Albertazzi, Liliana. 1996. "Material and Formal Ontology." In Formal Ontology, edited by Poli, Roberto and Simons, Peter M.,
199-232. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Ales Bello, Angela. 1981. "Le Problème De L'être Dans La Phénomenologie De Husserl." In The Great Chain of Being and Italian
Phenomenology, edited by Ales Bello, Angela, 41-50. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Ameriks, Karl. 1977. "Husserl's Realism." Philosophical Review no. 86:498-519.
Angelelli, Ignacio. 1989. "Husserl-Frege: Filosofia Del Numero." Analisis Filosofico no. 9:139-145.
After pointing out some of the coincidence between Frege and Husserl about the philosophy of numbers and paying less attention to the subject
of psychologism, in order to understand the differences between the authors, the analysis that each one made on the nature of number are described, showing the
most evident divergencies. Immediately afterwards, three objections are examined regarding Husserl's position and a crucial criticism is formulated against
Frege's method, related to the one discussed by Husserl. Lastly, it is assumed that it is possible to offer a method of analysis that gathers together the most
important aspects of both authors points of view and leaving out the most noticeable defects."
Aquila, Richard. 1974. "Husserl and Frege on Meaning." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 12:377-383.
Bachelard, Suzanne. 1968. A Study of Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University
Translation by Lester E. Embree from the original French edition: La logique de Husserl. Étude sur Logique formelle et
trascendentale, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1957.
Paperback edition 1989.
Balaban, Oded. 2002. "Epoché: Meaning, Object, and Existence in Husserl's Phenomenology." In Phenomenology World-Wide:
Foundations, Expanding Dynamisms, Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 103-114. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Banchetti-Robino, Marina. 1997. "Husserl's Theory of Language as Calculus Ratiocinator." Synthese no. 112:303-321.
Abstract: "This paper defends an interpretation of Husserl's theory of language, specifically as it appears in the Logical Investigations, as
an example of a larger body of theories dubbed `language as calculus'. Although this particular interpretation has been previously defended by other authors,
such as Hintikka and Kusch, this paper proposes to contribute to the discussion by arguing that what makes this interpretation plausible are Husserl's
distinction between the notions of meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment, his view that meaning is instantiated through meaning-intending acts of
transcendental consciousness, and his view that the content of meaning-intending acts is ideal meaning simpliciter. As well, the paper argues that the
phenomenological method of reduction itself presupposes the notion that reality as such can be reached by subtracting the influence of the language of the
natural attitude and its ontological commitments and it, thus, presupposes the conception of language as a reinterpretable calculus."
Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua. 1956. "Husserl's Conception of a Purely Logical Grammar." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no.
Reprinted in: Aspects of language. Essays and lectures on philosophy of language, linguistic philosophy and methodology of linguistics -
Jerusalem - The Magnes Press - The Hebrew University, 1970 pp. 89-97.
Reprinted also in: Jitendra Nath Mohanty - Readings on Husserl's Logical Investigations - The Hague - Martinus Nijhoff 1977 pp. 128-137.
Bégout, Bruce. 2000. La Généalogie De La Logique. Husserl, L'antéprédicatif Et Le Catégorial. Paris: Vrin.
Si le concept husserlien de passivité a fasciné toute une génération de philosophes (Merleau-Ponty, Landgrebe, Levinas, Henry), il a rarement
fait l'objet d'une étude qui adopte la perspective du fondateur de la phénoménologie. Husserl considère que la passivité appartient sans reste à la sphère de
la constitution et qu'elle consolide par conséquent son transcendantalisme. Loin d'être un domaine de sens irréductible à la rationalité, elle représente même
le fondement des opérations de la pensée catégoriale. C'est en son sein que doivent être cherchées les "sources" des formes supérieures de la logique. Toute
passive et préconsciente qu'elle soit, l'expérience antéprédicative appartient donc pour Husserl au sujet transcendantal.
Ce travail s'attache ainsi à montrer que la genèse du catégorial à partir de l'expérience passive entre dans le projet général de Husserl
d'asseoir la phénoménologie sur le socle originaire de l'expérience du monde."
———. 2001. "La Réverbération Logique: La Phénoménologie Des "Prolégomènes À La Logique Pure" De Husserl." Revue Philosophique de
Louvain no. 99:564-592.
Bell, David. 1989. "A Brentanian Philosophy of Arithmetics." Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung
The aim of this paper is to identify the main respects in which Husserl's early philosophy, and in particular his early writings on the
foundation of arithmetic, were influenced by Brentano's thought. It is claimed that the doctrinal, conceptual and methodological perspective within which
Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic is conceived and executed (but which remains very largely suppressed in Husserl's texts) is that which he
inherited, more or less without modification, from Brentano in the period to which Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, The Origin of our
Knowledge of Right and Wrong, and the lectures on Descriptive Psychology belong. That influence was extensive and profound enough to warrant
calling Husserl's philosophy of arithmetic 'Brentanian'."
———. 1991. Husserl. New York: Routledge.
Benoist, Jocelyn. 1995. "La Découverte De L'a Priori Synthétique Matériel: Au-Delà Du "Quelque Chose", Le Tout Et Les Parties (Recherches
Logiques Iii)." Recherches Husserliennes no. 3:3-22.
———. 1996. "Les Recherches Logiques De Husserl: Le Catégorial, Entre Grammaire Et Intuition." In Phénomenologie Et Logique,
edited by Courtine, Jean-François, 33-63. Paris: Presses de l'École normale supérieure.
———. 1997. "De Kant À Bolzano: Husserl Et L'analyticité." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale no. 100:217-238.
In his Logical Investigations, Husserl uses a concept of "analyticity" that seems quite different from the Kantian one. Analyticity
is defined as formal and by the possibility of regular variations, so as in mathematical equations which determine relations between variables. In that matter,
Husserl is influenced by Bolzano and is much deeply connected with the Austrian tradition of logical studies than with the transcendental tradition of the
German Idealism. But he deals also with the problem that Bolzano left unsolved: if analyticity in the "strict" sense means the logical rule, what does
———. 1997. Phénoménologie, Sémantique, Ontologie. Husserl Et La Tradition Logique Autrichienne. Paris: Presses Universitaires de
———. 1998. "Qu'est-Ce Qu'un Jugement? Brentano, Frege, Husserl." Études Phénomenologiques no. 14 (27-28):169-192.
———. 1999. "Y a-T-Il Une "Logique De L'expérience"? Remarques Sur Le Contrat Phénoménologique Dans Les Recherches Logiques." Recherches Husserliennes no. 12:47-76.
———. 2000. "Husserl Entre Brentano Et Bolzano: Jugement Et Proposition." Manuscrito no. 23:11-39.
———. 2001. Intentionnalité Et Langage Dans Les "Recherches Logiques" De Husserl. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
———. 2002. "Husserl and Bolzano." In Phenomenology World-Wide: Foundations, Expanding Dynamisms, Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research
and Study, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 98-100. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 2002. "The Question of Grammar in Logical Investigations, with Special Reference to Brentano, Marty, Bolzano and Later
Developments in Logic." In Phenomenology World-Wide. Foundations -- Expanding Dynamics -- Life-Engagements, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 94-98.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Benoist, Jocelyn, and Courtine, Jean-François, eds. 2003. Husserl. La Représentation Vide Suivi De Les Recherches Logiques, Une œuvre De
Percée. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Bergmann, Gustav. 1960. "The Ontology of Edmund Husserl." Methodos:359-392.
Bernet, Rudolf. 1981. "Logik Und Phenomenologie in Husserls Lehre Von Der Warheit." Tijdschrift voor Filosofie no. 43:35-89.
———. 1990. "Husserl and Heidegger on Intentionality and Being." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no. 21:136-152.
———. 2002. "Different Concepts of Logic and Their Relation to Subjectivity." In One Hundred Years of Phenomenology: Husserl's Logical
Investigations Revisited, edited by Zahavi, Dan and Stjernfelt, Frederik, 19-29. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Bernet, Rudolf, Kern, Iso, and Marbach, Eduard. 1993. An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology.
Original German edition: Edmund Husserl: Darstellung seines Denkens - Hambyrg, Felix Meiner, 1989.
Bernet, Rudolf, Welton, Donn, and Zavota, Gina, eds. 2005. Edmund Husserl. Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers. New York:
Five volumes: 1. Circumspections: classic Essays on Husserl's phenomenology; 2. The cutting edge: phenomenological method, philosophical
logic, ontology, and philosophy of science; 3. The nexus pf phenomena: intentionality, perception, and temporality; 4. The web of meaning: language, noema, and
subjectivity and intersubjectivity; 5. Horizons: life-world, ethnics, history, and metaphysics.
Beyer, Christian. 1996. Von Bolzano Zu Husserl: Eine Untersuchung Über Den Ursprung Der Phänomenologischen Bedeutungslehre.
———. 2004. "Bolzano and Husserl on Singular Existential Statements." In Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central European
Philosophy, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 69-88. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Blecksmith, Richard, and Null, Gilbert T. 1990. "Matrix Representation of Husserl's Part-Whole-Foundation Theory." Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic no. 32:87-111.
This paper pursues two aims, a general one and a more specific one. The general aim is to introduce and illustrate the use of Boolean
matrices in representing the logical properties of one- and (mainly) two-place predicates over small finite universes, and hence of providing matrix
characterizations of finite models for sets of axioms containing such predicates.
This method is treated only to the extent required to pursue the more specific aim, which is to consider axiomatic systems involving the
part-whole relation together with a relation of foundation employed by Husserl."
Bosio, Franco. 1966. Fondazione Della Logica in Husserl. Milano: Lampugnani Nigri.
Bostar, Leo. 1994. "Reading Ingarden Read Husserl: Metaphysics, Ontology, and Phenomenological Method." Husserl Studies no.
Brisart, Robert. 2002. "Husserl Et Bolzano: Le Lien Sémantique." Recherches Husserliennes no. 18:3-29.
———. 2002. "La Logique De Husserl En 1900 À L'épreuve Marbourgeois: La Recension De Natorp." Phänomenologische
———, ed. 2002. Husserl-Frege. Les Ambiguïtés De L'antipsychologisme. Paris: Vrin.
Chacune des études rasssemblées ici se propose de jeter sur les rapports de Husserl et de Frege un regard neuf et surtout exempt des nombreux
préjugés qui, jusqu'ici, ont detérminé les diverses «lectures frégéennes de la phénoménologie». En pointant les différences profondes qui, sous le couvert de
quelques similitudes de surface, ont en fait, et de très bonne heure, orienté les deux philosophes sur des voies radicalement opposées, ce recueil permet de se
faire une idée plus claire de ce que fut en réalité l'antipsychologisme de Husserl dans tout ce qui le sépare de la version logiciste que lui a donné Frege. De
cette manière, il concours également à apporter quelques éclairages nouveaux sur la question des origines de la philosophie contemporaine."
Brown, Charles S. 1991. "Problems with the Fregean Interpretation of Husserl." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no.
Bruzina, Richard. 2004. Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink. Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology, 1928-1938. New Haven: Yale University
Bucci, Paolo. 2000. Husserl E Bolzano. Alle Origini Della Fenomenologia. Milano: Edizioni Unicopli.
Buonazia, Sabrina. 1996. "Per Una Formalizzazione Della Teoria Husserliana Dell'intero E Della Parte." Rivista di Filosofia no.
Bussotti, Paolo. 1997. "Alcune Note Sulla Gnoseologia Husserliana Della "Philosophie Der Arithmetik", Con Particolare Riferimento Al Concetto
Di Numero." Teoria no. 17:119-133.
Cairns, Dorion. 1973. Guide for Translating Husserl. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
———. 1976. Conversations with Husserl and Fink. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
———. 2002. "The Fundamental Philosophical Significance of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen." Husserl Studies no.
Caputo, Anselmo. 2000. "Gli "Studi Psicologici Per Una Logica Elementare" Di Husserl." Aquinas no. 43:31-62.
Carvalho, Vargas Carlos Eduardo de. 2007. A Teoria Das Multiplicidades (Mannigfaltigkeitslehre) Na Lógica Pura Dos Prolegômenos Às
Investigações Lógicas De Edmund Husserl.
This research aims to explain the Theory of Manifolds (Mannigfaltigkeitslehre) since its mathematical genesis until its meaning in the pure
logic (reine Logik) as theory of science (Wissenschaftslehre), reaching its philosophical consequences relating to phenomenology. The manifold
(Mannigfaltigkeiten) are analysed in the Husserl's development on the view of the elements of the philosophical theory described in the Prolegomena to Pure
Logic (Prolegomena zur reinen Logik), first volume of the Logical Investigations (Logische Untersuchungen). After a description of the psychologism's
problematic on the debate about objectivity in the fields of logics, mathematics and general knowledge, the work presents the division of the issues concerneds
to the theory of manifolds considering the categories of meaning and objects investigateds by logics, mathematicians and philosophers. "
Casadio, Claudia. 1990. "Husserl E Il Pradigma Mereologico." Lingua e Stile no. 25:405-423.
Casari, Ettore. 2005. "On Husserl's Theory of Wholes and Parts." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 21:1-43.
The strongly innovative theory of whole-parts relations outlined by Husserl in his Third logical Investigation-to which he
attributed a basic value for his entire phenomenology-has recently attracted a renewed interest. Although many important issues have been clarified (especially
by Kit Fine) the subject seems still worth being revisited. To this aim Husserlian universes are introduced. These are lower bounded distributive
lattices endowed with a unary operation of defect and a binary relation of isogeneity. Husserl"s contents are identified with nonzero
elements of a Husserlian universe and the dependence relations among contents are defined and studied starting from the idea that the defect
of x is what x needs in order to "exist" i.e., in order to be "closed" with respect to the closure operation defined as the sup of x
and its defect. It turns out that there are (at least) eight dependence relations which are worth to be considered. Many other questions concerning the world
of contents (among them the proofs of the famous Husserl"s Satze) may now be discussed and clarified. Then the theory of species and genera is
developed. Ultimate species (for short: species) are identified with equivalence classes of contents modulo isogeneity, and species in
general (for short: genera) are identified with arbitrary unions of species. On the basis of the relation obtaining among two contents when
they are isogeneous to two contents the first of which is a part of the second it becomes possible to develop a rather satisfying interpretation of Husserl"s
theory of the dependencies among species and genera and of the material a priori laws. By strengthening the notion of Husserlian universe into the
notion of rigid Husserlian universe, the theory of species and genera obtains a stronger version. Three models of the theory are exhibited. The first
one, suggested by combinatorial-topological considerations, identifies contents with finite non-empty sets of natural numbers ; the second one identifies
contents with non-empty sets of formulas of a formal language; the third one (not totally "rigid") identifies contents with positive integers."
Cavallin, Jens. 1997. Content and Object. Husserl, Twardowski and Psychologism. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
See in particular: Chapter 3. Husserl and Twardowski: a philosophical encounter pp. 21-42
Appendix I: References to Twardowski in Husserl's published works 241
Appendix III: Kazimierz Twardowski's Nachlass 243-248.
Celis, Raphael. 1996. "Le Problème De La Mathématisation Du Savoir Dans L'œuvre Tardive De Husserl." Revue de Théologie et de
Philosophie no. 128:1-24.
The distinction established by Husserl in 1913 between formal and material ontology constitutes the theoretical basis needed in phenomenology
to mathematize knowledge, and physics in particular. In "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology", this distinction appears as a
subwork in the sections concerned with Galileo and the birth of modern physics. Through its reformulation. Husserl tried to imagine the foundational range of
an eidetic interpretation of nature as entrenched in the "Lebenswelt"."
Centrone, Stefania. 2009. Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics in the Early Husserl. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Cobb-Stevens, Richard. 1990. Husserl and Analytic Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 1994. "The Beginnings of Phenomenology: Husserl and His Predecessors." In Routledge History of Philosophy. Volume Viii:
Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy, edited by Kearney, Richard, 5-37. New York: Routledge.
———. 1998. "Two Stages in Husserl's Critique of Brentano's Theory of Judgment." Études Phénomenologiques no. 14 (27-28):193-212.
———. 2002. ""Aristotelian" Themes in Husserl's Logical Investigations." In One Hundred Years of Phenomenology: Husserl's Logical
Investigations Revisited, edited by Zahavi, Dan and Stjernfelt, Frederik, 79-92. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Cortois, Paul. 1996. "From Apophantics to Manifolds: The Structure of Husserl's Formal Logic." Philosophia Scientiae no.
A global picture of Husserl's architectonic view of the structure of formal science (including formal mathematics) is offered, as the view
got its fullest (yet elliptic) articulation in the first three chapters of Formale und transzendentale Logik (1929). It is shown how Husserl's
understanding of the structure of formal science (abstracting from the latter's subjective foundation) requires the independent consideration of at least three
dimensions with respect to the formal, in terms, respectively, of 'approaches', epistemic 'interests', and 'successive layers'. First, there is the dimension
of apophantic versus ontological approaches; second, the distinction of combinatorial (syntactic) versus truth (semantic) interest; and third, the
consideration of the three layers of pure grammar, derivability relations, and systems or manifold theory. Moreover, it is shown how, in Husserl's view, the
virtual identity of apophantic and ontological approaches on the top layer (deductive systems and/or manifolds) is supposed to give a kind of technical (if not
philosophical) warrant for the unity of formal science."
Courtine, Jean-François. 1996. "L'objet De La Logique." In Phénomenologie Et Logique, edited by Courtine, Jean-François, 9-31.
Paris: Presses de l'Ecole normale supérieure.
———, ed. 1996. Phénomenologie Et Logique. Paris: Presses de l'Ecole Normale Supérieure.
Crosson, Frederick James. 1962. "Formal Logic and Formal Ontology in Husserl's Phenomenology." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
Cunningham, Suzanne. 1976. Language and the Phenomenological Reductions of Edmund Husserl. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Da Silva, Jairo José. 1999. "Husserl Conception of Logic." Manuscrito no. 22:367-397.
This paper presents and discusses Husserl's conception of logic, formal logic in particular. A special emphasis is giving to Husserl's idea
of a theory of manifolds as the closure of the thematic field of formal logic. Husserl's own version of logicism in the philosophy of mathematics is also
presented and some aspects of his conception of formal logic are highlighted and contrasted with Frege's."
———. 2000. "Husserl's Two Notions of Completeness. Husserl and Hilbert on Completeness and Imaginary Elements in Mathematics." Synthese no. 125:417-438.
In this paper I discuss Husserl's solution of the problem of imaginary elements in mathematics as presented in the drafts for two lectures he
gave in Gottingen in 1901 and other related texts of the same period, a problem that had occupied Husserl since the beginning of 1890, when he was planning a
never published sequel to "Philosophie der Arithmetik" (1891).
In order to solve the problem of imaginary entities Husserl introduced, independently of Hilbert, two notions of completeness (definiteness
in Husserl's terminology) for a formal axiomatic system. I present and discuss these notions here, establishing also parallels between Husserl's and Hilbert's
notions of completeness."
Dahlstrom, Daniel O., ed. 2003. Husserl's Logical Investigations. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
De Oliveira, Nythamar Fernandes. 2000. "Husserl's Phenomenology of Meaning in the "Logical Investigations"." Veritas no.
This article seeks to show that, although emerging out of a so-called traditional, metaphysical view of language, Edmund Husserl's theory of
meaning qua ideal species in the "Logical Investigations" cannot be reduced to the linguistic expression of an essentialist, representational adequation, but
rather emphasizes the role of intentionality, the ideality of language, and the constitutive character of consciousness in the fulfillment of "meaning"
Dougherty, Charles J. 1979. "The Significance of Husserl's Logical Investigations." Philosophy Today no. 23:217-225.
The purpose of this paper is to explore Husserl's critique of psychologism and his positive theory of mind against both its historical
background and the developments that issued from it. The conclusion of the paper is the claim that Husserl's rejection of psychologism led him to ground logic
in a realm of ideal relationships made available by way of a new method of non-reductive analysis, phenomenology. Phenomenological analysis itself is shown to
be a methodological expression of a theory of mind as an active participant in the constitution of reality."
Dreyfus, Hubert L., ed. 1982. Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Drummond, John J. 1991. "Willard and Husserl on Logical Form." In Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences, edited by Seebohm, Thomas,
Føllesdal, Dagfinn and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
———. 1998. "From Intentionality to Intensionality and Back." Études Phénomenologiques no. 27-28:89-126.
———. 2002. "The Logical Investigations: Paving the Way to a Transcendental Logic." In One Hundred Years of Phenomenology:
Husserl's Logical Investigations Revisited, edited by Zahavi, Dan and Stjernfelt, Frederik, 31-40. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 2007. Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy. Lanham: Scarecrow Press.
Ducat, Philippe. 1996. "Que Veut La "Grammaire Purement Logique" De Husserl?" In Phénomenologie Et Logique, edited by Courtine,
Jean-François, 65-81. Paris: Presses de l'École normale supérieure.
Dufourcq, Annabelle. 2011. La Dimension Imaginaire Du Réel Dans La Philosophie De Husserl. Dordrecht: Springer.
Dupré, Louis. 1964. "The Concept of Truth in Husserl's Logical Investigations." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
It is stated that Husserl's theory of truth is ambiguous. when Husserl attacked psychological interpretations of truth, a logicism seemed to
be predominant; later he inclined toward intuitionism, where truth is constituted by the real presence of the object. Purely logical relations in an eternal
order of truth, independent of things, seems to conflict with the idea of evidence, which is a psychological experience. It is concluded that truth is the
result of an intuition in which the thing itself is given. Finally, parallels are drawn between Husserl's double truth and Leibniz's truths of reason and
truths of fact."
Edie, James M. 1987. Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology. A Critical Commentary. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Eley, Lothar. 1969. Metatrik Der Formalen Logik. Sinnliche Gewissheit Als Horizont Der Aussagenlogik Und Elementaren
Prädikatenlogik. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Elliston, Frederick A., and McCormick, Peter, eds. 1977. Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Elveton, Roy O., ed. 1970. The Phenomenology of Husserl. Selected Critical Readings. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
Second edition with a new introduction: Seattle, Noesis Press, 2000.
English, Jacques. 1996. "Husserl Et Hilbert: La Phénoménologie Est-Elle Axiomatisable?" In Phénomenologie Et Logique, edited by
Courtine, Jean-François, 83-107. Paris: Presses de l'École normale supérieure.
———. 1998. "Pourquoi Et Comment Husserl En Est Venu À Critiquer Brentano." Études Phénomenologiques no. 14 (27-28):51-88.
———. 2002. Le Vocabulaire De Husserl. Paris: Ellipses.
Farber, Marvin. 1943. The Foundations of Phenomenology. Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Reprinted with a new introduction, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1968.
Reprint of the 1968 edition: Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2006.
Fine, Kit. 1995. "Part-Whole." In The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, edited by Smith, Barry and Smith, David Woodruff, 463-485.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fink, Eugen. 1995. Sixth Cartesian Meditation. The Idea of a Transcendental Method. Boomington: Indian University Press.
With textual notations by Edmund Husserl.
Translated with an introduction by Ronald Bruzina.
Fisette, Denis. 1994. Lecture Frégéenne De La Phénoménologie. Combas: Éclat.
———, ed. 2003. Husserl's Logical Investigations Reconsidered. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Fisette, Denis, and Lapointe, Sandra, eds. 2003. Aux Origines De La Phénoménologie. Husserl Et Le Contexte Des Recherches Logiques.
Douze étude ont été réunies dans ce volume afin de souligner le centenaire de la publication de l'ouvrage séminal de la phénoménologie.
Fidèles à la vocation que lui assigne le père de la phénoménologie d'être une œuvre de percée, ces études ouvrent de nouvelles perspectives sur ce monumental
Grundwerk. Elles se penchent sur les différents aspects des Recherches logiques en portant une attention particulière à son contexte
historique, à ses sources (bolzaniennes et brentaniennes) dans la philosophie du XIXe siècle et à sa réception, du Cercle de Munich jusque dans la philosophie
Flores, Luis. 2002. "Husserl's Concept of Pure Logical Grammar." In Phenomenology World-Wide: Foundations, Expanding Dynamisms,
Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 100-103. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Føllesdal, Dagfinn. 1972. "An Introduction to Phenomenology for Analytic Philosophers." In Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia,
edited by Paul, Anthony, Olson, Raymond and Wright, Georg Henrik von, 417-429. Baltimore, London: The John Hopkins Press.
Phenomenology is a science of noemata.
An object, for Husserl, is anything toward which an act can be directed. Not all objects are material; there are also immaterial objects, for
example, numbers and the other ideal objects of mathematics.
Mathematics and all natural sciences, including psychology, are sciences about the objects of our acts. But we have just noticed that in
addition to possibly having an object, every act also has a noema. And what Husserl wanted to create with his phenomenology was a new science, a science of
Noemata are objects, too. In an act of reflection the noema of one act can be made the object of another act.
Mathematicians and scientists explore what we experience, the world of nature around us. In the phenomenological reduction we disregard this
nature, this world of objects toward which our acts are directed. We do not deny that it is there, as if we were sophists, nor do we doubt that it is there, as
if we were sceptics, but we, as it were, put it in brackets. We perform an epoché, Husserl said, borrowing a word which the skeptics of antiquity used to
denote abstinence from any judgment.
The phenomenologist does not worry about what is or is not in the real world around him. He is not disturbed by the fact that some of our
acts have objects, others not, but turns to the noemata of our acts. These are the phenomena he considers. The real world is reduced to a correlative of our
acts, which constitute it, bring it forth. All that is transcendent is put in brackets together with the other objects of our acts. What is left, purified of
all that is transcendent, Husserl called transcendental. The phenomenological reduction hence leads us from the transcendent to the transcendental.
The phenomenologist analyzes the noemata of his acts in order to clarify how the world is 'constituted' by his consciousness. He observes
that he expects a tree to have a back, to continue to be there if he turns away from it for a moment, and so forth. He studies the structure of the noemata of
his acts. He elucidates how his expectations are arranged in patterns, how new sense impressions can change his expectations and sometimes lead to an
'explosion' of the noemata and make him reject his original supposition about the direction of his act. According to Husserl, phenomenology thereby becomes an
analysis of something similar to what Kant called the a priori. If one were to describe phenomenology in brief, it would therefore be this: an investigation of
the a priori, the necessary. Its aim is similar to that of many other philosophies from antiquity onward. But its methods, and the general framework of acts,
noemata, and objects within which it tries to make sense of this aim, are different.
It is also not difficult to see the close connection between analytic philosophy and phenomenology here. For just as analytic philosophers,
especially those of the so-called linguistic variety, analyze meaning, meanings of linguistic expressions, so the phenomenologist analyzes noemata, or meanings
of acts in general."
———. 1976. "Husserl's Notion of Noema." Journal of Philosophy no. 20:680-687.
Reprinted in: Hunert Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (eds.) - Husserl. Intentionality and cognitive science - Cambridge, The MIT Press,
1982, pp. 73-80
———. 1991. "The Justification of Logic and Mathematics in Husserl's Phenomenology." In Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences, edited
by Seebohm, Thomas, Føllesdal, Dagfinn and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, 25-34. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
The problem of justifying our beliefs, giving evidence for them, is central in Husserl's phenomenology. In his writings he comes back again
and again to the notions of justification and evidence.
Husserl is particularly interested in perfect evidence, of which he distinguishes two kinds: adequate evidence, which we have when
all our anticipations are filled, and apodictic evidence, which we have when the negation of our judgment is self-contradictory. This emphasis on apodictic and
adequate evidence, together with Husserl's concern with philosophy as a strict science and with the possibility of establishing absolutely certain and obvious
first premisses, might give us the impression that Husserl was a foundationalist: he wanted to establish a firm foundation for science and philosophy of the
kind that Aristotle, Descartes, and many others have been striving for.
However, in this paper I shall argue that in spite of appearances, Husserl was not a foundationalist. He was not even a foundationalist in
logic and mathematics,- the classical strongholds of foundationalism; on the contrary he was close to the position that was later put forward by Nelson Goodman
and some other "holists". (p. 25)
———. 1994. "Husserl and Frege. A Contribution to Elucidating the Origins of Phenomenological Philosophy." In Mind, Meaning, and
Mathematics. Essays on the Philosophical Views of Husserl and Frege, edited by Haaparanta, Leila, 3-47. Kluwer: Dordrecht.
Translated from German by Claire Ortiz Hill.
Original edition: Husserl und Frege. Ein Beitrag zur Beleuchtung der Entstehung der phänomenologischen Philosophie - Oslo, I
kommisjon hos Aschehoug, 1958.
———. 1995. "Gödel and Husserl." In From Dedekind to Gödel, edited by Hintikka, Jaakko, 427-446. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 1998. "La Notion D'objet Intentionnel Chez Husserl." In Jaakko Hintikka: Questions De Logique Et De Phénoménologie, edited by
Rigal, Élisabeth, 223-233. Paris: Vrin.
———. 2001. "Bolzano, Frege and Husserl on Reference and Object." In Future Pasts. The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth Century
Philosophy, edited by Floyd, Juliet and Shieh, Sanford, 67-80. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2004. "Husserl and the Categories." In Categories: Historical and Systematic Essays, edited by Gorman, Michael. Washington:
Catholic University. of America Press.
Gardies, Jean-Louis. 1985. Rational Grammar. München: Philosophia Verlag.
Translated from the original French: Ésquisse d'une grammaire pure - Paris, Vrin, 1975 by Kevin Mulligan.
"This enlarged version of a book which originally appeared in French in 1975 provides an introduction to the project of a rational grammar,
as it was sketched out by Husserl and partially developed by Ajdukiewicz. Besides investigating the nature of grammaticality, the distinction between logic and
grammar and the relation of grammatical structure to the communicative functions of language, the author analyzes a large number of grammatical phenomena
(names, verbs, conjunctions, adverbs, mood, tense, aspect, etc.)."
Ginev, Dimitri. 1992. "Fundamental Ontology and Regional Ontology of Humanities." Epistemologia no. 15:87-100.
Gobber, Giovanni. 1985. "Alle Origini Della Grammatica Categoriale. Husserl, Leśniewski, Ajdukiewicz." Rivista di Filosofia
Neo-Scolastica no. 77:258-295.
Haaparanta, Leila. 1988. "Analysis as the Method of Logical Discovery: Some Remarks on Frege and Husserl." Synthese no.
This paper attempts to study the methods which Frege and Husserl followed in their logics. Frege regards the problem of discovering logical
laws as a psychological problem but takes the interest in the method of discovering the logical language to belong to logic. Husserl does not intend to
construct a new language but he seeks for the epistemological justification of Aristotelian logic. It is shown how Husserl proceeds in his studies of the
origins of logic. It is concluded that both Frege and Husserl rely on the method of analysis but they use it for different purposes in their logical
———, ed. 1994. Mind, Meaning, and Mathematics. Essays on the Philosophical Views of Husserl and Frege. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 1998. "L'analyse Comme Méthode De Justification: Quelques Remarques Sur Les Études Logiques De Husserl." In Jaakko Hintikka:
Questions De Logique Et De Phénoménologie, 234-246. Paris: Vrin.
———. 2006. "Husserl's Argument against Naturalism and His Own Foundation of Pure Philosophy." In Foundations of the Formal Sciences Iv.
The History of the Concept of the Formal Sciences, edited by Löwe, Benedikt, Peckhaus, Volker and Rasch, Thomas, 69-79. London: College Publications.
Hamacher, Hermes Adelheid. 1992. "Debate between Husserl and Voigt Concerning the Logic of Content and Extensional Logic." Analecta
Husserliana no. 34.
Hanna, Robert. 1984. "The Relation of Form and Stuff in Husserl's Grammar of Pure Logic." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
———. 1993. "Logical Cognition: Husserl's "Prolegomena" and the Truth in Psychologism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no.
Frege's devastating attack on logical psychologism leaves philosophers of logic in a quandary: If logical propositions exist altogether
independently of human acts of thinking, then "how" can they be grasped by thinkers? Husserl's "Prolegomena to Pure Logic" contains a thorough critique of
psychologism, but manages to avoid Frege's problem by developing a plausible theory of logical cognition. Husserl's account entails that a) logical
propositions are essentially knowable by finite rational minds, but also b) those propositions are irreducible to individual human minds. Hence Husserl shows
that there can be a weak form of psychologism that is perfectly consistent with anti-psychologism."
Hart, James G. 2004. "Edmund Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. Lectures on Transcendental Logic." Husserl Studies no. 20:135-159.
Harvey, Charles W., and Shelton, Jim D. 1992. "Husserl's Phenomenology and the Ontology of the Natural Sciences." In Phenomenology of
Natural Science, edited by Hardy, Lee and Embree, Lester. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Heffernan, George. 1983. Bedeutung Und Evidenz Bei Edmund Husserl. Bonn: Bouvier.
Das Verhältnis zwischen der Bedeutungs- und der Evidenztheorie in den "Logischen Untersuchungen" und der "Formalen und transzendentalen
Logik" : ein Vergleich anhand der Identitätsproblematik
———. 1989. Isagoge in Die Phänomenologische Apophantik. Eine Einführung in Die Phänomenologische Urteilslogik Durch Die Auslegung Des
Textes Der Formalen Und Transzendentalen Logik Von Edmund Husserl. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
———. 1989. "In the Beginning Was the "Logos": Hermeneutical Remarks on the Starting-Point of Edmund Husserl's "Formal and Transcendental
Logic"." Man and World no. 22:185-213.
According to the leading commentators and the author himself, Edmund Husserl's "Formal and transcendental logic" is the most important work
on phenomenological logic ever written. Nonetheless, it has, in general, gained far less attention than the "Logical investigations" and the "Ideas on a pure
phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy". In particular, the argument of section 1 of the "Logic", namely, that it is fruitful to start with the meanings
of the expression "Logos" in order to develop a genuinely transcendental logic, has received virtually no consideration. This paper takes a step towards
filling this empty space by analyzing and criticizing the argument of section 1 as a problem to which (a) solution(s) must be found. Throughout, the paper
reads Husserl's "descriptions" as 'arguments' for his positions, thereby avoiding any of the obscurity sometimes infecting work in continental philosophy."
———. 1989. Am Anfang War Die Logik. Hermeneutische Abhandlungen Zum Ansatz Der Formalen Und Transzendentalen Logik Von Edmund
Husserl. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
———. 1998. "Miscellaneous Lucubrations on Husserl's Answer to the Question "Was Die Evidenz Sei": A Contribution to the Phenomenology of
Evidence on the Occasione of the Publication of Husserliana Volume Xxx." Husserl Studies no. 15:1-75.
———. 2002. "Language, Logic, and Logocentrism in Transcendental Phenomenology: Critical Reflections on the Sprachvergessenheit of
the Later Husserl." New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy no. 2:205-247.
Hill, Claire Ortiz. 1991. Word and Object in Husserl, Frege, and Russell. The Roots of Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Athens, Ohio:
Ohio University Press.
Contents: Abbreviations IX; Preliminary terminological comments XI; Glossary XIII; Acknowledgments XIV; Introduction 1.
Part One: Logic, realism and the foundations of arithmetic
1. The argument that Frege influenced Husserl 7; 2. Husserl, Frege, and psychologism 13; 3. Sense, meaning, and noema; 4. Husserl's 1891
critique of Frege 43; 5. Frege's review and the development of Husserl's thought 57; Conclusion: analyticity 91.
Part Two: Conceptual clarity
Introduction 99; 6. Intensions and extensions 103; 7. Presentation and ideas 125; 8. Function and concept 137; 9. On denoting 147;
Conclusion: The way things are 163; Notes 175; Bibliography 191; Index 215.
From the Introduction: "As a book by the founder of phenomenology that examines Frege's ideas from Brentano's empirical standpoint, Husserl's
Philosophy of Arithmetic is both an early work of phenomenology and of logical empiricism. In it Husserl predicted the failure of Frege's attempt to
logicize arithmetic and to mathematize logic two years before the publication of the Basic Laws of Arithmetic in 1893. I hope to show that Husserl did
so in terms that would prefigure both the account Frege would give of his error after Russell encountered the paradoxes ten years later and the discussions of
Principia Mathematica. Moreover, in locating the source of Frege's difficulties in the ambiguous theory of identity, meaning, and denotation that
forms the basis of Frege's logical project and generates Russell's contradictions, Husserl's discussions indicate that these contradictions may have as serious
consequences for twentieth century philosophy of language as they have had for the philosophy of mathematics.
This book is about these Austro-German roots of twentieth century philosophy. It is mainly about the origins of analytic philosophy, about
the transmission of Frege's thought to the English speaking world, and about the relevance of Husserl's early criticism of Frege's Foundations of
Arithmetic to some contemporary issues in philosophy. It is more about Husserl the philosopher of logic and mathematics than it is about Husserl the
phenomenologist, and it is principally addressed to those members of the philosophical community who, via Russell, have been affected by Frege's logic.
This makes it very different from work on Husserl and Frege that has focused on the importance of Frege's criticism of Husserl's
Philosophy of Arithmetic and attendant issues. The goal of this book is quite the opposite. It studies the shortcomings in Frege's thought that
Husserl flagged and Russell endeavored to overcome. One possible sequel to this book would be a thorough study of Husserl's successes and failures in remedying
the philosophical ills he perceived all about him, but that goes beyond the scope of this work, which follows the issues discussed into the work of Russell and
his successors." (pp. 3-4)
———. 1994. "Frege's Attack on Husserl and Cantor." Monist no. 77:345-357.
———. 1997. "Did Georg Cantor Influence Edmund Husserl?"Synthese no. 113:145-170.
Few have entertained the idea that Georg Cantor, the creator of set theory, might have influenced Edmund Husserl, the founder of the
phenomenological movement. Yet an exchange of ideas took place between them when Cantor was at the height of his creative powers and Husserl in the throes of
an intellectual struggle during which his ideas were particularly malleable and changed considerably and definitively. Here their writings are examined to show
how Husserl's and Cantor's ideas overlapped and crisscrossed in the areas of philosophy and mathematics, arithmetization, abstraction, consciousness and pure
logic, psychologism, metaphysical idealism, new numbers, and sets and manifolds."
———. 2002. "On Husserl's Mathematical Apprenticeship and Philosophy of Mathematics." In Phenomenology World-Wide: Foundations, Expanding
Dynamisms, Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 74-94. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Hill, Claire Ortiz, and Da Silva, Jairo José. 2013. The Road Not Taken. On Husserl's Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics. London:
Hill, Claire Ortiz, and Rosado Haddock, Guillermo. 2000. Husserl or Frege? Meaning, Objectivity, and Mathematics. Chicago: Open
Hintikka, Jaakko. 1996. "Husserl: La Dimension Phénoménologique." Les Études Philosophiques:481-496.
———. 1998. "L'idée De Phénoménologie Chez Wittgenstein Et Husserl." In Jaakko Hintikka: Questions De Logique Et De Phénoménologie,
edited by Rigal, Élisabeth. Paris: Vrin.
———. 2003. "The Notion of Intuition in Husserl." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 57:169-192.
Hopkins, Burt C. 1993. Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger. The Problem of Original Method and Phenomenon of Phenomenology.
———, ed. 1997. Husserl in Contemporary Context: Prospects and Projects for Phenomenology. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 2011. The Philosophy of Husserl. Durham: Acumen.
———. 2011. The Origin of the Logic of Symbolic Mathematics: Edmund Husserl and Jacob Klein. Bloomington: Indiana University
Huemer, Wolfgang. 2004. "Husserl's Critique of Psychologism and His Relation to the Brentano School." In Phenomenology and Analysis.
Essays on Central European Philosophy, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 199-214. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.