

[Theory and History of Ontology](#)

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History of Truth. Selected Bibliography on Ancient Primary Authors

Homer

1. Accame, Silvio. 1963. "L'invocazione Alla Musa E La Verità in Omero E in Esiodo (Prima Parte)." *Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione Classica* no. 41:257-281.
2. ———. 1963. "L'invocazione Alla Musa E La Verità in Omero E in Esiodo (Seconda Parte)." *Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione Classica* no. 41:385-415.
3. Adkins, Arthur W.H. 1972. "Truth, *Kosmos*, and *Arete* in the Homeric Poems." *Classical Quarterly* no. 22:5-18.
4. Levet, Jean-Pierre. 1976. *Le Vrai Et Le Faux Dans La Pensée Grecque Archaïque. Étude De Vocabulaire*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

Tome I. *Présentation générale. Le vrai et le faux dans les épopées homériques*.
Avant-Propos: "Ce livre est la première partie d'une thèse de doctorat d'État qui a été soutenue le 11 mai 1974 en Sorbonne".
"A la description de l'état homérique de la langue et de la pensée succédera, dans une seconde partie, une étude du vocabulaire historique. Cet examen accompli, il restera à dépeindre l'évolution de chaque élément lexical jusqu'à la fin du Ve siècle, à travers le *Hymnes Homériques*, la poésie lyrique et élégiaque, les œuvres des poètes tragiques et comiques anciens, les écrits d'Hérodote, de Thucydide et d'Antyphon, les fragments des Présocratiques et les passages du *Corpus Hippocratique* que l'on peut dater du Ve siècle. On composera enfin une dernière synthèse résumant l'ensemble de l'évolution constatée et présentant l'état de langue et de pensée dont hérite le IVe siècle." (p. 5, note omise).
5. Nagy, Gregory. 1996. *Homeric Questions*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

See Chapter 4: *Myth as exemplum in Homer* - particularly pp. 122-128.
6. Prier, Raymond Adolph. 1997. "Achilles *Rheter*? Homer and Proto-Rhetorical Truth." In *The Rhetoric Canon*, edited by Schildgen, Brenda Deen, 63-81. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
7. Pucci, Pietro. 1987. *Odysseus Polutropos. Intertextual Readings in the Odyssey and the Iliad*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

See Chapter I.8 *Disguising truth: fiction* pp. 83-109
8. Puelma, Mario. 1989. "Der Dichter Und Die Wahrheit in Der Griechischen Poetik Von Homer Bis Aristoteles." *Museum Helveticum* no. 46:65-100.
9. Riezler, Kurt. 1943. "Homer's Contribution to the Meaning of Truth." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 3:326-337.

Hesiod

1. Arrighetti, Graziano. 1992. "Esiodo E Le Muse: Il Dono Della Verità E La Conquista Della Parola." *Athenaeum* no. 80:45-63.
2. ———. 1996. "Hésiode Et Les Muses. Le Don De La Vérité Et La Conquête De La Parole." In *Le Métier Du Mythe. Lectures D'Hésiode*, edited by Blaise, Fabienne, Judet de la Combe, Pierre and Rousseau, Philippe, 53-70. Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
3. Buongiovanni, Angelo. 1987. "La Verità E Il Suo Doppio (Hes. *Theog.* 27-28)." In *Interpretazioni*

Antiche E Moderne Di Testi Greci, 9-24. Pisa: Giardini editore.

Ricerche di filologia classica. Vol. III.

4. Daix, David-Artur. 2006. "Réalités Et Vérités Dans La *Théogonie* Et Les *Travaux Et Les Jours* D'Hésiode." *Métis. Anthropologie des Mondes Grecs Anciens* no. 4:139-164.

"Et d'abord quelle est cette vérité que nous chante Hésiode ? Nous pourrions répondre qu'il s'agit à l'évidence d'une vérité "poétique", autrement dit d'une vérité qui s'exprime au sein d'une composition littéraire -- étant entendu que la nature orale de cette composition ne nuit en rien à son caractère littéraire --, d'un ensemble de récits auxquels nous donnons souvent le nom de "mythes", où l'imagination et la fiction tiennent une place prépondérante. Toutefois, cette réponse fait surtout ressortir l'écart entre la conception que pouvaient avoir Homère ou Hésiode d'un discours véridique et celle que développera un philosophe comme Platon ou, dans un autre registre, un historien comme Thucydide, qui l'un comme l'autre se méfient hautement des artifices poétiques, au point de souhaiter les censurer, voire les expurger. Mais elle ne nous apprend en rien ce qu'Hésiode lui-même entend par "vérité". p. 140

(...)

"Conclusion.

Ni le mythe de Prométhée et de Pandora - qui, tel qu'il apparaît dans la *Théogonie* précisément, servirait à merveille le projet des *Travaux et les Jours* - - ni l'Éris iliadique n'ont perdu leur sens quand ils apparaissent au milieu des "réalités" qu'Hésiode rappelle à Persès. Mais ils sont en décalage par rapport à la perspective qu'adopte le poète et au monde qu'il veut célébrer.

Hésiode redéfinit les notions de lutte et d'exploit, de querelle et d'envie. Et, de même, il modifie l'équilibre entre les récits sur lesquels s'appuie sa démonstration. Il n'échappe pas pour autant au poids de la tradition, mais il assure la pertinence de son chant et se montre ainsi fidèle à ses patronnes, les Muses, "les filles à la langue habile du puissant Zeus" (29), dont les paroles sont toujours ajustées à leur propos, et au pouvoir dont elles l'ont investi.

La vérité est au coeur des préoccupations d'Hésiode. Toujours ses compositions prétendent la dire. Reste que cette vérité même pose problème, tant il est vrai qu'elle offre, paradoxalement, elle aussi, deux visages, selon qu'elle habite le temps des dieux ou celui des hommes."

5. Ferrari, Giovanni. 1988. "Hesiod's Mimetic Muses and the Strategies of Deconstruction." In *Post-Structuralist Classics*, edited by Benjamin, Andrew E., 45-78. New York: Routledge.

"This essay has a narrow focus but a large penumbra. My focus is a current interpretation of the couplet spoken by the Muses in the prologue to Hesiod's *Theogony*, an interpretation avowedly influenced by the work of Jacques Derrida. I think it not just mistaken, but mistaken in an exemplary fashion. That is, in considering how it goes wrong I hope to reveal something more general about the impact of Derrida's work, actual and potential, bad and good, on classical studies. (This will eventually involve me in a quite detailed analysis of an exemplary piece by Derrida himself.) (1) In addition, I will offer the beginnings of an account of a significant and general pattern of archaic Greek thought evinced by Hesiod's couplet (one which has particular importance for the later development of Greek philosophy); a pattern which, I argue, is obscured by a certain pervasive anachronism that classicists engaged by Derrida have imported from his work."

(1) "*Signature, événement, contexte*" and its companion piece "*Limited, inc. a b c...*" which I come to in the fourth section [both essay reprinted in: J. Derrida - *Limited Inc.* - Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1988]

6. Heiden, Bruce A. 2007. "The Muses' Uncanny Lies: Hesiod, *Theogony* 27 and Its Translators." *American Journal of Philology* no. 128:153-175.
7. Judet de la Combe, Pierre. 1993. "L'autobiographie Comme Mode D'universalisation. Hésiode Et Hélicon." In *La Componente Autobiografica Nella Poesia Greca E Latina Fra Realtà E Artificio Letterario*, edited by Arrighetti, Graziano and Montanari, Franco, 25-39. Pisa: Giardini.
8. Leclerc, Marie-Christine. 1993. *La Parole Chez Hésiode. À La Recherche De L'harmonie Perdue*. Paris: Belles Lettres.
9. Nagy, Gregory. 1992. "Authorisation and Authorship in the Hesiodic *Theogony*." *Ramus* no. 21:119-130.

"Strict attention to poetic truth, *aletheia*, as the 'recovered essence of being' and to the sharp contrast between *muthos* and *epos* (especially in diachronic perspective) reveals a pan-Hellenism in Hesiod's *Theogony* that confers authority on the poem and authorship on the poet."

10. ———. 1996. "Autorité Et Auteur Dans La *Théogonie Hésiodique*." In *Le Métier Du Mythe. Lectures D'Hésiode*, edited by Blaise, Fabienne, Judet de la Combe, Pierre and Rousseau, Philippe, 41-52. Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
11. Neitzel, Heinz. 1980. "Hesiod Und Die Lügenden Musen. Zur Interpretation Von *Theogonie* 27f." *Hermes* no. 108:387-401.
12. Otto, Walter F. 1952. "Hesioidea." In *Varia Variorum. Festgabe Für Karl Reinhardt Dargebracht Von Freunden Und Schülern Zum 14. Februar 1951*, 49-57. Münster: Böhlau.
13. Pretagostini, Roberto. 1995. "L'incontro Con Le Muse Sull'elicon in Esiodo E in Callimaco: Modificazioni Di Un Modello." *Lexis* no. 13:157-172.

Ristampato in. R. Pretagostini - Ricerche sulla poesia alessandrina II. Forme allusive e contenuti nuovi - Roma, Edizioni Quasar, 2007
14. Pucci, Pietro. 1976. *Hesiod and the Language of Poetry*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

See Chapter I: *The true and false discourse in Hesiod* - pp. 8-44
15. Rudhardt, Jean. 1996. "Le Préambule De La *Théogonie*. La Vocation Du Poète. Le Langage Des Muses." In *Le Métier Du Mythe. Lectures D'Hésiode*, edited by Blaise, Fabienne, Judet de la Combe, Pierre and Rousseau, Philippe, 25-39. Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
16. Strauss, Clay Jenny. 2003. *Hesiod's Cosmos*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

See pp. 58-64 on *Theogony*, 27-28.
17. Stroh, Wilfried. 1976. "Hesiods Lügende Musen." In *Studien Zum Antiken Epos*, edited by Görgemanns, Herwig and Schmidt, Ernst A., 85-112. Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain.
18. Svenbro, Jesper. 1976. "La Parole Et Le Marbre. Aux Origines De La Poétique Grecque." In. Lund: Studentlitteratur.

Chapitre 1.2 *Hésiode: la vérité comme relation sociale* pp. 46-73.
"Au VIIe Chant [de l' *Odyssée*], Alcinoos donne un banquet en l'honneur d'Ulysse. "Laissez-moi manger dans ma détresse, dit Ulysse, car il n'y a rien de plus chien que le ventre odieux (*ou gar ti stugerei epl gastéri kúnteron allo épleto*)" ; sans nourriture, Ulysse ne pourrait raconter ses aventures car, dit-il, son ventre lui "commande de manger et de boire" et lui "fait oublier" (*ek... léthaneí*) ce qu'il a éprouvé. Or, la signification de la notion archaïque d'*alétheia*, étudiée entre autres par Detienne, nous permet de faire l'observation suivante: loin de correspondre à notre conception de "vérité", l'*alétheia* archaïque tend à garder son sens "étymologique" et signifie le "non-oubli" (a-létheia), de sorte qu'on pourrait dire d'Ulysse qu'il ne saurait dire l'a-létheia qu'à condition de recevoir à manger. C'est aussi le cas des trois Vierges dans l'Hymne homérique à Hermès qui après avoir mangé du miel blond disent volontiers la vérité (*alétheièn agoreúein*)" tandis qu'elles "deviennent menteuses (*pseúdontai*)" aussitôt qu'elles en sont privées. (*)" p. 54
(*) *Hymnes homériques* IV.560-3.
19. Wismann, Heinz. 1996. "Propositions Pour Une Lecture D'Hésiode." In *Le Métier Du Mythe. Lectures D'Hésiode*, edited by Blaise, Fabienne, Judet de la Combe, Pierre and Rousseau, Philippe, 15-22. Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.

Pindar

1. Hubbard, Thomas K. 1985. *The Pindaric Mind. A Study of Logical Structure in Early Greek Poetry*. Leiden: Brill.

See Chapter II.3 *Alathea / Pseudos* pp. 100-106.

2. Komornicka, Anna Maria. 1972. "Quelques Remarques Sur La Notion D' *Alétheia* Et De *Pseudos* Chez Pindare." *Eos. Commentarii Societatis Philologa Polonorum* no. 60:235-253.
3. ———. 1979. *Studia Nad Pindarem I Archaiczna Liryka Grecka W Kregu Pojec Prawdy I Falszu*. Lodz: Uniwersytet Lodzki.

In Polish: *Studies on Pindar and Archaic Greek lyric. Terms denoting true and false* (with a French summary, pp. 252-272).

4. ———. 1981. "Termes Déterminant Le Vrai Et Le Faux Chez Pindare." In *Aischylos Und Pindar. Studien Zu Werk Und Nachwirkung*, edited by Schmidt, Ernst Günther, 81-89. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

"L'analyse de ces deux notions (le Vrai et le Faux) donne lieu à maintes conclusions. Citons, à titre d'exemple, deux réflexions. Or, contrairement au Faux -- sur le plan moral -- qui est toujours double (*diplóos*) ou même multiple, bariolé, sinueux, furtif, qui se tapit dans l'obscurité, la Vérité morale, elle, est toujours unique, simple (*aletós*). Par ailleurs, ce qui m'a frappée au cours de mes recherches, c'est le fait que tandis que la vérité morale en tant que franchise, véracité, loyauté est claire, manifeste, ouverte à tous et dévoilée -- la vérité rationnelle-cognitive, elle, est cachée, difficile à trouver, invisible et insaisissable, résidant dans les profondeurs. Une autre observation -- que je partage avec M. Detienne (*) -- c'est le fait que le domaine du Vrai et du Faux se trouve gouverné -- dans toute la poésie archaïque grecque -- par deux lois fondamentales -- celle de la contradiction et celle de l'ambiguïté -- autrement dit, que ces notions résident dans un couple de contraires antithétiques et complémentaires." pp. 88-89
 (*) M. Detienne, *Les maîtres de vérité dans la Grèce archaïque*, Paris, 1967, p. 146.

5. Nagy, Gregory. 1990. *Pindar's Homer. The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

The Mar Flexner Lectures, 1982 Bryn Mawr College.
 On *Alétheia* see pp. 58-71.

6. Ortega, Alfonso. 1970. "Poesia Y Verdad En Pindaro." *Helmantica* no. 21:253-272.

Thucydides

1. Allison, June. 1997. *Word and Concept in Thucydides*. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

On *Aletheia* see pp. 206-237.

2. Moles, John L. 1993. "Truth and Untruth in Herodotus and Thucydides." In *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World*, edited by Gill, Christopher and Wiseman, Timothy Peter, 122-146. Exeter: University of Exeter Press.

"In this discussion, I want to mediate between 'literary' and 'historical' approaches to the question, primarily through a close reading of the prefaces of Herodotus and Thucydides (presented in my own very literal, and sometimes controversial, translations). What emerges, I think, from the content and form of these programmatic statements is the way in which 'literary' and 'historical' objectives are alike present and deeply interfused.

On the one hand, both writers see themselves as inheritors of the tradition of epic narrative, especially as expressed in Homer's commemoration of a great war in the Iliad. Both writers also see themselves as developing the project built into Homer's poem (a project itself not without a certain 'historical' concern), namely that of analysing the causation and process of war and conflict, and of doing so by the invention of significant speeches and by the selection and presentation of concrete events. On the other hand, both writers also see themselves as engaged in a project which is distinctive from that of the poetic tradition in its attempt to establish factual truth and to distinguish this from factual 'untruth' or 'falsehood'. Thucydides is more explicit about the nature and methodology of this project than Herodotus, and also about the kind of history (that is, primarily, recent history) in which this project can be pursued effectively. Indeed, in this respect especially, he presents himself as a critic, and rival, of Herodotus as well as a successor. But, in the prefaces of both historians, as in their full-scale narratives, we can recognize the combination of objectives (the perpetuation of epic narrative and interpretation and the innovative search for factual truth) that makes it so difficult to characterize their writings either in terms of 'literature' or 'history'. This combination also makes it difficult to characterize their work in terms of 'truth', 'falsehood' or 'fiction', though if we examine their own descriptions of their project, we have a better chance of seeing how these concepts match with theirs."

3. Romilly, Jacqueline de. 1990. *La Construction De La Vérité Chez Thucydide*. Paris: Juillard.

Heraclitus

Texts

Studies

1. O'Meara, Dominic. 2004. "'Dire Le Vrai" Chez Héraclite." In *La Vérité. Antiquité - Modernité*, edited by Aenishanslin, Jean-François, O'Meara, Dominic and Schüssler, Ingeborg, 11-17. Lausanne: Payot.

Parmenides

Texts

Studies

1. Constantineau, Philippe. 1987. "La Question De La Vérité Chez Parménide." *Phoenix. Journal of the Classical Association of Canada* no. 41:217-240.

"This article proposes a new interpretation of Fragment 2 based on a reading of verses 3 and 5 as questions rather than as assertions, a reading which is supported by references to similar Homeric formulae. It is argued that this reading solves all the problems that have plagued all previous interpretations of this fragment. It also sheds new light on the starting point of Parmenides' ontology as set against the background of the traditions of epic poetry and of Ionian cosmology."

2. Germani, Gloria. 1988. "Aletheie in Parmenide." *La Parola del Passato* no. 43:177-206.
3. Mourelatos, Alexander. 1970. *The Route of Parmenides. A Study of Word, Image and Argument in the Fragments*. New Haven: New Haven University Press.

New, revised edition including a new introduction, three additional essays and a previously unpublished paper by Gregory Vlastos *Names of Being in Parmenides* - Las Vegas, Parmenides Publishing, 2008.

4. Papadis, Dimitris. 2005. "The Concept of Truth in Parmenides." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 23:77-96.

"Studies Parmenides' tripartite cognitive scheme: a) *doxa*, true or false, b) *ta dokounta* = true doxai, primarily of universal reference, and c) *aletheia*. *Doxa* and *ta dokounta* refer to the perceptible aspect of the world, whereas *aletheia* refers to the inner Being of the world. Although in the Poem access to the truth is reserved to Parmenides, it is understood that such access is also possible for everyone possessed of exceptional spirituality."

Sophists

Texts

Studies

1. Classen, Carl Joachim. 1989. "Protagoras' *Aletheia*." In *The Criterion of Truth*, edited by Huby, Pamela and Neal, Gordon, 13-38. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
2. Huby, Pamela, and Neal, Gordon, eds. 1989. *The Criterion of Truth*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

Essays written in honour of George Kerferd together with a text and translation (with annotations) of Ptolemy's *On the Kriterion and Hegemonikon*.

Plato's Doctrine of Truth

Texts

Studies

1. Belfiore, Elizabeth. 1985. "'Lies Unlike the Truth': Plato on Hesiod, *Theogony*, 27." *Transactions of the American Philological Association* no. 115:47-57.

Plato's text is: *Republic* 2, 376-383.

2. Benardete, Seth. 1963. "The Right, the True and the Beautiful." *Glotta* no. 41:54-62.
3. Bury, Robert Gregg. 1973. *The Philebus of Plato*. New York: Arno Press.

Edited with introduction, notes and appendices (first edition 1897).
See Appendix F (on *aletheia*) pp. 201-211.

4. Casertano, Giovanni. 2007. *Paradigmi Della Verità in Platone*. Roma: Editori Riuniti.
5. Des Places, Édouard. 1961. "La Langue Philosophique De Platon: Le Vocabulaire De L'accès Au Savoir Et De La Science." *Syculorum Gymnasium* no. 16:71-83.

Repris dans: É. Des Places - *Études platoniciennes 1929-1979* - Leiden, Brill, 1981 pp. 36-48 (sur

alétheia pp. 44-46).

6. Fiorentino, Fernando. 2002. "Il Problema Della Verità in Platone." *Sapienza* no. 55:3-38.
7. Frede, Michael. 1992. "Plato's *Sophist* on False Statements." In *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, edited by Kraut, Richard, 397-424. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8. Gill, Christopher. 1993. "Plato on Falsehood - Not Fiction." In *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World*, edited by Gill, Christopher and Wiseman, Timothy Peter, 88-121. Exeter: University of Exeter Press.

"I begin by drawing three types of distinction between kinds of discourse. The first relates to the speaker's intended form of communication with a listener. This distinction involves two aspects: that between factual and fictional discourse, and that between forms of factual discourse. Factual discourse is intended either to convey to the listener what the speaker takes to be true ('veracious'), or to convey what the speaker takes to be false ('lying'). Fictional discourse is different in kind from factual: its statements (and other forms of expression) do not constitute truth-telling or lying, and in this sense fiction has no truth-status.

The second type of distinction differs from the first in that it characterizes discourse by reference to whether it is in fact true or false rather than whether the speaker intends to convey what he or she takes to be true or false.

The third type of distinction relates to the mode of expression. I have in mind such distinctions as that between analytic discourse and non-analytic (representative or narrative); between prosaic discourse (historical, philosophical) and poetic (epic, dramatic, lyric); between literal discourse and figurative (imagistic, musical); and between general and specific discourse. This type of distinction differs from the first two in several ways, notably in not designating truth-status in either of the senses involved in those distinctions. But I include this distinction here because the question of the truth-status of a given discourse is often connected closely with that of the mode of expression involved. Thus, for example, a given statement may be false (in intention or fact) on the literal level but true (in intention or fact) on the figurative level; or it may be false in a specific case but true in general. This is only the most obvious way in which the distinctions drawn in the first two types may be connected with those in the third type.

My claim is that these distinctions, while broadly intelligible to modern readers, do not correspond in one crucial respect to the conceptual framework presupposed by Plato. The distinction between factual and fictional discourse, which is familiar to us, has no obvious equivalent in Plato's framework." pp. 39-40

9. Guillaud, Patrice. 1987. "La Doctrine De La Vérité Dans Le *Cratyle* De Platon." *Revue de l'Enseignement Philosophique* no. 38:1-9.
10. Hestir, Blake E. 2000. "A Conception of Truth in *Republic V*." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 17:311-332.

"Plato sometimes refers to truth (*alétheia*) as an object. The thesis of this paper is that Plato's "object" truth is being, an object of knowledge. I provide an examination of the difficult stretch of text at "Republic" V 476e-480a, where Plato argues for the separation of knowledge, belief, and ignorance with respect to their objects. Plato claims that knowledge is "set over" being, by which he means forms. Since philosophers are lovers of the sight of truth and Plato thinks that in one respect forms are truth, it follows that the being knowledge is set over is truth."

11. ———. 2003. "A Conception of Truth in Plato's *Sophist*." *Journal of The History of Philosophy* no. 41:1-24.

"Plato's solution to the problem of falsehood carries a notorious reputation which sometimes overshadows a variety of interesting developments in Plato's philosophy. One of the less-noted developments in the *Sophist* is a nascent conception of truth which casts truth as a particular relation between language and the world. Cornford and others take Plato's account of truth to involve something like correspondence; some find the origin of Aristotle's "correspondence" account of truth in Plato's *Sophist*. But all this assumes a lot about Plato, much less Aristotle. For one, it assumes that to claim that the statement 'Theaetetus is sitting' is true is to claim that it is true because it corresponds with the fact that Theaetetus is sitting. Other scholars have been reluctant to accept Cornford's view, but few offer any explanation of what sort of account of truth we might ascribe to Plato by the end of the *Sophist*. Tarski has argued that truth is a simpler notion than that of correspondence. In fact, he claims his own

"conception" of truth is similar to the classical conception we find in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* -- a conception of truth formulated in Greek in much the same way Plato formulates it in the *Sophist*. Unfortunately, Tarski never sufficiently explains what it is about the classical conception that makes it closer to his own. I argue that Tarski is generally right about the ancient conception of truth, but this is not to claim that Tarski's own conception is in Plato. By interpreting Plato's solution to the paradox of not-being and his solution to the problem of falsehood, I argue that Plato's account of truth implies a simpler notion of truth than correspondence. I outline various types of correspondence theory and show that none of these fits what Plato says about truth, syntax, and meaning in the *Sophist*."

12. ———. 2004. "Plato and the Split Personality of Ontological *Aletheia*." *Apeiron* no. 37:109-150.

"I argue that Plato conceives of truth in at least two distinct and fundamentally important ways: (T1) truth is simply that being or substance which he identifies as forms, and (T2) truth is the ontological stability of the forms which is the precondition for the forms being what they are insofar as they are forms and for each form having the particular F-property it has by virtue of itself, and which guarantees that each form will satisfy the Parmenidean requirements for knowledge. Plato's ontological truth has a split personality, the latter of which (T2) I argue has been misunderstood."

13. Jenks, Rod. 2001. *The Contribution of Socratic Method and Plato's Theory of Truth to Plato Scholarship*. Levinston: Edwin Mellen Press.

Contents: 1. The problem of the Socratic method; 2. The Coherence Theory of Truth; 3. The Coherence Theory within the Platonic corpus; 4. Coherence and anamnesis; 5. Socratic ignorance and the Coherence Theory of Truth; 6. The uniqueness of the world; conclusion; Notes; Bibliography; Index.

14. Knight, Thomas. 1993. "The Use of "*Alétheia*" for the "Truth of Unreason": Plato, the Septuagint, and Philo." *American Journal of Philology* no. 114:581-609.

"Orthodoxy about the semantic evolution of *Aletheia* in the Hellenistic period represents Philo Judaeus and Plutarch as the non-Christian representatives of a line of development beginning in Plato (where *Aletheia* is said to denote abstract, conceptual Truth, 'die Wahrheit') (1) and ending in the sense of absolute truth, specifically 'the content of Christianity as absolute truth.' (2) The problem of such a stemma is that it fails to stand up to close inspection; the present study considers one of the circumstances under which 'truth' was equated with doctrinal content in the Hellenistic period. (3) Specifically, I undertake to demark the distinction between 'truth' as Philo Judaeus understands it from 'truth' as it is used by the philosophers who are his stylistic and intellectual models; I intend to show that Philo's notion of pure truth is not a natural semantic extension of Platonic (or even contemporary philosophic) usage, but is rather an expression of deeper cultural determinants." p. 581

(1) Bultmann, '*Alétheia*.' The passages he cites here in support of this development (Plut. *De Isid et Os.* 351c, e, and Hierocles *Carm. Aur.* 21-23 Mullach) are far too late to represent the direct semantic development of Platonic usage of the term. The same objection holds for Bultmann's citation of Epictit. (*Diss.* 1.4, 31; 3.24, 40) for the extension of *Alétheia* into 'the sense of `correct learning.' From these observations he proceeds into his second major heading in the discussion of the Classical and Hellenistic evolution of the word, 'The Usage of Dualism.' In this section he again fails to make the crucial distinction between fourth- and third-century (and later) usage.

(2) Bauer, Arndt, and Gingrich, *Lexicon*, s.v. '*Alétheia*', cite Plutarch (*Is. and Os.* 351e) and Philo (*Spec. Leg.* 4.178, 'the proselyte is a *metanastàs eis aletheian*') as the non-Christian antecedents for *Alétheia* denoting 'the content of Christianity as absolute truth.'

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"This article tries to explain how the concepts of truth and coherence feature in Plato's theory of knowledge. It sets out Plato's concept of coherence (*homologia*, *symphonia*) in connection with the methods of his dialectic, gives a critical assessment of the evidence for the foundationalist or intuitionist interpretations of his theory of knowledge, and tries to unearth the presuppositions that allow Plato to combine his specific criterion of coherence with the hard realism of his concept of truth."

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Aristotle's Definition of Truth

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"This research aims to study the Aristotelian notion of truth (ἀλήθεια) in relation to the development of the so called logic of comparison from a historical and philosophical standpoint. The logic of comparison (or comparative logic) is defined as the proportioning way to make comparisons between different terms through major, minor or equal measure (Casari 1984; 1985). The main thesis of this research is that the Aristotelian notion of truth is not a gradable value, i. e. declinable by "more" or "less", but, because of that, it could be considered as the ultimative reference of validity for comparative logic. This is argued through the analysis of three chosen key-concepts: gradationism, truth and comparison. Firstly, it is shown how some Aristotelian conceptions about "more" or "less" were unduly taken over with ontological (mis)understanding by later metaphysics, up to consider them as logical justification of existence for degrees of being and corresponding truths, despite Aristotle's thought, from faulty sensibility to a highest level of absolute Truth. Some recent authoritative studies about the subject of the Aristotelian theory of ἀλήθεια are been considered here and the result is that none of those allows to attribute such a gradable notion to Aristotle. Then it is proposed a critique evaluation about the problem of the origins of the ancient comparative logic, showing that presumed degrees of truth are not detectable at all in the Aristotelian dialectic, but only more or less sound arguments always based on the criterion of bivalence (truth/false) provided by the Principle of Excluded Middle. Finally, the research ends arguing the groundlessness for attributing to Aristotle the idea of an intuitive and pre-predicative truth as different, prior and superior to an alleged predicative truth through the contextual critique of the interpretations of A. Trendelenburg (1846), F. Brentano (1862) and M. Heidegger (1930) and their common Neo-Scholastic background. - From a theoretical point of view, the whole thesis can be read as a critique to the idea of «truer»."

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Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Notes on the text X; List of abbreviations of titles of Aristotle's works XI; Introduction 1; Part I. Bearers of truth or falsehood 45; 1. States of affairs. thoughts. and sentences 45; 2. Truth conditions for predicative assertions 77; 3. Truth conditions for existential assertions 99; Part II. 'Empty' terms 129; 4. Truth as correspondence 129; 5. 'Vacuous' terms and 'empty' terms 152; Part III. Truth and time 183; 6. Truth and change 183; 7. Truth and determinism in *De Interpretatione* 9 198; Appendix I. *Metaph.* Theta 10 1051b 1: the text 234; Appendix 2. *Metaph.* Theta 10 1051b 2-3: the text 238; Appendix 3. *Int.* 7, 17b 16-18: the text 239; Appendix 4. The two place relations in Aristotle's definition of truth 254; Appendix 5. Aristotle's theory of truth for predicative assertions: formal presentation 258; Appendix 6. The failure of Bivalence for future-tense assertions formal presentation 266; References 284; Index of names 313; Index of subjects 319; Index of passages 321.

"The study of truth is a central part of the philosophical tradition we have inherited from classical Greece. Aristotle played an important role in developing and sharpening the debate in this area and on many issues that are connected with it. I have two primary goals: to offer a precise reconstruction of all of

Aristotle's most significant views on truth and falsehood and to gain a philosophical understanding of them. In this introduction I first offer an overview of Aristotle's theory of truth and then discuss the methodology I adopt in pursuing my primary goals.

I AN OVERVIEW OF ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF TRUTH

Why an overview? Aristotle speaks about truth and falsehood in passages from several works, mainly the *Categories* (chapters 4, 5, 10, and 12), *de Interpretatione* (chapters 1-9), *Sophistici Elenchi* (chapter 25), *de Anima* (chapter 3.6), and the *Metaphysics* (chapters Γ 7, Δ 7, Δ 29, E 4, and Θ 10). Truth and falsehood are not the main topic of these works: their discussions of truth and falsehood are asides.

Reconstructing an Aristotelian theory of truth and falsehood on the basis of such asides poses complicated problems of various sorts. To help readers to keep their orientation through the many bifurcations of the arguments addressing these problems, I decided to offer a concise but precise map of the territory — an overview of Aristotle's theory of truth. References to the passages from Aristotle's works that substantiate the attribution of a certain view to him, and an examination of the relevant secondary literature, will be found in the chapters that follow this introduction." (p. 1)

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 "The problem of the relation between the determinations of the concept of truth in the chapters E, 4 and Theta, 10 of *Metaphysics* in the modern exegesis has been prevalently framed in the distinction between a logical meaning and an ontological one of truth. In this article it is re-examined with reference to the strict connection between thought and being as a peculiar character of the Aristotelian (and generally Greek) thought of truth. The result is the character of *arché* and *aitia* of truth of *asuntheton* (as it presents itself in the *noein*) in relation to every determinable truth in the *dianoein*, and so the character of original foundation of the *eidos*, as it shows itself to the thought in the simplicity of the intellectual intuition."
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" Lorsque, en *Metaphysique* Δ , 29, Aristote parle de la « chose vraie », cela ne signifie pas que le Stagirite possède, outre sa conception de la vérité propositionnelle, une conception de la vérité ontologique. Dans le texte en question, Aristote adopte, pour les besoins de la polémique, la conception antisthénienne de la proposition et de la vérité, selon laquelle il ne peut y avoir qu'un *logos* par objet, ce qui entraîne l'impossibilité de la contradiction. Cette conception donne lieu à des paradoxes, auxquels Platon se heurte notamment dans le *Sophiste*; mais qui n'ont été définitivement résolus que par la distinction analytique effectuée par Aristote entre sujet et prédicat, distinction qui marque la naissance de la notion de proposition proprement dite."

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