"An edition of Brentano's literary production in its entirety is not yet available. At present the available works by Brentano divide between
the following two types:
1. Works published during his lifetime.
2. Works in his Nachlass.
The works which Brentano published during his lifetime, in the form of both books and Essays, represent only a small part of his total
output. The books published from the Nachlass divide between:
1. Books edited by orthodox pupils, for instance 0. Kraus, A. Kastil and F. Mayer-Hillebrand, which afford numerous personal insights.
2. Books published since the 1970s.
(See F. Mayer-Hillebrand, "Franz Brentanos wissenschaftlicher Nachlass", Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 6, 1951-52,
599-603, and by the same author, "Rückblick auf die bisherigen Bestrebungen zur Erhaltung und Verbreitung von Fr. Brentanos philosophischen Lehre und kurze
Darstellung dieser Lehren", Zeitschrift fur philosophische Forschung 17, 1963, 146-169; also "Remarks Concerning the Interpretation of the Philosophy
of Franz Brentano. A Reply to Dr. Srzednicki", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23, 1962-3, 438-44; see also J.C.M. Brentano, "The Manuscripts
of Franz Brentano", Revue internationale de philosophie 78, 1966, 477-482).
The books belonging to the first category were compiled according to debatable philological criteria, with additions and collages of writings
produced in different periods. The considerable arbitrariness of these constructs and the interpretative interpolations made by the editors have not generally
benefited the understanding and diffusion of Brentano's thought. In particular, collections of the posthumously-published Essays and dictations have often
adopted the method of interpreting earlier texts as anticipations of later ones.
Moreover, one should read a huge body of correspondence (1400 letters with Marty alone) which has been published only in part, while some of
the corpus, including letters from Brentano's period in Italy (1895-1916), is entirely unpublished. Brentano's philosophical correspondence is of great
interest, not least because a letter sent to one scholar was then passed on to others, who read it, commented on it, and then sent it back, in a sort of
epistolary colloquium. Only a tiny part of Brentano's correspondence has been published from the Nachlass.
Apropos the Nachlass, its first classification was produced by T. Masaryk, who founded a Brentano Archive in Prague for the purpose
of organizing and publishing items. In 1939, at the beginning of the Second World War, the Archive was transferred first to Manchester, then to Oxford (the
Bodleian Library), and finally to the United States.
Brentano's unpublished writings and dictations have undergone successive cataloguing by F. Mayer-Hillebrand, W. Baumgartner and T. Binder.
They can currently be consulted at diverse universities. In the USA at the University of California (Berkeley), Brown University (Providence, Rhode Island),
Cornell University (Ithaca, New York), Harvard University (Cambridge, Mass.), University of Minnesota (Minneapolis); Northwestern University (Evanston, Ill.),
and at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. In Australia they can be consulted at Melbourne University (Victoria); in Europe at the Bodleian Library of
Oxford, the Staatsbibliotek of Munich, the University of Innsbruck, the University of Vienna, and the Goethemuseum of Frankfurt; in France at the Bibliothèque
Nationale, Paris; in Latin America at the University of Mexico City (Mexico D.F.) and the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina.
The Brentano Archive originally deposited at Brown University included Brentano's personal library. It can now be consulted at the
Forschungsstelle and Dokumentationszentrum far österreichische Philosophie of Graz."
From: Liliana Albertazzi, Immanent Realism. An Introduction to Brentano, Dordrecht, Springer, 2006, pp. 341-342.
"Being is a homonym. Its several senses fit into the fourfold distinction of accidental being, being in the sense of being true, being of the
categories, and potential and actual being.
'Being is said in various ways', says Aristotle in the beginning of the fourth book of his Metaphysics [IV, 2, 1003a33]. He repeats this in
Books VI and VII and several more times in other places. In these passages he enumerates a number of concepts, each of which, in different ways, is called a
being. In Met. IV. 2. 1003b6 he says 'one thing is said to be because it is substance, another because it is an attribute of substance, still another because
it is a process toward substance, or corruption of substance, or privation of substantial forms or quality of substance, or because it produces or generates
substance or that which is predicated of substance, or because it is a negation of such a thing or of substance itself. For this reason we also say that
non-being is nonbeing." The various sorts of being which are here enumerated can be reduced to four kinds: (1) Being which has no existence whatever outside
the understanding (privation, negation); (2) The being of movement and of generation and corruption (process toward substance, destruction); for though these
are outside the mind, they do not have complete and perfect existence (cf. Physics III 1. 201a9); (3) Being which has complete but dependent existence
(affections of substance, qualities, things productive and generative) (4) The being of the substances (ousia)." (p. 3).
"Thesis I: The categories are not merely a framework for concepts, but they are themselves real concepts, extramental independent being.
This is Aristotle's opinion which he states clearly and repeatedly, so much so that, as I said, I cannot believe that there are more than
verbal differences between his interpreters. If, to begin with, there is no doubt that being itself, of which the metaphysician must treat, is a concept,
indeed a real concept, since what merely exists objectively in the mind was previously set aside, there can also be no doubt with respect to the categories."
"Thesis II: The categories are several senses of being which is asserted of the analogically, indeed in a twofold manner, i.e. as analogy of
proportionality, and as analogy to the same terminus.
This sentence contains a further confirmation of the preceding one. It contains three assertions: (1) that being which is divided according
the schema of the categories is divided not like a univocal concept, i.e., as a genus into species, but rather in the manner of a homonym which is
differentiated according to its various senses; (2) that the use of 'being' for the different categories, even though an a homonym, is not a mere accidental
likeness of names,; rather, that there is among them a unity of analogy; and, finally, (3) that the analogy among them is a twofold one, namely, not only an
analogy of proportionality, but also an analogy to the same terminus. We hope to secure this result fully by establishing it, point by point, from the various
utterances of our philosopher." (pp. 58-59).
"Thesis III. The categories are the highest univocal general concepts, the highest genera of being.
In the previous section we have considered the categories in relation to being, which is superordinate to them and designates them jointly,
though it is not, properly speaking, common to them. Their unity was a unity of analogy; nothing applied to them in one and the same way (Met. VII 4 1030a32),
i.e., univocally. It has already been shown that there is no higher univocal concept. We now turn to a consideration of the relation between the categories and
the things subordinate to them, and here we find, by contrast, that all things belonging to the same category are things univocally named. The categories are
general concepts in the proper sense, and genera of things." (p. 66).
"These XIV. There is a harmony between the categories of Aristotle and the grammatical differences of noun and adjective, verb and
When Trendelenburg (1) advanced his now famous hypothesis about the grammatical origin of Aristotle's categories he wanted to find, to begin
with, something which could have guided Aristotle in the determination of the highest genera. He was concerned with rejecting the objection of Kant and Hegel
that Aristotle haphazardly raked together a round number of general concepts. We hope to have met this objection in a different way.
It must be admitted that a procedure which lacks an ontological principle and thus has to rely on mere agreement with grammatical relations
as a guarantee for the validity of this important division cannot escape being reproached for its superficiality.
Still it is a phenomenon welcome to sound philosophy to find itself in agreement with common sense and with the general consciousness which
is exhibited particularly also in language. Thus it is a recommendation for Aristotle's categories that there is a considerable kinship between his categories
and certain linguistic forms. It seems to me that Trendelenburg has shown that this is undeniable, no matter how many objections have been raised. He has also
shown that Aristotle was well aware of this agreement with grammar. Here as everywhere he knew how to make use of the speculations of earlier thinkers and the
speculative content of common opinions. He noticed, above all, that if one thing is essentially predicated of another so that name and concept of the predicate
applies to it, the this occurs in a grammatically different form than if the predicate merely give its name to the subject without being of the essence of the
subject." (pp. 123-124).
(1) Adolf Trendelenburg - Geschichte der Kategorienlehre (History of the theory of Categories) - Berlin, 1846 [Note added]
"Thesis XV. The preceding investigation concerning the principle and meaning of the categories resolves objection raised from various
quarters against the division of the categories.
Aristotle's division of categories has withstood the passage of time in an admirable way. If one follows the history of the doctrine of
categories he can see that even its opponents pay unconscious tribute to it, an one is often inclined to smile on discovering that those who consider
themselves its decided opponents are essentially guided by it.
The present era no longer has an Aristotelian doctrine of categories. When we now speak of categories we do not think of the what, how, how
much, in relation to what. But none of the more recent systems has been able to establish a lasting reputation. More recent theories which investigate
categories non longer pursue the same goal as Aristotle, and one cannot possibly claim that they have put anything into the place of the old categories.
The question if now whether one can suppose that something with has lived so long can lack all vitality, or whether it is rather the case
that it meet its purpose, the thru purpose of the table of categories. We hardly need to say that our opinion inclines toward a favourable judgment, and in out
investigation we have generally attempted to let the doctrine of categories develop with a kind of internal necessity -- presupposing the correctness of other
Aristotelian doctrines." (p. 130).
"This now complete the domain of our inquiry, Step by step we have ascended from what has been called being in a lesser sense to proper
being. Of the four senses into which being is initially divided, being in figures of the categories was the most distinguished. The course of this chapter has
shown that the categories bear the name of 'being' all with respect to one being, namely, with respect to their being of the first category.
It would be more proper to say of every other category that it is of a being than it is a being. Hence it is substance which has being in the
preeminent sense, i.e. which is not only something, but simply is. There are many sense in which something ca be first, but substance is among all being the
first in every sense, in concept, in cognition, as well as in time. Its being in the terminus to which all stand in analogy, just as health is the terminus
with respect to which everything that is healthful is called healthful, either because it has it, or because it bring about it, or shows it, etc. If now
metaphysics is the science of being as such, the it is clear that its main objects is substance. For in all cases of such analogies science treats mainly of
the first, upon which the others depend, and form which they receive their name. Hence the first philosopher must research the principles and grounds of
substance. His primary, most distinguished, and in a sense only, task is to consider what it is." (p. 148).
From: Franz Brentano - On the several senses of Being in Aristotle - Berkeley: University of California Press 1975 (Greek words and