

Theory and History of Ontology

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Annotated Bibliography of John P. Doyle (1966-2016)

John Patrick Doyle (born 1930) is Professor Emeritus of philosophy at Saint Louis University and Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Kenrick-Glennon Seminary in Shrewsbury, Missouri; his main area research is late medieval philosophy; he has published seven volumes of translations from Latin, a volume of Collected Studies on Francisco Suárez, and over fifty articles, essays, and encyclopedia entries.

I wish to thank Professor Doyle for helping me to complete this bibliography.

Abbreviations:

CSS = John P. Doyle, *Collected Studies on Francisco Suárez S.J. (1548-1617)*. Edited by Victor M. Salas, Leuven: Leuven University Press 2010

BBK = John P. Doyle, *On the Borders of Being and Knowing. Late Scholastic Theory of Supertranscendental Being*. Edited by Victor M. Salas, Leuven: Leuven University Press 2012

COMPLETE BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Doyle, John Patrick. 1966. *The Metaphysical Nature of the Proof for God's Existence According to Francis Suárez S.J.*, University of Toronto. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation.
2. ———. 1967. "Suárez on the Reality of the Possibles." *Modern Schoolman* no. 44:29-48. Reprinted as Chapter 2 in *CSS*.

"The first of twelve essays which follow the introduction ("Suarez on the Reality of the Possibles") agrees with Etienne Gilson's view of Suárez as an heir to the Avicennian doctrine of the possibles, while it adds the refinement that a possible here equates with a not-impossible or with a non-self-contradictory essence. The key to this is provided by the Scotist doctrine that "What is not non-being, is being" (*Quod non est non-ens est ens*). The main distillate from Suárez's teaching is a lowest common denominator concept of being which is found everywhere from mere possibles to the most actual being of God." (*CS* p. XI).

"This article shows that for Francisco Suarez the core reality of possible beings is their non-self-contradiction. Their intrinsic claim to inclusion under the common concept of Being and the Suarezian analogy of Being resides in the fact that as non-repugnant they are not non-being. So understood, they are actually nothing but still more than mere beings of reason. Of themselves, they are eternally true and apt to be known, even if there were no God. Far beyond this, their reality is such that if they were not what they are, there would be no God and, ' *a fortiori*', none of the actual creatures which depend upon him."

3. ———. 1969. "Suárez on the Analogy of Being (First part)." *Modern Schoolman* no. 46:219-249.
Reprinted as Chapter 3 in *CSS*.

"The next essay (" *Suarez on the Analogy of Being*") presents the ground plan of Suarezian metaphysics and gives a more detailed account of Suárez's thoughts on the formal and objective concepts of being, as well as on being as a participle and being as a noun. Coupled with this is his identification of the subject of metaphysics with the *one common objective concept of being as a noun*. This in turn is identified with what is *apt to exist* - what is non-contradictory of itself and what importantly excludes beings of reason. The basic Suarezian analogy of intrinsic attribution presupposes this common concept and works within it. The essay goes on to show the main program of Suárez's metaphysics, which is to treat the general concept of being and then to follow its internal demand for partition into God and creatures. In this, real being for Suarez is *one*, but neither a genus nor *simpliciter simplex* in the manner of Scotus. In creatures as well as in God, its common denominator is aptitude for existence in the sense of intrinsic non-contradiction. This marks the difference between possibles and beings of reason and reduces real being in the widest sense to that which is "not nothing." Then despite the gradation in their analogous sharing of being, God and creatures, including mere possibles, are equal in their lack of intrinsic contradiction." (*CS* p. XII).

4. ———. 1969. "Suárez on the Analogy of Being (Second part)." *Modern Schoolman* no. 46:323-341.
Reprinted as Chapter 3 in *CSS*.

"Francis Suárez doctrine of the analogy of being requires that one common character of being be found intrinsically but unequally, according to an order of prior and posterior, in those inferiors of which the one, common, objective concept of being as a noun is predicated.

Problems are that the requirement of intrinsicality has forced Suarez to give a shadow reality to merely possible things while the need for inequality has militated against the all important unity of the common character or concept of being."

5. ———. 1972. "Heidegger and Scholastic Metaphysics." *Modern Schoolman* no. 49:201-220.
Reprinted as Chapter 4 in *CSS*.

"The third essay ("Suarezian and Thomistic Metaphysics before the Judgment of Heidegger" - which is a change from the original title, "Heidegger and Scholastic Metaphysics"), contends that Heidegger's criticism of medieval metaphysics is aimed directly at the Avicennian-Scotistic-Suarezian metaphysics rather than at that of St. Thomas Aquinas. While written from a Thomistic viewpoint, for present purposes this essay highlights the difference between the Suarezian science of being as the non-contradictory and the Thomistic metaphysics of *esse*. For the Suarezian metaphysics, the essay notes nuances and raises questions linked with: the Scotistic equation of being and thinkability; the rooting of thinkability in non-contradiction; using the *passiones disjunctae entis* as the basis of a progression in metaphysics; justifying any progression in a metaphysics of the non-contradictory; and Heidegger's rejection of any speech-governed metaphysics as well as his accusation of "*Seinsvergessenheit*." This essay might be improved by an addendum that would take into account Heidegger's famous Marburg lectures, which were not available at the time I composed my original text." (*CSS* p. XII).

"Regarding Heidegger's appraisal of Scholastic metaphysics, we have asked: (1) is he right about the sort of metaphysics represented by Scotus and Suarez? and (2) is he correct in equating all medieval metaphysics with this type of Scotistic-Suarezian metaphysics?

We have answered the first question in the affirmative and have replied negatively to the second."

6. ———. 1972. "Person: a Christian Contribution." *Social Justice Review* no. LXV:184-186.
7. ———. 1972. "A Suggested Modification of the Critical Text of the Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus" *Manuscripta. A Journal for Manuscript Research* no. 16:30-32.
8. ———. 1973. "*Ipsum Esse* as God-Surrogate: The Point of Convergence of Faith and Reason for St. Thomas Aquinas." *Modern Schoolman* no. 50:293-296.
"Since, for St. Thomas Aquinas, "cognita sunt in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis," even revealed truths must be phrased in terms which we can naturally understand. But the very best term which

we can naturally muster for God-talk is "ipsum esse," a term to which we come across the medium of a demonstration "quia" from the being of creatures. As such, it has obvious limitations.

It does not supply us with an immediate knowledge of the divine reality, but it is, instead, a surrogate for God who remains unknown in himself. This surrogate then is employed in theology not only at the level of "de Deo uno" but also at the very heart of "de Deo trino". As so employed, it is patently the point of convergence of faith and reason for St Thomas."

9. ———. 1974. "Saint Bonaventure and the Ontological Argument." *Medieval Studies* no. 52:27-48.
"For St Bonaventure the self-evident truth of God's existence can be shown forth by 'intellectual exercises' like that of St Anselm.

Such exercises are not simple-minded transits from the ideal to the real order. Rather they are based upon a sophisticated metaphysics; they involve the experience of common intelligibility.

With Plato, they accept the 'really real' character of that intelligibility. Implicitly, they also accept a plurality and a one-way hierarchy of intelligibles leading up to a 'First'. Turning then precisely upon the unprincipiated nature of this 'First', they spread before us its absolute necessity both in reality and for thought."

10. ———. 1979. "Some Thoughts on Duns Scotus and the Ontological Argument." *New Scholasticism* no. 53:234-241.
"Duns Scotus has substituted the notion of a "highest thinkable" for Anselm's "that than which a greater cannot be thought." For Scotus, the touchstone of "thinkability" is non-contradiction. He resumes the non-contradictory and therefore the thinkable character of God. He then shows God's existence in two steps: (1) from thinkability to essential reality, and (2) from essence to existence. The first step involves Scotus in some inconsistency and also comes close to making man's mind the very rule of reality. The second step entails a confusion of internal possibility with total possibility, which ordinarily, beyond internal possibility, includes an external potency."
11. ———. 1982. "The Suarezian Proof for God's Existence." In *History of Philosophy in the Making. A Symposium of Essays to Honor Professor James D. Collins on his 65th Birthday*, edited by Thro, Linus J., 105-117. Washington: University Press of America.
Reprinted as Chapter 5 in *CSS*.

"Essay four after the introduction ("The Suarezian Proof for God's Existence") pursues the entailment of the common concept of being as a noun as it is divided into God and creatures. Fundamentally, the essay argues that Suárez's metaphysical proof for God's existence, which is the pivotal point of his metaphysics and whose Avicennian roots he has expressly embraced, amounts to an ontological argument of the type later criticized by Kant." (*CSS* p. XII).

12. ———. 1984. "Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Work of Francis Suárez S.J." *Vivarium* no. 22:121-160.
Reprinted as Chapter 6 in *CSS*.

"In the next essay (*Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Work of Francis Suarez, S.J.*), I looked to discover in Suárez's use of *extrinsic denomination* rules which might adumbrate the Kantian *a priori*. While I found that in regard to extrinsic denomination Suarez did observe conventions which I was able to catalog, these did not in any clear way anticipate Kant. Indeed, I may have discovered the opposite. For although, on its face, extrinsic denomination might seem to be simply a matter of names imposed by us on things, my study showed that Suarez thought it to be a feature of things themselves, anterior to any operation of ours. In this, it clearly stood on the side of real being as opposed to being of reason." (*CS* p. XII-XIII).

"At times, extrinsic denomination for Suarez seems close to, if not synonymous with, a mere naming from the outside. But at other times, it is regarded as a feature of things themselves. In this article, there is some description and some examples of extrinsic denomination according to Suarez. Following this, are some of his reasons for and sources of such denomination. Special attention is paid to his use of extrinsic denomination in connection with the properties and categories of being. Finally, there are listed conventions and other items observed in Suarez's use of extrinsic denomination."

13. ———. 1984. "The Unborn as Person." In *Restoring the Right to Life: The Human Life Amendment*,

edited by Bopp, James Jr., 81-88; 218-221. Provo, Utah.

14. ———. 1985. "The Conimbricenses on the Relations Involved in Signs." In *Semiotics 1984*, edited by Deely, John, 567-576. New York: University Press of America.
 " *Conimbricenses* is the name of a group of Jesuit professors of philosophy at the University of Coimbra during the latter half of the sixteenth century. It is also the name given to a five volume set of philosophical commentaries on Aristotle which they edited and published between 1592 and 1606. The last volume to appear was a Logic entitled: *Commentarii in universam dialecticam Aristotelis* (Friedrich Stegmüller, *Filosofia e teologia nas universidades de Coimbra e Evora no seculo XVI*, Coimbra, Universidade de Coimbra, 1959 pp. 95-96).

(...)

The particular work, with which I am now concerned, is their commentary on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*. More precisely, my concern is with the first chapter of that commentary. Entitled *De signo* (On the Sign), it runs over 60 pages in quarto. While some treatment of signs at this place in Aristotelian commentary was common among the Scholastics, these pages of the *Conimbricenses* represent, as far as I know, the first really major treatise on signs as such which we have from the Scholastic period. The table of contents of the chapter gives a pretty fair indication of its character.

Principal issues raised are four: (1) On the nature and conditions common to signs; (2) On the divisions of signs; (3) On the signification of spoken words (*voces*) and of writing; (4) Whether some concepts in our minds are true or false, and others devoid of truth and falsity. Along the way there are sub-questions about the essence of a sign, the possibility of something being a sign of itself, signs as actual or aptitudinal, the relations involved in signs, *et cetera*. Although this commentary is a work of logic, the *Conimbricenses* explicitly aware of further epistemological, psychological, metaphysical, and theological questions which can be raised with regard to signs and signification. At the same time, they also display a remarkable understanding of the breadth and scope of semiotics itself.

Some of the items which they have touched on different ways are the following: language, syntactical speech, laughing, nodding, coughing, persons talking in sleep, persons lying, persons emitting words without thought. They consider the signification of negative words, of syncategorematic words such as "if", nonsense words like "Blictri", and words like "chimaera" and "goat-stag" to which no real things correspond. They are interested in the signs involved in writing and reading, especially voiceless reading. Coupled with a discussion of the physiological bases of speech and hearing, they treat the relation of deafness and an inability to speak or communicate." pp. 567-568.

15. ———. 1987. "Suárez on Truth and Mind-Dependent Beings: Implications for a Unified Semiotic." In *Semiotics 1983*, edited by Jonathan, Evans and Deely, John, 121-133. New York: University Press of America.
16. ———. 1987. "Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (First part)." *Vivarium* no. 25:47-75.
 Reprinted as Chapter 7 in *CSS* and as Chapter 2 in *BBK*.

"The sixth essay after the introduction ("Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth"), against a background view of truth as a function of being, considers Suárez's response to the question of truth where there is no real being independent of the mind. If truth consists in a conformity between the mind and reality, how can there be any truth where there is no independent reality? Most of all, how can there be any truth where something would be impossible of realization? In last analysis, Suárez's reply turns upon the significative cast of the words involved in the expression of beings of reason, especially so called impossible objects. Because, unlike mere nonsense words such as "*Blytiri*" or "*scyndapsus*," words like "*goat-stag*" or "*chimera*" have signification, there is in their regard, and in regard to the beings of reason they express, the possibility of some statements being true even as others are false." (*CSS* p. XIII).

17. ———. 1987. "Peter John Olivi on Right, Dominion, and Voluntary Signs." In *Semiotics 1986*, 419-429. New York.
18. ———. 1988. "Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (Second part)." *Vivarium* no. 26:51-72.
 Reprinted as Chapter 7 in *CSS* and as Chapter 2 in *BBK*.

"From Parmenides on, it has been a commonplace in the Western philosophical tradition that truth is a function of being. One need only remember the general Platonic doctrine of Forms, which are at once 'really real' and the locus of intelligibility of truth. Francis Suarez has passed on the common teaching of the Schoolmen that truth is threefold. (1) There is a truth in words, in writing, and in what he calls 'non-ultimate concepts' which is termed truth 'in signifying'. (2) There is a truth in the intellect knowing things, which is called truth 'in knowing'. And (3) there is a truth in things, which is a truth 'in being'."

"This is the completion of a two-part article which considers Suarez's reply to the question of truth where there is no real being independent of the mind. That reply turns upon the significative cast of the words expressing beings of reason, especially "impossible" beings. Because such words, unlike nonsense syllables, have signification, there is in their regard, and in regard to the beings of reason they express, the possibility of some statements being true even as others are false."

19. ———. 1988. "Thomas Compton Carleton S.J.: On Words Signifying More Than Their Speakers or Makers Know or Intend." *Modern Schoolman* no. 66:1-28.
"For Carleton (1591-1666) words have power to signify independent of their speakers. Moreover, while first wordmaker may control the extension of his words, he cannot control their intension. Words can signify something more clearly to a hearer than that same thing was understood by the one who first established a word to express it. Carleton clearly demarcates the roles of speakers and wordmakers and foreshadows current concerns about extension versus intension of words."
20. ———. 1990. "*Extrinsic Cognoscibility*: a Seventeenth Century Supertranscendental Notion." *Modern Schoolman* no. 68:57-80.
Reprinted as Chapter 3 in *BBK*.

"This essay explores the area of intentionality in late Scholasticism. For Suarez the subject of metaphysics is 'real being' which is transcendental but exclusive of beings of reason. After Suarez, the Calvinist Clemens Timpler says that the subject of metaphysics is 'the intelligible,' which encompasses both real and unreal, even impossible, beings. Also for 17th century Jesuit logicians what seems common to real beings and beings of reason, including impossible objects, is 'cognoscibility.' More precisely, this is 'extrinsic cognoscibility,' which is labeled 'supertranscendental.' In Timpler and the Jesuits I see anticipations of Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie* (Theory of objects)."

21. ———. 1991. "Suárez on the Unity of a Scientific Habit." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 65:311-334.
Reprinted as Chapter 8 in *CSS*.

"The next essay ("Suárez on the Unity of a Scientific Habit") explores Suárez's reply to the question: how is a science such as geometry somehow undivided in itself and divided off from arithmetic, or from other speculative sciences such as physics and metaphysics? Is there a basis in things themselves for such indivision and division? Or is it something entirely or in part supplied by the knower? Connected with this is a question about the growth of a habit of science. Suárez's view is that any collection of conclusions making up a scientific habit will have at best only an artificial unity but nevertheless one which in some way rests on an aptitude in things to be so unified. However, as the essay shows, this view plainly raises as many questions as it answers, and Suárez's admitted perplexity is understandable." (*CS* p. XIII).

22. ———. 1991. "Francisco Suárez: On Preaching Gospel to People Like the American Indians." *Fordham International Law Journal* no. 15:879-951.
Reprinted as Chapter 10 in *CSS*.

"The ninth essay after the introduction ("Francisco Suarez: On Preaching the Gospel to People like the American Indians") was written in commemoration of the 500th anniversary of the European discovery of America. As its title suggests, the essay considers Suárez's doctrine on evangelization against the background of a new situation, a new opportunity, and new obligations for European Christians. On the basis of related passages and themes in his *Opera omnia* it attempts to fathom some of his deepest thoughts with respect to the personhood and rights of the American Indians in face of Christ's last command that his followers teach all nations. Along the way, it presents a fairly extended study of Suárez's views on the basic equality of all human beings, the character of human society (domestic and especially political), morality and law (Eternal, natural, and civil, including

the "law of nations" [jus gentium]), sovereignty, jurisdiction, war and conquest, Church and state, as well as a host of other issues." (CS p. XIV).

23. Doyle, John Patrick, and Charron, William C. 1993. "On the Self-Refuting Statement 'There is no Truth'. A Medieval Treatment." *Vivarium* no. 31:241-266.
"It is commonly known that 14th and 15th century logicians were deeply interested in the properties of self-referring statements.

Perhaps, however, it could be better known that medieval theologians were also interested in them. In this regard, one important discussion centered around the proposition "There is no truth" ("Nulla Veritas est"). Construed as a universal negative about an entire class of items of which it itself is a member, it is partially self-referring. And just because it is self-referring it also seems to be self-refuting: if it is true, then it is false; if it is false, then something is true. Thus, its contradictory is necessarily true, namely "There is some truth".

The history here goes back many centuries through a line of theologians and ultimately to St. Augustine. (1) Following him, St. Anselm, St. Bonaventure, and others claimed to have found in the self-refutation of the denial of truth a foundational premise adequate

to support other claims about God and immortality. But this was not without opposition from theological colleagues and successors, including Aquinas, Scotus, and in the post medieval period, Cajetan, and Toletus. Criticism came at either of two points: the critics

objected(a) that the self-referring character of the denial of truth does not entail the truth of what is claimed, or (b) that the truth which the self-refutation is purported to establish is not itself sufficient to found the metaphysical constructions it is further claimed to found.

An unraveling of this ancient debate -- beginning our story with Augustine in the 4th century and ending it with Toletus in the 16th reveals the appreciation among these theologians of ever more powerful tools of logical analysis, tools that have proven to be of lasting use." (pp. 241-242)

(1) Interest in self-refutation is common among ancient Greek and Hellenistic philosophers. Sextus Empiricus provides a notable statement of the alleged self refutation of the proposition in which we are interested. Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*, I 398-9, II 55, ed. and tr. R.G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge 1935, II, 213, 265. "Now as to those who assert that all things are false,... they are confuted. For if all things are false, the statement 'All things are false,' being one of the 'all things', will be false. And if the statement 'All things are false' is false, its contradictory, 'Not all things are false,' will be true. Therefore, if all things are false, not all things are false." (p. 265) For the history of the notion of self- refutation, see M. F. Burnyeat, 'Protagoras and Self- Refutation in Later Greek Philosophy', in: *The Philosophical Review*, 85 (1976), 44-69.

24. Doyle, John Patrick. 1994. "Poinsoot on the Knowability of Beings of Reason." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 68:337-362.
"John Poinsoot (a.k.a. Joannes a sancto Thoma (1589-1644) was heir to a common division of beings into these that are in themselves real and those which are entirely dependent upon human reason. Those division went back to Aristotle's split between being as found in the categories and being as true. In the Middle Ages and thorough the period of the Spanish Revival, it was found, *mutatis mutandis*, in Averroes (d. 1198), St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), Henry of Ghent (1217?-1293), John Duns Scotus (1266-1308), Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), and just about everyone else in the Scholastic tradition.

One of the very few exceptions that I know to this general rule was Francis of Mayronnes, O.F.M. (d. ca. 1325), who denied the existence of beings of reason. Not only an heir, Poinsoot himself embraced and transmitted the common view. For him, beings were either real or rational. Real beings (*res extra animam*) were those which exist, or can exist, independently of the human mind and which belong in the Aristotelian categories. Rational beings, or beings of reason, in the sense which contrasts with this, were those which do not belong to the categories, and which cannot exist outside human understanding. That there are such beings of reason was not for Poinsoot a matter of doubt."

25. ———. 1995. "Another God, Chimerae, Goat-Stags, and Man-Lions: a Seventeenth Century Debate About Impossible Objects." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 48:771-808.
Reprinted as Chapter 4 in *BBK* and as Post-Scriptum in: Victor M. Salas (ed.), *Hircocervi & Other*

Metaphysical Wonders. Essays in Honor of John P. Doyle, Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 2013, pp. 329-367.

"This article concerns a 17th Century debate over whether there are self-contradictory impossible objects of understanding or whether there is no intellectual object which is not some actual or possible being. The debate, which has its roots in the Greek and Scholastic traditions, is presented especially between two Jesuits: Thomas Compton Carleton and John Morawski, respectively, a proponent and an opponent of impossible objects. The article itself does not take sides in the debate, but, inasmuch as he wrote later, Morawski is presented as espousing his own view and answering arguments in support of Carleton's position."

26. Suárez, Francisco. 1995. *On Beings of Reason (De Entibus Rationis). Metaphysical Disputation LIV* by Francisco Suárez. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Translated from the Latin with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.

"Suárez's *Disputationes metaphysicae* is to this day the most comprehensive and systematic treatise on metaphysics written from an Aristotelian perspective. It addresses every metaphysical issue raised by medieval and Renaissance scholastics and discusses the views of all important figures who preceded Suárez. As such it is a treasure-trove not only for the metaphysician but also for the historian and has exercised enormous influence on early modern philosophy, particularly in Continental Europe. (...) The Disputation deals with mental entities and, therefore, contains relevant discussions to the philosophy of mind and the ontological status of intensional objects."

Jorge J. E. Gracia - State University of New York at Buffalo.

"In a finely wrought and philosophically intelligible translation of this 54th Disputation of Suárez, John P. Doyle has documented with care the ancient Greek and Medieval sources of Suárez's discussion, its influence upon many hitherto unknown late Scholastic writers and the relevance of Suárez's intentionality theory to such prominent figures in early, middle and late Modern thought as Descartes, Berkeley, Leibniz, Kant, Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, B. Russell, Heidegger and others."

Norman J. Wells, Boston College.

27. Doyle, John Patrick. 1996. "Silvester Mauro, S.J. (1619-1687) on Four Degree of Abstraction." *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 36.
Reprinted as Chapter 7 in *BBK*.

"Mauro says there are four degrees of abstraction. The lowest is 'physical', abstracting from material singulars. The second is 'mathematical', abstracting not just from singulars, but also from sensible and changeable matter as such. A third is 'metaphysical', abstracting from all matter and opening on to real immaterial being. Peculiar to Mauro and marking a departure from orthodox Aristotelianism is the last and highest degree, which is 'logical'. At this level, we consider intentional being -- which he says is more immaterial than real being, including that studied by metaphysics, in as much as 'being known' is identical with being elevated from matter."

28. ———. 1997. "Between Transcendental and Transcendental: The Missing Link?" *Review of Metaphysics* no. 50:783-815.
Reprinted as Chapter 8 in *BBK*.

"Medieval transcendentals are on the side of things while Kantian transcendentalism is on the side of the knower. Is there a link between the two in the Seventeenth-Century scholastic understanding of 'supertranscendentals'? In the century before Kant, scholastic supertranscendental being was primarily identified with extrinsic intelligibility and regarded as a contribution of the knower. It was said to be the same as 'the object as such' (objectum ut tale). This seems very close to 'der Gegenstand überhaupt' which Kant has called a 'missing concept' above the dichotomy of the possible and the impossible."

29. ———. 1997. "Two Thomists on the Morality of a Jailbreak." *Modern Schoolman* no. 74:95-115.
30. ———. 1997. "Vitoria on Choosing to Replace a King." In *Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery*, edited by White, Kevin, 45-58. Washington D. C.: Catholic University of America Press.

"Anyone familiar with the development of Hispanic philosophy in the Age of Discovery must be aware of the importance of Francisco de Vitoria (c. 1492-1546). Perhaps, however, that person will be surprised to hear that Vitoria, the holder of the *Catedra de Prima* in theology at the University of Salamanca, never published any of his own works. Instead, it was through his teaching that, during and after Spain's golden century, Vitoria influenced countless disciples, especially in areas of ethical and political thought. There are estimates of up to one thousand auditors attending some of his lectures. He himself in one place comes close to confirming that figure. But more than this, in the decades that followed, almost all the great moralists of the age looked back to Vitoria as their foremost authority. Their names read like the honor roll of Spanish and Counter-Reformation Scholasticism. But also outside Spain and Catholic Scholastic circles, in the dawning age of international jurisprudence, Vitoria exercised patent influence on important figures such as Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Alberico Gentili (1552-1608). Looking at all his influence and at the dearth of work published while he lived, it was with perfect truth that Domingo Bañez (1528-1604) could refer to him as "another Socrates"."

31. ———. 1997. "Reflections on Persons in Petri Dishes." *Linacre Quarterly* no. 64:62-76.
32. Vitoria, Francisco de. 1997. *On Homicide and Commentary on Summa Theologiae IIa-IIae Q. 64 (Thomas Aquinas)a*. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press.
Translated from the Latin with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.

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Appendix A 253; Appendix B 259; Appendix C 260; Bibliography 261; Subject Index 263; Name Index 266-269.

33. Doyle, John Patrick. 1998. "The 'Conimbricenses' on the Semiotic Character of Mirror Images." *Modern Schoolman* no. 76:17-31.
"Seneca distinguished two theories about images in a mirror. The first is that we see 'simulachra' and through their mediation we pass to things. The second is that in the mirror we immediately see things. The 'Conimbricenses', Jesuits at the Sixteenth-Century University of Coimbra, regarded mirror images as signs and, aware of Seneca's distinction, they favored the second theory. In so doing, they contrasted formal and instrumental signs and thought mirror images to be formal signs. All of this put them at odds

with Thomas Aquinas who apparently favored Seneca's first theory. It also puts them at odds with the present-day semiotician, Umberto Eco, who says that mirror images are not signs."

Translated in Russian by Lada Tsipana as: 'Koimbrskie scholastiki o semioticheskom charaktere zerkalnich otrazhenij', *Verbum* (St. Petersburg Society of Philosophy), 5, pp. 93-109.

34. ———. 1998. "Supertranscendental Nothing: A Philosophical Finisterre." *Medioevo* no. 24:1-30. Reprinted as Chapter 9 in *BBK*.

"For the innocent of geography, let me first explain that Finisterre is a cape in northern Spain at the westernmost point of the Spanish mainland. It marks an end of Europe; beyond Finisterre there is only the ocean. As readers of this essay may see, 'supertranscendental nothing' is arguably a philosophical Finisterre which was a farthest point of speculation reached by European philosophers in the seventeenth century. But what readers also may see is that this apparently ultimate item of seventeenth-century European philosophy was possibly pushed even farther out, at what might then to some have seemed beyond Spain and Europe the very end of the earth itself, in Santiago, Chile [by Miguel Viñas, S. J. (1642-1718)]."

35. ———. 1998. "Supertranscendental Being: On the Verge of Modern Philosophy." In *Meeting of the Minds. The Relation between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy*, edited by Brown, Stephen F., 297-315. Turnhout: Brepols.

"As every historian of philosophy knows, Aristotle thought the subject of metaphysics was «being insofar as it is being» and from this subject he excluded «being as true». Centuries after Aristotle, Francisco Suarez, S.J., (1548-1617) designated the subject of metaphysics more explicitly as «being insofar as it is real being» (*).

The addition of «real» to Aristotle's formula highlighted the inclusion of all that *can* as well as does exist. Against the backdrop of two already well known distinctions -- (1) between formal and objective concepts, and (2) between being as a participle and being as a noun -- for Suarez the subject so conceived was identical with "the objective concept of being as a noun". Concurrently, while being was said to be analogous with regard to hierarchically ordered objects (God and creatures, substance and accidents) with an intrinsic attribution of the perfection it represented, such analogy presupposed a common, unitary, and all but univocal, concept. But from that concept and from the subject of metaphysics Suarez excluded "beings of reason", which he subsumed under Aristotle's *being as true*, and of which impossible objects, in the sense of those that would be self-contradictory, furnished the paradigm case.

On at least one occasion, Suarez did use the word "supertranscendental" to label a notion wide enough to cover both a transcendental and a predicamental relation (***) -- but not to signify anything common between real beings and beings of reason. Nevertheless, there does seem to be some kind of supertranscendent community here. Real being is transcendent, but real beings and beings of reason are in some more than transcending way the same inasmuch as they both can be objects of cognition. Yet Suarez will allow only a community of name and not of concept between real being and being of reason. At the same time, he has distinguished between being which is the object of metaphysics and being which is the object of cognition generally." (notes omitted)

(*) Cf. *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (hereafter DM), d. 1, s. 1, n. 26, *Opera omnia*, ed. C. Berton. Paris, Vivés, 1856-1866, XXV, p. 11.

(**) 11 DM 48, s. 1, n. 5 (XXVI, p. 869).

36. ———. 1999. "Francisco Suárez on the Law of Nations." In *Religion and International Law*, edited by Janis, Mark W. and Evans, Carolyn, 103-120. London. Reprinted as Chapter 11 in *CSS*.

"The tenth essay ("Francisco Suarez on the Law of Nations") repeats a great deal of what is found in the ninth essay both in content and even style. Its inclusion in the present volume was considered justified, however, since its focus is much narrower than the ninth essay, not to mention that there are nine years separating the two essays and both were written for different audiences. "Francisco Suarez on the Law of Nations" concerns the law of nations, which for Suarez was a quasi-medium between natural law and the positive human law of individual states. Closely following upon the

natural law, the law of nations is not as necessary as that law. In truth, it has the character of positive law. Yet its precepts differ from those of civil law inasmuch as they are unwritten and have been established by the customs not of a single state or province but rather by those of all, or *almost* all, nations. In this way, like the state itself, the *jus gentium* has its origin in human consensus. Along the way here we will see Suárez's general teaching with regard to "*jus*" which in different contexts he translates as "law" or as "right." This will then lead into the next essay." (*CS* p. XIV).

37. ———. 2000. "Suárez on the Truth of the Proposition: "This is my Body"." *Modern Schoolman* no. 77:145-163.
Reprinted as Chapter 9 in *CSS*.

"Essay eight in order ("Suarez on the Truth of the Proposition, 'This is My Body-") treats a problem coming from Suárez's Aristotelian doctrine of truth vis-a-vis the Council of Trent's dogma of Transubstantiation. The model case of truth is offered by a present indicative proposition which correctly affirms the identity of its subject with its predicate. "This is my Body" aims to do that. But the dogma requires in this proposition a basic non-identity between its subject and predicate. So it appears that the subject is bread, while the substantially different predicate is Christ's Body. Suarez considered earlier opinions and then advanced his own solution to the problem, a solution which gives us insight into not only his doctrine respecting truth but also his understanding of objectivity." (*CS* p. XIII-XIV).

"Best known for his systematic study of metaphysics and his teaching on law, Francisco Suarez was arguably the greatest theologian in the history of the Jesuits. While the particular doctrine that I am now treating was published in 1587 in the wake of his teaching sacramental theology at Alcali de Henares, there is no indication that he ever changed his mind on it.

My precise present focus is on Suarez's treatise, *De Eucharistia*, Disputation 58, Sections 4 to 9, which cover pages 322-336, in Volume 20 of the Vivès edition (Paris, 1856-78) of his *Opera omnia*. In that place, he is commenting on St. Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae*, Part III, Question 78, and is raising questions with regard to the formula of Eucharistic consecration: most specifically, the words: *This is my Body.*" p. 145.

38. ———. 2001. "Francisco Suárez, S.J. on Human Rights." In *Menschenrechte: Rechte und Pflichten in Ost und West*, edited by Wegmann, Konrad, Ommerborn, Wolfgang and Roetz, Heiner, 105-132.
Muenster: LIT Verlag.
Reprinted as Chapter 12 in *CS*.

"The eleventh study ("Suarez on Human Rights") addresses a controverted matter in Scholastic philosophy - the doctrine of subjective rights which has been generally associated with Suarez. In fact, Suarez here accented something already in the Scholastic tradition, something which then later came to be termed a "subjective right." Suarez himself called it a "moral faculty" - understanding "moral" as intentional rather than physical and "faculty" as a power, an authority, a claim, a warrant, or a license. Moreover, he did not reject the earlier "objective" notion of rights, with its understanding of "*jus*" as the object of the virtue of justice. Rather, he presupposed a common objective order of justice upon which ultimately all rights would be grounded. But he did emphasize and to a certain extent modify something that existed in the tradition before himself, namely, the thought that individuals can be the bearers of personal rights, not in opposition to but in distinction from the common "right" which is the object of justice. An added nuance here is that subjective rights may be understood not just over against an objective right but also as moral faculties which are possessed by persons who are subject to human authority opposite that authority to which they are subject." (*CS* p. XIV-XV).

"For most observers, the American Declaration of Independence is a milestone in the history of human rights. From its promulgation in 1776 down to present time it has served as a philosophical base for various democratic systems of government and as a logical, if not an always demonstrably historical, starting point for the expansion of human rights claims in such current-century documents as the United Nations Universal Declaration and the Geneva Conventions. However, it has long been recognized that the Declaration of Independence has its own philosophical antecedents, most notably perhaps in the work of John Locke (1632-1704). Our aim now is to go back before Locke and to show such antecedents in the Scholastic philosophy which Locke himself

imbibed as a young student at Oxford where he first enrolled in 1652. More specifically, I will point to their presence in the work of arguably the greatest Jesuit philosopher-theologian of all time, Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). (*)

(*) For a recent overview of Suarez, the man, his work, and his influence, See John P. Doyle, "Suárez, Francisco," *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London and New York, 1998), vol. 8; pp. 189-196.

39. ———. 2001. *The Conimbricenses: Some Questions on Signs*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. Translated with introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.

"The *Conimbricenses* were late sixteenth and early seventeenth century Jesuit philosophy professors at the University of Coimbra. Chief among them were Emmanuel de Goes (1542-1597), Cosmas de Magalhães (1551-1624), Balthasar Alvarez (1561-1630), and Sebastian do Couto (1567-1639). Although not usually numbered among the *Conimbricenses*, their confrere in the Society, Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599), had promoted the novel idea of a philosophical *cursus* authored by the Jesuits of Coimbra.

The treatise *De Signo* (On the Sign) is the commentary to the first chapter of Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*.

The work raises five principal questions: (1) On the nature and conditions common to signs; (2) On the division of signs; (3) On the signification of spoken words and of writing; (4) Whether concepts are the same among all and whether spoken words are different; then (5) Whether some concepts in our minds are true or false, and others devoid of truth or falsity."

40. ———. 2001. "On the Pure Intentionality of Pure Intentionality." *Modern Schoolman* no. 79:57-78. Reprinted as Chapter 5 in *BBK*.

"With his own intention of instructing novices, Luis de Lossada, S.J. (1681- 1748), has summarized the new, yet old, terminology of the disputed Scholastic doctrine of intellectual intentionality. (*) Although the Scholastics (and I to entitle the present essay) have ambiguously used the term 'intention' -- first in relation to will and then to understanding, in executing his intention Lossada has employed it simply to designate an act of the human intellect. Such an act may be either first or second, depending upon whether it directly represents the physical reality of its object or reflexly represents an object as already known or insofar as it has some being derived from the intellect. From these intellectual acts, the words which signify things as first and directly conceived are called 'terms of first intention,' while those which signify things as secondly and reflexly known are called 'terms of second intention,' that is to say terms corresponding to a second intending by the intellect. Examples of the former terms may be 'man,' 'animal,' or 'sun,' while terms like 'universal,' 'genus,' 'species,' 'subject,' or 'predicate' are examples of the latter. Moreover, since objects are customarily named from the knowledge they terminate, both first and second intentions (whether one looks at acts of understanding or the words which express them) may be either 'formal' or 'objective'."

(*) *Cursus philosophici Logica*. Tr. I disp. 2 c. 4, n.1; ed. Barcinonae: Apud Vid. et Fil. J. Subirana, 1883 [originally: Salamanca, 1724], vol. I, p. 204. (Notes omitted).

41. ———. 2003. "Gedankendinge und Imagination bei den Jesuiten des 17. Jh." In *Imagination -- Fiktion -- Kreation: Das kulturschaffende Vermögen der Phantasie*, edited by Dewender, Thomas and Welt, Thomas, 213-228. München - Leipzig: K. G. Saur - Verlag. Translated in German by Thomas Dewender.

The original English version is published as Chapter 6 in *BBK* with the title: *Beings of Reason and Imagination*.

42. ———. 2003. "The Borders of Knowability: Thoughts from or Occasioned by Seventeenth-Century Jesuits." In *Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aerstsen zum 65. Geburtstag*, edited by Pickavé, Martin, 643-658. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter. Reprinted as Chapter 11 in *BBK*.

"This essay concerns the upper and the lower borders between what is and what is not knowable for

human beings, particularly as these borders were variously considered by some seventeenth-century Jesuit thinkers. Expanding, let me say that the boundary above is reached when one confronts the reality of God, who while He may be evidently knowable in Himself is not so, at least in this life, for us. In contrast, the lower boundary seems to run between that which is in itself knowable and that which is totally unknowable either for us or for God. This lower boundary is reached at the level of what is intrinsically impossible and what to that extent fails of being and of being knowable.

A further refinement is suggested from geography. Take the Alps as a natural boundary between Italy and France. As any tyro knows, this boundary has a double face, inasmuch as we can view it either from the side of Italy or of France, that is from either a cisalpine or a transalpine perspective. Apply this to the borders of knowability. The cisalpine side of the upper border is somehow supplied by our human knowledge groping toward God - especially through negative theology in the wake of Pseudo-Dionysius and through what seventeenth-century Scholastics termed the metaphysical essence of God. The transalpine side is the reality of God in Himself which is beyond the present grasp of a human mind. The lower border will be at the interface of the possible and the impossible. More exactly, its cisalpine side will enclose both the possible and the impossible. Its transalpine side will in some way exclude both the possible and the impossible.

For what follows I will use Jesuit sources in the wake of Francisco Suarez, S. J. (1548-1617), but I will principally focus on one Jesuit, Maximilian Wietrowski (1660-1737), whom I have treated in other places. This will occasion forays into Jesuits between him and Suarez, most singularly: Thomas Compton Carleton (1591 -1666), Sylvester Mauro (1619-1687), and André Semery (1630-1717), as well as one publishing after, Miguel Viñas (1642-1718). At times I will go outside Jesuit writings to clarify or to confirm points and finally I will suggest conclusions against the backdrop of Thomistic theology, which the Jesuits, by their "Constitutions" and "Ratio Studiorum", were obliged wherever possible to follow." (notes omitted)

43. ———. 2004. "Wrestling with a Wraith: André Semery, S. J. (1630-1717) on Aristotle's Goat-Stag and Knowing the Unknowable." In *The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy*, edited by Pozzo, Riccardo, 84-112. Washington: Catholic University of America Press. Reprinted as Chapter 10 in *BBK*.
44. Suárez, Francisco. 2004. *The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God. Metaphysical Disputations 28-29 by Francisco Suárez, S.J.* South Bend: St. Augustine Press. Translated and edited from the Latin with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.

"The two Disputations that are translated in the present work open the second part of the *Disputationes metaphysicae* and mark the turn from being in general to particular beings. Their concern is with, first in Disputation 28, a comprehensive division of being in general, and after in Disputation 29, the existence of the principal member of this division, namely, that being which is God.

Disputation 28 is divided into three Sections, which ask about the legitimacy and the sufficiency of the division, as well as whether the dividend, i.e. being, is univocal or analogous between God and creatures. In the first Section (Vivès: vol. 26, pp. 1-8), the question is whether being is rightly divided into infinite and finite being? Doubts arise from the fact that "infinite" and "finite" on their face do not appear to cover the whole range of being but rather look to be restricted to accidental being in the category of quantity (§ 1). In addition, the terms of the proposed division seem obscure, especially the term "infinite" (§ 2). Suarez's answer is to analyze the terms (§ 3) and then to defend the division as one that is good and necessary (§ 4) as well as first and most evident (§ 5). It is equivalent to other divisions such as being by itself (*ens a se*) and being from another (*ens ab alio*) (§§ 6-7) or, with clarifications, necessary being and contingent being (§§ 8-12). It is also equivalent to: essential being and being by participation (§ 13), created being and uncreated being (§ 14), or being in act and being in potency (§§ 15-16). Suarez next compares the first division with the rest (§ 17), explains the terms of the first division by comparison with quantity (§ 17), and closes the first Section (§ 18) with a reply to objections raised at its beginning." p. XIV.

"Though almost twice as long, Disputation 29 like the one before is again divided into three Sections. Section 1 (vol. 26, pp. 21-34) begins after two introductory paragraphs (§§ 1-2) in which Suarez gives reasons for the location of the subject matter of the Disputation in this place and

remarks how he will leave aside as much as possible items which depend for their understanding on Revelation. The first Section then asks whether and/or by what means the existence of God can be demonstrated. Among the Scholastic Doctors, Peter d'Ailly (1350-1420) has denied the possibility of such a demonstration. To this Suarez makes the brief but revealing reply that already by the various divisions of being that have been presented in the previous *Disputation* the existence of "some being which is uncreated or not produced" has been proven (§ 1). The obvious implication is that by now the existence of God has in effect been proven. But immediately the question arises: by what means, physical or metaphysical, is this properly done? On one side, the opinion of Averroes is that the means is physical, namely the motion of the heavens (§ 2). The contrary opinion, that of Avicenna and later of Duns Scotus among others, holds that the means must be metaphysical (§ 3) -- that is, not motion but being itself. A third and a fourth opinion hold in different ways that the task must belong to both physics, that is natural philosophy, and metaphysics (§§ 4-5). In different ways the means would thus be both physical and metaphysical. In Suarez's judgment the second opinion is certainly the true one but there can be some probability in the fourth position, if it is rightly explained (§ 6).

At this juncture, he examines at length the physical argument that proceeds by the medium of motion and for various reasons he finds it wanting (§§ 7-17). Then he considers another physical argument, from the operations and the essence of the rational soul (§ 18). This too comes up short, unless we first pose a question about the soul's being, which is a metaphysical question (§ 19). Here Suarez gives the metaphysical argument that is based upon a broader and deeper principle than the physical one, "*Whatever is moved is moved by another.*" The metaphysical principle is "*Whatever is made or produced is made by another*" and the argument itself concludes to an unmade Maker (§§ 20-21). An objection of a possibly circular chain of causes is dismissed as every bit as inadmissible as a thing's causing itself (§ 22). Other objections involve an infinite number of causes that would preclude any arriving at a first uncaused or unmade cause. There are different ways to conceive such an infinity of causes. Suarez explains such ways in detail and shows their insufficiencies (§§ 23-40). The first Section ends (§§ 41-42) with a brief rehearsal of and summary judgment upon the opinions listed at the beginning." pp. XV-XVI.

45. ———. 2004. *A Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics (Index locupletissimus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis)* - by Francisco Suárez. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Translated from the Latin with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.

"As the reader will see, the following volume is divided into translations and the corresponding Latin texts. The translations are in order:

(1) *Suarez's Plan for his Metaphysical Disputations*. This is his preface to the 1597 edition. It is an address to his reader in which he lays out his intention as a Christian theologian to pursue a Christian philosophy, specifically a metaphysics which will be at the service of his theology. This metaphysics will be in two main parts. The first of these will be what will shortly after be called an "ontology" or a general science of being, in which after establishing "real being insofar as it is being" as the object of metaphysics, he will proceed to study its properties, its principles, and its causes. The second part will then descend from the general concept of being to study those beings, God and creatures, substances and accidents, which are contained under that concept. Finally, it should be noted that in this preface he speaks of the present Index and gives his reader some idea of its purpose.

(2) *The Proemium to the Second Metaphysical Disputation*. This short piece is important. After again indicating the systematic plan of the *Disputationes*, it contrasts that with the disorganized text of Aristotle and commentaries on it. But then he says that, in order to satisfy "students of Aristotle," he has added the present Index which follows the order of the *Metaphysics* and which gives cross-references to the *Disputations*. It will also, he tells us, comment at times directly on the text of Aristotle and will explore matters which for whatever reasons have not been covered well enough in the *Disputations*.

(3) Next comes the *Most Ample Index* itself. In this Suarez, as he promised, follows the order of the *Metaphysics*, essentially commenting on it as I have said, "by way of question." To appreciate this Index, a modern reader should have some familiarity with Aristotle's text and the main problems interpreters have encountered with it. To facilitate that, I have at the start of most Books added a

summary of the remarks of Jules Tricot, the important French translator of the *Metaphysics*. I chose Tricot's remarks for a number of reasons. First, they were succinct. Second, they were the thoughts of an authentic scholar. Third, while Tricot's scholarship may be a few decades old, it is still valuable for understanding the main nineteenth and twentieth-century debates about the composition and the meaning of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, debates which often bear on problems which Suarez and the medievals encountered. Finally, there is something which will not be evident from the summaries I gave, but which was in the background of my choosing Tricot. This is that he, unlike many contemporary writers, extends his interest out beyond the text of Aristotle to the traditions of his Greek and Latin commentators. In short, Tricot pursues understanding of Aristotle in a way which I am certain Suarez would endorse.

(4) *An Index of Disputations*: This amounts to a Table of Contents for the fifty-four Disputations which comprise the main portion of Suarez's work. To make it easier for readers to find these Disputations I have added volume and page numbers to Suarez's list. A further benefit of this may be that a reader will be able to see at a glance the relative importance which Suarez attached to each Disputation from the number of pages he allotted to it. In passing I did notice minor variations between some of the Section headings in the main text of the *Disputationes* and the Index of Disputations. Generally, in my notes I ignored such variations and mentioned them only on rare occasions.

Following the translations, the next portion of the current volume is devoted to the Latin texts. Thus I have transcribed in their original language the Preface to the whole work, the Prologue to the Second Disputation, the Most Ample Index itself, and the Index of the Disputations. The most important notes that I added contain the Latin translations mentioned above, i.e., those of Moerbeke, Argyropoulos, Bessarion, and Fonseca. On this score, let me say that I deliberately separated the Greek of Aristotle from the Latin of Suarez and these others. My purpose in this was to allow interested persons to compare the Latin translations without the immediate distraction of the Greek. At the same time, the Greek will be available and matched directly to my English translation of Suarez's Latin. My hope is that this is clear and that it makes some sense to interested readers.

The volume includes a *Dramatis Personae*, that is, a list of and a few facts about persons whom Suarez mentions in the Ample Index. Again, I have added a bibliography of sources in various languages to which readers may go for more in depth understanding of the issues raised in the translated texts."

46. Doyle, John Patrick. 2005. "Two Sixteenth-Century Jesuits and a Plan to Conquer China. Alonso Sanchez and José de Acosta: An Outrageous Proposal and its Rejection." In *Rechtsdenken: Schnittpunkte West und Ost. Recht in den gesellschafts- und staatstragenden Institutionen Europas und Chinas*, edited by Wegmann, Konrad and Holz, Harald, 253-273. Münster: LIT Verlag.
"I. The Plan of Alonso Sanchez SJ.

II. The Great Plan in Detail: Ten Sections of Preparing, Pursuing, and Safe-Guarding the Conquest of China

III. The Opponent of the Plan: José de Acosta S.J.

IV. Several Reasons, Technico-practical and Moral, against the Plan

V. The Royal Decision: Renunciation of the Plan.

I. The Plan of Alonso Sanchez S. J. of Conquering China

The first of our two Jesuits, Alonso Sánchez (1547-1593), has been called "a Jesuit like no other." (1) Born in the province of Guadalajara in Spain, he entered the Society of Jesus in 1565 at the age of 17. (2) In 1571 he was ordained a priest and in 1579 he was sent by his Order to Mexico and then on to the Philippine Islands, where he disembarked in September of 1581 at the city of Manila, which had been founded ten years earlier by Miguel Lopez de Legazpe (1510-1572). In the years that followed, Sánchez gained prominence in the Philippines and made two trips from there to China.

His first trip, in 1582, was to the Portuguese enclave at Macao. (3) His purpose was to acquaint the Portuguese with, and to gain their acceptance of, the fact that Philip II of Spain had in 1580 also assumed the throne of Portugal and that now the whole Iberian peninsula was united under one rule. In this Sánchez was most successful and upon returning to the Philippines he was acclaimed as a skilled diplomat. Well known for his virtue, his learning, and his zeal for souls, (4) he still became a figure of controversy even within the Jesuits. (5) This last was largely because of his penchant for crossing the line between affairs of church and state and in particular for his view with regard to China. (6)

(1) "Un jésuite tel qu'il n'y a en eut jamais de semblable: Alonso Sanchez." H. Bernard, SJ, "La Théorie du protectorat civil des missions en pays infidèle: ses antécédents historiques et sa justification théologique par Suarez," *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, 64 (1937), pp. 261-93, esp. p. 266.

(2) For dates in Sánchez's life, cf. Joseph Dehergne, SJ., *Répertoire des Jésuites de Chine de 1552 à 1800* (Roma: Institutione Historicum, SJ., 1973), pp. 238 - 9; also, cf. F. Zubillaga, "Sánchez, Alonso (Alfonso). Misionero," in *Diccionario histórico de la Compañía de Jesús: biográfico-temático*, Charles E. O'Neill, Joaquín Ma. Domínguez, directores (Roma: Institutum Historicum, S.I.; Madrid: Universidad Pontificia Comillas, 2001 vol. 4, pp. 3486-7.

(3) The Portuguese had had a trading station at Macao since 1537.

(4) Cf. Antonio Astráin, SJ., *Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la asistencia de España*, 7 vols. (Madrid: Razón y Fe, 1912 -1925), vol. 3, pp. 549 - 50.

5 For some modern reflection of this, cf. "Il Sanchez faceva profusione di consacrare un tempo eccessivo adorazione, ma sembra essere stato un uomo piuttosto portato agli eccessi." *Fonti Ricciane: Documenti originali concernenti Matteo Ricci e la storia delle prime relazioni tra l'Europa e la Cina (1579 - 1615)*, cd. Pasquale M. D'Elia, S.I., tomo 1 (Roma: La Libreria dello Stato, 1942), p. 214, n. 5. For an extended and reasonably balanced view, see W.C. Repetti, SJ., *History of the Society of Jesus in the Philippine Islands*, (Manila: Good Shepherd Press, 1938), pp. 77 - 79.

(6) Cf. Zubillaga, p. 3487.

47. ———. 2006. "Hervaeus Natalis, O.P., (d. 1323) On Intentionality: Its Direction, Context, and Some Aftermath." *Modern Schoolman* no. 83:85-124.

"It is generally known that Franz Brentano (1828-1917) came through a tradition Aristotelian-Scholasticism to a philosophy which stood in opposition to Kant and to the main stream of German idealism after. It is also often thought that nothing in that tradition was more influential than its intentionality doctrine. Central for Brentano's early development, intentionality was a doctrine whose Scholastic origin he himself indicated, when in 1874, he wrote:

"Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages referred to as the intentional (and also mental) inexistence of the object, and what we, although with not quite unambiguous expressions, would call relation to a content, direction upon an object (which is not here to be understood as a reality) or immanent objectivity."

Since 1874, for proponents, opponents, and simple observers of Brentano and of intentionality doctrine, whatever else may be at issue the general consensus has been that the term "intentionality" indicates a direction from knower to known. *Mutatis mutandis*, so understood, intentionality continued to be important for various phenomenological philosophies which stemmed from Brentano. In this vein, Brentano's most recognized disciple, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), who is credited with introducing the term itself into modern philosophy, has described its basic signification as "the property of being conscious of something." This direction from consciousness to the object (which Brentano himself influenced by the problem of non-existent objects later at least in part rejected in his famous *Abkehr vom Nichtrealen* has been regarded as central in Husserl's work even by critics. The same direction appears in the work of others dependent upon Brentano and a glance at secondary sources will confirm its almost universal acceptance as the common view.

In the Middle Ages, from the Latin Avicenna on, the term "intention" (*intentio*) can be found throughout the thirteenth century. However, to my knowledge, somewhat surprisingly, the actual word, "intentionality" (*intentionalitas*), first appears only when we come to the fourteenth-century writing of Hervaeus Natalis. It was a bigger surprise for me to find that Brentano in one place actually mentioned Hervaeus and listed three of his works. But the biggest surprise was to discover that for Hervaeus the direction of *intentionality* as such was not from knower to known but rather opposite wise -- from known to knower! My purpose now is to recount and perhaps to sharpen that discovery as well as to go further and touch on some of its possible *Wirkungsgeschichte*." pp. 85-86 (notes omitted).

48. ———. 2006. "Francisco Suárez, S. J. (1548-1617) on the Interpretation of Laws." *Modern Schoolman* no. 83:197-222.
Reprinted as Chapter 13 in *CSS*.

"The twelfth and final essay ("Francisco Suarez on the Interpretation of Laws") will serve to bring out some of the breadth and depth of Suarez's great work, *De Legibus*. For that I have picked out just one of its 246 chapters and have given a brief exposition of that chapter against the civil and canon law background before which it was written. In this, I have followed Suarez to speak generally of interpretation of the words of a law, the mind of the lawgiver, and the reason for the law, in the two directions of expanding and of restricting that law. Along the way, I have treated such issues as various types of law which Suarez recognized, the legal codes he had to cope with, the interpreters on whom he relied, the absence of any written constitution, yet, at the same time, some *de facto* practices and principles substituting for that. I have also highlighted his own skills at interpretation in other contexts. Lastly, I have added an Appendix here which using particular laws will show more concretely some of the points made in the essay." (*Cs* p. XV).

49. ———. 2006. "Mastri and Some Jesuits on Possible and Impossible Objects of God's Knowledge and Power." In *Rem in seipsa cernere: saggi sul pensiero filosofico di Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673)*, edited by Forlivesi, Marco, 439-468. Padova: Il Poligrafo.
50. Suárez, Francisco. 2006. *On Real Relation (Disputatio Metaphysica XLVII) by Francisco Suárez*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Translated from Latin with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.

"There are two main places in which Aristotle has dealt with the category of relation. These are: (a) *Categories*, Chapter 7, and (b) *Metaphysics*, Book V, Chapter 15. As will become apparent, these places will be central for Suarez's treatment of relation in *Disputation 47*." p. 19.

"At very least, without pinning the matter down at all points, it is safe to say that relation is central to any overall understanding of Aristotle's doctrine of the categories and even more to any understanding of his wider doctrine beyond.

As I have mentioned, there are two principal places in the *Disputationes metaphysicae* (DM) in which Suarez treats relation. These are the present Disputation 47 and then Disputation 54, Section 6. The obvious dividing line between them is that between real being in the categories and "being as true" which by Suarez's time has come to be identified with being of reason. (77) But even as we say this, it is important once again to note that real relation extends beyond the category of relation and also that in the Second Section, Paragraph 22, of Disputation 47 Suarez will come exceedingly close to a reduction of real relation to a simple act of the knower, that is, a connotation.

There are other places in the *Disputationes* where in various ways Suarez has touched upon relation. While I have not explored them all in the present work, they do frequently shine added light on this work. For examples, let me mention his treatment of "prior and posterior" in the *Index locupletissimus* at Book Five, Chapter 11; (78) his discussion-in the context of his treatment of distinction -- of relation and its terminus; (79) his discussion of relation in the context of truth; (80) various points he makes about relation in treating transcendental goodness; (81) his contrast of finite created relations and infinite divine relations as regards the essences in which they are found; (82) the divine relations of paternity and filiation as dissimilar; (83) or within a context of his discussion of quantity, a further discussion of the characters of "measure" and "measured," (84) etc.

As may be gathered from some of the examples just mentioned, there are Christian dimension of

relation both in Suarez's sources and in his own teaching. These are linked particularly with the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. On both these themes, besides what he has said in the *Disputationes*, (85) he has written special works, which contain much on the subject of relation." pp. 26-27.

(77) For some of the history of this identification, cf. Theo Kobusch, "Ens in quantum ens und ens rationis: ein aristotelisches Problem in der Philosophie des Duns Scotus und Wilhelm von Ockham," in *Aristotle in Britain during the Middle Ages: Proceedings of the International Conference at Cambridge, 8 -11 April 1994* organized by the Société internationale pour l'Étude de la philosophie médiévale, edited by John Marenbon (Turnhout, Brepols, 1996), pp. 157-175, esp. 158-9.

(78) See Index ..., V, c. 11, q. 1, vol. 25, p. xxii; Francisco Suarez, *A Commentary* ..., pp. 89-90.

(79) DM 7, 2, n. 26, vol. 25, p. 270.

(80) DM 8, 2, nn. 3-9, vol. 25, pp. 278-9.

(81) For example, cf. DM 10, 1, nn. 3-5, vol. 25, p. 329; *ibid.*, 3, nn. 11-15, pp. 350-51

(82) DM 28, 2, nn. 5,6, 8-13, vol. 26, pp. 9-12.

(83) DM 29, 3, nn. 16-17, vol. 26, p. 53.

(84) DM 40, 3, nn. 9-10, vol. 26, pp. 540-41.

(85) As regards relation and the Trinity, cf. DM 7, 2, n. 27, vol. 25, p. 270; DM 10, 3, nn. 16-18, pp. 351-2; DM 28, 2, nn. 5,6, 8-13, vol. 26, pp. 9-12; DM 29, 3, nn. 16-17, vol. 26, p. 53; and DM 47, 4, n. 21, below. As regards relation and the Incarnation, *sec.*, e.g.: DM 47, 4, n. 9, below.

51. Doyle, John Patrick. 2007. "Hispanic Scholastic Philosophy." In *The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy*, edited by Hankins, James, 250-269. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. "Hispanic scholastic philosophy in this chapter designates a sixteenth and seventeenth-century stream of philosophy which flowed out of medieval universities, increased to a torrent on the Iberian peninsula, then poured into other regions of Europe, America, Africa, and Asia. Arising in the wake of Spanish and Portuguese explorations and conquests, which at the end of fifteenth and through the sixteenth century brought radically new, and usually bloody, encounters between European and non-European peoples, it was at its core concerned with such encounters. Other background were furnished by the Counter-Reformation, especially the reforms of the Council of Trent (1545-63) and its aftermath; the late Renaissance debates among philosophers, humanists and skeptics; and the revival of Thomistic texts and thought. Two subjects stand out as particularly important and influential: (1) moral and juridical philosophy centering on "the law of nations" (the *jus gentium*) and (2) theoretical philosophy, which included Aristotelian physics but culminated in metaphysics.

For present purposes the birth year of Hispanic philosophy was 1526, when Francisco de Vitoria, OP (1492-1546), was elected to the Cátedra de Prima, in theology at Salamanca and began lectures on the "Second Part of the Second Part" (IIa-IIae) of the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas. This introduced the *Summa* as the principal textbook in theology and also inaugurated a Thomistic revival in theology and in philosophy at Salamanca, then elsewhere. Choosing a terminal date for Hispanic philosophy here is more arbitrary, but a plausible one is 1718, when Miguel Viñas, SJ (1642-1718) died. It may immediately be noted that while Vitoria taught in Spain and belonged to the older religious order of the Dominicans, Viñas was a Jesuit who taught at Santiago in Chile. In the period under discussion two salient facts are the passage of philosophical leadership from the Dominicans to the Jesuits, and the spread of Hispanic philosophy overseas from the Iberian peninsula, especially to Latin America. The development of that philosophy between 1526 and 1718 occurred within this broader context of a general shift from an old to a new religious order and from the Old World to a New. What follows is a very limited sketch of figures and themes in that development." pp. 250-251.

52. Hervaeus, Natalis. 2008. *A Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis (d.1323) The Doctor Perspicacissimus On Second Intentions*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Volume One - An English translation and Volume Two - A Latin edition by John P. Doyle.

"These volumes present a first critical Latin edition and an English translation of an important, but very difficult to read and understand, medieval treatise. As almost everyone knows, the notion of intentionality comes from the Middle Ages. What is less known is that Hervaeus Natalis, O.P. (d. 1323) was the first one explicitly to consider it as such. Even less known is the fact that he came to it not immediately from the Aristotelian *De Anima*, but rather from the division in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* between "being as being" and "being as true." Least of all known is the fact that Hervaeus, who uses the term "intentionality" in the present work 235 times, regards its significance as a relation of reason which runs in the direction of known or knowable to knower. Apart from its exceedingly obscure Latin style, what particularly makes this work difficult to understand is its multi-layered reflection on things and non-things, its reflection on Hervaeus thinking itself, and its reflection on his thinking about his thinking about things and non-things."

53. Doyle, John Patrick. 2009. "Hervaeus Natalis On Intentionality: its Direction and Some Aftermath." In *Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century*, edited by Brown, Stephen F., Dewender, Thomas and Kobusch, Theo, 261-283. Leiden: Brill.
A longer version of this article appeared in *The Modern Schoolman*, 83, 2006, pp. 85-124.
54. ———. 2010. *Collected Studies on Francisco Suárez S.J. (1548-1617)*. Leuven: Leuven University Press.
Edited by Victor M. Salas.

Contents: Editor's Foreword VII-IX; Introduction: The Theme of this Collection, its Contents, its Character and Rationale XIII-XVI; 1. Francisco Suárez, His Life, His Works, His Doctrine, and Some of His Influence 1; 2. Suárez on the Reality of the Possibles 21; 3. Suárez on the Analogy of Being 41; 4. Suarezian and Thomistic Metaphysics before the Judgment of Heidegger 89; 5. The Suarezian Proof for God's Existence 109; 6. Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Work of Francis Suárez, S.J. 123; 7. Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth 161; 8. Suárez on the Unity of a Scientific Habit 209; 9. Suárez on the Truth of the Proposition, "This is My Body" 235; 10. Suárez on Preaching the Gospel to People like the American Indians 257; 11. Francisco Suárez on the Law of Nations 315; 12. Suárez on Human Rights 333; 13. Francisco Suárez on the Interpretation of Laws 357; 14. Postscript and Prospectus 389; Bibliography 393; Index of Names 409; Index of Terms 413-416.

"The main theme in these studies is twofold. The first is theoretical, centering on the Suarezian conception of being and metaphysics. As Etienne Gilson pointed out in *Being and Some Philosophers*, this conception had its origin in Avicenna's understanding of Aristotelian metaphysics, an understanding which passed through Duns Scotus to Suarez and then on to Suárez's successors, notably Christian Wolff. I still accept Gilson's basic account of Suárez's lineage, which account was also basic for these studies in their original appearance. But now (in 2010) I would modify it along the line suggested by Rolf Darge, who has emphasized the difference of the Suarezian concept of being and its descent to its inferiors versus the Scotistic concept of being as *simpliciter simplex* as this descends to its inferiors by differences outside itself.(1) The second theme takes up the practical side of Suárez's philosophical and theological interests, including his views on human society, law and morality, Church and state, international law, and human rights. The first theme is represented in different metaphysical and epistemological dimensions through eight studies, while the second is the major concern of the last four essays.

The introduction to the collection attempts to give an overview of Suarez the man, his published writings, his philosophical thought, and some of his influence." (p. XI)

(1) For this, see Rolf Darge, *Suárez transzendente Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysik-tradition* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2004).

55. ———. 2010. "Suárez and some Precursors on *Lex* and *Ius*." In *Politische Philosophie und Rechtstheorie des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit. Abteilung II: Untersuchungen: Lex und Ius. Band I*, edited by Fidora, Alexander, Lutz-Bachmann, Matthias and Wagner, Andreas, 393-427. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann Holzboog.
56. ———. 2011. "St. Thomas Aquinas On Theological Truth." In *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown*, edited by Emery, Kent, Friedman, Russell L. and Speer, Andreas, 571-590. Leiden: Brill.
"Aquinas (1225-1274) clearly recognized two kinds of theology, namely, that of the philosophers, which

is metaphysical, and that based upon divine revelation, which is "sacred doctrine" (*sacra doctrina*). Each will be in its way a science with its own distinctive subject matter and procedure. At the same time, there will be continuity between the two theologies inasmuch as faith, grace, and supernature presuppose nature. However, both philosophical and sacred theology have different subjects and relate to God in different ways. As it is ostensibly part of metaphysics, philosophical theology has common being (*ens* or *esse commune*) as its subject and relates to God as the extrinsic principle of that subject. Sacred theology has God and divine things as the subject to which it seems immediately to relate. To the degree that both theologies are conceived as scientific, each, in line with the norms of the *Posterior Analytics*, will need to presuppose the existence and essence of its subject and then explore the attributes and/or principles of that subject. In the case of philosophical theology, the subject of metaphysics will be the being that is commonly experienced in this sensible world and God will be established as its extrinsic principle. In the case of sacred theology, God will be the subject of the science, which will then go on with the help of revelation to consider his nature and attributes. In this, God and the articles of faith will be first principles of sacred theology. To prove its principles, sacred theology will not have a way intrinsic to itself, but neither will it reject the common principles of human reasoning itself." (pp. 571-573, notes omitted).

57. ———. 2011. "The Falling Dog and the Numerical Unity of Motion." In *Tolle Lege. Essays on Augustine and on Medieval Philosophy in Honor of Roland J. Teske, SJ*, edited by Taylor, Richard C., Twetten, David and Wreen, Michael, 253-276. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
58. ———. 2012. *On the Borders of Being and Knowing. Late Scholastic Theory of Supertranscendental Being*. Leuven: Leuven University Press.
Edited by Victor M. Salas.

Table of Contents: Editor's Foreword VII-IX; Introduction XIII-XVI; 1. Sprouts from Greek Gardens: Antisthenes, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics (first publication) 1; 2. Suarez on Beings of Reason and Truth 19; 3. Extrinsic Cognoscibility 67; 4. Impossible Objects 95; 5. The Teleology of Impossible Objects 127; 6. Beings of Reason and Imagination 151; 7. Four Degrees of Abstraction 167; 8. From Transcendental to Transcendental 185; 9. Supertranscendental Nothing 215; 10. Wrestling with Wraith 243; 11. The Borders of Knowability 273; 12. Conclusion 293; Bibliography 301; Indices 319-326.

"Sylvester Mauro, S.J. (1619-1687) noted that human intellects can grasp what is, what is not, what can be, and what cannot be. The first principle, 'it is not possible that the same thing simultaneously be and not be,' involves them all.

The present volume begins with Greeks distinguishing 'being' from 'something' and proceeds to the late Scholastic doctrine of 'supertranscendental being,' which embraces both. On the way is Aristotle's distinction between 'being as being' and 'being as true' and his extension of the latter to include impossible objects. The Stoics will see 'something' as the widest object of human cognition and will affirm that, as signifiable, impossible objects are something, more than mere nonsense. In the sixteenth century, Francisco Suárez will identify mind-dependent beings most of all with impossible objects and will also regard them as signifiable. By this point, two conceptions will stand in opposition. One, adumbrated by Averroes, will explicitly accept the reality and knowability of impossible objects. The other, going back to Alexander of Aphrodisias, will see impossibles as accidental and false conjunctions of possible objects. Seventeenth-century Scholastics will divide on this line, but in one way or another will anticipate the Kantian notion of 'der Gegenstand überhaupt.' Going farther, Scholastics will see the two-sided upper border of being and knowing at God and the negative theology, and will fix the equally double lower border at 'supertranscendental being' and 'supertranscendental nonbeing,' which non-being, remaining intelligible, will negate the actual, the possible, and even the impossible."

59. Wade, William Ligon. 2013. *On the Teacher: Saint Augustine & Saint Thomas Aquinas. A Comparison*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Edited by John P. Doyle.
60. Doyle, John Patrick. 2016. *John of St. Thomas (Poinsot) on Sacred Science: Cursus Theologicus I, Question 1, Disputation 2*. South Bend: St. Augustine Press.
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2. Bayle, Pierre vol. III p. 113
3. Bodin, Jean vol. III p. 356;
4. Bruno, Giordano vol. III p. 525
5. Cambridge Platonists vol. IV p. 52
6. Descartes, René vol. VI pp. 125-126
7. Ficino, Marsilio vol. VIII p. 70
8. Hobbes, Thomas vol. X p. 192
9. Innate Ideas vol. XI p. 178
10. Malebranche, Nicolas vol. XIII p. 87
11. Occasionalism vol. XIV p. 320
12. Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni vol. XV p. 294
13. Ramus, Petrus vol. XVI; p. 82
14. Rationalism vol. XVI pp. 92-93
15. Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, vol. XVII p. 234
16. Spinoza, Baruch vol. XVIII pp. 187-188
17. Suárez, Francisco vol. XVIII p. 312
18. Telesio, Bernardino vol. XIX p. 83
19. William of Ockham vol. XX pp. 154-155.

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1. Collegium Conimbricense vol.II pp. 406-408
2. Fonseca, Pedro da (1528-1599) vol. III pp. 688-690
3. John of St. Thomas (1589-1644) vol. V pp. 117-120
4. Soto, Domingo de (1494-1560) vol. IX pp. 37-40
5. Suárez, Francisco (1548-1617) vol. IX pp. 189-196
6. Toletus, Franciscus (1533-1596) vol. IX pp. 433-435

Supertranszendent, *Historische Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Forschungsprojekt der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur*, Edited by Joachim Ritter & Karlfried Gründer, Basel, Schwabe AG. Verlag, 1999, vol. X cols. 643-649.

Suárez, Francisco, *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 2. Supplement, 2010, pp. 1043-1047.

Hervaeus Natalis, *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, New York, Springer, 2011, pp. 472-473.

TRANSLATION

"Peter John Olivi (1248-1297): *A Disputed Question: 'What Does Right or Dominion Posit?' or 'About Voluntary Signs'.*"

Translated from: "Question de P. J. Olivi 'Quid ponat ius vel dominium' ou encore 'De signis voluntariis'", ed. P. Ferdinand Delorme, O.F.M., Antonianum, XX (1945) pp. 309-330. Published by the Translation Clearing House, Department of Philosophy, Oklahoma State University.

FESTSCHRIFT

Victor M. Salas (ed.), *Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders. Essays in Honor of John P. Doyle*, Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 2013.

Table of Contents: Victor M. Salas: Editor's Foreword 9; 1. Stephen Brown: The Eternity of the World According to Peter of Candia 31; 2. Rolf Darge: Suarez & Medieval Transcendental Thought 65; 3. Thomas Dewender: John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen on Chimerae, & Impossible Objects 95; 4. Marco Forlivesi: "Ut ex etymologia nominis patet? John Punch on the Nature & the Object of Metaphysics 121; 5. Jennifer Hart-Weed: Actions Speak Louder Than Words: What Aquinas Learned from Maimonides 157; 6. Daniel Heider: Abstraction, Intentionality, & Moderate Realism: Suárez & Poinsoot 177; 7. Ludger Honnefelder: John Duns Scotus's Approach to Metaphysics 213; 8. Jack Marler: Thomistic Ornithology: A Brief Note 229; 9. Daniel Novotný: Twenty Years after Suárez: Francisco de Araújo on the Nature, Existence, & Causes of *Entia rationis* 241; 10. Michael Renemann: Man's Ability to Understand His Own Understanding: Aquinas, Kant, & Modern Physics 269; 11. Victor M. Salas: Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, & Edith Stein on Essential Being 285; 12. Roland Teske, S.J.: Augustinian Abstraction & Henry of Ghent's Metaphysical Argument 309; John Patrick Doyle: *Post Scriptum: Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders* 329; About the Contributors 369; Index of Names 373; Index of Terms 377-384.

The twelve essays contained in this volume are a tribute to the career and scholarship of John Patrick Doyle offered by his former students, colleagues, and friends. Chapter 1, an edition of Peter of Candia's *Commentarium in II librum Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 3, which pertains to the question of the eternity of the world, is Stephen Brown's contribution to this volume. In chapter 2 Rolf Darge discusses Suarez's understanding of the transcendental character of being and takes pains to distinguish it from Scotus's *conceptus entis simpliciter simplex*. In chapter 3 Thomas Dewender offers an examination of a subject near and dear to Doyle, impossible objects, according to the logical and semantic analyses of John Buridan and his followers, Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Ingham. Marco Forlivesi's contribution, chapter 4, considers the role epistemology plays for John Punch in determining the proper object of metaphysics. Chapter 5 offers Jennifer Hart-Weed's consideration of how Moses Maimonides's account of divine actions informs much of Thomas Aquinas's analogical theory of religious language. Chapter 6 is Daniel Heider's contribution, wherein it is argued that Suárez's ontological theory of universals, even when compared to John Poinsoot's theory of universals, proves to be an equivalent — if not stronger — form of moderate realism than that of the Thomists. Ludger Honnefelder's essay, chapter 7, identifies the nature, scope, and peculiar features of Duns Scotus's metaphysics, identifying it as a truly transcendental science. Jack Marler's contribution, chapter 8, on the *De ente et essentia*'s, 'phoenix example' argues that Thomas's intention is to show how even (created) individuals that are one of a kind, like the phoenix, are such that their essence too is really distinct from their *esse*. In chapter 9 Daniel Novotny places Francisco de Araújo's theory of *entia rationis* into opposition with that of Suárez and argues that, while the former is not exactly the philosophical equal of the latter, nonetheless, Araújo improves upon and ultimately holds a more consistent theory than Suárez. Chapter 10, Michael Renemann's contribution, argues that self-consciousness according to Thomas Aquinas is not merely as anemic as those sympathetic to Kant might consider it to be but a truth-revealing power that has significant implications in contemporary experimental science. My own contribution, chapter 11, examines the notion of essential being as a point of convergence between the medieval metaphysics of Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus, on the one hand, and, on the other, the phenomenology of Edith Stein. Finally, in chapter 12 Roland Teske, S.J., discusses Henry of Ghent's metaphysical argument for God's existence and finds it problematic because of a faltering effort to synthesize a fundamentally Platonic Augustinian abstraction theory with an Aristotelian analogy of being. The volume concludes with a *post scriptum* featuring a reprint of one of Doyle's own articles on imaginary beings. In this essay Doyle, the consummate historian of philosophy, traces the lineage of beings of reason from a cast off of the Aristotelian metaphysics (i.e., being as true) to the vexing centerpiece of late Scholastic metaphysics. Questions pertaining to the metaphysical status of such "shadowy" beings eventually give rise to that topic which would eventually preoccupy much of Doyle's scholarship, namely, supertranscendental being."

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