

Theory and History of Ontology

by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: rc@ontology.co

Selected Bibliography on the Ontology of William of Ockham

BIBLIOGRAPHY

For Ockham's contributions to the theories of supposition and mental language see: *Medieval Theories of Supposition (Reference) and Mental Language* on the website "History of Logic".

1. Adams, Marilyn McCord. 1963. "Things Versus "Hows", or Ockham on Predication and Ontology." In *Essays in Ontology*, edited by Allaire, Edwin B., 175-188. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Ockham's account of the truth conditions for categorical propositions of the forms '*N* is *B*' and '*A* is *B*' is dictated by his two-fold ontological program: to eliminate universals other than names or concepts and to restrict particular things (*res*) to the categories of substance and quality.(1) For endorsing

(T1) '*N* is *B*' is true if and only if *B*-ness inheres in *N*

and

(T2) '*A* is *B*' is true if and only if something that is *A* has *B*-ness, or *B*-ness inheres in something that is *A* for all substitutions of proper names for '*N*', concrete general terms for '*B*', and abstract general terms for '*B*-ness' would be tantamount to adopting the ontology of the moderns with a distinct kind of thing for each of the ten Aristotelian categories. According to Ockham's description in the *Summa Logicae*, the moderns saw substances such as Socrates as having a certain layer-like structure: at the core is a particular substance composed of prime matter with several substantial forms; it is made one by the inherence of discrete quantity and extended by the inherence of dimensive quantity; other absolute quality-accidents such as color, flavor, odor, shape, etc. inhere in dimensive quantity immediately and substance mediately. Accidents in the remaining seven categories are relative things (*respectus*) that have their foundations either in the substance, quantity, or qualities and their term in something else. For example, when Socrates and Plato are similar, a relative similarity thing inheres in Socrates' whiteness and is Socrates' similarity to Plato, while another relative similarity-thing inheres in Plato's whiteness and is Plato's similarity to Socrates. For reasons that lie beyond the scope of this paper,(2) Ockham thought this ontology was as prolific of contradiction and absurdity as it was of entities. His own contention is that the truth of a proposition depends not merely on which things exist, but on how they exist.

In what follows, I shall explain how Ockham sacrifices the simplicity of across-the-board adherence to (T1) and (T2), applying them only to a certain range of case in the category of quality. Then I shall examine a series of objections that his own ontology offers no advantage commensurate with this loss. (p. 175).

(...)

"SUMMARY. Ockham's theory of truth-conditions is calculated to accommodate his ontology. He adopts a two-name theory of predication for categories involving absolute terms only, and admits the inherence-analysis for only a restricted range of concrete quality terms. Although he argues extensively that its wider application to the last eight Aristotelian categories of accident leads to contradiction and absurdity, his own positive proposal -- to treat all terms in those categories as connotatives that signify particular substances and/or particular qualities existing one way or another -- remains essentially programmatic. A full development of it would involve supplementing (T3)-(T7) by stating truth-conditions for statements about how things are related, quantified, active, etc., using absolute terms that name only substances and qualities. Ockham never delivers on the promissory notes he issues. Nevertheless, we must ask how many nominalists have gone further, and by how much, and how recently? In Ockham's view, the realists' program is demonstrably impossible; how much less an evil, if his own is merely incomplete." (p. 188.).

(1) Although Ockham thinks that unaided natural reason will restrict its ontology to substances and qualities, he himself feels forced by the doctrines of revealed Christian theology -- viz., the Trinity, the

Incarnation, and transubstantiation -- to admit really distinct relations of Paternity, Filiation, and Spiration in the Godhead, a relation of assumption in the human nature of Christ, real relations of inherence between matter and form, substance and accident, and relation of union between parts of the continuum (*Ordinatio* I, d. 30, q. 4; OT IV, 360-374).

(2) See my forthcoming book, *Ockham*, Part One, Chapters 5-9. [Adams 1987].

2. ———. 1973. "Did Ockham Know of Material and Strict Implication? A Reconsideration." *Franciscan Studies* no. 32:5-37.
3. ———. 1976. "Ockham on Identity and Distinction." *Franciscan Studies* no. 36:5-74.
4. ———. 1977. "Ockham's Nominalism and Unreal Entities." *Philosophical Review* no. 76:144-176.
5. ———. 1978. "Ockham's Theory of Natural Signification." *Monist* no. 61:444-459.
6. ———. 1987. *William Ockham*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Two volumes.
7. ———. 1989. "Ockham on Truth." *Medioevo* no. 15:143-172.
8. ———. 1990. "Ockham's Individualisms." In *Die Gegenwart Ockhams*, edited by Vossenkühl, Wilhelm and Schönberger, Rolf, 3-24. Weinheim: VCH-Verlagsgesellschaft.
9. ———. 1998. "Ockham on Final Causality: Muddying the Waters." *Franciscan Studies* no. 56:1-46.
10. Alanen, Lilli. 1985. "Descartes, Duns Scotus and Ockham on Omnipotence and Possibility." *Franciscan Studies* no. 45:157-188.
11. Alféri, Pierre. 1989. *Guillaume D'ockham, Le Singulier*. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit.
12. Andrés, Teodoro de. 1969. *El Nominalismo De Guillermo De Ockham Como Filosofia Del Lenguaje*. Madrid: Editorial Gredos S. A.
13. Andrews, Robert. 1997. "The 'Defensorium Ockham'." *Franciscan Studies* no. 54:99-122.
14. Ariew, Roger. 1977. "Did Ockham Use His Razor?" *Franciscan Studies* no. 37:5-17.
15. Bastit, Michel. 1997. *Les Principes Des Choses En Ontologie Médiévale: Thomas D'aquin, Scot, Occam*. Bordeaux: Bière.
16. Baudry, Léon. 1949. *Guillaume D'occam; Sa Vie, Ses œuvres, Ses Idées Sociales Et Politiques*. Paris: Vrin.

Vol. I: *L'homme et les œuvres* (only published).
17. ———. 1957. *Lexique Philosophique De Guillaume D'ockham. Étude Des Notions Fondamentales*. Paris: P. Lethellieux.
18. Beckmann, Jan P., ed. 1992. *Ockham - Bibliographie 1900-1990*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.

Inhalt: Danksagungen 6; Einleitung des Herausgebers 7; Teil I. Primärbibliographie; 1. Editionen 13; 2. Übersetzungen 21; Teil II. Sekundärbibliographie; Alphabetisches Verzeichnis der Schriften über Ockham 1900 - 1990 31; Teil II: Indices; Personenregister (Index auctorum) 135; Werkregister (Index operum)

141; Systematisches Register (Index systematicus) 143; Sachregister (index rerum) 155; Anhang: Schema "Ockham-Literatur 1900-1990" 168.

19. ———. 1996. *Wilhelm Ockham*. München: C. H. Beck.
 20. ———. 1998. "Ockham, Ockhamismus, Und Nominalismus: Spuren Der Wirkungsgeschichte Des Venerabilis Inceptoris." *Franciscan Studies* no. 56:77-95.
 21. Beierle, John. 1984. "A Truth-Functional Non-Modal Interpretation of Ockham's Theory of Consequences." *Franciscan Studies* no. 44:71-80.
 22. Beretta, Beatrice. 1999. *Ad Aliquid: La Relation Chez Guillaume D'occam*. Fribourg: Éditions universitaires.
 23. Berger, Harald. 1989. "Extensionale Versus Intentionale Semantik Am Beispiel Der Sprachphilosophie Ockhams Disziplin." *Acta Analytica*:171-186.
 24. Biard, Joel. 1981. "La Redéfinition Ockhamiste De La Signification." In *Sprache Und Erkenntnis Im Mittelalter. Akten Des Vi. Internationalen Kongresses Für Mittelalterliche Philosophie Der Société Internationale Pour L'étude De La Philosophie Médiévale*, edited by Kluxen, Wolfgang, 451-458. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Vol. I
25. ———. 1984. "L'unité De Monde Selon Guillaume D'ockham (Ou La Logique De La Cosmologie Ockhamiste)." *Vivarium* no. 22:63-84.
 26. ———. 1991. "Les Logiciens Médiévaux Face Aux Textes D'aristote. L'exemple De Guillaume D'ockham." In *Penser Avec Aristote*, edited by Sinaceur, Mohammed Allal, 307-324. Toulouse: Erès.
 27. ———. 1997. *Guillaume D'ockham. Logique Et Philosophie*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
 28. ———. 1997. "Intention Et Signification Chez Guillaume D'ockham. La Critique De L'être Intentionnel." In *Langages Et Philosophie. Hommage À Jean Jolivet*, edited by Libera, Alain de, Elamrani-Jamal, Abdelali and Galonnier, Alain, 201-220. Paris: Vrin.
 29. Boehner, Philotheus. 1946. "The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham." *Traditio* no. 4:307-335.
Reprinted in: Boehner, *Collected articles on Ockham* pp. 156-174
 30. ———. 1958. *Collected Articles on Ockham*. Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts.
 31. Boh, Ivan. 1968. "Burleigh and Ockham. An Ontological Confrontation." In *Proceedings of the 7th Inter-American Congress of Philosophy. Vol. Ii*, 255-262. Québec.
 32. ———. 1984. "Propositional Attitudes in the Logic of Walter Burley and William Ockham." *Franciscan Studies* no. 44:31-60.
 33. ———. 1990. "Epistemic Logic and Ockham's Theory of Demonstration." In *Die Gegenwart Ockhams*, edited by Vossenköhl, Wilhelm and Schönberger, Rolf, 241-255. Weinheim: VCH-Verlagsgesellschaft.

"When the treatises on knowing and doubting first appeared as separate specialized pieces of logical literature in the first half of the 14th century, (1) Ockham was already deeply involved in political controversies.(2) His work on logic and theoretical philosophy was certainly behind him by 1330 and his personal Odyssey began, ending in Munich in 1347. Although he left us with many detailed discussions

of the most important logical theories of the day, his treatment of epistemic-logical materials indicate that he was himself struggling to understand what little he found on the subject in his predecessors, to fit it properly into his own *Summa logicae* and to show its use in the formulation of the theory of scientific demonstration.⁽³⁾ The main aim of this paper is to identify the epistemic principles involved in a demonstrative syllogism and to recognize the pragmatic dimension of language in which such a syllogism is expressed. To achieve our goal, we must begin with observations about the state of epistemic logic in Ockham's time and about some of the problems which comprised such logic." p. 241

"Summary and Conclusion.

Ockham's contributions to epistemic logic are diversified, ranging from his recognition of several special modes (*scire, credere, opinari, dubitare, etc.*), through his extensive concern with epistemic syllogistic moods in all three figures, and through his perceptive judgment regarding composite and divided sense of epistemic proposition, and culminating perhaps in his epistemization of the theory of demonstration. Although there is a sparsity of the most general rules of consequence (i.e. the propositional rules) in Ockham, there are at least some. Moreover, Ockham says enough in various places on the basis of which we can reconstruct his most important presuppositions and his implied awareness of general principles of epistemic logic, especially those which are relevant for the theory of demonstration. One such principle is that if the antecedent is known by *a*, the consequent is known by *a*, but only on the condition that *a* knows that the consequence is sound. Whereas other writers on *Post. Anal.* and on scientific demonstration concentrated on the objective side of the matter, treating demonstration as if it were a matter of logical and extra-logical connections independently of the investigator, questioner, or doubter, Ockham showed a great deal of attention to the role of the knower and he recognized most vividly that the reference to the epistemic subject in the statement of epistemic/doxastic principles is essential and not accidental or superfluous." p. 255

(1) One of the earliest special treatises on the subject of knowing and doubting was written by Ockham's younger contemporary William Heytesbury whose *De scire et dubitare* appeared as one of the chapters of *Regulae solvendi sophismata* (ca. 1335). In this chapter Heytesbury refers back to the famous Grosseteste's characterization of the various senses of 'to know' (*scire*), but, unlike Ockham, he concerns himself with explicating primarily the nature of knowing in the sense of knowing "necessary" propositions of the sort which can become objects of scientific demonstration.

(2) The most comprehensive presentation of Ockham's ideas is undoubtedly that of Marilyn McCord Adams, *William Ockham* (2 vols.), Notre Dame University Press (Publications in Medieval Studies, 26), 1987, xvii + 1402 pp. The unique contribution to Ockham studies, however, goes to the editors of *Collected Works of William of Ockham* at the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University who finally made possible studies grounded in definitive, critically-edited texts. One should also keep in mind the studies of two other scholars, Philoteus Boehner and Ernst A. Moody, who made the thought of the great medieval thinker palatable to modern tastes. Cf. P. Boehner, *Collected Articles on Ockham*. Ed. Eligius M. Buytaert. Franciscan Institute. St. Bona-venture, N.Y. 1958; and E. A. Moody, *The Logic of William Ockham*. Russell & Russell, New York 1965.

(3) For an attempt to identify the most general aspects of Ockham's epistemic logic and to relate them to similar concerns in the works of Burley see I. Boh, "Propositional Attitudes in the Logic of Walter Burley and William Ockham", *Franciscan Studies* 44 (1984), 31-59

34. Boler, John. 1986. "Ockham' Cleaver." *Franciscan Studies* no. 45:119-144.
35. ———. 1997. "Accidents in Ockham's Ontological Projects." *Franciscan Studies* no. 54:79-97.
36. ———. 1998. "Ockham on Difference in Category." *Franciscan Studies* no. 56:97-111.
37. Bos, Egbert Peter. 1987. "William of Ockham and the "Predication of a Thing"." In *Ockham and Ockhamists. Acts of the Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum on the Occasion of Its 10th Anniversary (Leiden, 10-12 September 1986)*, edited by Bos, Egbert Peter and Krop, Henri A., 71-79. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
38. Bos, Egbert Peter, and Krop, Henri A., eds. 1987. *Ockham and Ockhamists*. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.

Acts of the Symposium organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy *Medium Aevum* on the occasion of its 10th anniversary (Leiden, 10-12 September 1986).
39. Bosley, Richard. 1985. "What Revision of Realism Could Meet Ockham's Critique." *Franciscan Studies*

- no. 45:111-118.
40. Brown, Stephen. 1966. "Sources for Ockham's Prologue to the Sentences." *Franciscan Studies* no. 26:36-65.
 41. ———. 1972. "Walter Burleigh's Treatise *De Suppositionibus* and Its Influence of William of Ockham." *Franciscan Studies* no. 32:15-64.
 42. Corcoran, John, and Swiniarski, John. 1978. "Logical Structures of Ockham's Theory of Supposition." *Franciscan Studies* no. 38:161-183.
 43. Courtenay, William J. 1991. "In Search of Nominalism: Two Centuries of Historical Debate." In *Gli Studi Di Filosofia Medievale Fra Otto E Novecento. Contributo a Un Bilancio Storiografico*, edited by Imbach, Ruedi and Maierù, Alfonso, 233-251. Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura.

Reprinted as Chapter one in: W. J. Courtenay, *Ockham and Ockhamism. Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought*, Leiden, Brill, 2008, pp. 1-19.
 44. ———. 2008. *Ockham and Ockhamism. Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought*. Leiden: Brill.
 45. Davies, Julian. 1998. *A Compendium of Ockham's Teachings. A Translation of the Tractatus De Principiis Theologiae*. St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute.
 46. Day, Sebastian. 1947. *Intuitive Cognition. A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics*. St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute.
 47. Dieterle, Jill. 2007. "Ockham's Razor, Encounterability, and Ontological Naturalism." *Erkenntnis* no. 55:51-72.
 48. Eco, Umberto. 1984. "Signification and Denotation from Boethius to Ockham." *Franciscan Studies* no. 44:1-30.
 49. Fitzgerald, Michael Joseph. 1978. "Ockham's Implicit Priority of Analysis Rule?" *Franciscan Studies* no. 38:213-219.
 50. Flórez, Alfonso. 2002. *La Filosofía Del Lenguaje De Ockham. Exposición Crítica E Interpretación Cognitiva*. Granada: Editorial Comares.
 51. Freddoso, Alfred J. 1980. "Ockham's Theory of Truth Conditions." In *William of Ockham's Theory of Propositions. Part Ii of the Summa Logicae*. Notre Dame: University of Indiana Press.

Introduction to the translation.
Reprint: South Bend, St. Augustine's Press, 1998.
 52. ———. 1991. "Ontological Reductionism and Faith Versus Reason: A Critique of Adams on Ockham." *Faith and Philosophy* no. 8:317-339.
 53. Gál, Gedeon, and Wood, Rega. 1991. "The Ockham Edition: William of Ockham's 'Opera Philosophica Et Theologica'." *Franciscan Studies* no. 51:83-101.
 54. Ghisalberti, Alessandro. 1972. *Guglielmo Di Ockham*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
 55. Gibson, Arthur. 1998. "Ockham's World and Future." In *Routledge History of Philosophy. Volume Iii:*

Medieval Philosophy, edited by Marenbon, John, 329-367. New York: Routledge.

56. Goddu, André. 1984. *The Physics of William of Ockham*. Leiden: Brill.
57. ———. 1990. "William of Ockham's "Empiricism" and Constructive Empiricism." In *Die Gegenwart Ockhams*, edited by Vossenkuhl, Wilhelm and Schönberger, Rolf, 208-231. Weinheim: VCH Acta Humaniora.
58. ———. 1993. "Connotative Concepts and Mathematics in Ockham's Natural Philosophy." *Vivarium*:106-139.
- "Connotation plays a central role in Ockham's analysis of the language of natural philosophy and mathematics. Some simple connotative terms belong to the deep structure of mental language. Ockham's program cannot guarantee the objectivity of things being quantified or located in space and time without his connotation-theory. Ockham's theory provides a partial explanation of why fourteenth-century philosophers shifted attention from discussion about the objects of mathematics to discussion of mathematics as a language. The shift explains in part the adoption of mathematical and metalinguistic approaches to philosophical and theological problems."
59. Grellard, Christophe, and Ong-Van-Cung, Kim Sang. 2005. *Le Vocabulaire D'ockham*. Paris: Ellipses.
60. Guelluy, Robert. 1947. *Philosophie Et Théologie Chez Guillaume D'ockham*. Paris: Vrin.
61. Hamesse, Jacqueline. 1986. "Les Problèmes Posés Par L'édition Critique Des Reportations." *Franciscan Studies* no. 46:107-118.
62. Henninger, Mark. 1985. "Peter Aureoli and William of Ockham on Relations." *Franciscan Studies* no. 45:231-244.
63. Henry, Desmond Paul. 1965. "Ockham and the Formal Distinction." *Franciscan Studies* no. 25:285-292.
64. Hoffmann, Fritz. 1998. *Ockham-Rezeption Und Ockham-Kritik Im Jahrzehnt Nach Wilhelm Von Ockham in Oxford 1322-1332*. Münster: Aschendorff.
65. Hülsen, Reinhard. 1998. "Burleigh and Ockham on Anaphoric Pronouns." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 80:30-51.

"Many medieval grammar and logic texts contain treatments of *relativa grammaticalia*, expressions some of which we now call anaphoric pronouns. The first philosopher who paid attention to these treatments seems to have been Peter Geach. Apparently, Geach found their treatments both stimulating and frustrating.' In his main work on semantics, *Reference and Generality* (1), he presents some theses of Walter Burleigh's on this topic, a fourteenth century logician and opponent of William Ockham, at considerable length. Elsewhere, however, he remarks that while 'the logic of pronouns with antecedents was extensively studied by medieval logicians in their chapters de suppositione relativorum; [...t]his medieval treatment of pronouns was inconclusive" (2) and that '[...] the medievals who discussed *relativa* - pronouns with antecedents - were groping in the dark despite all their ingenuity'. (3) What Geach deplored was the apparent tendency of 'the medievals' to treat anaphoric pronouns, *relativa grammaticalia substantiae identitatis* in terms of co-reference, of 'supponere pro eodem'. As is well known, Geach himself favors a rather different approach, according to which it is nonsense to talk about the reference of such pronouns at all, for they act like bound variables. His view on pronouns has now a considerable number of adherents and a few critics - most notably Gareth Evans. (4)

I am not concerned here with the question whether Geach's own theory of pronouns is correct, but whether his verdict about medieval theories of *relativa* is justified. His verdict is of unrestricted generality: it is not *some* medieval treatment of pronouns that is inconclusive, but "the" medieval treatment. This makes his claims an easy target for counterattack: Just find some medieval logician, whose theory does not fit Geach's claims. I have done this elsewhere. (4) Here I want to consider two logicians Geach has actually dealt with himself: Burleigh and Ockham.

- (1) Geach (1962), *Reference and Generality: An Examination of Some Medieval and Modern Theories*, Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press (3rd edition) 1980.
- (2) Geach (1960-61), "Ryle on Namely-Riders"; *Analysis* 21/3, repr. in Geach, *Logic Matters*, Oxford 1972, pp. 88-92, p. 92. All page-references will be to this edition.
- (3) Geach (1968-69), "Quine's Syntactical Insights", *Synthese* 19, repr. in Geach, *Logic Matters*, pp. 115-127, p. 118. All page-references will be to this edition.
- (4) Evans (1977), "Pronouns, Quantifiers, and Relative Clauses (I)", *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 7, pp. 467-536.
- (5) On a few such logicians see my *Die Semantik anaphorischer Pronomina*, Leiden 1994.
66. Jordan, Michael. 1985. "What's New in Ockham's Formal Distinction?" *Franciscan Studies* no. 45:97-110.
67. Karger, Elizabeth. 1976. *A Study of William of Ockham's Modal Logic*.
Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley.
68. ———. 1980. "Would Ockham Have Shaved Wyman's Beard?" *Franciscan Studies* no. 40:244-264.
Reprinted in: H. A. G. Braakhuis, C. H. Kneepkens, L. M. de Rijk (eds.) - *English logic and semantics. From the end of the Twelfth century to the time of Ockham and Burleigh* - Nijmegen, Ingenium Publishers, 1981, pp. 389-407.
69. ———. 1991. "Référence Et Non-Existence Dans La Sémantique De Guillaume D'occam." In *Lectioinum Varietates. Hommage À Paul Vignaux*, edited by Jolivet, Jean, Kaluza, Zénon and Libera, Alain de, 163-176. Paris: Vrin.
70. ———. 1993. "Propositions Et Syllogismes "À L'oblique" Dans La Logique D'ockham." *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* no. 60:147-164.
71. ———. 1994. "Théories De La Pensée, De Ses Objets Et De Son Discours Chez Guillaume D'occam." *Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical Review* no. 33:437-456.
72. ———. 1995. "William of Ockham, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham on the Objects of Knowledge and Belief." *Vivarium* no. 33:171-196.
73. ———. 1999. "Ockham's Misunderstood Theory of Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition." In *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, edited by Spade, Paul Vincent, 204-226. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
74. Kaufmann, Matthias. 1994. *Begriffe, Sätze, Dinge. Referenz Und Wahrheit Bei Wilhelm Von Ockham*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

"This volume gives an introduction to William Ockham's theory of signs, his ontology, his epistemology, and the interrelations between these fields. Some recent results of analytic philosophy turn out to be useful instruments for the interpretation of Ockham's thought.
Part one contains a presentation of the basic concepts of Ockham's semantics. It is followed by an investigation of his ontology, including a comparison with modern ontology. Part three deals with the common and different elements in the conceptions of supposition and of quantification. Part four shows some similarities of Ockham's views on the truth of sentences with those of Davidson. The final part presents Ockham's epistemology within the discussion of his contemporaries and confronts it with actual issues raised by Quine and Putnam."
75. ———. 2003. "The Discussion on the Nature of the Concept in Ockham's *Perihermeneias* Commentary." In *Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages Essays on the Commentary Tradition*, edited by Braakhuis, Henk A.G. and Kneepkens, Corneille Henri, 119-133. Groningen: Ingenium Publishers.
76. Kaye, Sharon M. 1999. "Russell, Strawson and William of Ockham." In *The Proceedings of the Twentieth*

World Congress of Philosophy. Volume 2 Metaphysics., edited by Rockmore, Tom, 207-216. Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center.

77. Kaye, Sharon M., and Martin, Robert M. 2001. *On Ockham*. Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.
78. Kelley, Francis. 1978. "Some Observations on the 'Fictum' Theory in Ockham and Its Relation to Hervaeus Natalis." *Franciscan Studies* no. 38:260-282.
79. King, Peter. 2005. "Le Rôle Des Concepts Selon Ockham." *Philosophiques* no. 35:435-447.
80. Klima, Gyula. 1999. "Ockham's Semantics and Ontology of the Categories." In *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, edited by Spade, Paul Vincent, 118-142. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
81. ———. 2008. "The Nominalist Semantic of Ockham and Buridan: A 'Rational Reconstruction'." In *Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic*, edited by Gabbay, Dov and Woods, John, 389-431. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Handbook of the history of logic: Vol. 2.
 "This paper is going to outline the innovative semantic theories of the two great 14th-century nominalist thinkers whose work eventually gave rise to the quasi institutional separation of the nominalist *via moderna*, the "modern way", from the realist *via antiqua*, the "old way" of doing logic, science, philosophy, and theology in the late Middle Ages. The person who initiated these changes was the English Franciscan theologian, William Ockham. However, the person who was primarily responsible for establishing Ockham's nominalism as a genuinely viable theoretical alternative was the French secular Master of Arts, John Buridan." p. 389 (note omitted)
 "Buridan's semantics starts out in the same way as Ockham's. Acknowledging the subordination of written to spoken, and spoken to mental terms (i.e., concepts), establishes for him a "semantic triangle", in which concepts are natural signs of whatever we conceive by means of them, whereas the utterances and inscriptions subordinated to them are the conventional signs of the same, in virtue of their conventional subordination to concepts. Not all concepts have, however, the function of conceiving something; some concepts merely serve to determine *how* we conceive of things conceived by other concepts. This is the basis of Buridan's primary distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic concepts, and the corresponding spoken and written terms." p. 414
82. König-Pralong, Catherine. 2005. *Avènement De L'aristotélisme En Terre Chrétienne. L'essence Et La Matière: Entre Thomas D'aquin Et Guillaume D'ockham*. Paris: Vrin.
83. Krop, Henri A. 1987. "The Self-Knowledge of God. Duns Scotus and Ockham on the Formal Object of Scientific Knowledge." In *Ockham and Ockhamists*, edited by Bos, Egbert Peter and Krop, Henri A., 83-92. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
84. Lagerlund, Henrik. 2006. "What Is Singular Thought? Ockham and Buridan on Singular Terms in the Language of Thought." In *Mind and Modality. Studies in the History of Philosophy in Honour of Simo Knuuttila*, edited by Hirvonen, Vesa, Holopainen, Toivo J. and Tuominen, Miira, 217-237. Leiden: Brill.
85. Lahey, Stephen. 1997. "William Ockham and Trope Nominalism." *Franciscan Studies* no. 54:105-120.
86. Lambertini, Roberto, Marmo, Costantino, and Tabarroni, Andrea. 1997. " *Virtus Verborum: Linguaggio Ed Interpretazione Nel Dialogus Di Guglielmo Di Ockham.*" In *Langages Et Philosophie. Hommage À Jean Jolivet*, edited by Libera, Alain de, Elamrani-Jamal, Abdelali and Galonnier, Alain, 221-236. Paris: Vrin.
87. Langston, Douglas. 1979. "Scotus and Ockham on the Univocal Concept of Being." *Franciscan Studies* no. 39:105-129.

88. Leff, Gordon. 1975. *William of Ockham. The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
89. Leffler, Oliver. 1995. *Wilhelm Von Ockham: Die Sprachphilosophischen Grundlagen Seines Denkens*. Werl/Westfalen: Dietrich Coelde Verlag.
90. Leite, Pedro Gilberto Junior. 2007. "Univocity of Being in William of Ockham's Thought: A First Approach." In *New Essays on Metaphysics as Scientia Transcendens*, edited by, Pich, Roberto Hofmeister, 303-320. Louvain-la-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales.
91. Lenzen, Wolfgang. 1993. "Ockhams Modale Aussagenlogik." *Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 75:125-159.
92. Longeway, John. 2007. *Demonstration and Scientific Knowledge in William of Ockham. A Translation of Summa Logicae Iii-Ii : De Syllogismo Demonstrativo, and Selections from the Prologue to the Ordinatio*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
93. Loux, Michael J. 1974. "The Ontology of William of Ockham." In *William of Ockham's Theory of Terms. Part I of the Summa Logicae*, 1-21. Notre Dame: University of Indiana Press.

First introductory essay to the translation.

Reprint: South Bend, St. Augustine's Press, 1998.

"The distinctions between singular and general terms, on the one hand, and abstract and concrete terms, on the other, play crucial roles in discussions of ontological issues. Although these dichotomies can be expressed in purely grammatical terms, they have traditionally been thought to point to two over-arching distinctions among things. Philosophers have frequently claimed that the singular-general term distinction is rooted in a distinction between objects that are particulars and objects that are universals; whereas, the distinction between concrete and abstract terms forces us to confront the distinction between substances (minimally interpreted to include material bodies and persons) and the various characteristics they possess or exhibit.

But because they appear to carry these far-reaching metaphysical implications, these grammatical dichotomies receive detailed treatment at the hands of the nominalist. If his theory is to be at all plausible, the nominalist must have the resources for providing a metaphysically neutral account of the singular-general and concrete-abstract dichotomies. In this essay I want to examine William of Ockham's ontology by focusing on his treatment of these distinctions. My aim here is twofold. By examining Ockham's analysis I hope to provide an introduction to the central themes of Part I of the *Summa Logicae* and to clarify the concept of a nominalistic ontology in general." p. 1

94. ———. 1974. "Ockham on Generality." In *William of Ockham's Theory of Terms. Part I of the Summa Logicae*, 23-46. Notre Dame: University of Indiana Press.

Second introductory essay to the translation.

Reprint: South Bend, St. Augustine's Press, 1998.

95. Marmo, Costantino. 1984. "Guglielmo Di Ockham E Il Significato Delle Proposizioni." *VS Versus. Quaderni di Studi Semiotici* no. 38/39:115-148.
96. Martin, Gottfried. 1949. *Wilhelm Von Ockham. Untersuchungen Zur Ontologie Der Ordnungen*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
97. Massobrio, Simona. 1984. "The Individuation of Matter in Ockham's Philosophy." *Franciscan Studies* no. 44:197-210.
98. Matteo, Anthony M. 1985. "Scotus and Ockham: A Dialogue on Universals." *Franciscan Studies* no. 45:83-96.

99. Maurer, Armand. 1978. "Method in Ockham's Nominalism." *Monist* no. 61:426-443.
100. ———. 1984. "Ockham's Razor and Chatton's Anti-Razor." *Mediaeval Studies* no. 46:463-475.
101. ———. 1999. *The Philosophy of William of Ockham in the Light of Its Principles*. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
102. McGrade, Arthur Stephen. 1985. "Plenty of Nothing: Ockham's Commitment to Real Possibles." *Franciscan Studies* no. 45:145-156.
103. Michon, Cyrille. 1994. *Nominalisme. La Théorie De La Signification D'occam*. Paris: Vrin.
104. ———. 1996. "Asimétries: Thomas D'aquin Et Guillume D'occam Précurseurs De Frege." *Études Philosophiques*:307-321.
105. Miralbell, Ignacio. 1998. *Guillermo De Ockham Y Su Crítica Lógico-Pragmática Al Pensamiento Realista, Serie Universitaria Del La Universidad De Navarra*. Pamplona: Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico.
106. Moody, Ernest. 1935. *The Logic of William of Ockham*. New York: Sheed & Ward.
Reprinted New York, Russell & Russell, 1965.
107. Müller, Paola. 1985. "Terminus E Nomen Nella Logica Di Ockham." *Rivista di Filosofia neo-scolastica* no. 77:599-611.

"The author analyses philologically and philosophically the two different expressions 'nomen' and 'terminus' used by Ockham in the chapters given up to the supposition theory in his "Summa logicae". By that we can say that Ockham's logic of terms is interested primarily in the words, and in the concepts just with reference with these last ones, without qualifying Ockham's logic as 'nominalist': in fact 'nomen' receives his own capacity of meaning by the concept as natural linguistic sign."
108. ———. 1986. "La Discesa Al Particolare Nella Logica Di Ockham." *Rivista di Filosofia neo-scolastica* no. 78 (3):353-377.
109. ———. 1989. "Nominare L'essenza Divina. La Distinzione Xxii Dell' *ordinatio* Di Ockham." *Rivista di Filosofia neo-scolastica* no. 81:224-254.
110. ———. 1991. "Esistenza E Verità in Guglielmo Di Ockham." *Medioevo* no. 17:249-280.
111. ———. 1994. "Le *Obligationes* Nella *Summa Logicae* Di Guglielmo Di Ockham." In *Filosofia E Teologia Nel Trecento. Studi in Ricordo Di Eugenio Randi*, edited by Bianchi, Luca, 85-104. Louvain-la-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales.
112. ———. 2012. *La Logica Di Ockham*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
113. Muralt, André de. 1976. "La Connaissance Intuitive Du Néant Et L'évidence Du 'Je Pense'. Le Rôle De L'argument *De Potentia Absoluta Dei* Dans La Théorie Occamienne De La Connaissance." *Studia Philosophica* no. 36:107-158.

Introduction, traduction et commentaire du *Prologue des Sentences* de Guillaume d'Occam *quaestio 1, 1*.
114. ———. 1999. "La Critique De La Notion Scotiste D' *esse Objectivum*, Le "Psychologisme" Et Le "Nominalisme" Occamiens." *Cahiers de la Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* no. 20:113-148.

Métaphysiques Médiévales. Études en l'Honneur d'André de Muralt - Éditées par Curzio Chiesa et Léo Freuler.

115. Norena, Carlos P. 1981. "Ockham and Suarez on the Ontological Status of Universal Concepts." *New Scholasticism* no. 55:348-362.
116. Normore, Calvin Gerard. 1976. *The Logic of Time and Modality in the Later Middle Ages: The Contribution of William of Ockham*, Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Toronto.
117. ———. 1999. "Some Aspects of Ockham's Logic." In *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, edited by Spade, Paul Vincent, 31-52. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
118. Novaes, Catarina Dutilh. 2000. *A Study of William of Ockham's Logic - from Suppositio to Truth Conditions*, University of Amsterdam.
119. Nuchelmans, Gabriel. 1987. "Ockham on Performed and Signified Predication." In *Ockham and Ockhamists*, edited by Bos, Egbert Peter and Krop, Henri A., 55-62. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
- Reprinted in: G. Nuchelmans - *Studies on the history of logic and semantics, 12th-17th century* - Edited by E. P. Bos - Aldershot, Ashgate, 1996.
120. Nute, Donald. 1974. "A Contradiction in Ockham's Theory of Language." *Philosophical Studies* no. 25:417-422.
- "It is argued that Ockham's theory of language either fails to provide a principle of individuation to account for the diversity of mental entities he posits or is committed to certain spoken terms both having and not having some one entity as a significant. It is suggested that this problem can be solved by allowing that every categorematic term is subordinated to an infinite number of concepts and by modifying Ockham's supposition theory."
121. Panaccio, Claude. 1974. "Langage Ordinaire Et Langage Abstrait Chez Guillaume D'occam." *Philosophiques* no. 1:37-60.
122. ———. 1978. *Signification Et Nomination. La Logique De Guillaume D'occam*, Ph. D. Dissertation University of Montreal.
123. ———. 1981. "Guillaume D'occam Et Les Pronoms Demonstratifs." In *Sprache Und Erkenntnis Im Mittelalter. Akten Des Vi. Internationalen Kongresses Für Mittelalterliche Philosophie Der Société Internationale Pour L'étude De La Philosophie Médiévale (First Volume)*, edited by Beckmann, Jan P., Honnefelder, Ludger, Jüssen, Gabriel, Münxelhaus, Barbara, Schrimpf, Gangolf, Wieland, Georg and Kluxen, Wolfgang, 465-470. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter.
124. ———. 1987. "Nominalisme Occamiste Et Nominalisme Contemporain." *Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical Review* no. 26:281-287.
125. ———. 1992. *Les Mots, Les Concepts Et Les Choses. La Sémantique De Guillaume D'occam Et Le Nominalisme D'aujourd'hui*. Paris: Vrin.
126. ———. 1993. "Guillaume D'ockham Et La Perplexité Des Platoniciens." In *Contre Platon. Tome I: Le Platonisme Devoilé*, edited by Dixsaut, Monique, 117-135. Paris: Vrin.
127. ———. 1995. "La Philosophie Du Langage De Guillaume D'occam." In *Sprachtheorien in Spatantike Und Mittelalter*, edited by Ebbesen, Sten, 184-206. Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag.
128. ———. 1999. *Le Discours Intérieur. De Platon À Guillaume D'ockham*. Paris: Editions du Seuil.

About this volume see the special number of "Laval Théologique et Philosophique" vol. 57 n. 2 (June 2001)

129. ———. 2002. "Propositionalism and Atomism in Ockham's Semantics." *Franciscan Studies* no. 44:61-70.
130. ———. 2004. *Ockham on Concepts*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
131. ———. 2005. "Le Nominalisme D'ockham Et La Représentation Mentale. Précis De *Ockham on Concepts*." *Philosophiques* no. 35:423-426.
132. ———. 2005. "Réponses À Mes Critiques." *Philosophiques* no. 35:449-457.
- Replies to the essay by E. J. Ashworth and P. King in the same journal.
133. ———. 2008. "L'ontologie D'ockham Et La Théorie Des Tropes." In *Compléments De Substance. Études Sur Les Propriétés Accidentelles Offertes À Alain De Libera*, edited by Erismann, Christophe and Schniewind, Alexandrine, 167-181. Paris: Vrin.
134. Panaccio, Claude, and Piché, David. 2010. "Ockham's Reliabilism and the Intuition of Non-Existents." In *Rethinking the History of Skepticism. The Missing Medieval Background*, edited by Lagerlund, Henrik, 97-118. Leiden: Brill.
135. Pelletier, Jenny E. 2012. *William Ockham on Metaphysics. The Science of Being and God*. Leiden: Brill.
136. Perini-Santos, Ernesto. 2002. "L'extension De La Liste Des Modalités Dans Les Commentaires Du *Perihermeneias* Et Des *Sophistici Elenchi* De Guillaume D'ockham." *Vivarium* no. 40:174-188.
137. ———. 2003. "A Explicação Ockhamiana De Proposições Passadas, Ou Instruções Ára Um Aprendiz." *Analytica.Revista de Filosofia* no. 7:49-64.
- "Within the Ockhamist semantics, the predicate 'true' is explained by another more basic semantical relation, the relation of supposition. The author shows how this relationship between two semantical predicates figures in the analysis of the truth-conditions of propositions about the past, and demonstrates that it is a model that can be extended to propositions about both the future and the possible. The author indicates how the semantics of alethic modalities is in continuity with the semantics of propositions about the past and about the future. If we consider another aspect of Ockham's modal theory, viz., the fact that modalities are defined as any term that can be predicated of a whole proposition, the importance of this point becomes clear. In conclusion, the author points out the different levels of analysis of alethic modalities within an Ockhamist framework."
138. ———. 2006. *La Théorie Ockhamienne De La Connaissance Évidente*. Paris: Vrin.
139. Perler, Dominik. 1991. "Kopulatheorie Und Seinsbegriff. Zum Verhältnis Von Logik Und Metaphysik Bei Wilhelm Von Ockham." In *Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien Zur Geschichte Der Philosophie Des Mittelalters*, edited by Burkhard, Mojsisch and Pluta, Olaf, 805-829. Amsterdam: R. Grüner.
140. Putallaz, François-Xavier. 1983. "Autour De La Connaissance Intuitive Des Non-Existants Chez Ockham." *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* no. 30:447-467.
141. Rabade, Romeo Sergio. 1966. *Guillermo De Ockham Y La Filosofía Del Siglo Xiv*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto "Luis Vives" de Filosofía.
142. Read, Stephen. 1977. "The Objective Being of Ockham's *Ficta*." *Philosophical Quarterly* no. 27:14-31.

143. ———. 2007. "William of Ockham's *the Sum of Logic*." *Topoi* no. 26:271-277.

"William of Ockham's *Summa Logicae* is a classic of analytical metaphysics, using a typical fourteenth century logic treatise to defend a reductionist ontology. For Ockham, everything is an individual, and this is to be shown by the correct logical analysis of language, reinterpreting Aristotle's *Categories* as a taxonomy of the many ways in which terms can be predicated. The ultimate basis is the attribution of an individual quality to an individual substance. This theory of the signification of terms is then extended to an account of the truth-conditions of propositions and the truth-preservation of arguments, but always with the reduction to individuals as the key. This classic work in the logical analysis of language still contains lively insights for contemporary scholars."

144. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1987. "War Ockham Ein Antimetaphysiker? Eine Semantische Betrachtung." In *Philosophie Im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien Und Paradigmen. Wolfgang Kluxen Zum 65. Geburtstag*, edited by Beckmann, Jan P., Honnefelder, Ludger and Wieland, Georg, 313-328. Hamburg: F. Meiner.

Reprinted as chapter XIV in: *Through language to reality: studies in medieval semantics and metaphysics*.

"IV. Schlußbetrachtung. Ockham anerkennt ohne Einschränkung den transzendenten Bezirk, d. h. das Metaphysische oder Übersinnliche als Bezirk; in diesem Sinne ist er also gewiß kein Antimetaphysiker. Aber verwirft er denn die Metaphysik als Wissenschaft, oder höhlt er sie zumindest aus? Zuerst muß anerkannt werden, daß Ockham im Prinzip der Metaphysik das Weisungsrecht über die Seienden (d. h., für Ockham, die individuellen Seienden) keineswegs abspricht. Zugleich kann nicht geleugnet werden, daß bei ihm der Metaphysik eine auffallend bescheidene Stelle zukommt. Wie läßt sich das unter Berücksichtigung von Ockhams unzweifelbarer Ehrfurcht vor dem Übersinnlichen erklären? Der Schlüssel zur Lösung dieser Frage liegt nicht bloß in Ockhams Ontologie des individuellen Seins, sondern auch in seinen anthropologischen Auffassungen. Der Mensch ist nach ihm in seinen Denken und Sprechen nicht imstande, das Erhabene wesentlich zu durchforschen. Dessen soll sich der Mensch fort während eingedenk sein. Dies ist für Ockham in zwei deutliche Strategien übersetzbar:
a) nicht jedem *modus significandi* oder *loquendi* entspricht ein *modus essendi* in der Wirklichkeit
b) viele maßgebende Aussagen, sowohl sakrale wie profane, soll man nicht de *virtute sermonis* (dazu reicht unser Sprechen zuwenig aus), sondern der Absicht des Redners oder Schriftstellers entsprechend deuten." pp. 326-327 (Notes omitted).

145. ———. 1987. "Logic and Ontology in Ockham. Some Notes on His View of the Categories of Being and the Nature of Its Basic Principles." In *Ockham and Ockhamists. Acts of the Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum on the Occasion of Its 10th Anniversary (Leiden, 10-12 September 1986)*, edited by Bos, Egbert Peter and Krop, Henri A., 25-40. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.

Reprinted as chapter XIII in: L. M. De Rijk, *Through language to reality: studies in medieval semantics and metaphysics*, (edited by E. P. Bos), London, Variorum Reprints, 1989.

"*Conclusion*. There is no single reason, I think, to ascribe to Ockham any feelings of hostility towards metaphysics on this account. God created 'true and real being', but He created it in shaping 'what is truly and really being', individual beings, that is. As created, it is radically changeable and contingent as well. Uncreated, unchangeable being is not to be created, not even as some mysterious constituent present in creaturely being. Human beings are not entitled to sublimate their (indispensable) conceptual tools (e.g. universal terms) so that they represent unchangeable ontic standards. Whenever we are inclined to do so, Ockham's razor comes in, not however, to make us say that the metaphysical domain is void. Rather logic (and human thought in general) should make us recognize our own limitations, and refrain from speaking about the unspeakable when, and inasmuch as, our linguistic tools are bound to lead us astray. The same applies to Ockham's view of proofs of God's existence. He only admits the proof of God as first preserver of these actual things in this actual world and rejects all atemporal proofs. However, his faith is unshakeable and not involved in any philosophical thinking either. Likewise it is Ockham's ontology (doctrine of being) which is modest, the *onta* 'beings' are as abundant as they are. For that matter, Ockham let them really be (*ontôs einai* Plato would say). Well, in order to let them *be*, human thinking should be prudent in cautiously managing its homemade conceptual apparatus." pp. 38-39

146. ———. 1990. "Ockham's Theory of Demonstration: His Use of Aristotle's *Kath' Holou* and *Kath' Hauto* Requirements." In *Die Gegenwart Ockhams*, edited by Vossenkuhl, Wilhelm and Schönberger, Rolf, 232-240. Weinheim: VCH-Verlagsgesellschaft.

"Far from being a sceptic William of Ockham made every effort to corroborate the basis of philosophical and theological thought by purifying it of all sorts of untenable presuppositions. His main contribution to fourteenth century philosophical and theological development lies in systematically rethinking scholastic doctrines, and especially their assumptions, on the firm basis of his own favourite leading principles: the strictly individual nature of all that really is and the radical contingency of all creatural being.

These two principles also play a major part in Ockham's way of dealing with the Aristotelian theory of demonstration. The present paper aims at investigating Ockham's doctrine of demonstrative proof, focusing on the way in which he felt forced to adapt or rephrase the special requirements Aristotle had laid down for propositions to enter into syllogistic proof, especially strict proof (the so-called '*demonstratio potissima*'). Our main argument will concern Aristotle's rather peculiar '*kath holou*' requirement and Ockham's appliance of the '*kath hauto*' (Latin: 'per se') notion which is also involved in framing correct premisses for demonstrative proofs. A few preliminary remarks will be made about the essentials of Aristotle's theory of demonstration." p. 232

(...)

"Conclusions.

To sum up our findings: Ockham's adaptations and manipulations of Aristotle's requirements for genuine demonstrative propositions are as many demands imposed by his own metaphysical views. He comments on Aristotle, always starting from his own favourite views. Though Aristotle is the Master, Ockham is the one to say what the Master meant, or what he should have meant. On the other hand, his introducing the '*per se strictissimo modo*' rather seems to be a matter of technicality. Whereas in *Posterior Analytics* Aristotle deals with the scientific procedure of *apodeixis* in general, in which the apodeictic syllogism is merely a vehicle for correctly framing an *apodeixis*, the Medievals, and Ockham in particular, were apt to reduce Aristotle's theory of demonstrative proof to a theory of demonstrative syllogism. That is why the '*demonstratio potissima*' (including its specific demands) so heavily influenced Ockham's theory of demonstration." p. 239

147. ———. 1995. "Ockham as the Commentator of *His* Aristotle. His Treatment of *Posterior Analytics*." In *Aristotelica Et Lulliana: Magistro Doctissimo Charles H. Lohr Septuagesimum Annum Feliciter Agenti Dedicata*, edited by Domínguez Reboiras, Fernando, Imbach, Ruedi, Pindl, Theodor and Walter, Peter, 77-127. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

1. Introduction; 2. Preliminary: Aristotle on demonstrative or epistemoni proof; 2.1 On the three requirements '*kata pantos*', '*kath' hauto*', '*kath' holou*', 2.2 On the notion of necessity; 2.3 On the four types of questions. On 'Middle' and 'Definiens'; 2.3.1 Subject and attribute. The Middle; 2.3.2. On definition and the four question-types; 2.3.3 The role of definitions in epistemoni proof; 2.3.4 Recipes for the discovery of definitions; 2.4 The '*kath' holou*' requirement revisited; 2.5 Particulars and the proper objects of Aristotle's epistemoni proof; 3. Ockham as a Commentator of *Posterior Analytics*; 3.1 Ockham's treatment of the four basic question-types; 3.2 Ockham's view of the '*kath' holou*' requirement; 3.3 The impact of Ockham's ontology upon his theory of demonstration; 3.3.1 Ockham's problem concerning the First Subject; 3.3.2 Ockham's introduction of 'Non-First Subject'; 3.3.3 '*Demonstratio particularis*' in Ockham; 3.3.4 Ockham's view of necessity; 3.5 '*Dici per se*' and '*propositio per se vera*' in Ockham; 3.5.1 Two kinds of '*per se*' assignment; 3.5.2 The '*propositio per se (vera)*' in Ockham; 3.5.3 The strict and strictest senses of '*per se*'; 4. Conclusion.

"The present paper aims to clarify the attitude towards Aristotle adopted by one of the leading lights of fourteenth century philosophical and theological thought, William of Ockham, by investigating (a) how in some of the vital subjects of Aristotelian doctrine, the Venerable Inceptor understood and interpreted the Master, (b) how and why on specific occasions, he deliberately took the liberty to stray from Aristotle's teachings. It goes without saying that in such an undertaking, one has to confine oneself to certain doctrinal themes the choice of which might seem quite arbitrary. The present author has picked out the Aristotelian doctrine of demonstrative proof as interpreted by Ockham." p. 78

148. ———. 1995. "Ockham's Horror of the Universal. An Assessment of His View of Individuality." *Mediaevalia. Textos e Estudos* no. 7-8:473-497.

Quodlibetaria: miscellanea studiorum in honorem prof. J. M. da Cruz Pontes anno iubilationis suae, Conimbrigae MCMXCV

149. Salamucha, Jan. 2003. "The Propositional Logic in William Ockham." In *Knowledge and Faith*, edited by Swietorzecka, Kordula and Jadacki, Jacek Juliusz, 139-167. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Originally published in Polish in *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 38, 1935, pp. 208-239.

150. Schulthess, Peter. 1992. *Sein, Signifikation Und Erkenntnis Bei Wilhelm Von Ockham*. Berlin: Akademia Verlag.
151. Scott, Theodore Kermit. 1969. "Ockham on Evidence, Necessity, and Intuition." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 7:27-50.
152. Shapiro, Herman. 1957. *Motion, Time and Place According to William Ockham*. St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute.
153. Shimizu, Tetsuro. 1990. "Time and Eternity: Ockham's Logical Point of View." *Franciscan Studies* no. 50:283-307.
154. Spade, Paul Vincent. 1981. "Ockham on Terms of First and Second Imposition and Intention, with Remarks on the Liar Paradox." *Vivarium* no. 19:47-55.
155. ———. 1990. "Ockham, Adams and Connotation. A Critical Notice of Marilyn Adams, *William Ockham*." *Philosophical Review* no. 99:593-612.
156. ———. 1997. "The Logic of 'Sit Verum' in Richard Brinkley and William of Ockham." *Franciscan Studies* no. 54:227-250.
157. ———. 1998. "Three Versions of Ockham's Reductionist Program." *Franciscan Studies* no. 56:347-358.
158. ———. 1999. "Ockham's Nominalist Metaphysics: Some Main Themes." In *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, edited by Spade, Paul Vincent, 100-117. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
159. ———, ed. 1999. *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
160. Stump, Eleonore. 1987. "Consequences in Ockham's Summa Logicae and Their Relation to Syllogism, Topics and Insolubles." In *Logos and Pragma. Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans*, edited by Rijk, Lambertus Marie de and Braakhuis, Henk A.G., 141-159. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
161. ———. 1999. "The Mechanisms of Cognition: Ockham on Mediating Species." In *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, edited by Spade, Paul Vincent, 168-203. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
162. Tabarroni, Andrea. 1984. "A Note on a Short Treatise Attributed to Ockham: The *Super Terminos Naturales*." *Franciscan Studies* no. 44:329-349.
163. ———. 1989. "Mentl Signs and the Theory of Representation in Ockham." In *On the Medieval Theory of Signs*, edited by Eco, Umberto and Marmo, Costantino, 195-224. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
164. Tachau, Katherine. 1988. *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics 1250-1345*. Leiden: Brill.
165. Turnbull, Robert G. 1962. "Ockham's Nominalist Logic: Some Twentieth Century Reflections." *New Scholasticism* no. 36:313-329.

Reprinted in: Edwin B. Allaire [and others], *Essays in Ontology*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1963, pp. 79-91.

"The logic of William of Ockham is commonly -- and, I believe, rightly - thought to be nominalistic. It is also commonly -- and, I believe, wrongly -- thought to be helpful in the solution of those philosophical problems which cluster about the issue of the "one and the many." The allegedly helpful features of his

logic are the theories of signification and supposition. I intend to show that these theories, far from being helpful, lead to certain intolerable results, in particular, (1) construing singular propositions, like "Socrates is a man," either as analytic or as no propositions at all (i.e., neither true nor false) and (2) construing all general propositions as either analytic or contradictory. These results follow from taking Ockham as offering object language analyses of object language propositions. Taking him as offering metalanguage analyses of object language propositions is to start off with attributing an intolerable "result" to his logic. It will be helpful, at the end, briefly to compare his logic with that of a contemporary nominalist, Nelson Goodman, for neither of the intolerable results follows from Goodman's logic. Whether the latter is, therefore, acceptable is another issue.

My strategy is as follows. In Part I, I wish to show that a rather straightforward interpretation of Ockham does have him offering metalinguistic analyses of object language propositions and also to show how certain contemporary interpreters and Ockham himself have managed to blind themselves to this fact. In Part II, I wish to show that the so-called "descent to singulars" affords a possibility of construing Ockham as offering object language analyses of object language propositions and to show how, given the doctrines discussed in Part I, he is led to adopt the 'is' of identity, the latter in such a way as to lead into the "intolerable results" mentioned above. In Part III, I wish to make the brief comparison with Goodman's logic.

No detailed descriptions of the Ockhamite theories of signification and supposition will be attempted. Ockham states them quite clearly, and there exist excellent contemporary accounts of both, especially those of Fr. Boehner and Prof. Moody.* I shall discuss just what is necessary to make good the several claims listed above. The discussion will, furthermore, be limited to Ockham's doctrine of categorical propositions of present time. This is quite enough, for his doctrines of past, future, and modal propositions are directly dependent upon his doctrine of present-time categoricals." (pp. 79-80 of the reprint).

(* Cf. P. Boehner, *Collected Articles on Ockham*, ed. E. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1958); E. Moody, *The Logic of William of Ockham* (New York, 1935); E. Moody, *Truth and Consequence in Medieval Logic* (Amsterdam, 1953).

166. Tweedale, Martin. 1963. "Scotus and Ockham on the Infinity of the Most Eminent Being." *Franciscan Studies* no. 23:257-267.
167. ———. 1992. "Ockham's Supposed Elimination of Connotative Terms and His Ontological Parsimony." *Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical Review* no. 31:38-54.
168. ———, ed. 1999. *Scotus Vs. Ockham - a Medieval Dispute over Universals. Vol. I: Texts*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

Texts translated into English with commentary by Martin M. Tweedale.

"This work is meant to make accessible to students of philosophy and later medieval thought the key texts in one of the most crucial philosophical debates of that period. The concentration is on Scotus's positive doctrine since it is difficult and has not received the detailed attention it deserves. Ockham's polemic against Scotus raises a host of objections to the internal coherence of Scotus's reworking of the traditional line. Some of these are ones it seems to me Scotus could have countered quite easily; others would have required some revisions, but ones that are basically within the spirit of the doctrine. Some, however, are very difficult indeed, and I shall leave to the commentary and its introductory essay the exposition of my own view on whether Scotus's position can survive intact. There is also a positive side to Ockham's views about universals, and that is only partially covered in what follows. The texts that show how Ockham envisioned preserving all the essentials of Aristotelian science even after real universals have been excised, are presented and discussed, and the very real issue of whether Ockham's effort here could possibly succeed is broached but not definitely resolved one way or the other."

169. ———, ed. 1999. *Scotus Vs. Ockham - a Medieval Dispute over Universals. Vol. II: Commentary*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

"The commentary which composes the greater part of this volume attempts not only to explain the texts translated in the first volume and to understand the positions adopted by the protagonists in this debate, but also to assess the cogency of the various arguments put forward. After all that work is done, however, there remains the task of drawing attention to the crucial issues that have emerged and arriving at some understanding of the debate as a whole and the relative merits of the positions put forward. It is this task that this introductory essay undertakes. Perhaps it would be better read after a thorough study of the commentary, but I am inclined to think that some awareness of the general issues and positions taken by

Scotus and Ockham helps in making one's way through the individual texts and their often elaborate argumentation. In explaining these issues and positions I have made free use of philosophical ideas of our own day, at least to the extent that this is not grossly anachronistic."

170. Vossenköhl, Wilhelm. 1985. "Ockham and the Cognition of Non-Existants." *Franciscan Studies* no. 45:33-46.
171. Vossenköhl, Wilhelm, and Schönberger, Rolf, eds. 1990. *Die Gegenwart Ockhams*. Weinheim: VCH Acta humaniora.
172. Webering, Damascene. 1953. *Theory of Demonstration According to William Ockham*. Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts.
173. Weidemann, Hermann. 1979. "William of Ockham on Particular Negative Propositions." *Mind* no. 88:270-275.
174. White, Graham. 1984. "Ockham's Real Distinction Between Form and Matter." *Franciscan Studies* no. 44:211-226.
175. Willing, Anthony. 1985. "Buridan and Ockham: The Logic of Knowing." *Franciscan Studies* no. 45:47-56.
176. Wood, Rega. 1990. "Ockham on Essentially-Ordered Causes, Logic Misapplied." In *Die Gegenwart Ockhams*, edited by Vossenköhl, Wilhelm and Schönberger, Rolf, 25-50. Weinheim: VCH-Verlagsgesellschaft.
177. Zheng, Yiwei. 1998. "Metaphysical Simplicity and Semantical Complexity of Connotative Terms in Ockham's Mental Language." *Modern Schoolman* no. 75:253-264.
178. ———. 1998. "Ockham on Connotative Terms." In: *The Paideia Project On-Line. Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy*. Boston, Massachusetts U.S.A. 10-15 August 1998.
179. ———. 2001. "Ockham's Connotation Theory and Ontological Elimination." *Journal of Philosophical Research* no. 26:623-634.

"The importance of the connotation theory in Ockham's semantics and metaphysics can hardly be overstated--it is the main mechanism that brings forth Ockham's famous ontological elimination. Yet none of the extant interpretations can satisfactorily accommodate three widely accepted theses: (1) there is no synonym in mental language; (2) a connotative term has a semantically equivalent nominal definition; and (3) there are simple connotative terms in Ockham's mental language. In this paper I offer an interpretation that I argue can accommodate all."

RELATED PAGES

[On the website "Theory and History of Ontology"](#)

[The Nominalist Ontology of William of Ockham](#)

[On the website "History of Logic"](#)

[History of Medieval Logic after Boethius to Late Scholasticism](#)

[Medieval Theories of Supposition \(Reference\) and Mental Language](#)

[Annotated bibliography of L. M. de Rijk](#)