Ales Bello, Angela. 2004. "The Controversy about the Existence of the World in Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological School: A. Reinach, R.
Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, E. Stein." In Does the World Exist? Plurisignificant Ciphering of Reality, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa,
97-116. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 79.
"The aim of the essay consists in analyzing one of the most important points of discussion among some of Husserl's disciples: A.
Reinach, R. Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, E. Stein, that is the existence of the world and the way to prove it. The research leads to two consequences: to
pinpoint Husserl's particular and original interpretation regarding "existence" that concludes to the acceptance of it and the difference between his
transcendental phenomenology and that one sustained by his disciples that can be called a realistic phenomenology. In this contest E. Stein assumed a peculiar
position that to some extend combines the two attitudes."
"The above outline sought to show very briefly how the discussion about the existence of the world came into being within the
phenomenological school. We noted that Husserl's cited disciples are convinced that, as far as the maestro is concerned, the world - understood as external
reality that comprises ourselves as human beings - does exist. but doubt that he succeeded in justifying this view moving from his theoretical assumptions.
Nevertheless, the objections are more or less mellow and indistinct and all of them are made within the school, that is to say. within a common style of
The great common terrain is constituted by essential analysis, which nobody wants to do without. but precisely because the philosophical
tradition regards the theme of the essence as related to that of existence, there arises the fear that this latter aspect might he pushed into the background.
Furthermore, because for Husserl essential analysis concentrates on subjectivity and opens the road to the transcendental perspective, what is feared is
becoming enclosed in subjectivity and concentrating all of reality in it. as in the great lesson of German idealism.
As can be seen. I have endeavored to defend Flossed against his own disciples, trying to delve into his profound intentions, re-balancing -
wherever this proves possible - the results of his analysis. comforted in this by the observations of Edith Stein, who was probably closest to the maestro and
therefore managed to grasp the principal lines of his position more accurately. The theoretical core always remains the relationship between idealism and
realism. with respect to which Husserl's attitude, at least in my opinion, is very balanced, notwithstanding its peculiarity. On the other hand, it is quite
readily understandable that his disciples should have committed the "great parricide," to use the expression that Plato used in connection with
Parmenides: it may well he that without it one does not achieve theoretical autonomy. All the same, one also has to hear in mind a saying that once again
involves Plato: amicus Plato. sell magis amica veritas. which should help us understand the intentions of the other before we raise objections."
Bartoszynski, Kazimierz. 1989. "The Ontology of Objects in Ingarden's Aesthetics." In Man within His Life-World: Contributions
to Phenomenology by Scholars from East-Central Europe, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 369-383. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 27.
Blaszczyk, Piotr. 2005. "On the Mode of Existence of Real Numbers." In Logos of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of the Logos,
Book 1, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 137-155. Dordrecht: Springer.
Analaecta Husserliana. Volume 88.
"Ingarden's ontology is an ontology of an object. An object, as conceived by Ingarden, is, first of all, something which is a unity of
matter (referred to by Ingarden as material endowment), form (formal structure) and existence (mode of existence). As examples of objects in this meaning one
may offer: a physical object, a process, an event, a Platonic idea, a property of a thing, a negative state of affairs. Yet, not everything is an object.
Non-objects are: matter, form and mode of existence as such. The Controversy over the Existence of the World was divided by Ingarden into Existential
Ontology and Formal Ontology in order to deal with existential and formal aspects of objects." (p. 137)
Bostar, Leo. 1994. "Reading Ingarden Read Husserl: Metaphysics, Ontology, and Phenomenological Method." Husserl Studies
Brogowski, Leszeck. 1999. "La détermination, l'indéterminé, une surdétermination : réflexions sur une ontologie de l'oeuvre d'art à partir
de Roman Ingarden." Revue d'Esthétique no. 36:59-73.
Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz. 1999. Die Erkenntnistheorie von Roman Ingarden. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 1999. "Are Meanings in the Head? Ingarden's Theory of Meaning." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no.
"The question in the title should be construed as an epistemological and not an ontological one. Omitting the difficult problems of the
ontology of intentionality we will ask if all what is needed to explain the phenomenon of the meaningful use of words, could be found "in our private
head" interpreted as a sphere of specific privileged access, the sphere that is in the relevant epistemological sense subjective, private or
There are many "mentalistic" theories of meaning that force us to the answer: "yes". According to these theories our
words are meaningful in virtue of certain intentions of the speaker. And our intentions consist in having some mental states that should be in the relevant
sense subjective or private. (Searle, Chisholm) But there are also philosophers (Kripke, Putnam) who claim to have evidence to the contrary. They argue that
the meanings of our words could not be "in the head", because of two important reasons. (I) Very often we don't know exactly the meanings of the
words that we use meaningfully. Furthermore, our "semantical self-knowledge" is principally corrigible by other people, and hence our access to the
meanings we use could be by no means privileged. And secondly (ii) we can imagine a situation in which two subjects with the same mental intention use the same
word with the very different meanings.
We will investigate our question on the ground of the Ingarden's philosophy. As we will see, his answer turns out to be in an interesting
sense: "yes and no"."
———. 2002. "Von Brentano zu Ingarden. Die Phänomenologische Bedeutungslehre." Husserl Studies no. 18:185-208.
Reprinted as Chapter 6 in: A. Chrudzimski - Intentionalität, Zeitbewusstsein und Intersubjektivität. Studien zur Phänomenologie von
Brentano bis Ingarden - Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2005, pp. 135-160.
———. 2004. "Roman Ingarden: Ontology from a phenomenological point of view." Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian
University) no. 22:121-142.
———, ed. 2005. Existence, Culture, and Persons: The Ontology of Roman Ingarden. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos Verlag.
Contents: Introduction 7; Gregor Haefliger, Guido Küng: Substances, States, Processes, Events. Ingarden and the Analytic Theory of Objects 9;
Peter Simons: Ingarden and the Ontology of Dependence 39; Daniel von Wachter: Roman Ingarden’s Ontology: Existential Dependence, Substances, Ideas,
and Other Things Empiricists Do not Like 55; Arkadiusz Chrudzimski: Brentano, Husserl und Ingarden über die intentionalen Gegenstände 83;
Amie L. Thomasson: Ingarden and the Ontology of Cultural Objects 115; Jeff Mitscherling: Concretization, Literary Criticism, and the Life of the Literary Work
of Art 137; Edward Swiderski: Ingarden: From Phenomenological Realism to Moral Realism 159; Andrzej Póltawski: Roman Ingardens Ontologie und die Welt 191;
Notes on Contributors 221; Index of Names 225.
"Actually, the majority of philosophers who find Ingarden's work valuable and inspiring belong to the growing community of
"naïve" or "straight" realists who typically don't even consider transcendental idealism as a serious philosophical option. Ironically, the
main goal of Ingarden's philosophical struggle - the refutation of idealism - remained something that very few of his reader are really interested in.
Most of the papers collected in this volume follow this strand of Ingarden's reception. The first three articles concern the basic
ontological categories and distinctions. Gregor Haefliger and Guido Küng concentrate on categories of substance, state, process, and event, and compare
Ingarden's solutions with some contemporary developments. Peter Simons investigates several concepts of ontological dependence that are central for the
especially Ingardenian branch of ontology that Ingarden called "existential ontology". Daniel von Wachter proposes "a Europe-in-seven-days tour
through Ingarden's ontology" (p. 55 in this volume). The next three papers concern the topic of Ingarden's philosophy that happened to become the best
known of his achievements: the philosophy of fiction and of cultural objects. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski sketches the general problematic of intentional objects and
argues that they are by no means useless fictions. Amie L. Thomasson presents an Ingardenian ontology of social and cultural objects such as money, churches,
Finally, Jeff Mitscherling investigates the difficult topic of the "life" of a literary work of art.
The last two papers open a somewhat wider perspective on Ingarden's work. Edward Swiderski points out an interesting change of perspective
that occurred in Ingarden's late work, which was devoted to the problem of responsibility. He argues that there is a tension between the hypothetical
scientific and phenomenological sides of his philosophy. Andrzej Póltawski tries to answer the question of what Ingarden's ontology would look like if he
developed it according to his deeply personalist picture of the world." (pp. 7-8)
———. 2005. Intentionalität, Zeitbewusstsein und Intersubjektivität. Studien zur Phänomenologie von Brentano bis Ingarden. Frankfurt
am Mein: Ontos verlag.
Contents: Einführung 7; 1. Franz Brentano über die Intentionalität 17; 2. Franz Brentano über die Zeitbewusstsein 39; 3. Anton Marty 53; 4.
Wozu brauchte Carl Stumpf Sachverhalte? 89; 5. Alexius Meinong 107; 6. Von Brentaon zu Ingarden 135; 7. Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität 161;
Bibliographie 203; Namenregister 211.
———. 2005. "Brentano, Husserl und Ingarden über die intentionale Gegenstände." In Existence, Culture, and Persons. The Ontology
of Roman Ingarden, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz, 83-114. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos Verlag.
Dziemidok, Bohdan, and McCormick, Peter, eds. 1989. On the Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden: interpretations and Assessments. Dordrecht:
Falk, Eugen. 1981. The Poetics of Roman Ingarden. Chapell Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Farber, Marvin. 1973. "On Subjectivism and the World Problem. In Memory of Roman Ingarden." Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research no. 7:1-7.
Fiedler, Theodore. 1975. "Taking Ingarden Seriously: Critical Reflections on "The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art" Part
I." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no. 6:131-140.
Fizer, John. 1976. "Ingarden's Phases, Bergson's Durée Réelle and James' Stream: Metaphoric Variants or Mutually Exclusive
Concepts on the Theme of Time." In Ingardeniana. A Spectrum of Specialized Studies Establishing the Field of Research, edited by Tymieniecka,
Anna-Teresa, 121-139. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Galewicz, Wlodzimierz. 1994. "Das Problem des Seinsstatus der gegenständlichen Sinne und Ingardens Ontologie der rein intentionalen
Gegenstände." In Kunst und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden zum 100. Geburstag, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski,
Wladylasw, 5-20. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth, and Strózewski, Wladylasw, eds. 1994. Kunst und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden zum 100.
Geburtstag. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Gierulanka, Danuta. 1977. "The Philosophical Work of Roman Ingarden." Dialectics and Humanism no. 4:117-128.
———. 1989. "Ingarden's Philosophical Work: A Systematic Outline." In On the Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden: Interpretations and
Assesments, edited by Dziemidok, Bohdan and McCormick, Peter, 1-20. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"Ingarden's philosophical output does not form a closed system in the sense of a set of statements derived from apriori accepted general
assumptions. Following the basic methodological principle of Husserl's phenomenology, Ingarden obtained results in all areas of his philosophy by referring
directly to the "things given in experiences" corresponding to the type of object being investigated (in direct intuitive cognition). In spite of the
great breadth of topics studied his results constitute a lucidly organized whole, as I shall presently try to demonstrate.
Ingarden's writings (over two hundred items including twenty-seven large books) belong primarily to three areas of philosophy: epistemology,
ontology, and aesthetics (including the theory of the work of art). This does not, however, comprise all of his work, as I shall show later.
The first decade of Ingarden's philosophic work already included basic results which set the direction and paths of development of his
I shall discuss the main core of Ingarden's philosophy in several sections, indicating the thought processes leading from one to another.
Epistemology, being the least known chapter of his thought, and ontology, which dominates Ingarden's philosophy, will be discussed more extensively." (p.
Golaszewska, Maria. 1976. "Roman Ingarden's Moral Philosophy." In Ingardeniana. A Spectrum of Specialized Studies Establishing
the Field of Research, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 73-103. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 4.
Górniak-Kocokowska, Krystyna. 1989. "Controversy About Actual Existence: Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka Contribution to the Study of Roman
Ingarden's Philosophy." In Man Within His Life-World: Contributions to Phenomenology by Scholars from East-Central Europe, edited by Tymieniecka,
Anna-Teresa, 165-192. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 27.
Gumpel, Liselotte. 1994. "Language as Bearer of Meaning: the Phenomenology of Roman Ingarden." In Kunst und Ontologie. Für
Roman Ingarden zum 100. Geburstag, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 21-58. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Haefliger, Gregor. 1990. "Ingarden und Husserls transzendentaler Idealismus." Husserl Studies no. 7:103-121.
———. 1994. Über Existenz: die Ontologie Roman Ingardens. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"This book is a monograph study of Ingarden's investigations into existence. Its aim is to give a clear and formally precise account, as
well as a critical evaluation, of his contributions. In the first chapter the basic principles of Ingarden's ontology are reformulated and, contrary to
Ingarden, a nominalistic point of view is adopted. Chapters 2 to 4 give a reconstruction of the arguments for the following Ingardenian theses: (1) Existence
is not a property; (2) The concept of existence is a principle sui generis of classification; (3) "exist(s)"is an equivocal word. On the
basis of this critical doxography Chapters 5 and 6 provide a systematic examination of the Ingardenian position, by confronting it with the results of analytic
philosophy (such as early Husserl, Frege, Russell, Moore, Meinong, Bergmann, Hochberg, Castaneda)."
———. 1994. "Ens multipliciter dicitur. The Ingardian Variant of an Old Thesis." In Kunst und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden zum
100. Geburstag, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 59-78. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
"Now, one important thesis of Ingarden Das literarische Kuntswerk (1931) is that a literal work exists in a "purely
intentional" way. This thesis was later refined in Ingarden (1964), where a theory of the different ways of being is elaborated. Even today, however, his
theory has not yet received widespread attention. This is so despite the originality and conceptual transparency of the programme he developed for his theory.
And more importantly, his position contains novel viewpoints for an answer to the question of the equivocity of 'to be' - a question that has long been one of
the fundamental questions of ontology.
The aim of this paper is to elucidate Ingarden's answer to this "old" question. To this end we must first acquaint ourselves with
the fundamentals of his theory of the different ways or modes of existence. Then we shall consider the unique position that Ingarden's thesis of the equivocity
of 'to be' occupies in the history of philosophy. Finally some suggestions towards a systematic evaluation of Ingarden's position will be made."
Hanneborg, Knut. 1966. "New Concepts in Ontology. A Review Discussion of Roman Ingarden: Der Streit um die Existenz der
Welt." Inquiry no. 9:401-409.
"In his Contemporary European Philosophy Bochenski declared Ingarden's work, The Controversy over the Existence of the
World to be one of the most important philosophical publications of our time. The work had then been published only in Polish, a fact which occasioned
Bochenski to deplore the widespread habit of publishing professional philosophy in languages other than the main European ones.
Now Spór o istnienie swiata has become Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, and the decisive language barrier has been
broken. Other obstacles may remain: the 1100 pages do offer, even in non-Polish, a certain resistance. Not that the author has not done his share of the work,
for he expresses himself with exemplary precision and by no means leaves the reader with the task of reducing confusion to clarity. But his perseverance in
analysis and the wealth of rigorously differentiated concepts give us a complicated whole to survey. It is the limited purpose of the present paper to give a
short outline of this comprehensive system, and some hints of its place in a larger context." (p. 401)
Heffernan, George. 1998. "Miscellaneous Lucubrations on Husserl's Answer to the Question 'was die Evidenz sei': A Contribution to the
Phenomenology of Evidence on the Occasion of the Publication of Husserliana volume XXX." Husserl Studies no. 15:1-75.
Hempolinski, Michal. 1975. "On Ingarden's Conception of 'Pure' Epistemology as a Starting Point to His Criticism of So-Called
Psychophysiological Epistemology." Dialectics and Humanism no. 2:49-54.
Jadacki, Jacek. 1989. "On Roman Ingarden's Semiotic Views: A Contribution to the History of Polish Semiotics." In Man within
His Life-World: Contributions to Phenomenology by Scholars from East-Central Europe, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 523-540. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 27.
Johansson, Ingvar. 2009. "Roman Ingarden and the Problem of Universals." Metaphysica.International Journal for Ontology and
Metaphysics no. 10:65-87.
"The paper ends with an argument that says: necessarily, if there are finitely spatially extended particulars, then there are monadic
universals. Before that, in order to characterize the distinction between particulars and universals, Roman Ingarden's notions of "existential
moments" and "modes (ways) of being" are presented; and a new pair of such existential moments is introduced: Multiplicity-Monadicity. Also, it
is argued that there are not only real universals, but instances of universals (tropes) and fictional universals, too."
Kalinowski, Georges. 1968. "Ontologie et esthétique chez Roman Ingarden." Archives de Philosophie no. 31:281-287.
Kersten, Fred. 1972. "On Understanding Idea and Essence in Husserl and Ingarden." In The Later Husserl and the Idea of
Phenomenology, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 55-63. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 2.
Kocay, Victor. 1996. Forme et référence: le langage de Roman Ingarden. Sprimont: Pierre Mardaga.
Küng, Guido. 1972. "Ingarden on Language and Ontology." In The Later Husserl and the Idea of Phenomenology, edited by
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 204-217. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 2.
———. 1972. "The World as Noema and as Referent." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no. 3:15-26.
———. 1975. "Zum Lebenswerk von Roman Ingarden: Ontologie, Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik." In Die Münchener Phänomenologie:
Vorträge des Internationalen Kongresses in München, 13.-18. April 1971, edited by Kuhn, Helmuth, 159-173. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Phaenomenologica vol. 65
———. 1982. "Roman Ingarden: (1893-1970) Ontological Phenomenology." In The Phenomenological Movement, edited by
Spiegelberg, Herbert, 223-233. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Third revised edition
———. 1986. "Brentano and Ingarden on the Experience and Cognition of Values." Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian
University) no. 10:57-67.
Laskey, Dallas. 1972. "Ingarden's Criticism of Husserl." In The Later Husserl and the Idea of Phenomenology, edited by
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 48-54. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 2.
Majewska, Zofia. 2002. "The Philosophy of Roman Ingarden." In Phenomenology World-Wide: Foundations, Expanding Dynamisms,
Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 184-199. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Makota, Janina. 1975. "Roman Ingarden's Philosophy of Man." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no.
Translated from the Polish by the author with the assistance of E. M. Swiderski.
"Ingarden's views concerning man are scattered throughout his writings. But the bulk of them is contained in the chapter entitled
"The problem of the form of pure consciousness" in the second volume of Controversy over the Existence of the World (1) and in the posthumous A
Booklet on Man, (2) which is a collection of previously published articles, lectures, etc. The most advanced considerations on this subject are contained
in the essay On Responsibility. Its Ontic Foundations. (3) What is new in this essay and what proves to be theoretically fruitful is the application,
not only to man as a whole, but to his body and to the psychic side of his being as well, of the conception of relatively isolated systems. This notion had
been previously employed by Ingarden to explain various types of connections within the world as a whole. (4)"
(1) Der Streit urn die Existenz der Welt, vol. 11/2, Tubingen: Niemeyer 1965, chap. 16: "Das Problem der Form des reinen
(2) Ksiazecka o czlowieku (A booklet on Man), Krakow; Wydownictwo Literackie 1972, 2.ed. 1973.
(3) Ueber die Verantwortung. Ihre ontischen Fundamente, Stuttgart: Reclam 1970.
(4) Cf. Der Streit . . . vol. I, Tubingen: Niemeyer 1964, p. 104, and especially Der Streit . . . vol. III Ueber die
Kausale Struktur der realen Welt, Tubingen: Niemeyer 1974.
———. 1986. "Nicolai Hartmann's and Roman Ingarden's Philosophy of Man." Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University)
Mardas, Nancy. 2003. "Essence and Existence in Phenomenological Ontology: Roman Ingarden." In The passions of the soul in the
metamorphosis of becoming, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 183-198. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
McCormick, Peter. 1975. "On Ingarden's Account of the Existence of Aesthetic Objects." Dialectics and Humanism no.
Miskiewicz, Wioletta. 2003. "Réalisme gnoseologique contre réalisme sceptique: Ingarden et la réception de Brentano en Pologne."
Études Philosophiques no. 64:83-97.
Mitscherling, Jeff. 1985. "Roman Ingarden's "The Literary Work of Art": Exposition and Analyses." Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research no. 45:351-382.
"In the Preface to the second edition of The Literary Work of Art, Roman Ingarden calls attention to one of the unfortunate but
unavoidable shortcomings of his book: “I am quite conscious of the fact that for literary critics this book would be much more accessible and plastic if I had
devoted a series of concrete analyses to individual works of art. But I had to abandon this from the first, since the book would have become unmanageable.” In
this paper I present, as briefly as possible, two such concrete analyses. Throughout my analyses, I employ Ingarden’s terminology. For the reader who is
unfamiliar with this terminology, and perhaps with Ingarden’s work in general, these analyses must prove difficult to follow, if not entirely incomprehensible.
For this reader, I have added, as Part I of this paper, a preliminary exposition of The Literary Work of Art. The reader who is already acquainted
with Ingarden’s work may wish to skip this and turn immediately to Part II, in which I present my analyses. In Part III, I conclude with a few remarks on the
material presented in both the previous parts." (p. 351)
———. 1997. Roman Ingarden's Ontology and Aesthetics. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press.
Foreword by Raymond Klibansky.
Mohanty, Jitendra Nath. 1997. "Roman Ingarden's Critique of Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology." In Phenomenology. Between
Essentialism and Transcendental Philosophy, 32-45. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
"Roman Ingarden was Husserl's pupil, and remained in lifelong contact with him, continuously questioning Husserl's positions, especially
his transcendental idealism. Whereas the members of the Munich and Göttingen schools simply abandoned the master as having deviated from the path of philosophy
as a rigorous science, Ingarden continued his efforts to understand the motives and the arguments which led Husserl in that direction. In this relentless
effort, he seems to have gone a long way toward understanding, and even agreeing with, Husserl's transcendental-constitutive phenomenology, but he would
nevertheless draw a line that he did not want to cross-thereby preserving his own realistic intuitions from being overtaken by what he took to be an idealistic
philosophy. While thus seeking to understand Husserl, Ingarden also undertook first his famous work Das Literarische Kunstwerk, and then the large,
carefully argued work on the controversy regarding the existence of the world, Die Streit um die Existenz der Welt. One could say that Ingarden's
central interest lay in the realism-idealism dispute, and it may also be safely said that no one in the history of philosophy has more carefully analyzed that
issue than he. While Das Literarische Kunstwerk is deservedly more famous, Ingarden undertook it as much out of his interest in the subject matter of
art as out of the desire to advance the discussion of the realism-idealism issue." p. 32
Motroshilova, N.V. 1975. "The Problem of the Cognitive Subject as viewed by Husserl and Ingarden." Dialectics and Humanism
Póltawski, Andrzej. 1972. "Constitutive Phenomenology and Intentional Objects." In The Later Husserl and the Idea of
Phenomenology, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 90-95. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 2.
———. 1974. "Consciousness and Action in Ingarden's Thought." In The Phenomenological Realism of the Possible Worlds,
edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 124-137. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 3.
———. 1975. "Ingarden's Way to Realism and His Idea of Man." Dialectics and Humanism no. 2:65-76.
———. 1978. "The Idea and the Place of Human Creativity in the Philosophy of Roman Ingarden." Dialectics and Humanism no.
———. 1986. "Roman Ingarden. Ein Metaphysiker der Freiheit." Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University) no.
Przybysz, Piotr. 1993. "Polish Discussions about Reism." In Possible Ontologies, edited by Augustynek, Zdzislaw and Jacek,
Jadacki, 179-193. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Reese, William. 1965. "Phenomenology and Metaphysics." The Review of Metaphysics no. 19:103-114.
Richard, Sébastien, and Malherbe, Olivier, eds. 2016. Forme(s) et modes d’être. L’ontologie de Roman Ingarden / Form(s) and Modes of
Being. The Ontology of Roman Ingarden. Bern: P.I.E. Peter Lang.
Riska, Augustin. 1974. "The 'a priori' in Ingarden's Theory of Meaning." In The Phenomenological Realism of the Possible
Worlds, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 138-146. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 3.
———. 1976. "Language and Logic in the Work of Roman Ingarden." In Ingardeniana. A Spectrum of Specialized Studies Establishing
the Field of Research, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 187-217. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 4.
Rosiak, Marek. 2009. "Formal and Existential Analysis of Subject and Properties." In Essays in Logic and Ontology, edited
by Malinowski, Jacek and Pietrsuzczack, Andrzej, 285-299. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
"The paper is a contribution to the object ontology. The general approach assumed in the investigation is that of Roman Ingarden's
The Controversy Over the Existence of the World where an object is the subject-of-properties. The analysis of the form and the mode of existence of
properties leads to the rejection of both negative and general properties. Each property is an individual qualitative moment of a particular object. Its form
reveals existential heteronomy: the quality of the property is not immanent but refers to the object. The subject of properties has not its own qualitative
content: its form is just the internal causality establishing the unity of an object. An object is not causally isolated from other objects, but external
causation differs from internal either by being ramified in case of the composition and destruction of an object or reciprocal in case of interaction between
Rudnick, Hans H., ed. 1990. Ingardeniana II: New Studies in the Philosophy of Roman Ingarden. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 30.
Ruttkowski, Wolfgang. 2007. Essays on Aesthetics, Poetics and Terminology of Literary Studies. München: Grin Verlag.
Essay I: Stratum, structure, and genre (1973) pp. 4-30.
"The concept of genre can be satisfactorily explained only in comparison with the concepts of stratum and
structure. Proceeding from this conviction we shall try here to establish a demarcation of these often used terms and at the same time prove their
Essay III: The main differences between Roman Ingarden's and Nicolai Hartmann's Strata systems (1990) pp. 31-48.
"Although both designed strata-models for various kinds of art and especially for literature, the philosophers Nicolai Hartmann and
Roman Ingarden never entered into any kind of dialogue. Also in secondary literature there is no exact comparison of their systems to be found.
For that reason, the two strata systems are compared here for the first time and their respective advantages and deficiencies are being
Amongst other things. the following topics are being discussed: 1. In what way Hartmann's "Real Foreground" ("Realer
Vordergrund") is more specifically subdivided in Ingarden's system. - 2. How, on the other hand. Ingarden's "Stratum of Depicted Objects"
("Schicht der dargestellten Gegenstãndlichkeiten") was more thoroughly subdivided by Hartmann. 3. Why there cannot be found in Hartmann's system a
corresponding stratum for Ingarden's ''Stratum of Schematized Aspects" ("Schicht der schematischen Ansichten") - and 4. Why Hartmann's two
strata of the Treat Background" (''Irrealer Hintergrund") are consolidated by Ingarden and expressly not seen as a stratum."
Ryle, Gilbert. 1927. "Review of: Essentiale Fragen by Roman Ingarden." Mind no. 36:366-370.
Reprinted in: The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 4, 1973, pp. 72-75.
Rynkiewicz, Kazimierz. 2008. Zwischen Realismus und Idealismus. Ingardens Überwindung des transzendentalen Idealismus Husserls.
Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Sancipriano, Mario. 1976. "Ingarden et le 'vrai' Bergsonisme." In Ingardeniana. A Spectrum of Specialized Studies Establishing
the Field of Research, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 141-148. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 4.
Schaeffer, Jean-Marie, and Potocki, Christophe, eds. 2013. Roman Ingarden: ontologie, esthétique, fiction. Paris: Archives
Schopper, Werner. 1974. Das Seiende und der Gegenstand: zur Ontologie Roman Ingardens. München: Berchmanskolleg Verlag.
Seifert, Joseph. 1986. "Roman Ingarden' Realism and the motives that led Husserl to adopt Transcendental Idealism: critical reflections
on the importance and limits of Roman Ingarden's critique of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology." Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian
University) no. 10:27-42.
Seifert, Joseph, and Smith, Barry. 1994. "The Truth about Fiction." In Kunst und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden zum 100.
Geburstag, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 97-118. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Shusterman, Richard. 1987. "Ingarden, Inscription and Literary Ontology." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
Reprinted in: On the Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden: Interpretations and Assessments.
Simons, Peter M. 1986. "Categories and Ways of Being." Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University) no. 10:89-104.
Reprinted in: Peter Simons, Philosophy and Logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected Essays, Dodrecht: Kluwer, 1992,
"Ingarden's most substantial contribution to philosophy was his ontology. Ontology, the science of being as being, was conceived in
Plato's wrestling with the Eleatics' to on. Its birth to Aristotle was not without complications for it seemed a single science should have a single
genus as object, yet Aristotle denied that to on formed a genus. Given the role Aristotle gives to genera in definition, this is not surprising, but
the outcome is that 'to be' is not said according to one genus, and hence has several meanings. Can there then be a science of being as being? Aristotle's
solution lay in the idea that all these meanings revolved around the central one of to be said of substances. However, not all philosophers shared Aristotle's
denial of a single all-embracing class of objects. Plotinus regarded `ti', 'something', as denoting a highest genus. Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong and
Husserl all used univocal term: like 'etwas' and 'Gegenstand' to mark such a class, while Quine has insisted that 'there are' is univocally
rendered by the existential quantifier. Ingarden on the other hand follows Aristotle.
The question of the univocity or multivocity of be is still one of the first questions of ontology. In this paper I use historical
comparisons to point to where a solution to the problem may lie. Ingarden's account of the different ways or modes of being (Seinsweisen, modi
essendi) is a most important philosophical contribution to the problem. By chance 1985 marks not only the fifteenth anniversary of Ingarden's death but
also the official 700th anniversary of the birth of the greatest of the late scholastics, William of Ockham, who is also celebrated here. My motive is however
primarily systematic: I think be is indeed analogically ambiguous, though for different reasons than Aristotle or Ingarden. (1) But to be precise about what
this mean involves comparisons in which one looks for help and enlightenment to the great minds of the past."
(1) Cf. my Class, Mass and Mereology, "History and Philosophy of Logic" 4 (1983, 157-80, also Ch. 4 of my book Parts.
A Study in Ontology, 1987).
———. 1994. "Strata in Ingarden's Ontology." In Kunst und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden zum 100. Geburstag, edited by
Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
"This paper examines the concept of stratum as employed by Ingarden in his ontological investigations of works of art. Attention is
focussed on literary works, which are said to have four strata, two belonging to language itself. I find Ingarden's stratified account of language correct in
principle but defective in execution. In the ontology of literary works, the stratum of schematized aspects is particularly problematic, and I interpret these
as complex meanings, correlated with another element of the work not given sufficient recognition by Ingarden: the Reader. I suggest the terminology of strata
for anworks in general is dispensable."
Skolimowski, Henryk. 1967. Polish Analytical Philosophy. A Survey and a Comparison with British Analytical Philosophy. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Smith, Barry. 1975. "The Ontogenesis of Mathematical Objects." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no.
———. 1976. "Historicity, Value and Mathematics." In Ingardeniana. A Spectrum of Specialized Studies Establishing the Field of
Research, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 219-239. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 4.
———. 1978. "An Essay in Formal Ontology." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 6:39-62.
"The present paper may be conceived both as a working introduction to certain aspects of the ontological theory put forward by the
Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden in his mammoth treatise Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, (1) and also as a development of Ingarden’s views in the
light of current tendencies in analytic philosophical logic. The central theme of the paper – though one which does not become apparent until very near the end
– is the ontological analysis of states of affairs, and in particular of negative states of affairs, a topic which is of some specific nterest in forming a
connecting link between the Brentano-Meinong-Husserl tradition to which Ingarden belonged, and the (Frege)-Russell-Wittgenstein tradition which gave rise to
modern philosophical logic." (p. 39)
(1) (Hereafter referred to as StEW.) Ingarden completed two volumes of this work before his death in 1970, and a further volume has since
been compiled from manuscripts. Vol. I, Existentialontologie 1964; Vol. II, Formalontologie, Part 1, Form und Wesen, Part 2,
Welt und Bewußtsein, 1965; Vol. III, Über die kausale Struktur der realen Welt, 1974; all published by Niemeyer, Tübingen. For a more general
account of Ingarden's project see G. Küng, “Zum Lebenswerk von Roman Ingarden. Ontologie, Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik”, in Die Münchener Phänomenologie,
ed. H. Kuhn et al., Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1975, pp. 158–73.
———. 1979. "Roman Ingarden: Ontological Foundations for Literary Theory." In Language, literature and meaning, edited by
Odmark, John, 373-390. Amsterdam: Benjamins Press.
———. 1980. "Ingarden versus Meinong on the Logic of Fiction." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 41:93-105.
———. 1987. "The Ontology of Epistemology." Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University) no. 11:57-66.
Sodeika, Thomas. 1989. "The Ingarden-Husserl Controversy: the Methodological Status of Consciousness in Phenomenology and the Limits of
the Human Condition." In Man Within His Life-World: Contributions to Phenomenology by Scholars from East-Central Europe, edited by Tymieniecka,
Anna-Teresa, 209-221. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 27.
Spiegelberg, Herbert. 1982. The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Third revised edition; first edition 1960; second edition 1965.
Steinbach, Heribert. 1968. "Ist Ontologie als Phänemonologie möglich? Kritische Betrachtungen zu Ingardens Existentialontologie."
Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung no. 22:78-100.
Strózewski, Wladylasw. 1963. "Gli studi di estetica di Roman Ingarden." Rivista di Estetica no. 8:131-142.
———. 1976. "Man and Value in Ingarden's Thought." In The Crisis of Culture. Steps to Reopen the Phenomenological Investigation
of Man, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 109-123. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 5.
———. 1988. "Roman Ingarden's Aesthetic Program." Aletheia: an Internation Journal of Philosophy no. 4:226-234.
Swiderski, Edward. 1975. "Some Salient Features of Ingarden's Ontology." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
"Ingarden conceived and developed his ontology on the basis of the assumed existence of certain ideal entities, namely pure ideal
qualities and Ideas. An examination of these entities provides, according to him, a knowledge of the corresponding individual essences of individual objects.
Although his starting point in this matter reproduces Husserl's original conceptions, what he found in Husserl's writings on the subject proved finally to be
neither sufficient nor clear. For example, with respect to the problem of the existence and nature of Ideas, Ingarden wrote in the second volume of the
Controversy over the Existence of the World: "Actually, what he gave us, his students, in this matter was solely the conviction that a rejection
of the existence of Ideas-in some special manner-must lead to contradictions". (1) At the same time, the associated problem of the essences of individual
objects was felt, not only by Ingarden, but Hering and Spiegelberg as well, (2) to have been inadequately dealt with by Husserl in Ideas I, and it became,
consequently, a subject of their own extensive investigations. But what was certainly of value in Husserl, as far as the foundations of ontology were
concerned, was his discussion in the Logical Investigations of the a priori, i.e., of the ideal necessities governing the formal and material aspects of
objects. (3) It is rather this side of Husserl's work which prompted Ingarden to inquire further into the nature of ideal entities, for they, according to him,
are the foundations of the ideal necessities regulating the determinations and the structures of objects.
Accordingly, there are several related subjects to be considered. First, it should be seen how Ingarden conceives objects and their
structures in general. This discussion will help clarify the problem whether Ingarden's theory of objects owes its content to the theory of ideal entities, or
whether the reverse is true, that the theory of Ideas, etc., is fashioned after the requirements of the theory of objects. The possibility that they might be
independent theories is excluded because Ideas, etc., are supposed to furnish a certain kind of knowledge about all sorts of entities whose structures, on the
other hand, are already described, in a preliminary general way, by the theory of objects. Second, it should be clarified whether, and if so in what sense, the
structures of objects themselves reflect or indeed embody necessary connections of an ideal character. This calls for an analysis of the notions of
"concretion" and "moment" and of their relation to ideal entities. Finally, after these discussions, it will be possible to deal with the
central task of ontology according to Ingarden, namely with the analysis of Ideas as the proper field of investigations in ontology."
(1) Ingarden, Roman: Spór o istnienie swiata (The Controversy over the Existence of the World) vol. 1, 2nd rev. ed., Warsaw: PWN
1961, p. 63; German ed.: Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, vol. II/1, Tubingen; Niemeyer, 1965, p. 229.
(2) Hering, Jean: "Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee", Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phänomenologische
Forschung, vol. 4, Halle 1921; Spiegelberg, Herbert: "Uber das Wesen der Ideen", op. cit., vol. 11, Halle, 1930.
(3) Cf. especially Investigation III: "On the theory of wholes and parts" in Logical Investigations, trans.: J. N. Findlay, London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul 1970.
———. 1987. "Ingarden's Puzzling Ontology - Metaphysics Distinction." Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University) no.
"In this paper I will examine the distinction as well as the connection Ingarden drew between ontology and metaphysics. I want to show
that the distinction is problematic and that therefore the connection remains nebulous. The reason Ingarden gives for the distinction is that a philosopher
needs to be clear about what in general, for example, a world is and what sorts of things can in general "furnish" the world before he can claim that
the factual world, as apprehended in ordinary and scientific experience, is "really" thus and so. Now Ingarden had comparatively little to say about
the connection of ontology to metaphysics. However, speaking in his name it seems plausible to envisage a negative and a positive connection. On the negative
side, as it cannot be merely assumed that ontology has some special purchase on the factual world, it may be that no, so to speak, "metaphysical
commitment" to what is "really real" would be justifiable on ontological grounds. On the positive side, if metaphysical statements are grounded
in the same evidence that sustains ontological statements, arid the latter do have purchase on the facts, then it follows that ontology has a prima
facie metaphysical import to start with." (p.67)
———. 1994. "Individual Essence in Ingarden's Ontology." In Kunst und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden zum 100. Geburstag,
edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 183-206. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
———. 1995. "The Problematic Unity of Culture in Ingarden." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no.
Swiecimski, Jerzy. 1974. "Scientific Information Function and Ingarden's Theory of Forms in the Constitution of the Real World." In
The Phenomenological Realism of the Possible Worlds, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 165-186. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 3.
Szczepanska, Anita. 1975. "Perspectives of the Axiological Investigations of the Work of Roman Ingarden." Journal of the
British Society for Phenomenology no. 6:116-125.
Translated from the Polish by the author with the assistance of G. Kung and E. Swiderski. The Polish version of this paper appeared in Studia
Estetyczyne, Warsaw, vol. 10 (1973), 239-254.
"It is not my concern here to repeat Ingarden's well-known theses on the aesthetic quality-structure of a work of art. I want, instead,
to do the following: (1) to examine the relationship between Ingarden's axiological investigations and his earlier inquiry into the general "anatomy"
of works of art - literature, painting, music, etc., (2) to attempt a more detailed characterization of the system of aesthetically significant qualities and,
in particular, to state what the system is not, (3) to show the wide field of investigations opened up by the concept of the system of qualities, (4) to show
possible directions and make certain suggestions concerning further study of the system of qualities, together with an account of previous attempts and of the
difficulties thus brought to light."
Tarnowski, Karol. 1976. "Roman Ingarden's Critique of Transcendental Constitution." Dialectics and Humanism no.
Thomasson, Amie L. 2005. "Ingarden and the Ontology of Cultural Objects." In Existence, Culture, and Persons. The Ontology of
Roman Ingarden, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz, 115-136. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos Verlag.
"While Roman Ingarden is well known for his work in aesthetics and studies in ontology, one of his most important and lasting
contributions has been largely overlooked: his approach to a general ontology of social and cultural objects. Ingarden himself discusses cultural objects other
than works of art directly in the first section of "The Architectural Work", where he develops a particularly penetrating view of the ontology of
buildings, flags, and churches. This text provides the core insight into how his more lengthy studies of the ontology of works of art in The
Work of Art and the rest of The Ontology of the Work of Art, combined with the ontological distinctions of Der Streit
um die Existenz der Welt, may be used to understand social and cultural objects. The view that results, I will argue, is based in foreseeing problems with
the reductivist and projectivist views that remain popular, and is capable of resolving central problems still thought to plague those who would offer a theory
of cultural objects.
Social and cultural objects such as money, churches, and flags present a puzzle since they seem, on the one hand, to be entities that clearly
-- in some sense -- depend on minds, and yet, on the other hand, seem to be objective parts of our world, things of which we may acquire knowledge (both in
daily life and in the social sciences), and which we cannot merely modify at will. But it is hard to see how any entity could exhibit both of those
characteristics - if, on the one hand, we take their objectivity and mind-externality seriously, and consider them to be identifiable with physical objects, we
find ourselves saddled with absurd conclusions about the conditions under which such entities would exist and persist, and neglect their symbolic and normative
features. If, on the other hand, we treat them as mere creations of the mind, they seem either reduced to phantasms that could not have the recalcitrance and
impact on our lives cultural objects apparently exhibit, or we seem to be positing 'magical' modes of creation whereby the mind can generate real,
Ingarden, I will argue, foresees the problems with each of these alternatives and diagnoses of the root of the problem as lying in too narrow
an understanding of the senses in which an entity may be mind-dependent, and too narrow a set of ontological categories for entities there may be.
Once we can make evident the different senses in which something may be mind-dependent, and the different kinds of object there may be, we
can find room for cultural objects considered as entities that are neither mere physical objects nor projections of the mind, but instead depend in complex
ways on both foundations. Such a moderate realist view, I will argue, can provide the means to overcome the problems thought to plague social ontology and show
the way to a more comprehensive ontology."
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. 1955. Essence et existence. Étude à propos de la philosophie de Roman Ingarden et de Nicolai Hartmann.
Paris: Aubier Montaigne.
Second edition 1957
———. 1955. "Un dessin de la philosophie de Roman Ingarden." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale no. 60:32-57.
———, ed. 1959. For Roman Ingarden: Nine Essays in Phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
———. 1965. "Existence Vindicated or the Hundred Real Dollars." The Personalist no. 46:211-221.
———. 1975. "Roman Ingarden's Philosophical Legacy and Beyond: the Creative Freedom of the Possible Worlds." Dialectics and
Humanism no. 2:71-87.
———, ed. 1976. Ingardeniana. A Spectrum of Specialised Studies Establishing the Field of Research. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 4.
———. 1976. "Beyond Ingarden's Idealism-Realism controversy with Husserl: the new contextual phase of phenomenology." In
Ingardeniana. A Spectrum of Specialized Studies Establishing the Field of Research, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 241-418. Dordrecht:
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 4.
———, ed. 1991. Ingardeniana III: Roman Ingarden's Aesthetics in a New Key and the Independent Approaches of Others: the Performing Arts,
the Fine Arts, and Literature. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 33.
Urchs, Max. 1994. "On Causality. Ingarden's Aanalysis vs. Jaskwski Logic." Logic and Logical Philosophy no. 2:55-68.
Wachter, Daniel von. 2005. "Roman Ingarden's Ontology: Existential Dependence, Substances, Ideas, and Other Things Empiricists do not
Like." In Existence, Culture, and Persons. The Ontology of Roman Ingarden, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz, 55-82. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
"Ingarden's ontology is an impressive biotope. It takes Ingarden 1840 pages to set it up. His style is not cryptic, but he writes down
not only how he thinks things are and his arguments for his views, but all his thoughts about the matter, in good phenomenological tradition. The editors of
this book have asked me to move on a bit more swiftly. As life is short, let us take a Europe-in-seven-days tour through Ingarden's ontology. Preparing the
travel we need to clarify what ontology is for Ingarden, how it relates to semantics, and how it relates to metaphysics. Then we shall turn to
different kinds of existential dependence and to the distinction between form and matter. Having considered these preliminaries we shall
consider Ingarden's conception of a substance and, more briefly, his other categories. While my main aim is to guide you through Ingarden's ontology I shall
also indicate where I think the actual world is not as Ingarden describes it."
Wallner, Ingrid. 1987. "In Defense of Husserl's Transcendental Idealism: Roman Ingarden's Critique Re-Examined." Husserl
Studies no. 4:3-43.
Wegrzecki, Adam. 1975. "On the Absoluteness of Values." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no.
Translated from the Polish by E. M. Swiderski.
"In his axiological considerations, undertaken with increasing intensity in the last years of his life, Roman Ingarden devoted much
attention to the problem of the relativity of values. Above all, he attempted to determine what it is that we have in mind when we talk about this particular
aspect of values. He also pointed out in a more or less decided way whether and how it is possible to ascribe "relativity" to a given type of values.
He himself was reluctant to accept an axiological relativism, especially in its extreme form according to which all values would be relative in every possible
way. He felt that such a radical view on values leads inevitably to subjectivism, to a denial of various axiological qualifications for various spheres of
being. Though he was indeed opposed to this view it was not only because of its theoretical and practical consequences, but above all because of the
far-reaching simplifications it entailed, the superficiality of the argumentation as well as its disregard for the factual state of affairs accessible to the
unprejudiced researcher of value-phenomena.
Nevertheless, Ingarden's opposition to a radical axiological relativism does not mean that he spoke out for a radical axiological absolutism.
Such an inference would be too hasty since, as I shall try to show, it would impute to Ingarden a point of view which has no foundation in his investigations
of values. In order to ascertain whether Ingarden's theory of values eventually does allow for some conception of an axiological absolutism, a closer analysis
must be carried out of those of its assertions which directly or indirectly touch upon the absoluteness of values. In this regard Ingarden's significant
methodological postulate must be kept in mind, namely that in axiological considerations the essential differences among types of values are not to be
obscured. This means, in the first place, that a mechanical transference of assertions that apply to one type of values to some other type or types is invalid;
and, in the second place, that a mechanical extension to various types of values of the validity of a series of general axiological theses having the character
of pure theoretical possibilities is also invalid. Hence to determine in what sense Ingarden would be willing to admit an axiological absolutism is not at all
the same thing as resolving the question of what kind of absoluteness belongs, according to him, to the given types of values. Most of the remarks in
Ingarden's axiology refer to ethical and aesthetic values which makes it possible to determine more exactly their "absoluteness-character" and, at
the same time, to indicate which purely theoretical possibilities are "realized" in the case of these types of values.
It is possible to infer from certain of Ingarden's statements that he excludes certain forms of the absoluteness of values encountered in
axiological thought. Thus he rejects the view which was once current that values are autonomous objects of a particular kind existing independently of
everything and having in themselves the foundation of their continued existence. According to this view, values are simply ideal objects. Ingarden rejects this
form of a radically conceived absoluteness of values if only because he considers that a value is always a value of something, or in something, or for
something. Moreover, it does not possess the form of an object, whether or not it exists ideally or otherwise, and it always requires the appropriate
foundation for its existence. This conviction applies to all values." p. 109.
———. 1994. "The Function of Ontology and Experience in Roman Ingarden's Axiological Investigations." In Kunst und Ontologie.
Für Roman Ingarden zum 100. Geburstag, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 219-228. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Wolenski, Jan. 1986. "Remarks on Primitivity and Secondarity as Moments of Existence." Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian
University) no. 10:81-87.
"In the summary I should like to say that various problems of Ingarden's existential ontology can be profitably analysed by means of
contemporary modal logic. On the other hand, it is highly probable that some elements of Ingardenian ontology may be helpful for modal logicians. In spite of
the known Ingarden's very critical assesment of formal logic, there is a need for close cooperation between logicians and philosophers in Ingarden's style. I
hope that my considerations justify such an opinion."
———. 1994. "Sentences, Propositions and Quasi-Propositions." In Kunst und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden zum 100.
Geburstag, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 229-235. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Zeglen, Ursula. 1985. "An Attempt at a Formal Analysis of Pure Qualities in Ingarden's Ontology." In Studies in Logic and
Theory of Knowledge, edited by Borkowski, Ludwik, 79-89. Lublin.
———. 1996. "Meinong and Ingarden on Negative Judgments." Axiomathes:267-278.