress of scholarly research in the field of Asian and comparative philosophy. In an effort to realize this objective, in the late summer of 1988 a letter was circulated to our active list of comparative philosophers in order to begin compiling a directory which will describe the ongoing research and the recent publications in our field. This compilation also provides the *Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy* with a resource from which to draw the themes and potential participants for future panels and programs.
 In this issue, we are bringing to print the first installment of the *Directory of Comparative Philosophers*, and, at the same time, are again circulating a letter in

- preparation for the second installment, to be published at the beginning of next year. We encourage active comparative philosophers to provide us with the appropriate information on their research projects and publications to help us keep colleagues with similar interests informed.
Roger T. Ames, *Editor*" (p. 73)
8. Angle, Stephen C. 2006. "Making Room from Comparative Philosophy: Davidson, Brandom, and Conceptual Distance." In *Davidson Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement*, edited by Mou, Bo, 73-100. Leiden: Brill.
"Over the last three decades, one of the principal resources on which comparative philosophers could draw when they sought assurance has been the work of Donald Davidson." (p. 73)
(...)
"Davidson has argued convincingly that anything we can recognize as a language must, in principle, be translatable into any other language.
As I will elaborate below, this argument has sometimes been misunderstood, but it nonetheless stands as an important support for the enterprise of comparative philosophy.
As significant as Davidson's work has been, however, my thesis in this essay is that comparative philosophers need still more than Davidson's theory is able to provide. It is not enough to know that translation is possible in principle: we need to be able to talk about conceptual differences with more subtlety, and to reason about what is at stake in overcoming them." (p. 74)
(...)
"Davidson is not wholly without resources to explain the range of conceptual differences and the dynamics of language change. I will point to some promising ideas in his later work, as well as to some elaborations of his basic theories proposed by others. But in the end, the best solution to these matters is to be found in the work of Robert Brandom. In many respects Brandom's views are Davidsonian; turning to Brandom is not to abandon Davidson's core insights, but to recast them in a framework that allows them fuller expression.
My goal will be to show why the creative philosophical projects of contemporary comparative philosophy are possible, even though they are often difficult." (p. 74)
9. ———. 2010. "The Minimal Definition and Methodology of Comparative Philosophy. A Report from a Conference." *Comparative Philosophy* no. 1:106-110.
Abstract: "In June of 2008, the International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy (ISCWP) convened its third Constructive Engagement conference, on the theme of "Comparative Philosophy Methodology." During the opening speeches, Prof. Dunhua ZHAO, Chair of the Philosophy Department at Peking University, challenged the conference's participants to put forward a minimal definition of "comparative philosophy" and a statement of its methods. Based on the papers from the conference and the extensive discussion that ensued, during my closing reflections at the end of the conference I offered a tentative synthesis of the conference's conclusions. That summary has already been published on-line as part of the bi-annual ISCWP newsletter (Angle 2008). In this brief essay, I recapitulate the themes of my earlier summary and expand, in my own voice, on some of the key points."
References
Angle, Stephen C. (2008), "Conclusions drawn from ISCWP's 2008 conference on comparative methodology", ISCWPNewsletter 6:2.
10. Bahm, Archie John. 1977. *Comparative Philosophy: Western, Indian and Chinese Philosophies Compared*. Albuquerque: Universal Publications.
Contents: Acknowledgments VIII; Preface IX; I. What is Comparative Philosophy? 1; II. Standards for Comparative Philosophy 25; III. Eastern and Western Philosophies Compared 45; Appendix 82; Index 95-98.

- "Comparative philosophy is a relatively new field of study, research, achievement in understanding and teaching. The purpose of this work is to help clarify the nature of comparative philosophy; to survey views about the kinds of standards that may be used as bases for comparisons; and to propose an hypothesis comparing pervasive traits of the philosophies of Western, Indian and Chinese civilizations." (Preface, p. IX)
11. Balslev, Anindita N. 1997. "Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Conversation: Some Comments on the project of Comparative Philosophy." *Metaphilosophy* no. 28:359-370.
 Abstract: "This paper seeks to highlight the East-West asymmetry in philosophical exchanges. It draws attention to the absence of Eastern thought in the curriculum of philosophy in the West and suggests that cliches and stereotypes about cultures in general and thought-traditions in particular are perpetuated in this manner. The aim of the paper is to encourage 'cross-cultural conversation' among philosophers. A critical review of the project of 'comparative philosophy' is made to disclose the fact that despite the difficulties of such an endeavor, it is an attempt to bring thought-traditions together and is thereby useful for promoting intercultural understanding."
12. Benesch, Walter. 1997. *An Introduction to Comparative Philosophy: A Travel Guide to Philosophical Space*. London: Macmillan.
 "This travel guide to philosophical space in the broadest sense is a comparative introduction to philosophy and philosophizing as these are aspects of the human condition everywhere. It focuses in a more specific sense upon the concern for meaning and the corresponding development of thinking methodologies in certain Greco-European, Indian, and Chinese philosophical systems. The text introduces these Eastern and Western traditions in two unique ways:
 Firstly: It addresses philosophical space as four different but related dimensions of human thought and experience: (1) the significance and nature of the objects of experience and their interrelationships about which we think; (2) the significance and nature of the thinking *subject* in whose awareness objects mean what they mean; (3) the significance and nature of the situations in which thinking subjects encounter both their own awareness and the objects of which they are aware; (4) the nature and significance of these subject, object and situational elements as aspects and perspectives within a human/nature continuum. These are the sources of the object, subject, situational, and aspect/perspective dimensions of philosophical space. They are introduced and explained using texts from various Eastern and Western philosophies.
 Secondly: The guide is more than a compilation of information on various Eastern and Western views, for in each dimension, once it has been explained and explored, one or more of the thinking and reasoning techniques that have been developed within it, will be presented so that readers can incorporate these techniques into their own thinking processes. The travel guide is both an introduction to comparative philosophy and to comparative philosophizing.
 The reader will encounter the object logics of the West, the subject logics of the Indian Jains, the situational logics of the Buddhists and Nyaya, and the aspective/perspective logics of the Taoists, Confucians and Mohists." (pp. 1-2)
13. ———. 2002. "Comparative Philosophy as Feedback Loops and Fractals of Philosophical Space: The Butterfly Effect Meets the Butterfly Dream." *APA Newsletters* no. 2:32-35.
 "Conclusions
 The physicist, Erwin Schroedinger once said that "...it may perhaps be possible for logical thinking to disclose at least this much: that to grasp the basis of phenomena through logical thought may in all probability be impossible, since logical thought is itself a part of phenomena, and wholly involved in them."(15) The molecular biologist, Friedrich Cramer in applying chaos theory and the idea of fractals to 'living systems' maintains that "Systems are fundamentally complex if, despite

- deterministic initial conditions, they have indeterminate or chaotic solutions. In these systems, predictability fails not only for practical reasons but also for fundamental ones.”(16) I would suggest that just as the discovery of chaos and fractals in physical spaces offers a new access to and awareness of the nature aspect of the nature/mind continuum, so do chaos and fractals as paradoxes in philosophical space offer a new access to and appreciation of the mind aspect of the continuum." (p. 35)
- (15) Erwin Schroedinger, *My View of the World* (Cecily Hastings tran.), Ox Bow Press, Woodbridge, CT, 1983, p. 19.
- (16) Friedrich Cramer, *Chaos and Order*, VCH Publishers, New York, 1993, p. 214.
14. Berger, Douglas. 2021. *Indian and Intercultural Philosophy: Personhood, Consciousness, and Causality*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
 "There are, to be sure, many exemplary collections on Indian philosophy already in print, penned by the last several generations of scholars who have achieved monumental successes in making classical and modern Indian thought accessible to and most relevant for intercultural philosophical discussion today. And so, in putting forward my own assemblage of republished and original chapters here, I am obligated to set forth for the reader what is distinctive about these contributions. I will do so in three steps. First, I will rehearse in brief outline my own autobiography of learning in Indian philosophy in order to narrate who my teachers and greatest influences were, as well as what topics and issues in Indian and intercultural philosophy have been most important to me. Next, I will provide a skeleton review of the parts and chapters found in this volume, to give the reader a glimpse at which problems I have been most concerned to resolve in these fields. Finally, I will attempt to accentuate the most important discoveries I have so far made as a result of my encounters with Indian philosophical traditions. These discoveries not only relate to important aspects of India’s traditions, but have to a great degree shaped my own philosophical views." (pp. 1-2)
15. Berger, Douglas, and Kramer, Eli. 2019. "Lessons from Intercultural Philosophy: Getting Over Reductive Comparisons and Attending to Others: Douglas Berger interviewed by Eli Kramer." *Eidos: A Journal for Philosophy of Culture* no. 1:134-140.
 "EK: What are the most important tools for doing cross-cultural/comparative philosophy of culture in a responsible, thoughtful, and impactful way?
 DB: I would say at this point that the three most important tools for doing intercultural philosophy responsibly and thoughtfully – impact can never be guaranteed by oneself – are:
 1) an openness to learn the ideas, concepts, frameworks and assumptions of the tradition with which one is trying to engage;
 2) either a solid comprehension of the language(s) of the tradition with which one is trying to engage or at least good translations of their source texts or narrative traditions and discourse and;
 3) a community of mutually interested engagement.
 The first tool is vital because, as the last four centuries or so of European colonial history have amply and tragically demonstrated, one all-too-easy but all-too-flawed way of approaching cross-cultural philosophy is to take the entire or partial European history of philosophy, with its stock of ideas, vocabulary and assumptions about the world, persons, ethics, and even of philosophy itself, as normative and judge other philosophical positions on those bases. This approach has led to a variety of more or less unfortunate consequences. The consequences range from merely distorting the ideas of a philosopher or tradition of thought, or in some cases an entire cultural heritage, by claiming they are pursuing the same ideals and ends as one’s own, to claiming that other cultural traditions are incapable of attaining the supposedly truly philosophical status of European cultures, to using one’s knowledge and assessments of another cultural tradition in order to politically rule it or control it." (pp. 134-135)

16. Bilimoria, Purushottama, and Hemmingsen, Michael, eds. 2016. *Comparative Philosophy and J.L. Shaw*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
 Contents: 1. Purushottama Bilimoria and Michael Hemmingsen: Introduction 1;
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 16. Papia Mitra: Artificial Intelligences and Karma: An Evaluation of Information Technology in Light of J.L. Shaw's Concept of Moral Free Will 247; 17. Gordon F. Davis: Conceptions and Intuitions of the Highest Good in Buddhist Philosophy: A Meta-ethical Analysis 263; Index 277-279.
 "This volume attests to the impact of Dr. Shaw's career, if in no other way than the extent and quality of the articles represented here from leading philosophers, thinkers and logicians from all over the world. Jaysankar Shaw has tirelessly worked to solve some of the pressing and key problems of contemporary philosophy of language, logic, epistemology, metaphysics and morals from the perspectives of classical Indian philosophers using comparative analytical approaches, as his 11 books and some 90 published papers testify. Thus the significance, in no small, measure, of Indian, especially Nyāya logic, epistemology, semantics and cognitive ontology has not escaped the attention of Western scholars who have seen the convergence or at least a point of fecundity with the long tradition of systematic thinking in these areas." (p. 2)
17. Blitstein, Pablo A. 2016. "Sinology: Chinese Intellectual History and Transcultural Studies." *The Journal of Transcultural Studies* no. 7:136-167.
 "The guest editors of this journal issue have kindly asked me to provide a short overview of the relation between transcultural studies and Chinese intellectual history in Euro-American academia. There was a certain risk in accepting this request, as it might be either too small or too big a task. It would be too small if I narrowed it down to a review of explicit references to transcultural studies within Chinese intellectual history; but it would be too big if I extended it to a study of all the questions, approaches, and methods that the two fields have developed in the last few decades. To overcome these difficulties, I decided to focus on the legacy of one shared methodological point: the critique of so-called "methodological nationalism," that is, of the assumption (explicit or not) that the nation is the ultimate framework of research.(1) This critique has become a constitutive principle of transcultural studies, while it came to represent only a particular approach within Chinese intellectual history. Still, the two fields have developed a shared agenda in this regard. This essay limits itself to pointing out the presence of this critique in

both fields—which might be as much a sign of open scholarly exchanges as evidence of the parallel adoption of common references—and offers an illustration of the complex relations that exist between institutional labels, methodological agendas, scientific communication, and actual scholarly practice."

(1) This concept, undoubtedly inspired by "methodological individualism," seems to have first been used in the 1970s. The term has become more widespread in the last few decades, partly because of its critical use in global history and transcultural studies. For a discussion of this methodological assumption and a brief history of the expression, see Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, "Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences," *Global Networks* 4, no. 4 (2002): 301–334.

18. Blocker, Gene H. 1999. *World Philosophy: An East-West Comparative Introduction to Philosophy*. New York: Prentice Hall.
 Contents: Preface VII-XII; 1. Introduction: What is Philosophy? 1; 2 Logic and Language 42; 3. Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge 78; 4. Metaphysics 105; 5. Ethics 159; 6. Social and Political Philosophy 201; Bibliography 232; Glossary 235; Timelines 244-246.
 "In this book, Chinese, Indian, and Western philosophers of roughly the same sort and of comparable stature are brought together on the same philosophical topics and issues (arranged, for convenience, in traditional clusters—logic in chapter 2, epistemology in chapter 3, metaphysics in chapter 4, ethics in chapter 5, and social and political philosophy in chapter 6)." (p. VII)
 (...)
 "In this book, I treat the strictly philosophical arguments as being roughly similar across cultures, while the larger cultural contexts in which they occur I present as being considerably different. The Indian background of karma, for example, is quite distinct from anything in the West (except, perhaps, Socrates's and Plato's belief in reincarnation), but karma raises serious questions about the nature of causality, and when Indian philosophers tackle the problem of causality, their analyses are very similar and certainly comprehensible to their Western counterparts (who also are interested in causality, but for different reasons). Thus, students will get a chance to learn something about the differences among Western and non-Western cultures, while at the same time recognizing some of the philosophical similarities." (p. XI)
19. Bonevac, Daniel, and Phillips, Stephen. 1993. *Understanding Non-Western Philosophy: Introductory Readings*. Mountain View: Mayfield.
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 Ancient Egypt: From The Instruction of Ptahhotep; The Song from the Tomb of King Intef; The Dispute Between a Man and His Ba; From The Instruction of Any; From The Book of the Dead; Enlightenment Ethiopia: Zera Yacob, from The Treatise of Zera Yacob; Walda Heywat: from The Treatise of Walda Heywat;
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 Creationism: Al-Kindi: from On First Philosophy; Saadia ben Joseph: from The Book of Beliefs and Opinions; Al-Ghazali: from The Incoherence of the Philosophers; Maimonides: from The Guide of the Perplexed; Maimonides: The Purpose of Man;
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Early Buddhism: The First Sermon; From the Majjhima-Nikaya; Buddhaghosa: from The Path of Purification (Visuddhi-Magga); From Questions to King Milinda (Milindapanha); Buddhaghosa: The Duration of Life;

Jainism: From the Acaranga Sutra; Vadi Devasuri: from The Ornament Illuminating the Means and Principles of Knowledge (Pramana-naya-tattvalokalankarah);

Nagarjuna and Madhyamika Buddhism: Nagarjuna: from Averting the Arguments; Candrakirti: from Reasoning into Reality;

Buddhist Idealism and Logic: From The Surangama Sutra; Dignaga: from The Investigation of the Object of Awareness (Alambanapariksa) With Extracts from Vinitadeva's Commentary; Dharmakirti: from The Pith of Right Thinking (Nyayabindu) With a Commentary by Dharmottara;

Mimamsa (Exegesis): Kumarila: from The Slokavarttika;

Carvaka Skepticism: From Madhava's Compendium of Philosophy;

Nyaya-Vaisesika Epistemic Logic and Ontology: From the Vaisesika Sutra; From the Nyaya-sutra With a Commentary by Vatsyayana; Udayana: from Proofs of the Existence of God; Gangesa: from The Jewel of Thought about Reality

(Tattvacintamani);

Vedanta: From the Rg Veda; From the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad; From the Mundaka Upanishad; Sankara: from Brahmasutra Commentary; Sriharsa: Critique of Difference; Rupa Gosvami: The Mystical Theology of Passion; Vivekananda: Addresses at the Parliament of Religions; Aurobindo, from The Life Divine;

Modern Academic Philosophy: J. N. Mohanty: Gilbert Ryle's Criticisms of the Concept of Consciousness; B. K. Matilal: from Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge;

PART IV. EAST ASIA

Confucianism: Confucius: from The Analects; The Great Learning; Mencius: from The Book of Mencius; Hsun Tzu: from the Hsun Tzu;

Taoism: Lao Tzu, from Tao-te Ching; Chuang Tzu: from the Chuang Tzu; The Yang Chu Chapter;

Other Schools: Mo Tzu: from Universal Love; Wang Ch-ung: from Balanced Inquiries;

Chinese Buddhism: Hsuan-tsang: from The Treatise on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only; Fa-tsang: from Treatise on the Golden Lion; Fa-tsang: from Hundred Gates to the Sea of Ideas of the Flowery Splendor Scripture; The Recorded Conversations of Zen Master I-Hsuan;

Neo-Confucianism: Chu Hsi: from The Philosophy of Human Nature; Wang Yang-Ming: from Instructions for Practical Life; Wang Yang-Ming: from Record of Discourses; Wang Yang-Ming: from Reply to Ku Tung-Ch'iao; Wang Fu-chih: from The Surviving Works of Wang Fu-Chih;

Japanese Buddhism: Kitaro Nishida: from An Inquiry into the Good; D. T. Suzuki: from Zen Buddhism; Keiji Nishitani: from Science and Zen;

Pronunciation Guide; Glossary; Index.

20. ———. 2009. *Introduction to World Philosophy: A Multicultural Reader*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Abstract: "Ethics in the philosophical traditions of India -- Chinese ethics -- Ancient Greek ethics -- Medieval Christian, Jewish, and Islamic ethics -- Ethics in modern philosophy -- African ethics -- The self in Indian philosophy -- The self in Chinese Buddhism -- Ancient Greek philosophy of mind -- Mind and body in early modern philosophy -- African philosophy of mind -- Indian theories of knowledge -- Chinese theories of knowledge."
21. Bontekoe, Ron. 2017. "Some Opening Remarks on the Exclusionary Tendency in Western Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 67:957-965.

"There is a serious danger involved in taking the idea of the "philosophical tradition" too narrowly. Many readers of this journal will be familiar with the dangers of cultural exclusion — in particular with the long-standing tendency of many Western philosophers to reject out of hand the legitimacy of Chinese, Indian, and Japanese philosophy, on the grounds that these Asian modes of thinking do not appear to address the same problems that Western philosophers are interested in, in the same kind of way that Western philosophers prefer to approach these problems. This culturally myopic view of what is entitled to be called "philosophy" is deplorable, and needs to be resisted, but it probably helps to remember in this regard that the Asian philosophical traditions have not been the only victims of this attitude. It was not that long ago, no more than fifty or sixty years, in fact, that many Anglo-American analytic philosophers were adopting a similarly exclusionary attitude toward European Continental philosophy — declaring that Nietzsche and Heidegger, for example, were "*not philosophers*." This, it turned out, meant little more than that coming to understand these alien thinkers required more effort than the deniers of their philosophical *bona fides* were willing to put in. In time influential thinkers emerged — William Barrett and Walter Kauffman come immediately to mind — who were willing to put in the effort required to understand what these seminal Continental figures were saying, and to explain their messages in terms that more typical Anglo-American analytic philosophers could grasp. And thus the legitimacy of the phenomenological and existential approaches to philosophy came gradually to be accepted even in the most die-hard analytical departments." (p. 957)

22. Botz-Bornstein, Thorsten. 2006. "Ethnophilosophy, Comparative Philosophy, Pragmatism: Toward a Philosophy of Ethnoscapes." *Philosophy East and West* no. 56:153-171.

"In this essay I would like to reflect on the place of philosophy within a "globalized" world and reconsider its status as a phenomenon that is potentially linked to a "local" culture. Whenever we question the authority of "general" truths and we look for ways of integrating "local discourses" into the overall construction called "global philosophy," we come across the old idea of "ethnophilosophy." Far from suggesting ethnophilosophy as a model for the philosophy of the future, I intend to rethink certain themes of ethnophilosophy and contrast them with disciplines such as "comparative philosophy" and pragmatism. I will sketch an approach that I believe to be appropriate for the development of philosophy in times of globalization.

One of the negative undertones of the term "globalization" is that it is seen as a uniformizing and flattening power that eliminates existing cultural differences. On the other hand, there is an important side effect of globalization represented by those movements acting against it, stressing the importance of "localization" or "regionalization."

Ethnophilosophy, in spite of its outdated origin and its potential dangers, remains interesting as an intellectual model as long as it is not formulated in a radical fashion. When it is formulated in a radical fashion it has to face the reproach of relativism and of enclosing itself in a cultural sphere that it declares to be inaccessible to others." (p. 153)

23. Bradley, D. Park. 2006. "The Critical Presence of the Other: Comparative Philosophy, Self-Knowledge, and Accountability." *Journal of Philosophy and Culture* no. 3.

Abstract: "Western philosophy has traditionally taken justification as necessary for constituting genuine knowledge. On the contemporary scene, however, several influential epistemological theories (Gadamer, Polanyi, Kuhn, Sellars) see the project of epistemological transparency as undermined by the fact that implicit conditions necessarily underlie our explicit knowing. In this paper, I argue that "we" must engage non-Western traditions of thought, if we are to remain committed to justifying the conditions of our knowing. To put it differently, philosophical

accountability requires discarding the delusion of self-critique and coming to recognize our dependence on the critical distance provided by Other traditions."

24. Brooks, Thom. 2013. "Philosophy Unbound: The Idea of Global Philosophy." *Metaphilosophy* no. 44:254-266.
Abstract: "The future of philosophy is moving towards "global philosophy." The idea of global philosophy is the view that different philosophical approaches may engage more substantially with each other to solve philosophical problems. Most solutions attempt to use only those available resources located within one philosophical tradition. A more promising approach might be to expand the range of available resources to better assist our ability to offer more compelling solutions. This search for new horizons in order to improve our clarity about philosophical issues is at the heart of global philosophy. The idea of global philosophy encourages us to look beyond our traditions to improve our philosophical problem solving by our own lights. Global philosophy is a new approach whose time is coming. This essay offers the first account of this approach and an assessment of its future promise."
25. Brown, Nahum, and Franke, William, eds. 2016. *Transcendence, Immanence, and Intercultural Philosophy*. Cham (Switzerland): Palgrave Macmillan.
Contents: Preface IX, Introduction XI;
Part I The Debate: Methodological Position Statements
1. Roger T. Ames: Getting Past Transcendence: Determinacy, Indeterminacy, and Emergence in Chinese Natural Cosmology 3; 2. William Franke: Classical Chinese Thought and the Sense of Transcendence 35; 3. William Franke: Equivocations of "Transcendence": Responses to Roger Ames 67; 4. Yonghua Ge: Transcendence, Immanence, and Creation: A Comparative Study of Christian and Daoist Thoughts with Special Reference to Robert Neville 79; 5. Karl-Heinz Pohl: "Immanent Transcendence" in the Chinese Tradition: Remarks on a Chinese (and Sinological) Controversy 103; 6, Hans Rudolf Kantor: Emptiness of Transcendence: The Inconceivable and Invisible in Chinese Buddhist Thought 125;
Part II Critical Reflections on Traditions of Transcendence
7. William Desmond: Idiot Wisdom and the Intimate Universal: On Immanence and Transcendence in an Intercultural Perspective 153; 8. Nahum Brown: Transcendent and Immanent Conceptions of Perfection in Leibniz and Hegel 183; 9. Antonia Pont: An Exemplary Operation: Shikantaza and Articulating Practice via Deleuze 207; 10. Michael Eckert: Future as Transcendence: On a Central Problem in Ernst Bloch's Philosophy of Religion 237; 11. Mario Wenning: The Fate of Transcendence in Post-secular Societies 259; 12. Heiner Roetz: Who Is Engaged in the "Complicity with Power"? On the Difficulties Sinology Has with Dissent and Transcendence 283;
Index 319-327.
"What is still divisive in this question of transcendence and immanence is something like what makes the question of belief, especially religious belief or faith, so fractious. Our ability to reason critically and to attempt to persuade one another by logical argument has limits. Some of our conclusions and convictions seem to be not less firm and certain simply because of their being more difficult to explain and justify rationally to others. There are some things that we appear to know without knowing exactly how and why we know them. Even a strict Aristotelian logic of knowing allows for first principles that are self-evident and not subject to further grounding discourses. A decision to favor either transcendence or immanence is likely to presuppose some kind of unmediated assumption or presumed truth that implicitly excludes mediation by its opposite.
In an experiment to see whether forging such a mediation might not be possible after all, Nahum Brown and William Franke convened an international conference at the University of Macau under the auspices of the Programme of Philosophy and Religious Studies in March 2015 in order to explore this key issue in the area specifically of intercultural philosophy. We present the results of our investigation and exchange in the form of this collective volume of selected essays by

- participants in the conference combined with several supplementary invited contributions." (preface, p. X)
26. Bruya, Brian. 2017. "Ethnocentrism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 67:991-1018.
 "In what follows, I will make a case for diversifying philosophy in regard to subject matter. I'll do this in several steps. First I will motivate the project by describing a certain generic model of ethnocentrism. Like the implicit bias project, this model of ethnocentrism demonstrates a depressing fact about human decision making, but rather than leaving it at the level of the individual, it considers the effects of individual action at the level of the group. What is especially distressing about this model is that the decision-making mechanism leverages the strategy of cooperation to implement exclusionism, thereby masking discrimination beneath the self-congratulatory appearance of altruism. The second step will be to give a justification for the benefits of diversity in problem solving, drawing largely from the work of Scott Page, a specialist in political philosophy and complex dynamic systems. Next, I will highlight the benefits of multiculturalism at the individual level from the perspective of experimental psychology. For this, I will draw on the work of psychologist Ying-yi Hong 康瑩儀 among others. From these three mathematical and empirical resources, I will conclude that increasing diversity in philosophy by increasing its multicultural content is instrumentally desirable for students and for the profession. Having established the need for cultural diversity, I show how micromotives biased by ethnocentrism in philosophy are having macroeffects on the field. Finally, I suggest ways to act to help promote cultural diversity in the field of philosophy." (pp. 991-992)
27. ———. 2017. "Reply to Robert Neville." *Philosophy East and West* no. 67:1021-1022.
 "First, a clarification. Professor Neville says that "the point is not to bring in more Chinese (and other ethnic groups with minority status in America) philosophers." This is stated correctly in the sense that my main point is not about identity diversity, but the statement could be misconstrued as an opposition on my part to increasing identity diversity in philosophy programs. I want to prevent such a misconstrual by stating plainly that I think the demographic makeup of American philosophy departments should more or less reflect the demographic makeup of American society." (p. 1021)
28. Burik, Steven. 2009. *The End of Comparative Philosophy and the Task of Comparative Thinking: Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
 "The idea of comparative philosophy which guides me in this book thus has the following characteristics: Comparative philosophy should focus on two things: similarities and differences between ways of thinking. It should however not content itself with merely pointing to these similarities and differences but should instead seek to make them productive in the sense that through these similarities and differences we come to understand better first of all what we are comparing, and second the way in which we compare these philosophies, and that means also our contemporary philosophies and presuppositions of how we perceive our world. I do not believe in one overarching theory or methodology of comparative philosophy. In that sense my approach is hermeneutic, in that it recognizes the necessity of perspectives. There are however a couple of ideas which comparative philosophy should adhere to. It should seek a dialogue, between two different cultural perspectives (and it must be noticed that the Western philosophical tradition, although often one of the interlocutors, is not necessarily always involved), that is based on equivalence. This dialogic approach means that comparative philosophy should try as much as possible to position itself in-between the different cultures. How this in-between is to be perceived is addressed in this book." (p. 4)

29. ———. 2018. "Comment on "Comparative Philosophy: In Response to Rorty and Macintyre" by Rui Zhu." *Philosophy East and West* no. 68:266-270.
 "The brief response by Rui Zhu provides an interesting take on the (by now) perennial problem of what comparative philosophy is or should be. While Zhu makes some interesting observations about and suggestions for comparative philosophy, he chooses contributions to the thinking about the possibilities and methodologies of comparative philosophy that are rather old, though, and my first wonder is: why these two papers, and not more recent contributions to the development of the methodology of comparative philosophy, as can be found in numerous recently published work? Such more recent publications tend to take a more nuanced approach to the idea of (in-)commensurability than the two essays from 1991, given the developments in comparative philosophy in the last twenty-five years."
 (...)
 "In my view, it is a definite advancement that recent comparative philosophy is trying to step away from essentialism, the concept of 'essence' not even being prominent in other traditions such as the Chinese in the first place. This means that postmodern thinkers who have actively challenged the dominant Western tradition provide a more fruitful platform for comparison, since they display the kind of openness often lacking in the 'stricter' philosophers.
 Second and following up on this, using the term 'philosophy' is problematic for comparative philosophers since by the very nature of our profession we would then have to widen the scope of philosophy, which would inevitably result in disagreements about the limits and boundaries of what philosophy is in general."
 (pp. 266-267)
 References
 Zhu, Rui (2018).
30. ———. 2022. "Comparative Philosophy without Method: A Plea for Minimal Constraints." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 203-222. New York: Bloomsbury.
 "When Robert, Ralph, and I first met to discuss this project, my first impression was that I would write a paper on what I thought was the methodology of comparative philosophy. Then I realized that what I thought was the method that I would employ in my work would only be one of the various possible methods. Then I thought that if this was the case, there may virtually be no limit to the number of methods of comparative philosophy. And that informs my claim here: that methodological constraints on comparative philosophy should be minimal and kept minimal." (p. 203)
31. Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W., and Weber, Ralph, eds. 2022. *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*. New York: Bloomsbury.
 Contents: Steven Burik, Robert Smid, and Ralph Weber: Introduction 1;
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"This volume was brought to fruition out of a recognition that, while comparative philosophy is thriving, and while a number of texts within that field of study have been written in a manner that is explicit about its methodological commitments, very little work has been done to bring these many considerations on method and methodology in comparative philosophy together." (p.1)

(...)

"The intended audience for this book is intentionally broad. On the one hand, it is meant to serve as a primer for anyone looking to undertake the task of comparative philosophy. Because there are currently no clear and accessible resources laying out the variety of methodological considerations that are available, younger scholars should find this a valuable resource for weighing these considerations, making an informed choice among them, or perhaps even developing their own approach. On the other hand, it is also intended to broaden the awareness of even seasoned veterans, who would benefit from a more concise, explicit, and recent account of these methods for use in their own work. Ultimately, then, this should be an important resource for anyone writing on comparative philosophy, since upon publication of this text there should be no excuse for any lack of methodological awareness in such works." (pp. 5-6)

32. ———. 2022. "Introduction." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 1-15. New York: Bloomsbury.
- "In the early texts of *Philosophy East and West*, a lot of discussion revolved around world philosophical synthesis (Behuniak 2017) and the desire for world peace is palpable, given that the Second World War had just ended. One would have to assume that our own positionalities and political environments have similar impacts not only on the aims and purposes we attach to our work in comparative philosophy but also to discussions of method within it.
- This book seeks to join ongoing efforts to remedy this situation by presenting, in a concise and accessible format, a diverse set of methodological considerations for comparative philosophy. While it would not be possible to include all of the available alternatives within one volume, presenting a substantially diverse array of such alternatives is enough to challenge myopic understandings of comparative method and encourage a more informed consideration of method.
- Accordingly, this book includes essays by scholars from East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and America, with representatives from a wide variety of philosophical traditions.
- Each essay is meant to be cutting edge insofar as it reflects the authors' latest work in methodology, so that every chapter can serve as an up-to-date methodological resource and viable methodological alternative for any would-be philosophical comparativist." (p. 5)
- References
 Behuniak, Jim (2017), 'John Dewey and East-West Philosophy,' *Philosophy East and West*, 67 (3): 908-16.
33. ———. 2022. "Epilogue." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and

Weber, Ralph, 241-255. New York: Bloomsbury.

"One of the primary purposes of this volume has been to capture the present methodological moment in the history of comparative philosophy. This collection of essays from a wide array of contemporary comparativists reflects on the methodological challenges of our day. Although hardly exhaustive, it provides a snapshot of the present moment, a collective record of sorts, representing many of the shared assumptions, live disagreements, and anticipated possibilities for our field of study in the early part of the twenty-first century. Yet in this century, such documentation is hardly enough:" (p. 241)

34. Burt, E. A. 1948. "How Can the Philosophies of East and West Meet?" *The Philosophical Review* no. 57:590-604.

With my own attempt to understand the philosophies of the East I found myself making little headway until a key idea which I had hitherto failed to appreciate dawned in my mind." (p. 590)

(...)

"The key idea which has brought considerable and steadily increasing illumination to my mind as I confront this situation is that which the modern West usually denotes by the word "context." It gradually became clear to me that when one approaches the philosophy of a different culture whatever success he achieves will be contingent on his pursuing the task in two ways: (1) making full use of such apparent linguistic equivalents as are already available for probing his way into the details of that culture and its specialized forms of thinking; and (2) catching, as soon as he can, something of the genius of its point of view toward life and the world as a whole, and using that insight to throw light on the ideas which have perplexed him and their pattern of relationships with others. Each of these approaches is necessary, because the second cannot be performed in any promising fashion apart from the first, while if the first dispenses with the second it may yield some understanding of the technology, art, and science of the culture studied, but it will not open the door to its philosophy. The indispensability of the second approach is naturally indicated by the term "context," in the special meaning of an all inclusive orientation conceived to be required for the understanding of this or that philosophically relevant detail." (p. 591)

35. Butnor, Ashby, and McWeeny, Jennifer. 2009. "Why Feminist Comparative Philosophy?" *APA Newsletters* no. 9:4-5.

"We see feminist comparative philosophy as a natural outgrowth of both comparative philosophy and feminist philosophy. East-West comparative philosophy and feminist philosophy already share much in terms of methodology: a hermeneutic of openness and respect for difference, a crossing of philosophical boundaries and traditions, a rejection of the dichotomy of theory and practice, and the pursuit of new ways of looking at the world. In our work, we seek to show how bringing diverse philosophical traditions into dialogue with each other can provide fresh insights on questions of specific interest to feminists and global theorists generally. We believe that what distinguishes feminist comparative philosophy from transnational/global/postcolonial feminist theories is that feminist comparative methodology engages an analysis of original and primary *philosophical* sources from the tradition in question. Most importantly, we wish to emphasize that feminist comparative methodology fosters the development of original, creative concepts and ideas that may not have emerged had the philosopher been thinking within the confines of one tradition only" (p. 5)

36. Chakrabarti, Arindam. 2002. "Analytic versus Comparative: A Bogus Dichotomy in Philosophy." *APA Newsletters* no. 2:39-42.

"In the rest of this paper, I propose to indicate a specific research-program in (what Mark Siderits, one of the finest practitioners of analytic comparative Indian philosophy has called) "fusion philosophy," that derives its inspiration from an in-depth study of Abhinavagupta's epistemology of self-consciousness. Such fusion philosophy is nothing very new.

- In a profoundly creative way, K.C. Bhattacharya practiced it when he wrote his "Subject as Freedom" although his writing style is more phenomenological than analytic. In our own times, besides J.N. Mohanty who combines analytic clarity with phenomenological concerns and deep roots in Indian philosophy, Mark Siderits, Jonardon Ganeri and Roy Perrett have published quite a lot of Indian-Western fusion-analytic philosophy in the journals." (p. 40)
37. Chakrabarti, Arindam, and Weber, Ralph, eds. 2016. *Comparative Philosophy without Borders*. New York: Routledge.
Contents: Notes on Contributors VI; Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber: Introduction 1; 1. Tom J. F. Tillemans: Count Nouns, Mass Nouns, and Translatability: The Case of Tibetan Buddhist Logical Literature 35; 2. Barry Hallen: Translation, Interpretation, and Alternative Epistemologies 55; 3. Chien-hsing Ho: Resolving the Ineffability Paradox 69; 4. Laurie L. Patton: The Bowstring is Like a Woman Humming: The Vedic Hymn to the Weapons and the Transformative Properties of Tools 83; 5. Arindam Chakrabarti: How Do We Read Others' Feelings? Strawson and Zhuangzi Speak to Dharmakīrti, Ratnakīrti, and Abhinavagupta 95; 6. Masato Ishida: The Geography of Perception: Japanese Philosophy in the External World 119; 7. Ralph Weber: Authority: Of German Rhinos and Chinese Tigers 143; 8. Sari Nusseibeh: To Justice with Love 175; 9. Sor-hoon Tan: Justice and Social Change 205; Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber: Afterword/Afterwards 227; Index 241.
38. ———. 2016. "Introduction." In *Comparative Philosophy without Borders*, edited by Chakrabarti, Arindam and Weber, Ralph, 1-33. New York: Routledge.
"Three concepts need to be clarified before we can speak intelligibly about *Comparative Philosophy without Borders* avoiding calculated confusion or foreseeable misunderstanding: the concept of *philosophy*, the concept of *comparison* (from which the concept of "comparative" is derived), and the concept of *borders*. Everybody understands and agrees that "without" simply means lacking, which, in this context, must signify coming to lose or erase rather than never having had. Therefore, we need not dwell separately and tediously on the meaning of "without," although in some branches of classical and contemporary Indian metaphysics, the meaning of the particular sort of negation that expresses that peculiar "absence" whereby one thing lacks or sheds another thing or property is also a hot topic. Of the three crucial concepts, then, let us start with the concept of a border, since the concept of philosophy is inexhaustibly controversial (two sides across a border often do not mean the same by "philosophy") and paradox-generatively self-inclusive and we shall have much more substantial and provocative things to say about comparison." (p. 1)
39. ———. 2022. "Global Post-Comparative Philosophy as Just Philosophy." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 159-179. New York: Bloomsbury.
"This chapter revisits some recent controversies around the apparent difficulty of integrating comparative and "non-European philosophy" into philosophy departments in an attempt at distinguishing political from philosophical concerns. How to frame and label the philosophical concerns is important for the political discussion and crucial for achieving a more just philosophy. We argue for a global post-comparative approach, similar to what is also called fusion philosophy. But the results of such an approach should also constitute just-and nothing more than-philosophy, that is, amount to nothing qualitatively different from philosophy. The gist of the matter has to do with methodology, that is, with how to do philosophy. In this spirit, we offer two brief methodological arguments, one pertaining to a weak historicism, the other to the philosophical value of polyglotism, hopefully working toward facilitating the non-exclusionary inclusion of "non-European philosophy," no longer deserving of the label, in a future globally decentered philosophy."

40. Chakrabarti, Kisor K. 2002. "The Problem of Induction: A Comparative Approach." *APA Newsletters* no. 2:36-38.
 "The classical problem of induction was introduced into Indian philosophy fairly early. The legendary figure commonly associated with this is Carvaka (6th century BCE?). His own writings are lost. But many later writers have carefully developed his views." (p. 36)
 (...)

 "We do not imply that Carvaka and Hume hold exactly the same views. [For example, one difference is that for Hume but not for Carvaka, memory is knowledge.] But the similarities are patent enough to merit a comparison. For Hume, the inductive leap from observed to unobserved cases cannot be justified unless one assumes the principle of uniformity of nature and that the future will resemble the past; this involves begging the question. For Carvaka induction cannot be justified by observation alone because the inductive leap invariably goes beyond observation. At the same time, induction cannot be justified by inference or any other non-observational means. The latter must depend on premises that go beyond observation and are themselves dependent on further premises that too go beyond observation. This is doomed to end in infinite regress or circularity; this is similar to Hume's argument. Both again hold that this has no bearing on practical activities that can go on from expectation or habit based on probable opinion rather than knowledge." (p. 36)
41. Chimakonam, Jonathan O., and Chimakonam, Amara E. 2022. "Two Problems of Comparative Philosophy: Why Conversational Thinking Is a Veritable Methodological Option." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 223-239. New York: Bloomsbury.
 "This chapter will investigate what we take to be two of the most urgent comparative philosophy problems. These preceding discussions will pave the way for our proposal of conversational thinking as a veritable methodological option for comparative philosophy. Part of our goal will be to offer "conversational thinking," a burgeoning cross-cultural method, as another veritable option besides Mou's proposal. Another goal would be to produce a conception of comparative philosophy that clearly delineates its boundary. And then, in aligning both our conception and the method of conversational thinking, we will plot a new but clear trajectory for the field of comparative philosophy." (p. 225)
42. Chmielewski, Janusz. 1978. "The Principle of Reductio ad Absurdum against a Comparative Background." *Studia Semiotyczne — English Supplement* no. VIII-XII:139-222.
 Originally published as "Zasada redukcji do absurdu na tle porównawczym," *Studia Semiotyczne* 11 (1981), 21–106. Translated by Lesław Kawalec.
 "The subject of this discussion is the peculiar applications of the logical principle that states that if any sentence implies its own negation, the sentence is false and thus its negation is true." (p. 139)
 (...)

 "Of the issues that merit particular attention in comparative terms, three groups ought to be mentioned that could be summed up in the following initial propositions:
 1. firstly, the principle of the *reductio ad absurdum* was first devised independently (in the sense of being applied in peculiar reasonings) in all three ancient cultural circles that had created their own philosophical speculation: European (Greek), Chinese and Indian (Buddhist Indian);
 2. secondly, relevant reasonings, testified to in these otherwise different philosophies using different languages, are not only similar in form but concern similar if not identical issues and serve similar goals, with the Buddhist Indian circle differing uniquely from the others,
 3. thirdly, the reductive reasonings, which were revelatory in their day, in the light of modern semantics, prove to be covert paralogisms, which in practice do not so

much constitute examples of the application of the principle of the *reductio ad absurdum* but, rather, illustrations of unconscious overuse of the principle." (pp.138-139)

43. Collins, Randall. 1998. *The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press.
 "The topic of this book is a sociology of philosophies, which is to say the abstract conceptions produced by networks of specialized intellectuals turned inward upon their own arguments. This network displays definite social dynamics over the expanse of world history. This topic is not the same thing as the production of popular culture, such as the advertising, pop stars, tourist industry, personal apparel, electronic networks, and their multiplex intercombinations that make up the topics for postmodernist sociology of culture." (p. 12)
 (...)
 "The first three chapters present the general theory. Chapter 1 lays out the theory of interaction ritual chains, which is the micro-core of the argument for the social predictability of intellectuals' thinking. Chapter 2 gives a theory of the network structure which determines the location of creativity, and compares the evidence of networks of Chinese and Greek philosophers over several dozens of generations. The subsequent chapters confront the theory with long-term segments of these intellectual networks and those of India, Japan, the medieval Islamic, Jewish, and Christian worlds, and the European West through the 1930s. Each chapter highlights a particular analytical theme. The chapters need not be read in any particular sequence, although Chapter 3, on ancient Greece, presents some central principles that figure in what follows. A brief summary of the analytical model is given in "Conclusions to Part I: The Ingredients of Intellectual Life." Chapter 15 presents the conclusions of the entire analysis in a sketch of the pathways along which intellectuals through their debates drive the sequence of ideas during long periods of time. The reader may find it useful as a road map of the book. The Epilogue draws epistemological conclusions from the whole argument." (p. 15)
44. Connolly, Tim. 2015. *Doing Philosophy Comparatively*. New York: Bloomsbury.
 "This book is divided into three parts. Part I covers the definition of comparative philosophy and its central concepts. Critics have challenged both the comparative and the philosophical aspects of the field, and we begin by considering whether these criticisms are justified, focusing first on the definition of "philosophy" in comparative philosophy (Chapter 1). From there we turn our focus to the meaning of "comparison;" examining two main ways in which the study of thinkers and texts from culturally distinct traditions has been thought to be philosophically fruitful (Chapter 2). Finally, we look at the meaning of "culture" and "tradition" themselves and how they are related to the practice of comparative philosophy (Chapter 3). Part II focuses on the central methodological problems of comparative philosophy. Because the thinkers or texts being compared have been formed according to the languages, concepts, and standards of justification of their distinctive cultures and traditions, there is the issue of whether it is possible for philosophers from one tradition to understand and evaluate those from another-the problem of incommensurability (Chapters 4 and 5). Even if it is possible, the forced or unequal application of one tradition's categories can lead to a distorted image of the other-the problem of one-sidedness (Chapter 6). Finally, there is the difficulty of situating the items compared within the larger cultural traditions of which they are part-the problem of generalization (Chapter 7). We will consider the various challenges each problem poses as well as the main strategies that comparative philosophers have developed to overcome them.
 Part III gives brief discussions of four approaches to comparative philosophy: universalism (Chapter 8), pluralism (Chapter 9), consensus (Chapter 10), and global philosophy (Chapter 11). While in reality there are as many approaches to comparative philosophy as there are comparative philosophers, I focus on these four because they illustrate basic orientations toward similarity and difference.

- Universalism emphasizes points of convergence between different philosophical-cultural traditions; pluralism, points of divergence; consensus, a means of balancing points of convergence and divergence; and global philosophy, a rejection of the convergence / divergence model of comparison in favor of creative interaction between traditions at specific points. I hope that this last section of the book not only gives readers some sense of the competing models under which productive work in comparative philosophy has taken place, but also encourages them to think about how to improve or go beyond these models." (p. 7)
45. Cooper, David E. 2002. *World Philosophies: A Historical Introduction*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Second revised edition (First edition 1996).
"The title of this book is ambiguous. 'World philosophies' might refer to philosophies from around the world, or it might mean something like 'world-views', theories on the grand scale about 'The World'. My title is intended to bear both senses, so it is a pun." (Introduction, p. 1)
(...)
"The present book, then, attempts to redress an imbalance: the 'world philosophies' it presents are indeed from 'around the world', sizeable chunks of it, at any rate: India, China, Japan, the Near and Middle East, and Africa, as well as Europe and North America." (p. 2)
(,,)
"Indeed, it is not only geographical comprehensiveness that the book lacks: for its subject is not philosophy at large, but *philosophies*. 'Philosophy', as the name of a very general intellectual activity, does not have a plural, no more than does 'music'; and philosophies no more exhaust the field of philosophy than music consists entirely in the outpouring of musicals. Philosophies, like musicals, are particular products of the more general activity." (p. 2)
46. Creller, Aaron B. 2016. "Introducing the World: Making Time for Islamic and Chinese Material alongside the Western Canon." *ASIANetwork Exchange* no. 23:124-138.
Abstract: "In this essay I consider the challenges faced by non-specialists in comparative philosophy. I address several familiar objections to incorporating non-Western material into standing philosophy courses (i.e., the view that the material is, indeed, not included in the category philosophy, or the worry that there simply is not enough time to cover such material). In answering these objections, I emphasize that what we today call the "Western" canon has historically been shaped by a plurality of cultures. I then conclude with several sample course modules, designed to help non-specialists incorporate sessions on Islamic and Chinese philosophy into introductory classes."
47. ———. 2018. *Making Space for Knowing: A Capacious Approach to Comparative Epistemology*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
"Contemporary mainstream epistemology suffers from an overly narrow focus on propositional knowledge." (p. X)
(...)
"In this book, I focus on illustrating not only how this narrow definition has prevented analytic epistemology from adequately integrating its own accounts of non-propositional knowledge (i.e. skill-based knowledge or interpersonal knowledge), but also on how it fails to adequately account for the structure of propositional knowledge itself. In response to this narrow definition, I construct an alternative using Western and non-Western resources that both solves this initial problem as well as addresses the problems of objectivity and cross-cultural, comparative approaches to knowledge. In this way, I seek to reopen the space closed by analytic epistemology in order to better account for knowledge in its various forms, especially across cultural divides." (p. XI)
48. Dallmayr, Fred. 1996. *Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"This book is a collection of essays rather than a systematic treatise - for reasons having to do with the topic of inquiry. Proceeding in linear fashion from start to finish, a systematic treatise presupposes a standpoint outside or above the welter of competing cultures and life-forms, a standpoint permitting an objective and "totalizing" overview.

This assumption goes against the very grain of cross-cultural encounter, which has to start "from the ground up" and in a dialogical fashion, offering only the uncertain prospect of a learning experience. Coming from a European or Western background, I certainly cannot pretend to a superior or encompassing perspective; all I can claim is to have been sometimes the instigator and always the beneficiary of cultural learning-in a manner which hopefully will also be beneficial to readers. In the contemporary political climate, I definitely do not wish to give aid and comfort to a homogenizing globalism or universalism, which often is only a smokescreen for neocolonial forms of domination.

Although a collection of essays, this book is not simply a string of haphazardly linked vignettes. In a cautious and subdued manner the sequence of chapters is held together by a line of argument which moves forward (without being coercively systematic). The opening chapter discusses the broad range of possible "modes" of cross-cultural encounter in a historical perspective. Following a path of normative-ethical ascent, the discussion ranges from strategies of conquest, conversion, and assimilation to more benign forms of interaction, culminating in a model of dialogical reciprocity and exchange. Drawing its inspiration chiefly from Gadamer and Derrida, the book then develops as preferred option the notion of a 'deconstructive dialogue' or a 'hermeneutics of difference' where dialogical exchange respects otherness beyond assimilation. Concentrating on the relation between India and the West, subsequent chapters examine the work of several prominent bridge builders across cultures, primarily the Indian philosophers Radhakrishnan and J. L. Mehta and the German-American philosopher and Indologist Wilhelm Halbfass. Proceeding to a broader comparative level a centerpiece of the book juxtaposes Western thought and Indian thought along the lines of a distinction between decontextualized and context-bound modes of cultural discourse. The remaining chapters shift the accent to more concrete social-political problems, including the issues of social development (or "modernization"), multiculturalism, and the prospects of a globalized democracy." (Preface, pp. XI-XII)

49. Davidson, Donald. 1974. "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme." *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* no. 47:5-20. Reprinted in D. Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984, pp. 183-198.
- "Philosophers of many persuasions are prone to talk of conceptual schemes. Conceptual schemes, we are told, are ways of organizing experience; they are systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures, or periods survey the passing scene. There may be no translating from one scheme to another, in which case the beliefs, desires, hopes and bits of knowledge that characterize one person have no true counterparts for the subscriber to another scheme. Reality itself is relative to a scheme: what counts as real in one system may not in another.
- Even those thinkers who are certain there is only one conceptual scheme are in the sway of the scheme concept; even monotheists have religion. And when someone sets out to describe "our conceptual scheme," his homey task assumes, if we take him literally, that there might be rival systems.
- Conceptual relativism is a heady and exotic doctrine, or would be if we could make good sense of it. The trouble is, as so often in philosophy, it is hard to improve intelligibility while retaining the excitement. At any rate that is what I shall argue." (p. 5)
50. Davis, Bret. 2009. "Step Back and Encounter: From Continental to Comparative Philosophy." *Comparative and Continental Philosophy* no. 1:9-22.

Abstract: "By drawing on the insights of a number of continental as well as Asian thinkers, this article reflects on the "significance" of comparative philosophy—both in the sense of discussing the "meaning" and in the sense of arguing for the "importance" of this endeavor. Encountering another culture allows one to deepen one's self-understanding by learning to "see oneself from the outside"; this deeper self-understanding in turn allows one to listen to what the other culture has to say. These two moments, or movements, are interdependent and mutually supportive. Without the step back to self-understanding, we unknowingly reduce the other to the unrecognized categories of our own thinking; but without encountering another culture, our understanding of our own culture remains shallow. This article argues that an engagement with non-Western philosophy, particularly with a set of traditions as rich and radically different as those of Asian thought, can and should take place as a hermeneutic circling between self-understanding and openness to encounter: the dialogical step back and step forward are mutually supportive endeavors. For only by way of such dialogue do we attain the concrete freedom and possibility for transformation and change, that is, the ability to critically and creatively develop old customs or modes of thought and to critically and creatively adopt new ones. Moreover, only through such dialogue can we learn to not only let others be, but to share insights with them, and to build together a global community which neither reifies nor abolishes cultural differences."

51. Daye, Douglas Dunsmore. 1976. "Language and the Languages of East-West Philosophy: An Introduction." *Philosophy East and West* no. 26:113-115.
 "To continue the lineage of workshops sponsored by the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, there was held in the Spring, 1975, a series of four panels, which focused upon various aspects of the theme of this year's workshop, Language and the Languages of Philosophy: East and West. This workshop, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies on March 23 and 24, 1975, consisted of three major papers and three critics during each of four sessions."
 (...)
 "From the twelve excellent papers noted above, five were chosen to be included in this issue, since they illustrated many of the various philosophical directions exemplified in the four panels." (p. 113)
 Papers included in in this issue:
 Richard S. Y. Chi, *A Semantic Study of Propositions, East and West*, pp. 211-223.
 Ashok K. Gangadean, *Formal Ontology and Movement between Worlds*, pp. 167-188.
 Robert M. Gimello, *Apophatic and kataphatic Discourse in Mahāyāna: A Chinese View*, pp. 117-136.
 Luis O. Gómez, *Proto-Mādhyamika in the Pāli Canon*, pp. 137-165.
 Chad D. Hansen, *Mass Nouns and "A White Horse Is Not a Horse"*, pp. 189-209.
52. Defoort, Carine. 2001. "Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy? Arguments of an Implicit Debate." *Philosophy East and West* no. 51:393-413.
 "It is certainly not my intention to solve the crucial question concerning the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy once and for all - this would be an impossible task given the indecision governing the definition of the concept of philosophy even in the West. Nor do I wish to call into question the legitimacy or value of two domains that are closely adjacent to the theme of this essay, namely philosophy in China - the philosophical activities of contemporary Chinese academics - and current Chinese philosophy, insofar as this refers to a purely geographical variant of something like contemporary Continental philosophy. The arguments presented here concern only the traditional Chinese body of thought, which is generally labeled as Chinese philosophy. A clear definition of our domain is thus our first task." (p. 394, a note omitted)
53. ———. 2020. "The Exclusion of Chinese Philosophy: "Ten Don'ts," "Three Represents," and "Eight Musts"." *Philosophy East and West* no. 70:214-225.

Book discussion of: *Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought*. By Eric S. Nelson. London, Oxford, New York, New Delhi, Sydney: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017.

Abstract: "The legitimacy of Chinese philosophy is a thorny topic that has returned in waves during the last decades. The high tides were 2003 and 2016. While the topic can and has been discussed from a wide variety of points of view, most debates focus on the Chinese side: either on the nature and quality of early Chinese master texts (e.g., "Do they fit the demands of philosophy?") or on current research at Chinese philosophy departments (e.g., "How should the Chinese intellectual heritage be studied?" "Is it philosophically interesting?"). Such reflections are important and deserve to be continued.

However, one side of the issue usually remains out of view: the Western philosophers themselves, who lay the burden of proof almost exclusively with the Chinese masters or scholars. Since when, where, and how have scholars denied Chinese masters the label of "philosophy"? How explicit has the debate been? What were the various views and their historical or intellectual contexts? How did the debate evolve? What are its current implications and future prospects? These historically inspired philosophical questions differ in orientation from the dominant approaches. Even though they may not necessarily solve the disagreement concerning the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy, they do throw a fascinating light on the nature of (Western) philosophy." (A note omitted)

54. Deng, Xize. 2010. "Problem and Method: The Possibility of Comparative Study—Using "Lun Liujia Yaozhi" as an Example." *Frontiers of hilosophy in China* no. 5:575-600.

Abstract: "On the basis of general characteristics, comparative studies can be restricted by cross-cultural comparison in a narrow sense. In this paper, I take "Chinese philosophy" as an example to investigate the current problems within comparative studies. However, it is possible to embark on comparative study. "Lun Liujia Yaozhi" 论六家要旨 ("Discussion on the Main Points of the Six Schools") conducts a successful comparison, from which we can extract the comparative method of "Problem and Method," and it points directly to the basic structure of survival activities, and furnishes the possibility for cross-cultural comparisons."