A complete and updated bibliography of Gustav Bergmann (128 titles) and the studies about him (107 titles) is available in Rivista di
Estetica, 25, 2004 pp. 113-126; I give only the most relevant publications.
Bergmann, Gustav. 1954. The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism. New York: Longmans, Green & Co.
Second edition: Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1967.
Contents: Preface V; Preface to the Second edition IX-X; 1. Logical Positivism (1950) 1; 2. Semantics (1950) 17; 3. Logical Positivism,
language, and the reconstruction of metaphysics (1953) 30; 4. Two cornerstones of Empiricism (1953) 78; 5. Two types of linguistic philosophy (1952) 106; 6.
Bodies, minds, and acts (1952) 132; 7. Remarks on Realism (1946) 153; 8. Sense data, linguistic conventions, and existence (1947) 176; 9. Russell on
particulars (1947) 197; 10. Professor Ayer's analysis of knowing (1949) 215; 11. On nonperceptual intuition (1949) 228; 12. Conditions for an extensional
elementaristic language (1948) 232; 13. A note on ontology (1950) 238; 14. Logical Atomism, elementarism, and the analysis of value (1951) 243; 15. Comments on
Professor Hempel's "The concept of cognitive significance" (1951) 255; 16. The identity of indiscernibles and the formalist definition of "identity (1953) 268;
17. The problem of relations in classical psychology (1952) 277; 18. Ideology (1951) 300; Author's note 326; Index 328-340.
From the Preface: "This is not a collection of my papers on first philosophy but a selection from them. Nor is the order in which they are
arranged chronological. This requires some comment. The papers fall into three groups. Taken together, the first six, of most recent origin, provide an outline
of the views I now hold. The second group consists of the next three, which are the earliest included in this volume. Together with three other still earlier
ones which I have excluded, they form a unit centered around the realism phenomenalism issue. The excluded papers are "Pure Semantics, Sentences, and
Propositions" (Mind, 53, 1944), "A Positivistic Metaphysics of Consciousness" (Mind, 54, 1945), "Undefined Descriptive Predicates"
(Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 8, 1947) . I omit them because for the most part they merely say very badly what I have since said
again, a little less badly, in the six essays of the first group. I mention them because there I first struck out on my own, trying to free myself from the
influence of Carnapian positivism though not yet, alas, from its apparatus. Having said that much, as I believe I should, I wish to add, as I believe I also
should, that this by now radical dissent has not at all affected either my gratitude or my admiration for Carnap. I still think of him as the outstanding
figure in a major phase of the positivistic movement. The third group consists of all the remaining essays, some of them very short. These are in the main
elaborations of themes struck in the first nine pieces. The arrangement within this last group represents a compromise between their subject matter and the
order in which I remember having written them. The concluding essay differs from the rest. Quite nontechnical, it touches at least indirectly on my philosophy
in that broader sense in which everyone who is not himself an analytical philosopher speaks of a man's philosophy. Thus it is, perhaps, not out of place at the
end of a volume that is otherwise rather technical.
Aside from a few editorial changes I have left the papers as they were originally written."
From the Preface to the Second edition: "The logical positivists of the Vienna Circle were my first teachers. Thus I was faced with an
unpalatable choice. Dialectically, metaphysical materialism always seemed and still seems to me the greater evil. (Scientific materialism is but common sense.)
So I began my philosophical career as a reluctant phenomenalist in the style of the Circle. Now I am, and have been for some time, a realist of the
phenomenological variety. The break occurred in the early fifties, when I proposed an analysis of the act. This book, my first, a collection of essays
originally published in 1954, reflects the struggles which led to that break. Much of it I now reject. Yet there are also many analyses, of issues and of
movements, including pragmatism, logical positivism, and the so-called linguistic philosophy, which I still think are right.
Two of the essays introduce the act. Another, about semantics, mentions the meaning nexus which has come to play so great a role in my
thought. The essay on the problem of relations in classical psychology first manifests what has since become one of my major concerns. The concluding piece, on
ideology, has been well received by many social scientists.
By now logical positivism belongs to history. Yet it was a vigorous movement; some of its members were brilliant; its contribution to the
philosophy of science remains most valuable. From the record of such a movement much can be learned. This book, in its own peculiar way, is part of the record.
Thus, since it is still in demand although it has been out of print for some time, a new edition seems justified."
———. 1957. Philosophy of Science. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
———. 1959. Meaning and Existence. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Contents: Preface V-X; 1. Intentionality (1955) 3; 2. The revolt against Logical Atomism (1958) 39; 3. Analiticity (1958) 73; 4.
Particularity and the new nominalism (1954) 91; 5. (with Herbert Hochberg) Concepts (1957) 106; 6. Elementarism (1957) 115; 7. Individuals (1958) 124; 8.
Sameness, meaning, and identity (1958) 132; 9. Professor Quine on analiticity (1955) 139; 10. Some remarks on the ontology of Ockham (1954) 144; 11. Russell's
examination of Leibniz examined (1956) 155; 12. Some remarks on the philosophy of Malebranche (1956) 189; 13. Frege's hidden nominalism (1958) 205; 14. Some
reflections on time (1958) 225; Author's note 265; Index 267-274.
From the Preface: "The main theme of this book is the analysis of mind. But even the basic problems fall into each other's scopes. Thus other
themes had to be sounded, some of them rather fully. Foremost among these is the basic problem of ontology, that is, the search for a complete inventory of the
several kinds of existent. An analysis which denies mind the status of an existent, in the full ontological sense of 'existent', is patently inadequate. That
shows the connection. Yet, all attempts to place mind in any of the less extravagant ontological schemes available led to consequences which flaw the over-all
pattern. That shows the difficulty. The book propounds how I propose to conquer it.
The characteristic feature of minds is their intentionality. That makes "Intentionality and Ontology" an accurate two-word title. "Meaning
and Existence" sounds less formidable. Ontology asks what exists. This justifies the substitution of 'existence' for 'ontology'. That of 'meaning' for
'intentionality' will be justified in a moment.
What a philosopher takes a question to be as well as the sort of answer (rather than, which specific answer) he considers a (possible)
solution depends on his conception of the philosophical enterprise. Or, what amounts virtually to the same thing, it depends on his method. That is why
philosophers always were method conscious. At the beginning of this century analytical philosophy took what has been called the linguistic turn. The issue, and
it still is an issue, is one of method. That is why our generation is even more method conscious than some of its predecessors. My work is in the linguistic
stream. Inevitably, therefore, the basic theme of method runs through the whole book. One essay develops it in considerable detail.
The linguistic stream has several currents. I philosophize by means of one of the schemes known as ideal languages. My being in this current
in part determines the content of the book. Analyticity, every one agrees, is a very fundamental problem. For a practitioner of my method it is basic. (I am
even prepared to grant that the adequate explication of analyticity is the one and only major task for which the method is indispensable.) Moreover, there is a
very close connection between the problem of analyticity and the analysis of mind.
To whatever current a linguistic philosopher may belong, the analysis of mind is for him virtually indistinguishable from that of the various
ontological and logical aspects of meaning. (This justifies the substitution of 'meaning' for 'intentionality' in the two-word title.) If he belongs to my
current, then the core of the problem is to construct an ideal language into which the relevant uses of 'to mean' can be adequately transcribed. I propose such
an ideal language. Not surprisingly, for anyone familiar with the course of analytical philosophy in this century, it turns out that this proposal requires
radical re-examination and eventual modification of the classical analysts' explicit or implicit notions of analyticity. The connection of my main theme with
this major subtheme is thus close indeed.
This is the second essay collection I publish. The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism (1954) was the first. Since the public for
anything of this sort is rather limited, quite a few prospective readers of the second will have either read or at least heard of the first. I shall therefore
answer a question which is likely to occur to such readers. What, if any, is the connection between the two books? The central thesis of this book is the
proposed analysis of the act (I use the classical term). Its central idea is clearly stated in the first book. However, there is an important difference
between a full statement and its central idea, just as there is such a difference between even a full statement and the exploration of its consequences.
(Remember what was said about the scopes of philosophical problems.) In the Preface to the first book I promised to apply myself to the tasks I had thus set
myself. This book fulfills that promise. In this respect, and I believe also in some others, the first book stands to the second as flower stands to fruit.
Whether the fruit was worth gathering is not for me to say."
———. 1964. Logic and Reality. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Contents: Preface VII-VIII; 1. Acts (1960) 3; 2. Ineffability, ontology, and method (1960) 45; 3. Generality and existence (1962) 64; 4.
Meaning (1962) 85; 5. Duration and the specious present (1960) 98; 6. Physics and ontology (1961) 108; 7. Ontological alternatives (1963) 124; 8. Inclusion,
exemplification, and inherence in G. E. Moore (1962) 158; 9. Strawson's ontology (1960) 171 10. The ontology of Edmund Husserl (1960) 193; 11. The glory and
misery of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1961) 225; 12. Stenius on the Tractatus (1963) 242; 13. Synthetic a priori (1963) 272; 14. Realistic
postscript 302; Author's note 341; Index 343-355.
From the Preface: "Some philosophers never change their minds. Those who do are of two kinds. One kind vacillates, often abruptly, between
two extremes such as, say, phenomenalism and materialism. With the other kind the changes are gradual and show a direction. I belong to the latter kind.
This is my third book in first philosophy. In The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism (1954) the major concern is with epistemology;
the implicit ontology is a reluctant phenomenalism. Since the act is recognized, the phenomenalism is atypical. Recognition, though, is not enough; it merely
opens the way. The task is to find a dialectically adequate ontological assay of the act. If this decisive step has been made, then, structurally, realism has
been achieved. In Meaning and Existence (1960) ontology has come to the fore; structurally, realism is achieved; much of the phenomenalist debris is
cleared away. In this book the realism is explicit and fully articulated. In the concluding essay the last piece of debris is buried. That leaves no doubt
about the direction of the several changes. They took me over twenty years. The reprieve, even if only conditional, is welcome.
One who has struck out on his own, either ignoring or challenging the fashions of the day, will not, if he is sober, be certain that
everything he has gradually come to believe is true. I am very sober. Yet there is one belief I have come to hold very firmly. One cannot arrive at a
dialectically adequate realism without recognizing that the world's form exists. Logic is but a reflection of the world's form. Hence, one cannot fully
articulate one's realism without ontologizing logic. That accounts for the title of this book and, more importantly, for its thematic unity. The belief I so
firmly hold is the theme. The fourteen essays are fourteen variations on it."
———. 1967. Realism. A Critique of Brentano and Meinong. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Contents: Preface VII-VIII;
Book One: Facts, things, ideas
Part I: General ontology
One: Facts and things 3; Two: Two fundamental ties 22; Three: Connections 42; Four: Parts 71; Five: Perfect particulars and universals 85;
Part II: Representationalism
Seven: Introductory reflections 125; Eight: Cores and fringes 138; Nine: Three schemata 155; Ten: Perception 180; Eleven: Three predicaments
Book Two: Brentano and Meinong
Part III: Brentano
Twelve: Introduction 221; Thirteen: The truncated world 238; Fourteen: Minds 264; Fifteen: Double judgments 284; Sixteen: Existence, truth,
evidence 302; Seventeen: Places, moments, selves 320;
Part IV: Meinong
Eighteen: The truncated world 335; Nineteen: Minds 374; Twenty: Earlier stages 399; Twenty-one: Flaws and gaps 399; Bibliographical note 445;
From the Preface: "Freud said of The Interpretation of Dreams that it was the sort of book a man writes only once in his life. This
book is of that sort. It is also very long. Such a book ought to speak for itself. So I send it into the world without any introduction except for one remark
about the way it is written.
There are two kinds of philosophical criticism, and, perhaps, only two kinds of writing in philosophy. The inductive critics try at the same
time to make the cross and nail their intended victim onto it. Those who write deductively first make the cross and, while making it, affect, except for an
occasional glance, an almost studied unconcern for the victim. I am virtually incapable of writing inductively. The best I can do, therefore, is to do without
disguise, pretext, or apology, the one thing which I may hope not to do too badly. This book has four parts. The first is a short treatise on general ontology.
The second expounds the dialectics of representationalism. The third deals critically with Brentano; the fourth, with Meinong. The criticism in the last two
parts requires a minimum of exposition. But both criticism and exposition are highly selective."
———. 1992. New Foundations of Ontology. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Edited by William Heald.
Contents: Foreword by Edwin B. Allaire IX-XII; Editor's Note XIII-XX; Editor's introduction 3; 1. Simples and canons 43; 2. Facts and modes
61; 3. Diversity and order 101; 4. Functions and analiticity 134; 5. Thought and language 201; 6. Classes 239; 7. The Linguistic Turn contained 317; Glossary
357; Index 369-372.
From the Foreword: "During the last two decades of his life-from the publication of Realism in 1967 until his death in 1987 - Gustav
Bergmann published only five essays. One, 'Diversity,' his presidential address to the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, appeared in
1968; the other four, between 1977 and 1981.
In those decades Bergmann worked as hard and as steadily as he ever had; and he was a hard worker indeed. In the twenty-five years prior to
Realism, Bergmann published over a hundred essays, many of which are contained in four essay collections, and Philosophy of Science.
In his presidential address Bergmann made known his dissatisfaction with certain aspects of his ontology, in particular his assays of the
facts expressed by universal and existential statements. (See 'Generality and Existence,' Theoria, 28, 1962.) He thus set about to rethink his system.
New Foundations of Ontology is the result.
The manuscript seems to have been begun sometime in 1974 and completed in late 1975. Bergmann decided to delay its publication: he had
reservations about the penultimate chapter, which deals with classes and arithmetic. He never returned to the manuscript per se. Instead, he led himself into
the depths of set theory, a subject he had once known well. (Bergmann earned a PhD in mathematics and from 1928 to 1935 published eight papers in mathematics
———. 2003. Collected Works. Vol I. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos Verlag.
Selected Papers I.
Edited and with an introduction by Erwin Tegtmeier.
Contents: Introduction 9; Remarks on Realism 18; Sense data, linguistic conventions, and existence 41; Russell on particulars 62; On
nonperceptual intuition 80; A note on ontology 84; Bodies, minds, and acts 89; Two types of linguistic philosophy 110; The identity of indiscernibles ad the
Formalist definition of identity 136; Logical Positivism, language, and the reconstruction of metaphysics 145; Particularity and the new Nominalism 193; Some
remarks on the ontology of Ockham 208; Professor Quine on analyticity 219; Intentionality 224; Russell's examination of Leibniz examined 258; The revolt
against Logical Atomism 292; Frege's hidden nominalism 324; Sameness, meaning, and identity 344-350.
———. 2003. Collected Works. Vol Ii. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos Verlag.
Selected Papers II.
Edited and with an introduction by Erwin Tegtmeier.
Contents: Introduction 7; Acts 13; Ineffability, ontology, and method 55; Ontologial alternatives 75; Inclusion, exemplification, and
inherence in G. E. Moore 109; Strawson's ontology 121; The ontology of Edmund Husserl 145; The glory and misery of Ludwig Wittgenstein 177; Stenius on the
Tractatus 195; Synthetic a priori 225; Realistic postscript 255; Diversity (1968) 295; Sketch of an ontological inventory (1978) 309; Notes on ontology (1981)
321; Notes on the ontology of minds (1981) 345-370.
———. 2004. Collected Works. Vol Iii. Realism. A Critique of Brentano and Meinong. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos Verlag.
Reprint of the 1967 edition, edited and introduced by Erwin Tegtmeier.