"Le Problème Du Non-Être Dans La Philosophie Antique." 1990. Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie no. 122
Actes du Colloque
international de philosophie antique tenu à Genève les 2 et 3 novembre 1989. À la mémoire d'Henri Joly.
Sommaire: Jacques Bouveresse: Hommage à Henri Joly 297; Jean Rudhardt: Dans quelle mesure et par quelles images les mythes grecs ont-ils symbolisé le néant?
303; Françoise Létoublon: La notion de non-être dans l’histoire de la langue grecque archaïque 313;
Lambros Couloubaritsis: La logique du mythe et la question du non-être 323; André-Jean Voelke: Vide et non-être chez Leucippe et Démocrite 334; Curzio
Chiesa: Idées de négations 353; Enrico Berti: Etre et non-être chez Aristote: contraires ou contradictoires? 365; André: de Muralt: L’ctre du non-être en
perspective aristotélicienne 375; Jacques Brunschwig: Sur une façon stoïcienne de ne pas être 389; Dominic O’Meara: La question de l'être et du non-être des
objets mathématiques chez Plotin et Jamblique 405; Fernand Brunner: L’aspect rationnel et l’aspect religieux de la philosophie de Plotin 417; Bibliographie
d’Henri Joly 431-432.
Aubenque, Pierre. 1962. Le Problème De L' Être Chez Aristote. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
Bechtle, Gerald. 2000. "The Question of Being and the Dating of the Anonymous Parmenides Commentary." Ancient Philosophy no.
"This article was originally intended to precede the publication of my book (Bechtle 1999a) devoted to the extant fragments of the
anonymous commentary on Plato's Parmenides, also known as Anonymus Taurinensis.' The aim of this article was then-and it still is now-to make the
scholarly world acquainted with some of the main reasons, i.e., my view of `the question of being', for my novel thesis of a pre-Plotinian date for this
Commentary which has almost unanimously been ascribed to Porphyry. Since the thesis of the Porphyrian authorship goes back to the great French scholar
P. Hadot (see in particular Hadot 1961, 1965, 1968a, and 1968b), one can say that his thesis has been generally accepted for some thirty years or, at least, it
has not been seriously challenged. This fact is easily explained since neither before nor after Hadot has there been a thorough and critical examination of the
evidence. Hadot's thesis concerning the identity of the author being the only serious one in more than a century since research on the Commentary first
started, my idea was that probably a lot of questions had not been answered. Reconsidering all of Hadot's evidence and adding some new elements, I determined
that the Commentary is very likely of pre-Plotinian date. Additional work on lamblichus and post-Plotinian Platonism negatively confirms this thesis
since one can virtually exclude Iamblichus and any of the major Platonists following him as possible authors of the Commentary." p. 393
Benardete, Seth. 1977. "The Grammar of Being." Review of Metaphysics no. 30:486-496.
Bennekom, R.van. 1984. "Existential and Other Sentences in Ancient Greek." Mnemosyne no. 37:257-263.
Bolton, Robert. 1975. "Plato's Distinction between Being and Becoming." Review of Metaphysics no. 29:66-95
argues that important changes in Plato's conceptions of being (ousia) and becoming (genesis) occur over the Dialogues, but that the final version of the
distinction between the two remains strong enough to sustain the essentials of the theory of degrees of reality which the distinction was originally devised to
expound. This position is an alternative to the predominant prevailing positions -- that Plato's views underwent no significant change, or that there was a
change so radical as to force the abandonment of Plato's middle-period metaphysic. Relevant passages in the Phaedo, Republic, Theatetus, Sophist, and
Philebus are fully discussed."
Boman, Thorleif. 1960. Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek. New York: W. W. Norton & Company
Translated by Jules L. Moreau from the
German Das hebräische Denken im Vergleich mit den Griechischen (second edition; first edition 1952), Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1954, with
the author's revisions to January 1960.
Bradshaw, David. 1999. "Neoplatonic Origins of the Act of Being." Review of Metaphysics no. 53:383-401.
Brown, Lesley. 1986. "Being in the Sophist: A Syntactical Enquiry." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no.
"Plato's Sophist presents a tantalizing challenge to the modern student of philosophy. In its central section we find a Plato whose
interests and methods seem at once close to and yet remote from our own. John Ackrill's seminal papers on the Sophist, (1) published in the fifties, emphasized
the closeness, and in optimistic vein credited Plato with several successes in conceptual analysis. These articles combine boldness of 'argument with
exceptional clarity and economy of expression, and though subsequent writers have cast doubt on some of Ackrill's claims for the Sophist the articles remain
essential reading for all students of the dialogue. I am happy to contribute an essay on the Sophist to this volume dedicated to John Ackrill.
Among the most disputed questions in the interpretation of the Sophist is that of whether Plato therein marks off different uses of the verb einai , 'to
be'. This paper addresses one issue under that heading, that of the distinction between the 'complete' and 'incomplete' uses of `to be', which has usually been
associated with the distinction between the 'is' that means 'exists' and the 'is' of predication, that is, the copula."
(1) Symploke Eidon (1955) and Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-59 (1957), both reprinted in Plato I, ed G. Vlastos (New York, 1971),
201-9 and 210-22.
———. 1994. "The Verb 'to Be' in Greek Philosophy: Some Remarks." In Language, edited by Everson, Stephen, 212-236. Cambridge: Cambridge
"I examine key uses of 'to be' in Parmenides, Plato (especially Republic V and Sophist) and Aristotle. I argue
against imposing modern distinctions (into predicative, existential or identity uses) on to the texts, showing that while Greek uses of einai may be
partitioned into syntactically complete and incomplete (noted by Aristotle and perhaps at Sophist 255cd) the distinction was neither clear-cut nor
perceived as philosophically important. I examine how these authors treated the inference from 'X is F' to 'X is' (compare that from 'X teaches French' to 'X
teaches') and, more problematically (as Plato Sophist saw, correcting Parmenides and Republic V) from 'X is not F' to 'X is not'. "
Brugmann, Karl. 1925. "Die Syntax Des Einfachen Satzes Im Indogermanischen." Indogermanische Forschungen no. 43 -
Kapitel III. Subjekt und Prädikat, C. Kopula mit einem Prädikativum, pp. 69-77.
Brunschwig, Jacques. 1990. "Sur Une Façon Stoicienne De Ne Pas Être." Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie no. 122:389-403.
Couloubaritsis, Lambros. 1990. "La Logique Du Mythe Et La Question Du Non-Être." Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie no.
Courtine, Jean-François. 2003. Les Catégories De L'être. Études De Philosophie Ancienne Et Médiévale. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Dillon, John. 2009. "The Question of Being." In Greek Thought. A Guide to Classical Knowledge, edited by Brunschwig, Jacques and Lloyd,
Geoffrey E.R., 51-71. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Eck, Job van. 2002. "Not-Being and Difference: On Plato's Sophist 256 D 5-258 E 3." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no.
Plato's analysis of falsity at Sophist 263 is given in terms of not being and difference. 'Theaetetus flies' is false because what is
different is stated as the same, and what is not as what is, (263 D 1-2), things that are different from what is the case concerning him (viz. flying)
are described as the same (as what is the case about him). That there are indeed many 'not-beings' in the sense of things different from the things that are,
the Eleatic Stranger (ES) and Theaetetus remarked some lines above, 'for we said there are many things that are with regard to each thing and many things that
are not (263 B 11-12), referring to 256 E 6-7, 'so, with regard to each of the forms, being is many and not-being is indefinite in quantity'. In this way they
had been disobedient to Parmenides, who had stated, 'Never shall it force itself on us that things that are-not are.' But they had gone even further in
their disobedience: 'but we have not merely shown that the things that are-not are, but also brought to light the form not-being happens to have' (258 D
The context of both points has caused commentators a lot of problems. The main question is, how is it that something (i.e. a form) is called an ouk
on in 256 D 8-257 A 6? Is it because it is different from the form of being; or is it because it is different from any thing (i.e. any form) it is not
identical with? And on which of the two lines is the form of not-being defined as it is introduced in the section that follows, in 258 A 11-B 8 and 258 D 7-E
3? Only a few commentators have tackled the problems systematically, and as far as I know no interpretation has been reached that is both coherent and sound.
Nevertheless, such an interpretation is possible, as I shall argue in the following. I shall discuss the passages at issue, criticize commentaries that have
been given, and present the interpretation intended." pp. 63-64 (Greek omitted)
Enrico, Berti. 1990. "Être Et Non-Être Chez Aristote: Contraires Ou Contradictoires?" Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie no.
Flower, Robert. 1980. "G. E. L. Owen, Plato and the Verb to Be." Apeiron no. 14:87-95
"In defining what Being is
in the Sophist, Plato uses the verb to be in one sense only, that of participation. There is neither an "is" of existence nor one of
Gould, Josiah B. 1974. "Being, the World and Appearance in Early Stoicism and Some Other Greek Philosophies." Review of Metaphysics no.
"Stoicism's materialism and its lack of talk about being are remarkable in comparison to the thought of its predecessors, Plato and
Aristotle. Plato never clearly taught that logic was part of philosophy, but for the Stoics, concerned with the physical universe as well as with meanings,
propositions, and arguments, both physics and logic are incorporated in philosophy. Early Stoicism was a full-fledged philosophy, not merely a type of
Guiraud, Pierre. 1962. La Phrase Nominale En Grec D'homère À Euripide. Paris: Klincksieck.
Hadot, Pierre. 1961. "Fragments D'un Commentaire De Porphyre Sur Le Parménide." Revue des Études Grecques no. 74:410-438.
———. 1968. Porphyre Et Victorinus. Paris: Études Augustiniennes
Huber, Gerhard. 1955. Das Sein Und Das Absolute: Studien Zur Geschichte Der Ontologischen Problematik in Der Spätantiken Philosophie. Basel:
Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft.
Husain, Martha. 1976. "The Question 'What Is Being' and Its Aristotelian Answer." New Scholasticism no. 50:293-309
paper takes its point of departure from a recent article by Joseph Owens: "The content of existence," (*) which argues that being is unknowable in
terms of concepts since it either has all cognitive (when contrasted with not-being) or none at all (when contrasted with beings). These dilemmas can be
resolved by means of Aristotle's categories as the intrinsic formal structure of being, and as constituting the cognitive content of being "qua"
being. In terms of this cognitive content, being is conceptualized, becomes knowable, and can be meaningfully contrasted with both not-being and beings. Beyond
the resolution of Owens' dilemmas, the paper goes on to examine the need for meaningful contrasts in all knowledge as well as the adequacy and relevance of
Aristotle's categories in relation to modern science."
Joseph Owens - The content of existence - in: Milton K. Munitz (ed.) - Logic and ontology - New York, New York University Press 1973, pp.
Kahn, Charles H. 1966. "The Greek Verb 'to Be' and the Concept of Being." Foundations of Language no. 2:245-265
C. H. Kahn, Essays on Being, New York: Oxford University Press 2009, pp. 16-40.
———. 1972. "On the Terminology for Copula and Existence." In Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition. Essays Presented
by His Friends and Pupils to Richard Walzer on His Seventieth Birthday, edited by Stern, S.M., Hourani, Albert and Brown, Vivian, 141-158. London: Bruno
Reprinted in C. H. Kahn, Essays on Being, New York: Oxford University Press 2009, pp. 41-61.
———. 1973. The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek. Dordrecht: Reidel
Volume 6 of: John W. M. Verhhar (ed.), The Verb 'Be' and Its Synonims.
Philosophical and Grammatical Studies, Dordrecht: Reidel.
Reprinted by Hackett Publishing, 2003 with new introduction and discussion of relation between predicative and existential uses of the verb
"This book began unintentionally in 1964, when I tried to put together a brief description of the pre-philosophical uses of the Greek verb be in order
to lay the groundwork for an interpretation of the more technical use of the verb by the philosophers beginning with Parmenides. But the task was harder and
longer than I thought, and it gradually became clear that no adequate description of the Greek data could be given without confronting a number of major issues
in linguistic theory and in the philosophy of language.
As often happens in so-called empirical research, the terms in which the problem is posed and the recognition of what might count as a solution turn out to
depend upon certain theoretical assumptions about the nature of the subject matter and the appropriate form for description, analysis, and explanation. In this
case there was the preliminary question of an appropriate method for describing and classifying the different uses of the verb, and the closely connected
question of the relationship between a syntactic or formal analysis of these uses and a semantic account in terms of difference of meaning. Similar questions
would arise in the study of any verb. But the verb be poses specific philosophic problems of its own: how are we to define or clarify the concepts of subject,
predicate, copula, and verb of
existence? And there is the problem of the verb be itself: in what sense is this system of distinct uses a unity? Is the possession of a single verb be with
such a diversity of uses only a historical accident of Indo-European? And does it follow that the concept of Being is only a philosophic illusion?"
(Preface (1973), XLV)
"Thus the argument of my book reaches two conclusions, one linguistic and one philosophical. The philosophical conclusion, my defense of Greek
ontology, rests on my account of the system of einai but does not follow from it.
Greek ontology might be defended on different grounds, and a reader might accept my account of the system of einai but doubt its value as a defense
of ontology. Furthermore, I have not tried to demonstrate the fruitfulness of my linguistic analysis for the interpretation of Greek philosophy. That could be
done only by a detailed analysis of Platonic and Aristotelian texts.(1) The current study remains, after all, essentially a grammatical prolegomenon to the
history of Greek ontology." (Introduction (200), p. VIII)
(1) For the application of my account of einai to Parmenides, see Kahn (2002) ["Parmenides and Plato," in V. Caston and D. W. Graham
(eds.), Presocratic Philosophy: Essays in honour of Alexander Mourelatos. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, pp. 81-93] with references there to earlier
[In the Appendix to the Introduction (2003) Kahn replies to four important critical reviews of the first edition of his book:]
Ernst Tugendhat, "Die Seinsfrage und ihre sprachliche Grundlage," Philosophische Rundschau 24 (1977), pp. 161-176: "Tugendhat's review
contains a number of penetrating criticisms, some of which I am inclined to regard as justified." (p. XXXIII)
Seth Benardete, "The Grammar of Being," Review of Metaphysics 30 (1977), pp. 486-496. "Seth Benardete has contributed a number of
valuable corrections to my description of the Greek usage of einai." (p. XXXIV)
Joachim Klowski, Review in Gnomon 47 (1975), pp. 737-746. "Klowski criticizes my exposition from the point of view of traditional philology and doubts
the utility of introducing transformational grammar." (p. XXXV)
Cornelis Jord Ruijgh, "A review of Ch. H. Kahn, The verb 'be' in Ancient Greek," in Lingua 48 (1979), pp. 43-83. [in French] "The most
thorough and detailed discussion of my book is by C. J. Ruijgh, a linguist who is also a specialist in Greek. (Unfortunately, this 1979 publication came to my
attention only quite recently, as the result of a citation in De Rijk [Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology. Leiden: Brill 2002, two volumes]. I recommend
this review for a full, fair, and accurate report of the contents and claims of the book. I discuss here some points in which Ruijgh disagrees with me."
———. 1973. "On the Theory of the Verb 'to Be'." In Logic and Ontology, edited by Munitz, Miton, 1-20. New York: New York University
———. 1976. "Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy." Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie no.
Reprinted in C. H. Kahn, Essays on Being, New York: Oxford University Press 2009, pp. 62-74.
———. 1978. "Linguistic Relativism and the Greek Project of Ontology." In The Question of Being, edited by Sprung, Mervyn, 31-44.
University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press
Paper read at a symposium at Brock University, St. Catherines, Ontario.
Published also in: Neue Hefte für Philosophie 15-16, 1979 pp. 20-33.
———. 1981. "Some Philosophical Uses of 'to Be' in Plato." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 26:105-134
in C. H. Kahn, Essays on Being, New York: Oxford University Press 2009, pp. 75-108.
———. 1986. "Retrospect on the Verb 'to Be' and the Concept of Being." In The Logic of Being, edited by Knuttilla, Simo and Hintikka,
Jaakko, 1-28. Reidel: Dordrecht.
———. 1988. "Being in Parmenides and Plato." La Parola del Passato no. 43:237-261
Reprinted in C. H. Kahn, Essays on
Being, New York: Oxford University Press 2009, pp. 167-191.
———. 2004. "A Return to the Theory of the Verb Be and the Concept of Being." Ancient Philosophy no.
Reprinted in C. H. Kahn, Essays on Being, New York: Oxford University Press 2009, pp. 109-142.
"The recent reprinting of my book The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek by Hackett Publishing, thirty years after its appearance in 1973, gave me the
opportunity to rethink and reformulate the theoretical framework for my description of the Greek verb. Since the audience for the reprinted book will
inevitably be restricted, I present here a more accessible, slightly revised version of the new (2003) Introduction. In the original 1973 book, the
theoretical discussion was far too long and not always consistent. What follows is a more concise and, I hope, more coherent version of my theoretical account
———. 2009. Essays on Being. New York: Oxford University Press
Contents: Introduction 1; 1. The Greek verb 'to be' and the concept of
Being (1966) 16; 2. On the terminology for copula and existence (1972) 41; 3. Why existence does not emerge as a distinct concept in Greek
philosophy (1976) 62; 4. Some philosophical uses of 'to be' in Plato (1981) 75; 5. A return to the verb 'to be' and the concept of Being (2004) 109; 6. The
thesis of Parmenides (1969) 143; 7. Being in Parmenides and Plato (1988) 167; 8. Parmenides and Plato once more (2002) 192; Postscript on Parmenides (2008):
Parmenides and physics. The direction of the chariot ride in the proem. The epistemic preference for Fire 207; Bibliography 219; Index of names 227.
"The papers reprinted here, published over a stretch of forty years, reflect my continuing concern with two distinct but intimately related problems,
one linguistic and one historical and philosophical. The linguistic problem concerns the theory of the Greek verb to be: how to replace the conventional
but misleading distinction between copula and existential verb with a more adequate theoretical account. The philosophical problem is in principle quite
distinct: to understand how the concept of Being became the central topic in Greek philosophy from Parmenides to Aristotle. But these two problems converge on
what I have called the veridical use of einai. In my earlier papers I took that connection between the verb and the concept of truth to be the key to
the central role of Being in Greek philosophy. I think that clue pointed in the right direction, but I would now interpret the veridical in terms of a more
general function of the verb that I call 'semantic', which comprises the notions of existence and instantiation as well as truth."
Ketchum, Richard J. 1998. "Being and Existence in Greek Ontology." Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie no. 80:321-332.
Létoublon, Françoise. 1990. "La Notion De Non-Être Dans L'histoire De La Langue Grecque Archaique." Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie
Lewis, Frank A. 2004. "Aristotle on the Homonymy of Being." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 68:1-36.
Meillet, Antoine. 1906. "La Phrase Noninale En Indo-Uropéen." Mémoires de la Société Linguistique de Paris no. 14:1-26.
Morgenstern, Amy. 2001. "Leaving the Verb 'to Be' Behind: An Alternative Reading of Plato's Sophist." Dionysius no.
"In this paper, I critically assess readings of Plato's Sophist which, influenced by the Anglo-American philosophical tradition,
have in the latter half of the twentieth century set the terms for discussions of this text's central issues. While aware that these readings are often at odds
with each other and, therefore, do not form one coherent reading, I argue that the basic theoretical move unifying these readings -- equating the Greek terms
esti, to on, and ta onta with the verb 'to be,' understood existentially, predicatively, or as an identity sign -- cannot serve as the basis of
an illuminating approach to the Eleatic stranger's investigation."
Morrison, Donald. 1987. "The Evidence for Degrees of Being in Aristotle." Classical Quarterly no. 37:382-402.
Muralt, André de. 1990. "L'être Du Non-Être En Perspective Aristoteélicienne." Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie no. 122:375-388.
Nogales, Gómez Salvador. 1972. "The Meaning of Being in Aristotle." International Philosophical Quarterly no.
"In order to deal with the complex concept of being, Aristotle distinguished between synonyms and homonyms, and these two categories
were further subdivided. Things with nothing in common possess being and in every being there is something identical. We recognize matter and being only by
analogy. Accident is a dimension of being but is not an entity in itself."
O'Brien, Denis. 2013. "A Form That 'Si? Of What 'Is Not' . Existential Einai in Plato's Sophist " In The Platonic Art of
Philosophy, edited by Boys-Stones, George, El Murr, Dimitri and Gill, Christopher, 221-248. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
O'Farrell, Frank. 1982. "Aristotle's Categories of Being." Gregorianum no. 63:87-131.
Reding, Jean-Paul. 2004. "'To Be' in Greece and China." In Comparative Essays in Early Greek and Chinese Rational Thinking, 167-194.
Renaut, Alain. 1975. "Epicure Et Le Problème De L'etre. Sur Le Statut Ontologique Des Prédicats." Études Philosophiques no.
Ruijgh, Cornelis Jord. 1979. "A Review Of: Ch. H. Kahn, the Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek." Lingua no.
"Sommaire: §1. Introduction: le probleme du rapport entre l'emploi copulatif et l'emploi dit existentiel de
A. Le contenu du livre de M. Kahn: §2. L'ontologie des philosophes et les problèms des deux emplois de einai; le choix de la théorie
transformationnelle de Harris. - §3. Les différentes acceptions des termes 'sujet', 'prédicat' et 'copule'. - §4. L'application de la théorie
transformationnelle au grec ancien. - §5. La description des emplois copulatifs de einai (copule nominale, copule locative, etc.). - §6. La théorie
générale de la copule: valeur statique, marque de la prétention de vérité. - §7. Les emplois existentiels (six types), l'emploi possessif et 1'emploi potentiel
de einai. - §8. L'emploi veridical de einai. - §9. L'unité des emplois de einai: dès l'indo-éuropeen, l'emploi copulatif serait central. -
§10. L'accentuation de esti et sa place dans l'ordre des mots; la phrase nominale; to on et ousia.
B. Observations critiques: §11. Objections gènérales; la coexistence d'une analyse copulative et d'une analyse non-copulative sans différence
sémantique dans certains types de phrases. - §12. Le caractère vague des termes d'ordre sémantique 'valeur fondamentale' et `valeur centrale'. - §13. La valeur
fondamentale de einai, qui se manifeste surtout dans la construction absolue: 'être present', 'être là' sans spécification ultérieure (valeur
présentielle; les nuances 'subsistantielle' et 'existentielle')., §14. Le rapport entre einai et ses composés (pareinai, eneinai, etc). - §15.
L'emploi vital de einai. - §16. L'emploi strictement existentiel du type esti Zeux. - §17. L'emploi strictement existentiel du type estin
ostix ...; le passage aux emplois métaphoriques et abstraits de einai. - §18. L'emploi de einai avec un nom d'action comme sujet. -
§19. L'emploi-veridical de einai. - §20. L'emploi de einai avec un complement de lieu: le passage à la construction copulative. - §21. Le
caractère non spécifié de la valeur fondamentale de einai explique son emploi copulatif; la phrase nominative simple. - §22. La phrase nominative
cumulative: l'apposition. - §23. La phrase verbale monolectique (à sujet inclus). - §24. La phrase verbale à sujet extèrne. - §25. La phrase élémentaire du
type kuon esti: construction absolue et construction copulative. - §26. La phrase du type outo z Swkratm z esti. - §27. L'ambiguité syntaxique
d'autres types de phrases, notamment de ceux qui comportent un quantificateur. - §28. Le caractère non impersonnel de la construction du type nus esti.
§29. L'ambiguité syntaxique de la construction impersonnelle du type oion te esti makestai. - §30. La construction impersonnelle du type esti
makestai. - §31. La construction impersonnelle du type esti makestai (emploi potentiel; la fonction adverbiale de l'infinitif); les types anagke
esti makestai et anagkaion esti makestai. - §32. Conclusion."
———. 1984. "Sur La Valeur Fondamentale De Einai: Une Réplique." Mnemosyne no. 37:264-270
Reply to the article of R. van
Bennekom in the same number.
Salis, Rita. 2012. "The Notion of Being as Act in Neoplatonism and Its Transmission in the Translatio Studiorum." In Translatio
Studiorum: Ancient, Medieval and Modern Bearers of Intellectual History, edited by Sgarbi, Marco, 51-63. Leiden: Brill.
Suto, Taki. 2011. Boethius on Mind, Grammar and Logic. A Study of Boethius' Commentaries on Peri Hermeneias. Leiden: Brill
Two. Boethius on Logic and Grammar, Chapter VI. The Verb 'To Be', pp. 187-222.
Vasiliu, Anca. 2001. "Dire L'image Ou La Parole Visible Chez Platon (Sur Le Sophiste, 216a, 241e)." Dionysius no.
"This paper is a commentary on the first part of the Sophist, aiming to identify the instruments used to persuade or to
demonstrate the veracity of something considered as knowledge of a truth."
Voelker, André-Jean. 1990. "Vide Et Non-Être Chez Leucippe Et Démocrite." Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie no. 122:341-352.