Theory and History of Ontology ( Raul Corazzon | e-mail:

Annotated bibliography on Franz Brentano: Studies in English, Second Part: Bau - Chr

Contents of this Section


  1. Baumgartner, Wilhelm. 1989. "Objects analysed. Brentano's way toward the identity of objects." Topoi Supplement no. 4:20-30.

  2. ———. 1996. "Act, Content, and Object." In The School of Franz Brentano, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo and Poli, Roberto, 235-259. Kluwer: Dordrecht.

    "In what follows, I will deal with some aspects of Brentano's theory and terminology concerning the nature of the psychical, i.e. his descriptive psychological analysis which is, in fact, an early phenomenological theory about mental states, their structure, their mutual relation, and their intentional correlates (objects and contents). This theory goes along with his ontological theory of mind, which is an application of Aristotelian substance-accident or part-whole ontology, to the realm of mind, or more concretely, to a thinking person.

    Taking the teachings of the natural sciences (the world existing outside of us and its physical laws) for granted, Brentano develops a special, individual ontology of mind (facts and motivational interrelations of the psychical). In describing the two aspects of the minds intentional relations to things other than itself and the self-relating character of psychical phenomena, Brentano describes both the inner world of mind and the outer world of inner world (general ontology). The analysis of phenomena (phenomenology) serves as link between special and general ontology." (p. 235, a note omitted)

  3. ———. 2013. "Franz Brentano's Mereology." In Themes from Brentano, edited by Fisette, Denis and Fréchette, Guillaume, 227-245. Amsterdam: Rodopi.


    In his search for a scientifically based worldview, and in contrast to “blind a priori” assumptions (Brentano 1925), Brentano aimed at an analysis of parts, down to their last fundamental elements, their properties and interconnections in order to demonstrate “what binds the world from within”. He did so from an ontological (and from a broader metaphysical) standpoint on the one hand, and from a psychological perspective on the other.

    In what follows, I will examine Brentano’s methodological attempts to provide a foundational account of an ontology of things (§ 2) and an ontology of mind (§ 3) on the basis of his mereology, that is, his theory of part-whole-relations. In § 1, I refer to his lectures on the history of philosophy and to his essay on “The Four Phases of Philosophy”.

    I consider these investigations on scientific history in general, its periods, main themes, and endeavors, as relevant examples which illustrate my thesis that the relations of parts and wholes in Brentano’s thought can also be observed beyond his ontology and his psychology." (p. 227)


    Brentano, Franz. 1925.Versuch über die Erkenntnis, Leipzig: Meiner.

    Brentano, Franz. 1998. The Four Phases of Philosophy. Amsterdam: Rodopi

  4. Baumgartner, Wilhelm, and Pasquerella, Lynn. 2004. "Brentano’s value theory: beauty, goodness, and the concept of correct emotion." In The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, edited by Jacquette, Dale, 220-236. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    "Brentano’s theory of value, derived from his philosophical psychology, attempts to locate an objective basis for the intrinsic value of both aesthetic and ethical contemplation through the intentional objects of emotions and desires. As theories of intrinsic value, Brentano’s aesthetics and ethics are concerned with what is good and bad, beautiful and ugly, pleasurable and displeasurable, in and of themselves, and not merely as a means to an end. As objective theories, Brentano presupposes that our aesthetic and ethical evaluations, like our judgments or beliefs, are either correct or incorrect. In what follows, we will set forth some of the basic principles involved in Brentano’s aesthetics and ethics and elucidate how Brentano attempted to provide a foundation for these disciplines using his descriptive psychology." (p. 220)

  5. Baumgartner, Wilhelm, and Simons, Peter. 1994. "Brentano’s Mereology." Axiomathes no. 5:55-76.

    "1. Introduction

    Many philosophers have codidered the fundamental properties of the relational concept part/whole to be self-evident.

    Serious investigation of the formal properties of the concept part/whole began only in our century with the work of Whitehead and - especially - Lesniewski.

    Brentano employed the concept of part variously as a tool of his philosophy but he also considered the concept for itself. The topic part/whole runs right through his thinking and for good methodological and systematic reasons: he constructs and consolidates his conception of science(1) and his individual theorems in analytic descriptive manner "from below". Problems that appeared important to him, often the same problem, such as the interpretation of being, were turned around and looked at from different sides; he was always looking to explicate a complex problem step by step via partial solutions, always seeking to systematize the (apparently) disparate, while allowing individual issues their rightful place.(2)

    (1) Probably under the intluence of Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre, cf. its Introduction, § 7,

    p. 32 f., § 58, p. 253.

    (2) See the investigations into the "principle of mereological essentialism" in (Chisholm 1982), 8, also his (1973) and (1975).


    [Chisholm 1973] Roderick M. Chishohn, "Parts as essenlial to their wholes", Review of Metaphysics 25, 1973, 581-603.

    [Chisholm 1975] Roderick M. Chisholm, "Mereological essentialism: some further considerations", Review of Metaphysics 28, 1975, 477-484.

    [Chisholm 1982] Roderick M. Chishohm, Brentano and Meinong Studies, Amsterdam, Rodopi.

  6. Bell, David. 1989. "A Brentanian Philosophy of Arithmetic." Brentano Studien no. 2 (139-144).

    Abstract: "The aim of this paper is to identify the main respects in which Husserl's early philosophy, and in particular his early writings on the foundation of arithmetic, were influenced by Brentano's thought. It is claimed that the doctrinal, conceptual, and methodological perspective within which Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic is conceived and executed (but which remains veery largely suppressed in Husserl's texts) is that which he inherited, more or less without modification, from Brentano in the period to which Psychology from an empirical Standpoint, The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, and the lectures on Descriptive Psyvhology belong. That influence was extensive and profound enough to warrant calling Husserl's philosophy of arithmetic 'Brentanian'."

  7. Bell, John L. 2000. "Continuity and the logic of perception." Transcendent Philosophy no. 1:1-7.

    "In his On What is Continuous of 1914 ([2]), Franz Brentano makes the following observation:

    If we imagine a chess-board with alternate blue and red squares, then this is something in which the individual red and blue areas allow themselves to be distinguished from each other in juxtaposition, and something similar holds also if we imagine each of the squares divided into four smaller squares also alternating between these two colours. If, however, we were to continue with such divisions until we had exceeded the boundary of noticeability for the individual small squares which result, then it would no longer be possible to apprehend the individual red and blue areas in their respective positions. But would we then see nothing at all? Not in the least; rather we would see the whole chessboard as violet, i.e. apprehend it as something that participates simultaneously in red and blue. [p. 6]

    In this paper I will describe a simple and natural framework—a logic of perception—in which this “simultaneous participation” or superposition of perceived attributes is accorded a major role. (This framework was originally introduced in [1] for a different purpose.) The central concept of the framework is that of an attribute being manifested over a region or part of a proximity space—an abstract structure embodying key features of perceptual fields. An important property of the manifestation relation is nonpersistence, namely, the fact that a space may manifest an attribute not manifested by some part. This will be shown to be closely related to the idea of superposing attributes.

    I will also show how this framework is tied up with the continuity of perceptual fields." (p. 1)


    [1] Bell, J.L., A New Approach to Quantum Logic. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 37, 1986.

    [2] Brentano, Franz, Philosophical Investigations on Space, Time and the Continuum. Barry Smith, translator. London: Croom Helm, 1988.

  8. Benoist, Jocelyn. 2003. "The Question of Grammar in Logical Investigations, With Special Reference to Brentano, Marty, Bolzano and Later Developments in Logic." In Phenomenology World-Wide: Foundations - Expanding Dynamics - Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 94-97. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    "The question of grammar is among the most important in Husserl's Logical Investigations. Grammar measures the ability of thought to produce sense, thus opening the question of the possibility of objects-even where they cannot exist in any real sense. Grammar is the basic structure of the meaning modality of intentionality which, in Logical Investigations, is the fundamental modality.

    Brentano's criticism of language may have prepared Husserl to a reflect upon grammar. However, this last theme remained foreign to Brentano, who never engaged in any real inquiry into meaning, which is the basis of grammar. Brentano cared much more for the problem of the reference or lack of reference of signs within the framework of a "fiction-theory". The decisive stimulus for Husserl' s theory in fact came from the Brentanist Anton Marty (Mulligan, 1990; Benoist, 1997a, Ch. 3), who developed a philosophy of language where grammar played a significant role. Marty introduced the basic grammatical categories that characterize Husserl 's system." (p. 94)


    Benoist, Jocelyn (1997a). Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie: Husser! et la tradition logique autrichienne. Paris: P.U.F.

    Mulligan, Kevin ed. (1990), Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics. The Philosophy and Theory of Language of Anton Marty. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

  9. Bergmann, Gustav. 1967. Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

    Reprinted Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2004, with an introdction by Erwin Tegtmeier.

    Contents. Preface VII;

    Book One. Facts, Things, Ideas

    Part I: General Ontology 3; Part II: Representationalism 125:

    Book Two: Brentano and Meinong

    Part III: Brentano 221; Part IV: Meinong 335;

    Bibliographical Note 445; Index 447.

    "On the one hand, Brentano’s ontology is not easy to understand; nor therefore is it easy to describe accurately. That makes it difficult to achieve that alternation of exposition and criticism, both fluent and lucid, or at least not too crabbed and not obscure, which one ought to aim at when undertaking a task of this sort. On the other hand, Parts I and II have put us into possession of a considerable apparatus, developed at least in part with a view toward this task. In this situation an introductory section, consisting wholly of reflections designed to provide some preliminary orientation about matters both strange and difficult, should do some good. I shall present these reflections as a numbered string of comments or remarks.

    The last is about Brentano’s metaphilosophy. The one preceding it indicates how the issues I take up are distributed over the several sections. If at that point you will have a first glimpse of the reasons that led me to select just these issues and to discuss them in just this order, the Introduction will have served its purpose. But I do not feel like starting without first making explicit what I just implied. Both exposition and criticism are selective. For I am not, as a historian of the sort I am not, concerned with Brentano's views on all issues nor with how they developed in the course of his career, but, rather, as a philosopher of the sort I am, with what is interesting about them." (p. 222)

  10. Bergmann, Hugo. 1945. "Brentano's theory of induction." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 5:281-292.

    Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Brentano, pp. 213-223.

    "It is a remarkable fact that Hume’s problem of the validity of the incomplete induction did not disquiet most of the logicians of the nineteenth century.

    They studied the logical mechanism of induction, but the problem as discovered by Hume, that is, as an epistemological issue, was scarcely realised as existent. To quote one example, F.F. Apelt’s Theone der Induktion (1854), a book of great merit in many respects, virtually disregards the incomplete induction as such, and treats complete and incomplete induction as being on an equal footing.

    The exception, of course, is John Stuart Mill, whatever may be our opinion of the answers he offers to the question. On the European continent, Franz Brentano found himself grappling with the problem from the

    beginning of his philosophical thought. His Versuch über die Erkenntnis, edited from his literary remains by Alfred Kastil in 1925, is in essence a theory of induction." (p. 281)

  11. ———. 1965. "Brentano on the History of Greek Philosophy *." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 26:94-99.

    * Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie, in conformity with the lectures contained in his literary remains published by Franziska Mayer-Hildebrand. Bern: A. Francke, 1963. Pp. Lxiii, 396.

    "Franz Brentano, did not like to publish books; as he once said, he hated the "secondary work" that was connected with proof-reading, referencing of quotations, etc. He thus left the publication of his literary remains to his disciples. Indeed, after his death (1917) Alfred Kastil and Oskar Kraus undertook the publication of his literary remains and, in the time permitted to them, carried it out with great loyalty and dedication.

    In the years 1922 through 1934, there appeared in Felix Meiner's Philosophische Bibliothek ten volumes of Brentano's works; the editor's rich annotations are invaluable for understanding Brentano's lectures and the development of his thoughts. After Kastil's death the work of publication was taken over by Franziska Meyer-Hillebrand, his disciple. She published the Grundlegung and Aufbau der Ethik, Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil, the Grundzuege der Aesthetik, and Religion und Philosophie; to these are now being added the lectures on the Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie." (p. 94)


    "The edit:or calls our attention (p. 371) to "profound changes" in Brentano's comprehension of certain doctrines of Aristotle. Three times as much space in this book is devoted to Aristotle as to Plato. The exposition is divided not into three parts, as is that on Plato, but into seven parts: logic; metaphysics (subdivided into Being in general .and the origin and principle of Being); theology ("God is not only efficient cause, but creator of the world, but He is not identical with Plato's idea of the good; discussion of the proofs for the existence of God"); cosmology ("The eternity of the world is unacceptable; from this assumption there could be no progress, no proper evolution, no history"); psychology (in this chapter discussion of the doctrine that the·soul does not think without images; weighty objections against this doctrine and its refutation by Aristotle - the psychological efforts of the Wuerzburg school in the early years of our century, which were influenced directly or indirectly by Brentano, are unfortunately not mentioned); and ethics and politics,

    in chapters six and seven respectively." (p. 98)

  12. Berti, Enrico. 2001. "Brentano and Aristotle's Metaphysics." In Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism?, edited by Sharples, Robert W., 135-149. Aldershot: Ashgate.

    "Franz Brentano's interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy has attracted the attention of scholars right up to the present day. It has been considered important above all for two reasons: a) because it constituted the origin of the famous theory of intentionality, which was found in his book on Aristotle's Psychology (1867); and b) because of the influence that the theory of the several senses of being, developed in his Dissertation of 1862, exercised on the birth of Heidegger's thought. However, Brentano's attempt to attribute to Aristotle the concept of creation and the theory of the immortality of the human soul has been almost completely rejected.

    The first point was illustrated particularly by R. George and R. Sorabji, (1) but Brentano's interpretation of Aristotelian psychology was also at the centre of the debate on the "Mind-Body Problem", which involved several important philosophers, such as H. Putnam, the same R. Sorabji, M. Burnyeat, M. C. Nussbaum and others. (2) A part of his book on Aristotle's Psychology was included in the recent collection of Essays on Aristotle's "De anima".(3) The second point, to which Heidegger himself drew attention in his famous letter to Father Richardson, (4) was studied first by F. Volpi and afterwards by many others, including myself. (5)

    The interpretation of Aristotle's theology expounded by Brentano in an additional essay to Aristotle's Psychology, was criticised by Eduard Zeller in the third edition of his monumental history of Greek philosophy (1878). This criticism induced Brentano to write an essay on Aristotle's Creationism (1882), followed by a reply from Zeller, a new intervention on the part of Brentano and a further reply by Zeller (1883), which seemed to close the discussion.(6) But Brentano reprinted his essay of 1882, with some additions, in the volume Aristoteles Lehre vom Ursprung der menschlichen Geistes (1911) (7) and in the same year he also published a monograph, Aristoteles and seine Weltanschauung, where he repeated the main lines of his interpretation. (8) The controversy was definitively resolved, in my opinion, only with W. D. Ross's introduction to his edition of Aristotle's Metaphysics, where the famous English Aristotelian refuted any possibility of conceiving Aristotle's God as a creator, explicitly attacking the interpretation proposed by Brentano.(9)

    On this occasion I do not wish to return to the theory of intentionality, even if I will make some reference to it. I would like, on the contrary, to see what consequences the interpretation of Aristotle's ontology, developed by Brentano in his dissertation of 1862, and his interpretation of Aristotle's theology, developed in his later writings, had for the modern and contemporary image of Aristotle; that is, how Brentano's Aristotle influenced contemporary philosophers' judgements of Aristotle's metaphysics." (pp. 135-137)

    (1) Cf. R. George, 'Brentano's Relation to Aristotle', in R.M. Chisholm and R. Haller (eds.), Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1978, 249-266; R. Sorabji, 'From Aristotle to Brentano; the Development of the Concept of Intentionality', in H. Blumenthal and H. Robinson (eds.), Aristotle and the Later Tradition, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Supplementary Volume, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.

    (2) I tried to sum up this debate in E. Berti, 'Aristotele e il "Mind-Body Problem', Iride. Filosofia e discussione pubblica 11, 1998, 43-62.

    (3) Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom Nous Poietikos, Mainz: Kirchheim, 1867, was republished by R. George, Hamburg: Meiner, 1967, and was translated into English by R. George, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

    The first chapter, 'Nous poietikos: Survey of earlier interpretations', was included in M. C. Nuussbaum and A. O. Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle's De anima, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, 313-341.

    (4) This letter (1962), published by Heidegger as Preface to W.J. Richardson, Heidegger, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1963, has been developed in his lecture 'Mein Weg in die Phanomenologie' (1963), in id., Zur Sache des Denkens, Tubingen, Mohr, 1969, 81-90.

    (5) Cf. F. Volpi, Heidegger e Brentano, Padua: Cedam, 1976 (Pubblicazioni della Scuola di perfezionamento in Filosofia dell'Università di Padova), and Heidegger e Aristotele, Padova: Daphne, 1984; J. Taminiaux, Le regard et l'excédent, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1977, 156-182; E. Berti, Aristotele nel Novecento, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1992, 44-111; Th. Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

    (6) F. Brentano, 'Ueber den Creatianismus des Aristoteles', S.-B. d. K. Akad. d. Wiss., philos.hist. Kl., 100, Wien 1882, 95-126; E. Zeller, 'Aristoteles Lehre von der Ewigkeit des menschlichen Geistes', S.-B. d. Preuss. Akad. d. Wiss., Berlin 1882 (repr. in Zeller's Kleine Schriften, Berlin 1910); F. Brentano, Offener Brief an Herrn professor Dr. Eduard Zeller, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1883; E. Zeller, Deutsche Literaturanzeigung, 1883.

    (7) Leipzig: Veit & Comp., 1911 (second edition, with an Introduction by R. George who illustrates the controversy, Hamburg: Meiner, 1980). I examined this topic in E. Berti, 'Zeller e Aristotele', Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, cl. di lett. e filos., s. III, vol. XIX.3, Pisa 1989, 1233 -1254.

    (8) Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer. In preparing this monograph Brentano wrote a series of notes on Aristotle, which remained unpublished until after his death: cf. F. Brentano, Uber Aristoteles. Nachgelassene Aufsatze, hrsg. v. R. George, Hamburg: Meiner, 1986.

    (9) Aristotle's Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924, I, cxxxiii-cxxxix, cxlix, cliii-cliv. I occupied myself with this discussion in E. Berti, 'Da chi è amato it motore immobile? Su Aristotele, Metaph. XII 6-7', Methexis 10, 1997, 59-82.

  13. Betti, Arianna. 2013. "We owe it to Sigwart! A new look at the content/object distinction in early phenomenological theories of judgment from Brentano to Twardowski." In Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology, edited by Textor, Mark, 74-96. Palgrave.

    "In a series of articles, Dale Jacquette has offered the following picture of Twardowski’s contribution to Brentano’s theory of intentionality.

    Brentano made no distinction between the content and the object of mental acts: he ‘seems to place the real world beyond the reach of thought’ (Jacquette 1990: 181, Jacquette 2004: 107; see also Jacquette 2006: 12). By distinguishing sharply between content and object instead, Twardowski went beyond Brentano (although, contrary to what others claim, he was not the first Brentanian to do so).

    This picture needs fine- tuning." (p. 74)


    "On the basis of the logic manuscript EL 80 he edited, Robin Rollinger has recently argued that Brentano himself has the distinction in place (Rollinger 2009), and, given Rollinger’s dating of EL80, this implies not only that Brentano acknowledged the distinction before Twardowski, but also before Höfler and Meinong’s Logik.(1)" (p.75)


    "Why did Brentano himself introduce the content/object distinction at a certain point, and at which ‘certain point’? Here’s the story as I’ll tell it in this paper. It is, on the face of Rollinger’s dating of EL80, a (possibly) controversial story. Brentano was forced to consider (or consider more seriously) the content/object distinction at a certain point, I’d say not before 1888–89, by attacks against his theory of judgement made by critics such as Sigwart and Windelband." (p. 76)

    (1) For an earlier discussion of the issue, see Chrudzimski 2001: 33 and ff.


    Chrudzimski, A. (2001) Intentionalitatstheorie Beim Frühen Brentano/Intentionality Theory, the Early Brentano. (Dordrecht: Kluwer).

    Jacquette, D. (1990) ‘The Origins of Gegenstandstheorie: Immanent and Transcendent Intentional Objects in Brentano, Twardowski and Meinong’, Brentano-Studien 3, 177–202.

    —— (2004) ‘Brentano’s concept of intentionality’, In D. Jacquette (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, 98–130. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    —— (2006) ‘Twardowski, Brentano’s Dilemma, and the Content-Object Distinction’, in A. Chrudzimski & D. Łukasiewicz (eds.), Actions, Products and Things. Brentano and Polish Philosophy, 9–33. (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag).

    Rollinger, R.D. (2009) ‘Brentano’s Psychology and Logic And The Basis Of Twardowski’s Theory Of Presentations’, The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 4, 1–23.

  14. Blackmore, John. 1998. "Franz Brentano and the University of Vienna Philosophical Society 1888-1938." In The Brentano Puzzle, edited by Poli, Roberto, 73-92. Aldershot: Ashgate.


    The recent publication of the lectures given by the University of Vienna Philosophical Society from 1888 to 1922 has apparently stimulated increased interest among many scholars. The primary reason, of course, is that the Vienna background of many of the best-known philosophers of the 20th century has raised the distinct possibility that the Philosophical Society was a significant or even principal incubator for this remarkable development. Mach, Wittgenstein, Boltzmann, Neurath, Popper, von Hayek, and Feyerabend were all Viennese. The first four thinkers were clearly influenced by lectures and discussions given in the Society, the father of Sir Karl Popper was a member,3 Friedrich von Hayek alleges that most philosophical discussion revolved around Mach's ideas at that time, and concerning Feyerabend's attraction to philosophy, one might suspect a source in Boltzmann's Populäre Schriften. Some of the groups which appear to have been 'spun off from the Society include Schlick's Circle, Reininger's Circle, and Heinrich Gomperz's Circle.

    But in this paper, I would like to explore the relations of Franz Brentano and his students with the Society, which as we shall see were important until the First World War and for a few years afterwards. Brentano gave the first lecture, his students held top positions in the society often until their deaths, his followers actually gave more talks or led more discussions than the numerous adherents of Mach and Boltzmann, and Franz Brentano's most famous students, Meinong and Husserl, were corresponding members of this Vienna Society for some length of time." (p. 73, notes omitted)

  15. Bonino, Guido. 2018. "Brentano in America. Three episodes." Paradigmi no. 1:49-64.

    Abstract: "The article aims to investigate how Gustav Bergmann, Reinhardt Grossmann and Roderick Chisholm used Brentano's notion of intentionality in their own philosophical pursuits, and on how they saw themselves and their works with respect to what they regarded as Brentano's place in the history of philosophy. It is shown how the differences among their interpretations depend mainly on their different philosophical agendas."

  16. Brandl, Johannes. 2018. "Brentano’s Renewal of Philosophy: A Double-Edged Sword." Brentano Studien no. 16:25-52.

    Abstract: "This paper discusses Brentano’s plan to renew philosophy as consisting of two goals. One goal is to restore the scientific reputation of philosophy by employing the natural methods of descriptive psychology. In contrast to sceptical and critical approaches in 19th-century philosophy, Brentano seeks to renew philosophy by reviving a purely theoretical interest that he associates with the work of Aristotle. The other goal derives from Brentano’s theistic worldview. Like scholastic thinkers, Brentano believes that philosophy can provide a rational foundation for theism. His plan is therefore not just to align philosophy with the empirical sciences, but also to arbitrate between scientific knowledge and belief in God. But can one really expect from philosophy to serve as a bridge between science and religion? Since there is good reason to doubt that philosophy can play that role, Brentano’s plan for a renewal of philosophy remains a double-edged sword that cuts one way or the other, aligning philosophy with either science or religion, but not both."

  17. Brandl, Johannes L. 1996. "Intentionality." In The School of Franz Brentano, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo and Poli, Roberto, 261-284. Kluwer: Dordrecht.

    "There is one assumption which all participants in this debate, whether modern or traditional, agree on: they all accept propositional entities. Meinong accepts objectives, Husserl accepts states of affairs, and Fodor and Searle accept propositions.(12) They accept these entities as the objects of our propositional attitudes. Not so Brentano after 1874. His account of belief and desire makes do with the same entities as are already involved in his analysis of non-propositional acts. But it is not clear what those entities are to which Brentano is committed from the beginning.


    In what follows I want to explore this idiosyncracy of Brentano's theory, not as a historical curiosity, but as a source of inspiration for dealing with contemporary issues. I start out from a standard version of the representational theory of mind (section 2). I then consider two possible ways of attributing such a theory to Brentano (sections 3-5). The first approach emphasizes the fundamental role of presentations. The second approach leads to the result that only acts which are neither propositional nor non-propositional can play this fundamental role. In the final section I briefly consider the merits of this latter interpretation." (pp. 263-264)

    (12) 12 The difference between these types of entities is explored, both from a modem and a traditional perspective, in Künne 1987.


    Künne 1987. W. KUnne, "The intentionality of thinking: The difference between state of affairs and propositional matter", in Mulligan 1987, 175-186.

    Mulligan 1987. K. Mulligan (ed.), Speech act and sachverhalt, Dordrecht, Nijhoff.

  18. ———. 2013. "What is Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness? Brentano’s Theory of Inner Consciousness Revisited." In Themes from Brentano, edited by Fisette, Denis and Fréchette, Guillaume, 41-65. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

    "The plan of the paper is as follows. I begin with Brentano’s definition of mental phenomena (section 2) and his idea that mental phenomena have a distinctive internal structure (section 3). I then consider what inner consciousness contributes to this structure by clarifying two distinctions with which Brentano operates here: the distinction between primary and secondary objects (section 4), and his distinction between inner perception and inner observation (section 5).

    The main step in my interpretation will then consist in pointing out that inner perception and inner observation need not be conceived as two distinct cognitive faculties. Rather we can think of them as one faculty that gives rise to gradually different forms of self-knowledge (section 6). In the remaining part of the paper I will then exploit this interpretation for rebutting two objections that have been raised against Brentano’s theory. David Rosenthal has argued that Brentano’s model rests on a Cartesian premise and should therefore be replaced by a proper higher-order theory of consciousness (section 7).

    Others, including Henrich, Frank and many phenomenologists have questioned Brentano’s treatment of the regress-problem and on that basis suggested that Brentano’s model of consciousness should be replaced by a strictly one-level theory (section 8). I will argue that both objections miss their target because Brentano’s fits neither the mould of a higher-order nor of a one-level theory." (pp. 42-43)

  19. ———. 2017. "Was Brentano an Early Deflationist about Truth?" The Monist no. 100:1-14.

    Abstract: "It is often assumed that deflationist accounts of truth are a product of philosophy of logic and language in the twentieth century. In this paper I show why this assumption is historically short-sighted. An early version of deflationism about truth can already be found in Brentano’s 1889 lecture “On the Concept of Truth.” That Brentano is a precursor of deflationism has gone largely unnoticed because of a different reception of his lecture: according to most scholars, Brentano proposes in it a revision of the correspondence theory of truth that he later rejected in favour of an epistemic theory. Contrary to this received interpretation, I argue that Brentano actually tried to show how one can minimize an account of truth without thereby sacrificing a robust realist intuition about the objectivity of truth. Brentano held on to this deflationist view in his later years, when he assigned self-evident judgments a primary role in our understanding of truth."

  20. ———. 2017. "Brentano on Truth." In The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School, edited by Kriegel, Uriah, 163-168. New York: Routledge.

    "How to understand Brentano’s account of truth is a question of some controversy.

    A number of different views have been put forward as positions that Brentano held at some stage in his career. The received view has it that the early Brentano subscribed to a form of correspondence theory which he later rejected in favor of a definition of truth in terms of correct judging, where the correctness of a judgement is defined in terms of the notion of self-evidence (...)."


    "Section 1 first summarizes the received view and then indicates two problems raised by this interpretation. Section 2 explains in which sense Brentano may have been a deflationist and how this interpretation avoids the problems of the received view." (p. 163)

  21. ———. 2023. "The purposes of descriptive psychology." European Journal of Philosophy:358-370.

    Abstract: "In this paper, I discuss the different views of the founders of descriptive psychology in the 19th century about the meaning and purpose of this discipline and sketch a new plan for connecting descriptive psychology with the language-critical tradition of analytic philosophy. I will show that the goals Hermann Lotze, Franz Brentano, and Wilhelm Dilthey set for descriptive psychology were too lofty for different reasons. The common problem they faced was how to reconcile the ideal of autonomous philosophical knowledge with the empirical relevance that descriptive psychology should have. Faced with this dilemma, I outline a new plan to conceive of descriptive psychology as a critical project aimed at overcoming the obstacles that language places in the way of our knowledge of mental phenomena."

  22. Brandl, Johannes L., and Textor, Mark. 2021. "‘Disentangling Judgement from Its Linguistic Clothing’: Brentano’s View of Judgement and Its Linguistic Guises." In The Philosophy of Brentano: Contributions from the Second International Conference Graz 1977 & 2017, in Memory of Rudolf Haller, edited by Antonelli, Mauro and Binder, Thomas, 156-178. Leiden: Brill Rodopi.

    "What seems clear is that the potential of Brentano’s criticism of ordinary language has not yet been fully explored. We found that at least three points deserve further attention: Brentano’s view that noun phrases, for example, demonstratives, can express a simple judgment; his idea that assertoric sentences can express non-propositional acknowledgements; and last but not last, Brentano’s concept of double judgement. Taking together, these three insights may provide us with a better ground for introducing propositional objects into a theory of judgement. Disentangling our judgements from language also means not to follow the usual procedure of simply taking the meaning of assertoric sentences to constitute the objects that we judge to be true or false." (p. 177)

  23. Brentano, J. C. M. 1966. "The Manuscripts of Franz Brentano." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 20:477-482.

    "The philosopher Franz Brentano, my father, left at his death an unusual number of unpublished papers. This is due to two main reasons. One is that true to the principle he had announced in one of his theses when applying for the venia legendi at Würzburg university: Vera philoso phiae methodus nulla alia nisi scientiae naturalis est, which meant that philosophy should proceed by small well con solidated steps and that each step before being accepted should stand the test of not being in conflict with any other part of true philosophy, he wished to withhold his findings from publication until they were checked and rechecked. Apart from his lectures the medium for communicating the results of his investigations was the correspondence with other philosophers, particularly with former pupils. The other reason is that in the later part of his life he was affected by an eye ailment and gradually almost lost his eyesight. From about 1904 onwards writing and particularly reading became very difficult." (p. 477)

  24. Brito, Evandro Oliveira de. 2018. "Franz Brentano's theory of judgment (1889): a critique of Aristotle's correspondence theory of truth." Trans/Form/Ação no. 41:39-56.

    Abstract: "The purpose of this paper is to discuss the concept of truth formulated by Franz Brentano in 1889. As a textual basis, I take Brentano’s communication, presented to the philosophical community of Vienna in March 1889, entitled “On the concept of truth” (Über den Begriff der Wahrheit), and I provide a systematic exposition of Brentano’s analysis of the problems surrounding the interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence. My analysis explains how Brentano reinterpreted the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence within the conceptual framework of his descriptive psychology."

  25. Brown, Deborah. 2000. "Immanence and Individuation: Brentano and the Scholastics on Knowledge of Singulars." The Monist no. 83:22-46.

    "The primary aim of this paper is to explain the connection between the theory of immanence in its medieval and Brentanian forms and the problem of individuation. The predominant Scholastic solution to the problem will be compared with Brentano's own "Leibnizian" account of singular knowledge. I shall begin in the next section with a discussion of how the problem arose in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of the

    middle ages for it is in this metaphysico-epistemological tradition that Brentano's work is best located. In Section III, I outline Brentano's theory of immanence in more detail and discuss his proposed analysis of singular knowledge. I shall argue that there can be found in Brentano's later modifications of the theory of immanent objects nominalist tendencies which should have made the task of explaining singular knowledge easier.

    Brentano's general rejection of nominalism and the residual Aristotelian Thomistic ideas in his theory of intentionality, however, prevented a full swing to nominalism. In the fourth Section I consider one medieval nominalist solution to the problem of singular knowledge, William of Ockham's, in the light of Brentano's objections to nominalism. It is my contention that not only does Brentano's reading of medieval nominalism contain a fundamental misunderstanding, but that his own philosophy of mind requires the possibility of direct, non-abstractive epistemic access to individuals.

    Thus in the final Section I discuss how an adequate theory of the unity of consciousness requires an adequate account of our knowledge of singulars." (pp. 23-24)

  26. Cesalli, Laurent, and Taieb, Hamid. 2018. "Brentano and Medieval Ontology." Brentano Studien no. 16:335-362:.

    Abstract: "Since the first discussion of Brentano’s relation to (and account of) medieval philosophy by Spiegelberg in 1936, a fair amount of studies have been dedicated to the topic. And if those studies focused on some systematic issue at all, the beloved topic of intentionality clearly occupied a hegemonic position in the scholarly landscape. This paper considers the question from the point of view of ontology, and in a twofold perspective: What did Brentano know about medieval ontology and what kind of access did he have to that material (section 1)? What kind of use did Brentano make of medieval material in his own philosophy, and with what kind of results (section 2)?"


    Spiegelberg H. (1936), “Der Begriff der Intentionalität in der Scholastik, bei Brentano und Husserl”, Philosophische Hefte 5, p. 75-91 (reprint in Studia Philosophica 29 (1970), p. 189-216). [Revised by the author and translated in: Linda McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Brentano, pp. 108-127]

  27. Chisholm, Roderick M. 1952. "Intentionality and the Theory of Signs." Philosophical Studies no. 3:56-63.

    "Franz Brentano wrote, in a well-known passage, that intentionality is peculiar to psychical phenomena. No physical phenomenon, he said, shows anything like it; hence intentionality affords us a criterion of the mental or psychical(1). Let us refer to this view as "Brentano's thesis." Among the phenomena which he would have called "intentional" is the interpretation of signs. One may ask, is it possible to provide an adequate theory of signs which will show Brentano's thesis to be mistaken? In the present paper I shall make certain general points which, I believe, must be considered in any attempt to answer this question, I shall first attempt to state Brentano's thesis somewhat more exactly; then I shall turn to the analysis of the concept sign."

    (1) Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom emplrischen Standpunkte (Leipzig, 1924), vol. 1, pp. 124-25.

  28. ———. 1955/56. "Sentences About Believing." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society no. 56:125-148.

    "1. " I can look for him when he is not there, but not hang him when he is not there ".(1) The first of these activities, Brentano would have said, is intentional; it may take as its object something which does not exist. But the second activity is "merely physical"; it cannot be performed unless its object is there to work with. " Intentionality ", he thought, provides us with a mark of what is psychological.

    I shall try to reformulate Brentano's suggestion by describing one of the ways in which we need to use language when we talk about certain psychological states and events.

    I shall refer to this use as the " intentional use " of language.

    It is a kind of use we can avoid when we talk about nonpsychological states and events.

    In the interests of a philosophy contrary to that of Brentano, many philosophers and psychologists have tried to show, in effect, how we can avoid intentional language when we wish to talk about psychology. I shall discuss some of these attempts in so far as they relate to the sorts of things we wish to be able to say about believing. I believe that these attempts have been so far unsuccessful. And I think that this fact may provide some reason for saying, with Brentano, that " intentionality " is a mark of what is psychological." (p. 125)

    (1) Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, page 133e.

  29. ———. 1957. "Intentional Inexistence." In Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, 168-185. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Chapter XI; reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Brentano, pp. 140-150.

    "I have suggested that the locution ‘There is something that S perceives to be f' may be defined as meaning: ‘There is something such that it is f, it appears to S in some way, S takes it to be f, and S had adequate evidence for so doing.’ And I have suggested that ‘S takes something to be f may be defined by reference to what S assumes, or accepts. I have now said all that I can about the philosophic questions which the concepts of adequate evidence and of appearing involve. Let us finally turn, then, to the concept of assuming, or accepting. The principal philosophic questions which this concept involves may be formulated by reference to a thesis proposed by Franz Brentano.

    Psychological phenomena, according to Brentano, are characterised ‘by what the scholastics of the middle ages referred to as the intentional (also the mental) inexistence of the object, and what we, although with not quite unambiguous expressions, would call relation to a content, direction upon an object, (which is not here to be understand as a reality), or immanent objectivity.’(2) This ‘intentional inexistence’, Brentano added, is peculiar to what is psychical; things which are merely physical show nothing like it.

    Assuming, or accepting, is one of the phenomena Brentano would have called intentional. I will first try to formulate Brentano’s thesis somewhat more exactly; then I will ask whether it is true of assuming." (p. 168)

    (2) Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte, (Leipzig, 1924), vol. 1, pp, 124-5. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (New York and London, 1973), p. 88.

  30. ———, ed. 1960. Realism and the Background of Phenomenology. Atascadero: Ridgeview.

    Contents: Preface V; Editor's Introduction 3; Selections. 1. Franz Brentano: The distinction between mental and physical phenomena 39; 2. Franz Brentano: Presentation and judgment form. Two distinct fundamental classes 62, 3. Franz Brentano: Genuine and fictitious objects 76; 4. Alexius Meinong: The theory of objects 76; 5. Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology 118; 6. Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology and anthropology 129; 7. H. A. Prichard: Appearances and reality 143; 8. E. B. Holt, W. T. Marvin, W. P. Montague, R. B. Perry, W. B. Pitkin, and E. G. Spaulding: Introduction to 'The New Realism' 151; 9. Samuel Alexander: The basis of realism 186; 10. Bertrand Russell: The ultimate constituents of matter 223; 11. Arthur C. Lovejoy: A temporalistic realism 238; 12. G. E. Moore: A defense of common sense 255; Selected bibliography 283; Index 305-308.

    "The translations of Brentano and Meinong and the second translation of Husserl ("Phenomenology and Anthropology") have not previously been published. The selections from Brentano were translated by D. B. Terrell, of the University of Minnesota, and are taken, with his kind permission, from his translation of Brentano's Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Meinong's "The Theory of Objects" was translated by Isaac Levi, of Western Reserve University, D. B. Terrell, and Roderick M. Chisholm. Husserl's "Phenomenology" was translated by C. V. Salmon, of Belfast University; his "Phenomenology and Anthropology" by Richard Schmitt; of Brown University." (from the Preface)

  31. ———. 1966. "Brentano's Theory of Correct and Incorrect Emotion." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 20:395-415.

    Reprinted in: R. M: Chisholm, Brentano and Meinong Studies, pp. 68-79 and in Linda McAlister, The Philosophy of Brentano, pp. 160-175.

    "Brentano's theory of correct and incorrect emotion is based upon the analogy he believes to hold between what he calls the sphere of the intellect and the sphere of the emotions. What he has to say about this presumed analogy seems to me to be very important indeed.

    Even where his views are controversial, they are extraordinarily suggestive, not only for ethics, but also for the theory of preference and for philosophical psychology.


    Brentano divides judgments into two exclusive classes - those that are affirmative and those that are negative. Affirmative judgments are those that affirm, acknowledge, or accept something. Negative judgments are those that deny or reject something. All judgments are also either correct or incorrect; or, as we usually say, they are either true or false. And finally, there is a very close connection between the correctness and incorrectness of judgments, on the one hand, and existence and non-existence, on the other. For to say of an object that it exists, Brentano suggests, is to say that it is correct to accept that object, and to say of an object that it does not exist is to say that it is correct to reject that object. The latter point may also be put by saying that an object exists if and only if it is worthy of being accepted or affirmed, and that an object does not exist if and only if it is worthy of being rejected or denied.(1)

    And now Brentano thinks, we may say much the same thing, mutatis mutandis, about emotions - about "love and hate".

    Emotions are either positive or negative; they are either proemotions or anti-emotions, love or hate. Love and hate may be correct and they may also be incorrect. There is a very close connection between the correctness and incorrectness of emotions, on the one hand, and goodness and badness on the other. For to say of an object that it is good, Brentano suggests, is to say that it is correct to love that object, and to say of an object that it is bad is to say that it is correct to hate that object. The latter point may also be put by saying that an object is good if and only if it is worthy of being loved, and an object is bad if and only if it is worthy of being hated.

    But to put the analogy this way is to oversimplify Brentano's doctrine. And, so he concedes, there are fundamental points of disanalogy that hold between the intellectual and the emotive spheres." (pp. 396-397)

    (1) For the details of this view, see Brentano's Wahrheit und Evidenz (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1958; first published in Leipzig in 1930), ed., Oskar Kraus. The English edition is The True and the Evident (London:

    Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1966), ed., Roderick M. Chisholm.

  32. ———. 1967. "Brentano on descriptive psychology and the intentional." In Phenomenology and Existentialism, edited by Lee, Edward and Mandelbaum, Maurice, 1-23. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.

    "Brentano's doctrme ot the intentional, as well as much of the rest of what we would now call his philosophy, was a part of what he called "descriptive psychology." Brentano's "descriptive psychology" and Husserl's "phenomenology" are closely related. Husserl had studied with Brentano in Vienna from 1884 to 1886.(3) Brentano had used "beschreibende Phänomenologie" as an alternative name for descriptive psychology but evidently did not use "Phänomenologie" in this way after 1889.

    The relation that descriptive psychology bears to genetic or explanatory psychology, Brentano said, is analogous to the relation that anatomy bears to physiology and to the relation that "geognosy" bears to geology (hence "psychognosy" was still another term that Brentano used for descriptive psychology).(4) Genetic or explanatory psychology is concerned with the causal status of psychological phenomena and hence with the relations that such phenomena bear to physical and chemical processes. It is not an exact science but, like meteorology, must qualify its generalizations with such terms as "on the average" and "for the most part." But descriptive psychology, Brentano thought, was an exact science." (p. 2)

    (3) See Husserl's " Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano," in Oskar Kraus, Franz Brentano: Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seine Lehre (Munich: 1919).

    (4) See Franz Brentano, Grundzüge der Asthetik, ed. F. Mayer-Hillebrand, pp. 36fF., and Meine letzten Wünsche für Oesterreich (Stuttgart: 1895).

  33. ———. 1972. "Sentences about Believing." In Intentionality, Mind, and Language, edited by Marras, Ausonio. Urbana: University of Iilinois Press.

    From Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. II, eds. H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell, pp. 510-520. Copyright, 1958, by the University of Minnesota. Reprinted by permission of the author, the University of Minnesota Press, and the editors of Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, where an earlier version of this paper was first published [56 (1955-56), 125-148].

    " “I can look for him when he is not there, but not hang him when he is not there."(1) The first of these activities, Brentano would have said, is intentional; it may take as its object something which does not exist. But the second activity is “merely physical"; it cannot be performed unless its object is there to work with. “Intentionally,” he thought, provides us with a mark of what is psychological.

    I shall try to reformulate Brentano’s suggestion by describing one of the ways in which we need to use language when we talk about certain psychological states and events. I shall refer to this use as the “intentional use" of language. It is a kind of use we can avoid when we talk about nonpsychological states and events." (p. 31)

    (1) L. Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations (London and New York: Macmillan, 1953) p. 133e.

  34. ———. 1976. "Brentano's nonpropositional theory of judgment." Midwest Studies in Philosophy no. 1:91-95.

    "Burnham Terrell [*] has performed a valuable service in presenting Brentano’s theory of judgment and his “logical innovations” in the light of contemporary logical developments. In what follows, I will attempt to supplement what Terrell has done by showing how the reistic side of Brentano’s theory might be developed. As Terrell notes, Brentano in the final reistic phase of his thought rejects such entia irrealia as propositions, judgmental contents, and states of affairs.

    But it is normally supposed that a nonpropositional theory of judgment cannot possibly be made adequate to so-called compound judgments. I shall attempt to show that this supposition is false." (p. 91)

    [*] Franz Brentano's Logical Innovations (1976).

  35. ———. 1976. "Brentano's Descriptive Psychology." In The Philosophy of Brentano, edited by McAlister, Linda Lopez, 91-100. London: Duckworth.

    Revised by the author, who notes, ‘I have profited by certain criticisms made by D.B. Terrell’. The first version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the XIVth International Congress of Philosophy, 2-9 September 1968 (Vienna, 1968), volume 2, pp. 164-74.

    "It is most fitting that one session of an international congress of philosophers meeting in Vienna should be devoted to the topic, ‘Brentano, philosophical psychology, and the phenomenological movement’. Franz

    Brentano’s lectures on descriptive psychology were given at the University of Vienna three-quarters of a century ago. Husserl said that without Brentano’s researches ‘phenomenology could not have come into being at all’.(2) Brentano’s descriptive psychology is doubtless very close to what Husserl originally took phenomenology to be. But in the philosophical problems that are central to it, and in the precise analytic manner with which Brentano dealt with them, his descriptive psychology is also very close to the ‘philosophy of mind’ or ‘philosophical psychology’, that is now of concern to philosophers in the analytic tradition.

    Yet it would not be flitting, here in Vienna, to look upon Brentano merely as a precursor of subsequent philosophical movements. I shall try to say briefly what he took descriptive psychology to be and I shall comment upon what I take to be its philosophical significance." (p. 91)

    (2) See Edmund Husserl,‘Author’s Preface to the English Edition’, Ideas—General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (London, 1931), p. 23; Phanomenologische Psychologie (The Hague, 1962), pp. 31-4, 267-9, 353-4.

  36. ———. 1978. "Brentano's Conception of Substance and Accident." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 5:197-210.

    Abstract: "Brentano uses terms in place of predicates (e.g. "a thinker" in place of "thinks") and characterizes the "is" of predication in terms of the part-whole relation. Taking as his ontological data certain intentional phenomena that are apprehended with certainty, he conceives the substance-accident relation as a define-able type of part-whole relation which we can apprehend in "inner perception". He is then able to distinguish the following types of individual or ens reale: substances; primary individuals which are not substances; accidents; aggregates; and boundaries."

  37. ———. 1981. "Brentano's analysis of the consciousness of time." In Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Volume VI. The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, edited by French, Peter A., Uehling Jr., Theodore E. and Wettstein, Howard K., 3-16. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

    "Franz Brentano's conception of philosophical analysis is illustrated by his aanalysis of our consciousness of time. The analysandum is not a linguistic expression or a concept; it is an experience of a certain sort. Hence the analysis might be called "phenomenological," but Brentano prefers to say it is a matter of "descriptive psychology."

    An analysis of our consciousness of time is not, or course, an analysis of time. Hence Brentano's analysis is consistent with a number of different conceptions of time. But it does presuppose that tense is to be taken seriously. In other words, Brentano does not accept the philosophical view, advocated by many contemporary philosophers of science, according to which distinctions of tense are merely "subjective" or otherwise "illusory." Nor does he believe that all truths can he expressed in untensed sentences.

    I shall begin by formulating what Brentano takes to be a fundamental problem of descriptive psychology -- that of accurately describing our awareness of temporal succession. Then I shall set forth the development of his views with respect to this problem." (p. 3)

  38. ———. 1982. Brentano and Meinong Studies. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

    Contents: Foreword 1; 1. Brentano's Theory of Substance and Accident 3; 2. Brentano's Theory of Judgment 17; 3. Homeless Objects 37; 4. Beyond Being and Nonbeing 53; 5. Correct and Incorrect Emotion 68; 6. Objectives and Intrinsic Value 80; 7. The Quality of Pleasure and Displeasure 92; 8. Supererogation and Offence 98; 9. Beginnings and Endings 114-124.

    "I present these papers on Brentano and Meinong in the hope that they will lead the reader back to the originai sources. Some of the papers are expositions and commentaries. Others are developments of certain suggestions first made by Brentano or by Meinong.

    The first two papers are concerned with the basic presuppositions of Brentano's theoretical philosophy. "Brentano's Theory of Substance and Accident" was presented to the Congress on the Philosophy of Franz Brentano held in Graz in September 1977; it first appeared in the Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. V (1978). The second paper - "Brentano's Theory of Judgment" - has not been published before; but a preliminary version of part of it, entitled "Brentano's Nonpropositional Theory of Judgment," appeared in the Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. I (1976). It should be noted that Brentano's Kategorienlehre, to which many references are made in these two papers, has now been translated into English as The Theory of Categories, The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff 1981.


    The four papers that follow are concerned with the theory of value, as it had been conceived by Brentano and developed by Meinong. "Correct and Incorrect Emotion" and "The Quality of Pleasure and Displeasure" are both adapted from "Brentano's Theory of Correct and Incorrect Emotion," which first appeared in the Brentano issue of the Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Vol. 20 (1966).


    The final paper - "Beginnings and Endings" - is a revision of a paper entitled "Brentano als analytischer Metaphysiker," which first appeared in the special volume of Conceptus entitled Österreichische Philosophie und ihr Einfluss auf die analytische Philosophie der Gegenwart, Jg. XI (1977), Nr. 28-30, pp. 77-82. A later version appeared in Time and Cause, edited by Peter Van Inwagen (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980), pp. 17-25. It has been revised once again for the present volume.

    I hope that these essays will be thought of as carrying out the tradition of the Brentano school." (From the Foreword).

  39. ———. 1982. "Brentano's Theory of Judgment." In Brentano and Meinong Studies, 17-36. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

    "Introduction. In the final reistic phase of his thought Brentano rejects such entia irrealia as propositions, Judgmental contents, and states of affairs, and he develops what may be called a "nonpropositional theory of judgment". It is normally supposed that a nonpropositional theory of judgment cannot possibly be made adequate to so-called compound judgments. I shall attempt to show that this supposition is false.

    The two essential features of Brentano's theory of judgment are these: (1) that there are two irreducibly different types of judgment, one affirmative and the other negative; and (2) that the only terms needed in the formulation of such judgments are terms that a reist could countenance as being genuine." (p. 17)

  40. ———. 1983. "Boundaries as Dependent Particulars." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 20:87-95.


    Stephan Körner has noted that one way of drawing up a theory of categories will divide all particulars "into (a) a dass of independent particulars, i.e. particulars which are ontologically fundamental, and (b) a class of dependent particulars, i.e. particulars which are not ontologically fundamental."(1) The dependent particulars might be said to be "parasitical upon" the fundamental particulars.

    I shall here discuss the nature of spatial boundaries, viewing them as dependent particulars." (p. 87)

    (1) Stephan Körner, Categorial Frameworks, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970, p. 4.

  41. ———. 1986. Brentano and Intrinsic Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Contents: Editors' introduction IX; Acknowledgments XIII; 1. Introduction 1; 2. Thought and its objects 9; 3. The phenomena of love and hate 17; 4. Correct judgment 33; 5. Correct emotion 47; 6. The hierarchy of values 59; 7. Organic unities 69; 8. Evil 91: Index 103.

    "The psychological approach to the theory of value.

    I have tried to do two things in this book. The first is to set forth Franz Brentano's theory of value within the context of the remarkable philosophical system that he worked out.

    And the second is to develop in further detail some of his more suggestive insights about the nature of intrinsic value.

    My concern, for the most part, has been with exposition and clarification and not with criticism.

    Much of Brentano's philosophy is based upon psychological considerations. The most important of these, as far as the theory of value is concerned, is his conception of the analogies that hold between intellectual and emotive phenomena." (p. 1)

  42. ———. 1987. "Brentano and One-Sided Detachability." Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie no. 21:153-159.

  43. ———. 1987. "Brentano's theory of pleasure and pain." Topoi no. 6:59-64.

    "In one of their uses, the words "pleasure" and "pain" designate sense qualities of a certain sort. When they are used in this way, then "pleasure" may be said to designate one type of sense content and "pain" may be said to designate another. But in another of their uses, "pleasure" and "pain" designate certain types of mental act and not sensory contents. I can say "I am pleased that you are well" or "I am displeased about the bad news". In this case my statement may express an intentional attitude comparable to belief and desire.

    What is the relation, then, between sensory pleasure and pain, on the one hand, and nononsensory, or intentional, pleasure and pain on the other? Are they simply two different types of phenomena that happen to have the same name? Or is there a sense in which both can be said to be subspecies of more generic types of pleasure and pain? These are among the basic philosophical questions of the theory of pleasure and pain. They present a problem, therefore, for descriptive psychology.(1)

    The descriptive problem was clearly set forth by Stumpf in a lecture that was given in 1906 and published in the following year. Brentano's discussion of pleasure and pain in the Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie (1907) is essentially a commentary on Stumpf's lecture.(2)" (p. 59)

    (1) Compare the general discussion by William Alston, in 'Pleasure', in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1967), Vol. VI, pp. 341-347.

    (2) Carl Stumpf, 'Über Gefühlsempfindungen', Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, Band 44 (1907), pp. 1-49.

    In a later article, Stumpf replies in detail to Brentano's criticisms; see 'Apologie der Gefühlsempfindungen', Zeitschrift für Psychologie, Band 75 (1916), pp. 104-140.

  44. ———. 1989. "The objects of sensation: a Brentano study." Topoi no. 8:3-8.


    The objects of sensation -- that is to say, such things as sense-qualities, sense-data, or phenomena -- continue to be what Meinong had called "homeless objects (heimatlose Gegenstände)'. (1) Investigators cannot agree as to what kind of things they are and they cannot even agree as to whether there are such things. I will try to show in this paper that Brentano's final view about them tells us just what they are and what kind of a home they have.

    To explicate Brentano's view, I will begin, as he did in the Psychology, by considering the nature of the psychological.

    For I think we can do what he wanted to do -- namely, to find a mark that is peculiar to what is psychological.

    I assume, as he did, that we can agree pre-analytically about what things are psychological. All of our psychological properties are properties that include the property of thinking. Examples of such properties are judging, wishing, hoping and desiring. And the property of sensing -- the property of having a sensation -- is also a psychological property.

    Let us first consider the kinds of thing that can have psychological properties." (p. 3)

    (1) In "Uber die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften" (1907); see Meinong Gesamtausgabe Band V, eds. Rudolf Hailer, Rudolf Kindinger and Roderick M. Chisholm, Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstait, 1975, pp. 214--220.

  45. ———. 1991. "The formal structure of the Intentional: A metaphysical Study." Brentano Studien no. 3:11-18.

    Abstract: "What is the metaphysical significance of what Brentano has shown us about intentionality? It is the fact that intentional phenomena have logical or structural features that are not shared by what is not psychological.

    It was typical of British empiricism, particularly that of Hume, to suppose that consciousness is essentially sensible. The objects of consciousness were thought to be primarily such objects as sensations and their imagined or dreamed counterparts. In the Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Brentano makes clear that intentional phenomena need not be sensible. He is aware that, even if intentional phenomena are always accompanied by sensible or sensational phenomena, they are not themselves sensational or sensible phenomena. And the presence of certain intentional attitudes is at least as certain and indubitable for us as is the presence of our sensations. If I make a certain judgment or ask myself a certain question, then I can know directly and immediately that I make that judgment or ask that question. (This is not to say, of course, that every intentional attitude may be the object of such certainty. Perhaps there is a sense in which you may be said to like or to dislike a certain thing without realizing that you like or dislike that thing.)

    If I can know directly and immediately that I am making a certain judgment, then, I can know what it is to make such a judgment. And if I know what it is to make a judgment, then, in making the judgment I can know directly and immediately that there is a certain individual thing - namely, the one who makes the judgment. Arid I, of course, am the one who makes my judgments and does my thinking. The same is true, obviously, of my other intentional activities - such activities as wondering, fearing, hoping, desiring, considering, liking and disliking."

  46. ———. 1993. "Spatial continuity and the theory of part and whole. A Brentano study." Brentano Studien no. 4:11-24.

    "The concepts of a spatially continuous substance, of spatial dimension and of spatial boundary are here "analyzed out" of the concepts of individual thing, of constituent and of coincidence. The analysis is based upon the theory of spatial coincidence that was developed by Brentano. Its presuppositions are essentially these: (1) if there are spatial objects of any kind, then there are continuous spatial substances. (2) such substances are possibly such that they are not constituents of any individual thing; and (3) they contain constituents (namely, boundaries) which are necessarily such that they are constituents of spatial substances."

  47. ———. 1993. "Brentano on "Unconscious Consciousness"." In Consciousness, Knowledge, and Truth: Essays in Honour of Jan Srzednicki, edited by Poli, Roberto, 153-160. Dordrecht: Kluwer.


    In his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Franz Brentano sets forth a theory of consciousness which implies (i) that every mental state includes an awareness of the subject of that state. (ii) that every mental state is itself an object of consciousness and (iii) that there are no unconscious mental states. Brentano's views on these matters, it seems to me, are of first importance. Many of Brentano's critics have felt that they involve insuperable difficulties. In the present essay, I will attempt to put these views as clearly as possible and to suggest how Brentano might deal with some of the criticisms that have been made.

    I will discuss three questions: (l) Does Brentano's concept of a "secondary" object lead to a regress? (2) Is every mental act an object of an evident judgement? And (3) are there unconscious mental states?" (p. 153)

  48. Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz. 2003. "Brentano's Late Ontology." Brentano Studien no. 10:221-236.

    Abstract: "In the present paper I want to give an interpretation of Brentano's late, nominalistic ontology. There are two aspects of this theory: the conception of individual properties containing their substances, presented mainly in the fragments collected in Brentano's Theory of Categories and the conceptualistic reduction virtually involved in Brentano's definition of truth."

  49. ———. 2013. "Brentano and Aristotle on the Ontology of Intentionality." In Themes from Brentano, edited by Fisette, Denis and Fréchette, Guillaume, 121-137. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

    "It is often claimed that Brentano’s rediscovery of intentionality has been strongly influenced by Aristotle. Brentano himself stressed repeatedly his affinity to Aristotle(1) and this self-interpretation was by no means restricted to the theory of intentionality. In fact, Brentano seemed to believe that almost all of what he had discovered during his most influential years (1874–1895) has its more or less remote roots in the philosophy of Aristotle.(2) Yet if we carefully compare the picture of intentionality that is to be found in Aristotle’s De Anima with Brentano’s theory of immanent objects, we find more differences than similarities. The truth is that Brentano developed a quite different ontology of intentionality, and his references to Aristotle should be seen as a conventional homage to his master rather than as something of substance that could help us to understand better Brentano’s own theory. What Brentano in fact took from Aristotle was rather his way of doing philosophy and certain isolated ideas, but certainly not theories in their entirety.(3)" (p. 121)

    (1) Cf. e.g. Brentano (1874/1924, 124f.); Brentano (1982, 26).

    (2) Cf. e.g. his frequently cited letter, in Brentano (1977, 291).

    (3) This is true even of Brentano’s early metaphysics, as developed in his Lectures on Metaphysics from 1867 (manuscript M 96). Cf. Chrudzimski (2004, ch. 3) and Chrudzimski and Smith (2004, 197-204).


    Brentano, F. 1874/1924. Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt vol. I. ed. by O. Kraus, Leipzig: Meiner [1st ed. 1874].

    —— 1891/1982. Deskriptive Psychologie, ed. by Roderick M. Chisholm and Wilhelm Baumgartner, Hamburg: Meiner.

    —— 1977. Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen. Hamburg: Meiner.

    Chrudzimski, A. 2004. Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Chrudzimski, A. and B. Smith. 2004. ‘Brentano’s Ontology: From Conceptualism to Reism’ in: D. Jacquette, (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 197–219.

  50. ———. 2015. "Intentional Objects and Mental Contents." Brentano Studien no. 13:81-119.

    Abstract: "In this paper I present a sketch of a theory of intentionality introducing special entities called intentional objects. Elaborated theories of this kind can be found in the works of Franz Brentano and Roman Ingarden. Nowadays those philosophers who are sympathetic to intentional objects are accused of planting an ontological jungle. All the problems of the theory of intentionality, it is claimed, can be resolved within the framework of a theory assuming a much more parsimonious ontology, like the theory of mental content proposed by the early Husserl or the so-called “adverbial” theory of intentionality. However, I show that the competitors of the the- ory of intentional objects face serious difficulties, the most important being that within their framework the relation between the representing entity (mental content or “adverbially specified” mental property of the subject) and the external target object has to be construed as primitive, while in the theory of intentional objects it can be easily defined. The consequence is that the partisans of mental contents and adverbialists are forced to re- quire a distinguished kind of epistemic access not only to the representing entity but also to this “representing relation”. This consequence, which is very seldom made explicit, seems indeed to be fatal. Intentional objects appear in this light not as products of an ontological extravagance but in- stead as entities that are indispensable, if we are to be able to explain the phenomenon of intentionality at all. Moreover, it turns out that we gain nothing if we introduce mental contents in addition to intentional objects. The approach to intentionality that I finally advocate postulates an external relation between a conscious subject and an intentional object, and is thus at bottom Brentanian."

  51. Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz, and Lukasiewicz, Dariusz, eds. 2006. Actions, Products, and Things: Brentano and Polish Philosophy. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

    Contents: Introduction 7; Dale Jacquette: Twardowski, Brentano's dilemma, and the content-object distinction 9; Maria van der Schaar: On the ambiguities of the term Judgement: an evaluation of Twardowski's distinction between action and product 35; Arianna Betti: The strange case of Savonarola and the painted fish: on the Bolzanization of Polish thought 55, Peter Simons: Things and truths: Brentano and Lesniewski, ontology and logic 83; Arkadiusz Chrudzimski: The young Lesniewski on existential propositions 107; Barry Smith: On the phases of Reism 107; Dariusz Lukasiewicz: Brentanian philosophy and Czezowski's conception of existence 183; Jan Wolenski: Brentanism and the rise of formal semantics 217; Notes on contributors 233; Index of names 235.

  52. Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz, and Smith, Barry. 2004. "Brentano’s ontology: from conceptualism to reism." In The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, edited by Jacquette, Dale, 197-220. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    "It is often claimed that the beginnings of Brentano’s ontology were Aristotelian in nature; but this claim is only partially true. Certainly the young Brentano adopted many elements of Aristotle’s metaphysics, and he was deeply influenced by the Aristotelian way of doing philosophy. But he always interpreted Aristotle’s ideas in his own fashion. He accepted them selectively, and he used them in the service of ends that would not have been welcomed by Aristotle himself. The present paper is an exposition of the development of Brentano’s ontology, beginning with the Lectures on Metaphysics first delivered by Brentano in Würzburg in 1867 and concluding with his late work from 1904-17." (p. 197)