Heider, Daniel. 2007. "Is Suarez's Concept of Being Analogical or Univocal?" American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no.
"This article deals with the question of Suárez's conception of being, which prima facie seems to oscillate between a Scotistic
univocal conception and a conception of being according to the analogy of intrinsic attribution. The paper intends to show that Suárez's doctrine can in no way
be interpreted as representative of the univocal conception, and proceeds in six steps. First, it highlights the importance of the "uncommon
doctor"'s theory of the unity of both the formal and the objective concepts of being. In the second part, the paper asks how the concept of being can,
without any internal differentiation and structure, give rise to the different relations that it has to the natures subordinated to it. In the second and the
third parts, this question receives an answer against the background of Suárez's critique of Scotus's conception, and with the help of his theory of the
radical intimate transcendence of being. In the fourth section, there follows an exposition of Suárez's doctrine on the explication of the concept of being.
The fifth section offers a brief presentation of the significance of esse for ratio entis.
In the last section, the author places his interpretation in the general context of the Metaphysical Disputations."
———. 2009. "The Nature of Suárez's Metaphysics. Disputationes Metaphysicae and Their Main Systematic Strains." Studia
Neoaristotelica no. 6:99-110.
"The paper presents seven basic features of Francisco Suárez's metaphysics. They are as follows: "Univocalization" of the
concept of being and transcendental properties, "reification" of the act-potency doctrine, "ontologization" of individuality,
"conceptualization" of the Scotist perspective, "existential" character of the concept of being, "epistemologization" and
"methodologization" of metaphysics. Whereas the first five are indicated as remaining in the preserve of the traditional scholastic philosophy, the
last two are taken as portending the methodological priority of the subjective states of affairs of early modern "main-stream" philosophy."
———. 2009. "The unity of Suárez's metaphysics." Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale no. 34:475-505.
———. 2014. Universals in Second Scholasticism: A Comparative Study with Focus on the Theories of Francisco Suárez S.J. (1548-1617), Joao
Poinsot O.P. (1589-1644), and Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola O.F.M. Conv. (1602-1673), Bonaventura Belluto O.F.M. Conv. (1600-1676). Philadelphia: John
"This study aims to present a comparative analysis of philosophical theories of universals espoused by the foremost representatives of
the three main schools of early modern scholastic thought. The book introduces the doctrines of Francisco Suarez, S.J. (1548-1617), the Thomist John of St.
Thomas, O.P. (1589-1644), and the Scotists Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola, O.F.M. Conv. (1602-1673) and Bonaventura Belluto, O.F.M. Conv. (1600-1676). The author
examines in detail their mutual doctrinal delineation as well as the conceptualist tenet of the Jesuit Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578-1641), whose thought
constitutes an important systematic point of comparison especially with Suarez's doctrine. The book offers the first comparative elaboration of the issue of
universals, in both its metaphysical and its epistemological aspects, in the era of second scholasticism."
Hellin, José. 1962. "El concepto formal en Suárez." Pensamiento no. 18:407-432.
Hill, Benjamin, and Lagerlund, Henrik, eds. 2012. The Philosophy of Francisco Suarez. New York: Oxford University Press.
Contents: Acknowledgments VII; List of Contributors VIII; List of Abbreviations IX; Bejamin Hill: Introduction 1; I. Background and
Influence. 1. Michael Edwards: Suarez in a Late Scholastic Context: Anatomy, Psychology and Authority 25; 2. Roger Ariew: Descartes and Leibniz as Readers of
Suárez: Theory of Distinctions and Principle of Individuation 38; II. Metaphysics. 3. Christopher Shields: Shadows of Being: Francisco Suárez's Entia
Rationis 57; 4. Jorge Secada: Suárez on Continuous Quantity 75; III. Natural Philosophy. 5. Dennis Des Chene: Suárez on Propinquity and the Efficient
Cause 89; 6. Helen Hattab: Suárez's Last Stand for the Substantial Form 101; IV. Mind and Psychology. 7. James B. South: Suárez, Immortality, and the Soul's
Dependence on the Body 121; 8. Cees Leijenhorst: Suárez on Self-Awareness 137; 9. Marleen Rozemond: Unity in the Multiplicity of Suárez's Soul 154; V. Ethics
and Natural Law. 10. Thomas Pink: Reason and Obligation in Suárez 175; 11. James Gordley: Suárez and Natural Law 209; Bibliography 230; index 291.
Hurtado, Guillermo. 1999. "Entes e modos en la Disputationes Metafísicas." In Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradiçao e
Modernidade, edited by Cardoso, Adelino, Martins, Antonio Manuel and Dos Santos, Leonel Ribeiro, 99-117. Lisboa: Ediçoes Colibri.
Ippolito, Benedetto. 2005. Analogia dell'essere. La metafisica di Suárez tra onto-teologia medievale e filosofia moderna. Milano:
Iturroz, Jesûs. 1948. "Fuentes de la metafisica de Suárez." Pensamiento no. 4:31-89.
———. 1949. Estudios sobre la metafisica de Francisco Suárez, S.I. Madrid: Ediciones Fax.
Kainz, Howard P. 1970. "The Suárezian position on Being and the Real Distinction: a analytic and comparative study."
Thomist no. 34:289-305.
"In elucidating the relationship between "existence" and "essence", it seems that two fundamental options are open:
1) to ground existence in existence itself; or 2) to ground existence in nothingness. Thomas Aquinas, in his doctrine on essence as potentiality, chooses the
latter option, for all practical purposes. Suárez, in order to avoid grounding existence in nothingness, chooses the former option. One result of his choice is
the purely mental "distinction" between essence and existence."
Karofsky, Amy D. 2001. "Suárez's doctrine of eternal truths." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 39:23-47.
"In this paper, I offer an interpretation of Suárez's doctrine of eternal truths expounded in Metaphysical Disputation XXXI,
Chapter XII, Sections 38-47. There, Suárez considers and rejects several theories before developing his own. Because it is somewhat difficult to determine what
view Suárez ultimately adopts, interpretations of this passage tend to vary. I argue that the interpretations of Norman Wells, Armand Maurer and John P. Doyle
are inadequate, since Suárez wants a solution to the problem of eternal truths that does not depend upon the will of the divine being and one that avoids any
ontological commitment to unactualized, possible success."
———. 2001. "Suárez's influence on Descartes's theory of eternal truths." Medieval Philosophy and Theology no.
"There is a philosophical problem, what I will call the problem of eternal truths, that can be stated as follows: If an unactualized,
possible essence has no being and is, hence, absolutely nothing, then what grounds the eternal and necessary truth of propositions that purport to be about
them? If there were no men, what would ground the necessary truth, "Man is a rational animal"? And what grounded the truth of that proposition prior
to the creation of the world? (If it was in fact true at that moment?)"
Knebel, Sven K. 2011. Suarezismus. Erkenntnistheoretisches aus dem Nachlass des Jesuitengenerals Tirso González de Santalla (1624-1705).
Abhandlung und Edition. Philadelphia: B.R. Grüner.
Text based on the partial edition of two Latin manuscripts in the Bibliotheca Universitaria de Salamanca: 1) Disputationes in octo libros
Physicorum Aristotelis et in duo libros De Generatione et Corruptione and 2) Disputationes in Metaphysicam, et libros De Anima, quibus adiuncti sunt
duo ultimi tractatus Logicae De Interpretatione, et de Priori, et Posteriori Resolutione.
Kronen, John. 1991. "Essentialism old and new: Suárez and Brody." Modern Schoolman:123-151.
"A revived interest in essentialism characterizes much recent Anglo-American philosophy. In this article I compare and contrast one of
the most articulate and well-argued recent versions of essentialism, that of Baruch Brody, with that of the last great system builder of the Schoolmen, Francis
Suárez. I argue that Suárez's account of essentialism has advantages over Brody's because in positing a form that is entitative or thing-like as the chief
constituent of the essences of substances Suárez's account is better able to explain the substantial unity of substances."
———. 1997. "Substances are not windowless: a Suárezian critique of monadism." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly
"Recently, Thomas Huffman has defended Leibniz's metaphysics of substance. In this paper I offer a critique of that metaphysics from the
point of view of the metaphysics of Leibniz's near contemporary, Francis Suárez. In my critique I show that Suárez's Aristotelianism is better able to account
for the existence of composite substances than is Leibniz's metaphysics and that Leibniz's implicit arguments against the Suárezian account of substance fail.
I conclude, based upon this, that Suárez's metaphysics should be preferred to Leibniz's since it better accords with the common sense notion that things such
as humans and cats are true substances and not mere aggregates."
Larrainzar, Carlos. 1977. Una introducción a Francisco Suárez. Pamplona: EUNSA.
Lejenhorst, Cees. 2007. "Cajetan and Suarez on Agent Sense: Metaphysics and Epistemology in Late Aristotelian Thought." In
Forming the Mind Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment, edited by Lagerlund, Henrik,
237-262. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"In this paper I have to limit myself to only a few late Aristotelian authors.
I shall deal with Thomas de Vio (Cardinal Cajetan) and Francesco Suarez.
Cajetan was one of the key figues in the rise of the so-called seconda scolastica, the counter-reformational attempt to build a new
Christian philosophy that fused revelation with Aristotelian thought. Moreover, his ideas about sense perception were heavily attacked by Suarez, who is
probably the best known and most influential Jesuit authors, who were so important in shaping late Aristotelianism. In this fashion, our
sample of case studies is arguably limited, but nevertheless quite representative for sixteenth-century Aristotelian accounts of sense perception. By way of
conclusion, this article ends with a brief exploration of how the debate on sense perception and its relation to the metaphysics of the chain of being changed
with the advent of modern philosophy, in particular with Descartes." (p. 241)
Lohr, Charles H. 2002. "Possibility and Reality in Suárez's Disputationes metaphysicae." In Res et verba in der
Renaissance. Proceedings of a Colloquium held at Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbüttel in 1998, edited by Kessler, Eckhard and Maclean, Ian, 273-286.
Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.
Lombardo, Mario Gaetano. 1995. La forma che dà l'essere alle cose. Enti di ragione e bene trascendentale in Suarez, Leibniz, Kant.
Milano: Istituto Propaganda Libraria.
Lopez, Jesus Garcia. 1969. "La concepcion suarista del ente y sus implicaciones metafisicas." Anuario Filosofico no.
Marion, Jean-Luc. 1996. "A propos de Suárez et Descartes." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 50:109-131.
———. 1996. "Substance et subsistance. Suárez et le traité de la substantia dans les Principia I, § 51-54." In
Questions cartésiennes II, 91-99. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Italian translation: Sostanza e sussistenza. Suárez e il trattato della substantia nei Principia I, 51-54, in: Jean-Robert
Armogathe, Giulia Belgioioso (eds.), Descartes: Principia Philosophiae (1644-1994), Atti del convegno per il 350° anniversario della pubblicazione
dell'opera, Parigi, 5-6 maggio 1994, Lecce 10-12 novembre 1994, Napoli: Vivarium.
"Étude de la conception cartésienne de la substance à la lumière d'un rapprochement avec la définition de la substance comme subsistance
chez Suarez. Soulevant le problème de l'indétermination entre univocité et analogie, selon que le concept concerne le fini ou l'infini, l'Auteur examine le
double paradoxe de la définition épistémologique et de la définition ontique de la substance."
Martins, Antonio Manuel. 1999. "Tópica metafísica: de Fonseca à Suárez." In Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradiçao e
Modernidade, edited by Cardoso, Adelino, Martins, Antonio Manuel and Dos Santos, Leonel Ribeiro, 157-168. Lisboa: Ediçoes Colibri.
Menn, Stephen. 1997. "Suárez, nominalism, and modes." In Hispanic philosophy in the Age of Discovery, edited by White,
Kevin, 226-256. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.
Miner, Robert C. 2001. "Suárez as founder of modernity: reflections on a "topos" in recent historiography." History
of Philosophy Quarterly no. 18:17-36.
"The aim of this paper is to query a notion that appears with increasing frequency in recent narratives of modern philosophy. The notion
is that the secret founder of modernity is not Bacon, Descartes or Hobbes, but Francisco Suárez. This paper examines three attempts to make the case of Suárez
as the founder of modern philosophy and finds each of them deficient. First, I examine the treatment of Suárez in Etienne Gilson's Being and Some
Philosophers. Secondly, I consider Alasdair MacIntyre's characterization of Suárez as an essentially antihistorical thinker in Three Rival Versions of
Moral Enquiry. Thirdly, I attempt to disambiguate several claims about Suárez that are characteristically bundled together by post-Heideggerian readings
of Suárez as the founder of a new science of ontology. The conclusion is that while it would be premature to reject the possibility that Suárez is the founder
of modern philosophy, the precise sense in which he would fit this description has not been persuasively delineated."
Nadler, Stephen. 1989. Arnauld and the Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
On Suárez see: Chapter 18. Objective being in Suárez and Descartes, pp. 147-165.
Noreña, Carlos G. 1981. "Ockham and Suárez on the ontological status of universal concepts." New Scholasticism no.
"Ockham's failure to explain the ontological conditions for the possibility of universal predication partially justifies the traditional
view of him as a nominalist. Ockham rejected the basic aristotelian and Thomistic doctrines about common natures, the principle of individuation and relations.
Suárez avoided both the Platonizing realism of Scotus and the nominalistic leanings of Ockham with his carefully articulated theories on the limitation of the
act, the principle of individuation, and the difference between essence and existence. Scholastic thought on the ontological status of universal concepts
centers on issues which are fundamental to the interpretation of Plato and Aristotle and which a comprehensive theory of knowledge cannot avoid."
———. 1983. "Heidegger on Suárez: the 1927 Marburg Lectures." International Philosophical Quarterly no. 23:407-424.
"Heidegger's thought on Suarez has been studied for the most part by scholastic philosophers with a particular doctrinal intent, in the
context of Heidegger’s views on the history of ontology, and on the narrow basis of a few passing remarks in some of Heidegger’s works.(1) The 1975 publication
of Heidegger’s (Summer Semester, 1927) lectures on Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, and their recent translation into English by Professor
Hofstadter, make possible a better documented and more conclusive analysis of the subject.(2) Unfortunately, other relevant sources still remain unpublished,
such as Heidegger’s lectures and seminars on the history of philosophy from St. Thomas to Kant, medieval mysticism, St. Augustine, and Renaissance
scholasticism. All of them, however, give a clear indication of Brentano’s influence upon Heidegger’s early thought and demonstrate an interest in medieval
philosophy which one seldom finds among contemporary thinkers. In this essay we intend 1) to summarize Heidegger’s views on medieval scholastic philosophy in
general and those of Suärez in particular, and(2) attempt to retrieve from the Marburg lectures what Heidegger left unsaid and unthought on the scholastic
distinction between essence and existence." (p. 407)
(1) Some scholars have argued that Heidegger’s criticism of medieval ontology was fully justified when directed against Suárez, but radically
unfair to St. Thomas. To this group belong: G. Siewerth, Das Schicksal der Metaphysik vom Thomas zu Heidegger (Einsideln, 1959); R. Echauri,
Heidegger y la Metafísica Tomista (Buenos Aires, 1970); B. Rioux, L'être et la vérité chez Heidegger et Saint Thomas d'Aquin (Montreal-Paris.
1963); C. Fabro, Participation et causalité selon S. Thomas d'Aquin (Louvain. 1961); J. P. Doyle, “Heidegger and Scholastic Metaphysics," The
Modem Schoolman, 49 (1972), 201-221; O. N. Derisi, “Approximaciones y diferencias entre la fenomenología existencialista de Martin Heidegger y la
ontología de Santo Tomás,” Sapientia, 22 (1967), 185-192; W. R. Korn, “La question de l'être chez Martin Heidegger," Revue Thomiste, 71
More favorable toSuárez were H. Meyer, Heidegger und Thomas von Aquin (Munich, 1968); and M. Schneider, “Der angebliche
Essentialismus des Suarez,” Wissenschaft und Weisheit, 24 (1961), 40-68.
Finally, there are those philosophers who think that both St. Thomas and Suárez fully deserve Heidegger's criticism. See. e.g., H. Siegfried,
Die Warhrheit und Metaphysik bei Suárez (Bonn. 1967).
Heidegger’s references to Suárez can be found in Sein und Zeit (Gesamtausgabe, ed. by F. W. von Herrmann, vol. 2, Frankfurt
am Main, 1977), 30; Die Frage nach dem Ding (Tübingen, 1962). 77; and Nietzsche (Pfullingcn, 1961), II, 418.
(2) The lectures Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (henceforth GP) were published in 1975 as vol. 24 of the Gesamtausgabe.
They were reviewed by M. E. Zimmermann in the International Philosophical Quarterly, 17 (1977), 235-237. and in Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 39 (1979). 537-550. Professor A. Hofstadter’s excellent translation was published in 1981 by Indiana University Press under the title Basic
Problems of Phenomenology (henceforth BP). I want to thank both Indiana U. Press and Professor Hofstadter for their kind permission to quote the English
———. 1985. "Suárez and Spinoza: the metaphysics of modal Being." Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia no. 12:163-182.
Novák, Lukáš, ed. 2014. Suárez’s Metaphysics in Its Historical and Systematic Context. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Table of Contents: Lukáš Novák: Regaining the Context for Suárez: An Introduction to the Volume 1-7; Note on Editorial Policies. List of
Abbreviations 8-10; Part One. General Metaphysics 11; Marco Forlivesi: In Search of the Roots of Suárez's Conception of Metaphysics: Aquinas, Bonino, Hervaeus
Natalis, Orbellis, Trombetta 13-37; Rolf Darge: Zum historischen Hintergrund der Transzendentalienlehre in den Disputationes metaphysicae 39-62;
Giannina Burlando: Suárez on Translatio vocis 'Veritas' 63-86; Victor Salas: Francisco Suárez, the Analogy of Being, and its Tensions 87-104; Marko J. Fuchs:
Univozität und Distinktion Metaphysische Grundstrukturen bei Duns Scotus, Suárez, Descartes und Spinoza 105-116; Costantino Esposito: The Hidden Influence of
Suárez on Kant's Transcendental Conception of 'Being', 'Essence', and 'Existence 117-134; Marco Lamanna: Ontology between Goclenius and Suárez; 135-151; Jorge
Uscatescu Barrón: Das Gedankending und der Gegenstant der Metaphysik: Eine Untersuchung zum Problem der Analogie zwischen dem Realen Seienden und dem ens
rationis in den Disputationes metaphysicae des Suárez 153-181; Daniel D. Novotný: The Historical Non-Significance of Suárez's Theory of Beings of
Reason: A Lesson from Hurtado 183-208; Parto Two. Speical Themes 209; Jorge Secada: Suárez's Nominalist Master Argument: Metaphysical Disputations 5,
1 211-236; Saverio Di Liso: The Efficient Cause in Domingo de Soto 237-257; Simo Knuuttila: The Connexions between Vital Acts in Suárez's Psychology'
259-274; Anna Tropia: Scotus and Suárez on Sympathy: The Necessity of the "connexio potentiarum" in the Present State 275-292; Stephan Schmid: Suárez
and the Problem of Final Causation 293-308; Robert Fastiggi: Suárez in Relation to Anselm, Aquinas and Scotus on Proving God's Existence 309-323; Author
Profiles 325-328; About the Editor 329-330; General Index 331-344; Index of Persons 345-348; Index of Greek Terms 348.
Novotný, Daniel D. 2013. Ens Rationis from Suárez to Caramuel. A Study in Scholasticism of the Baroque Era. New York: Oxford
"Beings of reason are impossible intentional objects, such as blindness and square-circle. The first part of this book is structured
around a close reading of Suarez's main text on the subject, namely Disputation 54. The second part centers on texts on this topic by other
outstanding philosophers of the time, such as the Spanish Jesuit Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578-1641), the Italian Franciscan Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-73), and
the Spanish-Bohemian-Luxembourgian polymath Juan Caramuel de Lobkowitz (1606-82)."
Olivo, Gilles. 1993. "L'homme en personne. Descartes, Suarez, et la question de l'ens per se." In Descartes et Regius.
Autour de l'explication de l'esprit humain, edited by Verbeek, Theo, 69-91. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
———. 1995. "L'impossibilité de la puissance: les conditions de la pensée de l'individu chez Suarez." In L'individu dans la
pensée moderne XVIe-XVIIIe siècles / L'individuo nel pensiero moderno. Secoli XVI-XVIII, edited by Cazzaniga, Gian Mario and Zarka, Yves Charles. Firenze:
Owens, Joseph. 1957. "The number of terms in the Suárezian discussion on essence and being." Modern Schoolman no.
Peccorini, Francisco. 1972. "Suárez's struggle with the problem of the one and the many." Thomist no. 36:433-471.
"The purpose of this article is to find out whether Suárez's attempt to reconcile analogy with the thesis of the perfect unity of the
concept of 'ens' was successful. To this effect, Suárez's basic premises - his theory of the universals and his conception of existence as such - are
discussed. The former is dismissed on the grounds that in it the would be link between conceptualism and realism is no link at all because it rests only on an
inductive abstraction which in turn is unworkable inasmuch as it is incompatible with the basic Suárezian tenet that the first direct concept is of the
individual only. It is shown also how Suárez nullifies his claims of analogy by accounting for the genesis of his concept of 'ens' in terms of his theory of
the universals which necessarily opens up to a univocal format. Finally, the article tackles the second premise - Suárez's conception of existence as such
understood as a thing and points to its equivocating effect on the concept of 'ens'."
———. 1974. "Knowledge of the singular: Aquinas, Suárez, and recent interpreters." Thomist no. 38 (606):655.
"Given the decisive influence of Suárez's conception on modern and contemporary nominalism, a thorough criticism is carried out on
different levels: (1) through a 'prima facie' logical analysis of his arguments; (2) through an exhaustive criticism of José M. Alejandro's interpretation of
Suárez's position, which is bent upon updating his mentor's foundation; and finally (3) on the basis of an 'ad hominem' dialogue centered on Suárez's
Thomistic claims. It is the contention of this article that through his eclectic solution Suárez jeopardized both the nature of the agent intellect -- by
hollowing out its whole ontological value -- and the thesis of the primacy of the individual in epistemology -- by leaving our knowledge unexplained in its
most fundamental respects and providing it only with unrealistic grounds. This makes it incumbent upon the author to show that the Thomistic thesis of indirect
knowledge of the singular proves to be fully satisfactory if examined in the light of Bernard J Lonergan and Karl Rahner's writings."
Pereira, José. 1996. "John of St. Thomas and Suárez." Acta Philosophica no. 5:115-136.
"Classical Thomism, originated by Aquinas, developed by Cajetan and consummated by John of St. Thomas (1589-1644), had many critics,
chief among them Francisco Suárez, the prime thinker of Baroque Scholasticism. His critique initiated changes in Thomism, leading John, among other Thomists,
to abandon the commentarial method followed by the older Scholastics; to occasionally substitute the Suárezian metaphysical distinction for the real
distinction characteristic of Thomism; to concede that the foundational Thomist tenet of the limitation of existence by essence is debatable; and to accept
Suárez's definition of God as "ipsum intelligere subsistens" rather than as "ipsum esse subsistens". "
———. 1999. "The achievement of Suárez and the suarezanisation of Thomism." In Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradiçao e
Modernidade, edited by Cardoso, Adelino, Martins, Antonio Manuel and Dos Santos, Leonel Ribeiro, 133-156. Lisboa: Ediçoes Colibri.
———. 2004. "The existential integralism of Suárez, reevaluation of Gilson's allegation of Suárezian essentialism."
Gregorianum no. 85:660-688.
"In declaring that 'existence as existence corresponds to being as such, and pertains to its intrinsic significance', Suárez accords to
existence a preeminence perhaps not ascribed to it by any Scholastic philosopher. Conceptually distinct, existence and essence are really identical, their
identity indicated by the term essentia realis, or 'existent essence'. Being (ens) is at once unitary in meaning and dyadic; it denotes
existence that is both actual (ens ut participium) and aptitudinal (ens ut nomen). 'Actual' existence is realized extra-mentally, while the
'aptitudinal' is existence insofar it is intelligible to the mind, prescinding from but not denying any extra-mental realization. The terminology that Suárez
employs is distinctly his own. Gilson, however, reads him Thomistically, and so interprets his essentia realis as a kind of Thomist reified concept
affirming the preeminence of essence. More recent commentators, influenced by Heidegger, see in the Suarezian essentia realis no more than
———. 2007. Suarez. Between Scholasticism and Modernity. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Pérez San Martin, Héctor. 1999. "Determinación del objeto y estudio de la metafísica, sus límites y su correlato con el nombre de esta
ciencia según el pensamiento del P. Francisco Suárez." Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia no. 26:5-39.
Rinaldi, Teresa. 1998. Francisco Suarez. Cognitio singularis materialis: De Anima. Bari: Levante.
Riva, Franco. 1979. "La dottrina Suáreziana del concetto e le sue fonti storiche." Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica no.
"Suárez's doctrine of concept while historically accepting the contribution of the mayor philosophical traditions of Middle Ages, has
its own originality as it proceeds from the metaphysical fundamental, i.e., from the constant reference to the doctrine of power and act which is only typical
of Suárez. Theoretically, Suárez (whom Descartes read at La Flèche) definitely reaffirms the intention of knowledge supporting the form of immediate realism.
Beyond any gnosiological dualism he demonstrates by exclusion the identity of verbum and high intellective and proposes (differing in opinion with
Thomas Aquinas) to define "the concept of id quo res concipitur", reducing it to pure instrument or mere sign, the reality of which all lies in the
Robinet, André. 1980. "Suárez dans l'oeuvre de Leibniz." Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia no. 7:191-209.
"Statistiquement, Suárez est l'un des auteurs les moins cités par Leibniz (quatorze mentions). Aucune étude directe ne lui est consacrée
dans les manuscrits connus. Les références de Leibniz a Suárez sont étudiées autour de sept concepts (métaphysique, principe d'individuation, causalité,
harmonie préetablie, de vinculo substantiale, eucharistie, scientia media) une étude comparative "fondée en realité textuelle"
devient alors édifiable."
Roig Gironella, Juan. 1948. "La síntesis metafìsica de Suárez." Pensamiento no. 4:169-213.
———. 1987. "La analogía del ser en Suárez." Espíritu Cuadernos del Instituto Filosófico de Balmesiana no. 36:5-48.
Ross, James F. 1962. "Suárez on "universals"." Journal of Philosophy no. 59:736-747.
"This is an exposition of Francis Suárez's treatment of the following two questions: (1) what sort of "community" obtains
among things that are properly said to be of the same sort? (2) in what sense can any "reality" be correctly called universal? The paper explains
Suárez's claims that there are real universals and that there is fundamentally but not formally a real community in reality. The pivotal problem is seen to
concern the meaning of 'similarity', since it does "not" mean having something in common. The paper offers the only resolution of the problem
reconcilable with Suárez's own statements, indicating that it commits him to a very novel (in his time) form of conceptualism."
Salas, Victor M., and Fastiggi, Robert L., eds. 2015. A Companion to Francisco Suárez. Leiden: Brill.
Table of contents: Preface; Victor Salas and Robert Fastiggi: Introduction: Francisco Suárez, the Man and His Work 1-28; Jean-Paul Coujou:
Political Thought and Legal Theory in Suárez 29-71; Jean-François Courtine: Suárez, Heidegger, and Contemporary Metaphysics 72-90; Rolf Darge: Suárez on the
Subject of Metaphysics 91-123; Costantino Esposito: Suárez and the Baroque Matrix of Modern Thought 124-147; Robert Fastiggi: Francisco Suárez as Dogmatic
Theologian 148-163; Daniel Heider: Suárez on the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Universals 164-191; Simo Knuuttila: Suárez’s Psychology 192-220; John Kronen:
Suárez’s Influence on Protestant Scholasticism: The Cases of Hollaz and Turretín 221-247; Daniel Novotný: Suárez on Beings of Reason 248-273; Paul Pace: Suárez
and the Natural Law 274-296; Joseé Pereira: Original Features of Suárez’s Thought 297-312; Michael Renemann: Suárez’s Doctrine of Concepts: How Divine and
Human Intellection are Intertwined 313-335; Victor Salas: Between Thomism and Scotism: Francisco Suárez on the Analogy of Being 336-362; Epilogue; List of
Contributors; Bibliography; Index of Names; Index Rerum.
Sanz, Victor. 1989. La teoría de la posibilidad en Francisco Suárez. Pamplona: EUNSA.
———. 1992. "La reducción suáreciana de los transcendentales." Anuario Filosofico no. 25:403-420.
"The notion of aliquid and res, excluded by Suárez from the transcendentals, nevertheless are of primary importance in
the understanding of the notion of being, a key aspect of suárecian ontology."
Schmutz, Jacob. 2002. "Un Dieu indifférent. La crise de la science divine dans la scolastique moderne." In Le Contemplateur et
les idées. Modèles de la science divine du néoplatonisme aux Temps modernes, edited by Boulnois, Olivier, Schmutz, Jacob and Solère, Jean-Luc, 185-221.
———. 2004. "¿Abatir o ensalzar a Francisco Suárez?" In Francisco Suárez. "Der ist der Mann". Apéndice Francisco
Suárez De generatione et corruptione. Homenaje al Prof. Salvador Castellote, 5-16. Valencia: Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer.
Preface to the volume.
———. 2004. "Science divine et métaphysique chez Francisco Suárez." In Francisco Suárez. "Der ist der Mann". Apéndice
Francisco Suárez De generatione et corruptione. Homenaje al Prof. Salvador Castellote, edited by Schmutz, Jacob, 347-379. Valencia: Facultad de Teología
San Vicente Ferrer.
———, ed. 2004. Francisco Suárez. "Der ist der Mann". Apéndice: Francisco Suárez De generatione et corruptione. Homenaje al
Prof. Salvador Castellote. Valencia: Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer.
Schöndorf, Harald. 2004. "La nada real. La doctrina de los entes posibles en la Disuputaciones Metafísicas de Fracisco
Suárez." In Francisco Suárez. "Der ist der Mann". Apéndice Francisco Suárez De generatione et corruptione. Homenaje al Prof. Salvador
Castellote, edited by Schmutz, Jacob, 381-403. Valencia: Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer.
Schwartz, Daniel, ed. 2012. Interpreting Suárez. Critical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contents: Notes on Contributors VII-VIII; Acknowledgements IX; Abbreviations and method of citation IX; 1. Daniel Schwartz: Introduction 1;
2. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Daniel D. Novotný: Fundamentals in Suárez's metaphysics: transcendentals and categories 19; 3. Christopher Shields: The reality of
substantial form: Suárez, Metaphysical disputations XV 39; 4. Jorge Secada: Suárez on the ontology of relations 62; 5. Bernie Cantens: Suárez's
cosmological argument for the existence of God 82; 6. Thomas Pink: Action and freedom in Suárez's ethics 115; 7. Terence H. Irwin: Obligation, rightness, and
natural law: Suárez and some critics 142; 8.Daniel Schwartz: Suárez on distributive justice 163; 9. Gregory M. Reichberg: Suárez on just war 185; Bibliography
205; Index 214.
Seigfried, Hans. 1972. "Kant's thesis about being anticipated by Suárez?" In Proceedings of the Third International Kant
Congress, edited by Beck, Lewis White, 510-520. Dordrecht: Reidel.
"The paper attempts to clarify a notion in Kant's philosophy which is much discussed today, by referring back to the doctrine of Suárez,
an historically influential representative of traditional ontology. It tries to give a rational account of the Suárezian doctrine of possibility and reality by
making explicit those assumptions which make it comprehensible and which were still, after some important modifications, the presuppositions underlying Kant's
thesis that being is obviously not a real predicate or (a predicate which stands for) something real but merely the positing of a thing."
Sgarbi, Marco, ed. 2010. Francisco Suárez and His Legacy. The Impact of Suárezian Metaphysics and Epistemology on Modern Philosophy.
Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
Table of Contents: Preface 5; Victor Salas: Francisco Suárez: End of the Scholastic epistéme? 9; Salvador Castellote: El ‘túnel del
tiempo’. Tiempo, movimiento y su medida, la teoría de los puntos y la indivisibilidad, según Suárez 29; Marco Forlivesi: Francisco Suárez and the rationes
studiorum of the Society of Jesus 77; Anna Tropia: Suárez as a Scotist. The Portrait of the Doctor Eximius in Losada’s Commentary on the Soul 91; Daniel
Heider: Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza’s (Mis)interpretation of Aquinas 105; Marco Lamanna: Tra Fonseca e Suárez. L’ingresso della nozione di ens reale
nella Schulmetaphysik 141; Igor Agostini: Suárez, Descartes e la dimostrazione dell’esistenza di Dio 169; Stefano Di Bella: Tota sua
entitate. Suárez and Leibniz on Individuation 205; Marco Sgarbi: Francisco Suárez and Christian Wolff. A Missed Intellectual Legacy 227; Valerio Rocco
Lozano: L’eredità nascosta di Suárez nel sistema hegeliano 243; Jacopo-Niccolè Bonato: Le occorrenze di Suárez nell’opera di Brentano 261; Federico Baccaccini:
Quasi umbrae entium. Suárez e Brentano sull’ens rationis 271-294.
Siewerth, Gustav. 1959. Das Schiksal der Metaphysik von Thomas zu Heidegger. Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag.
Reprinted in G. Siewerth, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 4, Düsseldorf, Patmos, 1987.
See Chapter IX: Die Objektivierung ders Denkens, pp. 19-37.
South, James B. 2001. "Francisco Suárez on imagination." Vivarium no. 39:119-158.
"I discuss two themes in Suárez's account of internal sensation: the number of internal sense powers and the activities of the internal
sense. I show that Suárez rejects a plurality of internal sense powers arguing that there need be only one such power. I then explore his account of the act of
internal sensation showing its relation to both external sensation and intellectual knowledge. Most notably, I show why Suárez was compelled to posit an
"agent internal sense" and how he manages to remain consistent with his view that there is only one internal sense power."
———. 2001. "Suárez and the problem of external sensation." Medieval Philosophy and Theology no. 10:217-240.
Specht, Rainer. 1997. "Aspects 'cartésiens' de la théorie suarezienne de la matière." In Lire Descartes aujourd'hui,
edited by Sepré, Olivier and Lories, Danielle, 21-45. Louvain: Peeters.
Svoboda, David. 2007. "Francisco Suárez on the Addition of the One to Being and the Priority of the One over the Many." Studia
Neoaristotelica no. 4:158-172.
"Suárez's solution to the problem of the conceptual Addition of the One to being follows firstly the Aristotelian-Averroistic tradition
mediated by Aquinas. According to this tradition, the One adds to being only a negative determination. Suárez claims that the One does not signify any positive
perfection either really or conceptually distinct from being as such. Suárez's own solution to the problem is presented in a critical discussion with many
different conceptions, but Suárez pays most attention to the theory of certain, mainly Franciscan, authors who hold that the One adds to being a positive
perfection which is only conceptually distinct from being as such. The main argument for this thesis is based on the assumption that indivision is to be taken
as a double negation, by which an affirmation is expressed. This concept of indivision was, according to Suárez, also defended by Aquinas, who holds that the
negation which is expressed by the One negates the division of one being from another. Suárez rejects this solution and proposes his own conception, according
to which the One does not negate the negative moment of the division of one being from another, but the positive moment of an essential division of a being in
itself. The One thus negates a real positive division of being in itself. On the basis of this theory, Suárez further rejected Aquinas's (and the Thomistic)
conception of a conceptual priority of the One over the Many, which was put forth as an answer to the old Aristotelian problem of a privative opposition
between the One and the Many. Suárez defends the real priority of an indivision over a division as well as a real and conceptual priority of the One over the
Many. Suárez's conception seems to us to be compatible with his concept of a negative Addition of the One to being. "
Teixeira, António Braz. 1999. "Suárez e o objecto e a naturaleza da metafísica." In Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradiçao e
Modernidade, edited by Cardoso, Adelino, Martins, Antonio Manuel and Dos Santos, Leonel Ribeiro, 37-44. Lisboa: Ediçoes Colibri.
Thompson, Augustine. 1995. "Francisco Suarez's theory of analogy and the metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas." Angelicum no.
Uscatescu Barron, Jorge. 1995. "El concepto de metafisica en Suarez: su objeto y dominio." Pensamiento no. 51:215-236.
"Se trata de una interpretacion de la Primera Disputacion de las Disputationes metaphysicae de Suarez. El objeto de la
metafisica es el ser real en general con exclusion del ente de razon y del ente per accidens. Asi pues, el dominio de la metafisica es la totalidad de
los entes reales por si. A continuacion se estudia cada uno de los temas que la metafisica debe tratar, lo cual se refleja en la estructura de la mencionada
obra de Suarez: propiedades y principios del ser, etc. Al hacer de la inmaterialidad un rasgo del ser se desvirtua el caracter generalisimo de la metafisica,
que de por si esta mas alla de la division del ser material e inmaterial. Por ultimo, se analiza la correspondencia entre los rasgos entresacados de la
metafisica como ciencia y el ser real en general."
Vleeschauwer, Herman Jean de. 1949. "Un paralelo protestante a la obra de Suárez." Revista de Filosofia no. 8:365-400.
Volpi, Franco. 1993. "Suárez et le problème de la métaphysique." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale no. 98:395-411.
"L'article attire l'attention sur l'importance du "tournant" Suárezien dans l'historie de la métaphysique conçue comme
onto - théo - logie, mettant en lumière les decisions qui sont prises par Suárez par rapport aux "topoi" les plus importants de la pensée
scolastique et de la pensée moderne. L'éxtraordinaire fortune de Suárez s'explique par le fait qu'il n'est pas seulement le dernier scolastique, mais aussi le
Wells, Norman J. 1955. The Distinction of Essence and Existence in the Philosophy of Francis Suárez.
Ph.D thesis submitted to the University of Toronto.
Abstract: "The name of Francis Suárez is a famous one in the history of philosophy, not to mention the histories of theology and law.
Indeed, his position on the question of the distinction between essence and existence in creatures, the subject matter of this thesis, is especially notorious.
However, though his final position on this question is quite well known, the philosophical milieu surrounding that decision and undoubtedly influencing it, is,
in contrast, rather obscure. This dissertation is primarily concerned with the latter aspect of the problem.
Suarez himself is our best guide since he lists the three famous traditions on this question up to his day and cites men and arguments on
behalf of each. The first tradition, that of the "Thomists", is the real distinction which maintains, for Suarez, that the essence and existence of a
creature are really distinct as duae res or two beings, and mutually separable, each being able to exist apart from the other. The second tradition, that of
the modal distinction, also holds for a similar real distinction in creatures as between a res or a being and its mode which are not mutually separable. The
third tradition, the distinction of reason and the position of Suárez, rejects any kind of real distinction of essence and existence in a creature and affirms
a distinction which is the work of the intellect and is not at all present in the thing.
Research into the sources of the five arguments Suárez attributes to the "Thomists" he lists has found that the first two are
explicit in such "Thomists" as Giles of Rome, John Capreolus, Paulus Barbus Soncinas, Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara and Chrysostomus Javellus. The
other three arguments are not found in the texts of these men noted by Suárez. But the common denominator of all the arguments is that they affirm a real
distinction between an uncreated esse essentiae or essence and a created esse existentiae or existence. That is, for Suarez, these men distinguish what comes
to be by an efficient cause, namely, existence, and what does not come to be by an efficient cause, namely, essence. Thus Suárez sees that the
"Thomist" school undergoes the doctrinal influence of Avicenna and this Neo-Platonic tradition through St. Albert, Henry of Ghent, and possibly
On behalf of the second tradition, Suarez cites some texts of John Duns Scotus, Henry of Ghent and Dominicus Soto which purportedly support
this modal distinction. In this tradition, esse existentiae, according to Suarez, is a mode which is a positive existential entity in his own right as in the
first tradition. However, unlike the latter, it cannot endure apart from the essence of which it is the mode. Thus, the second tradition differs from the
first, not so much on the notion of essence which is the same, but on the degree of reality each will attribute to esse existentiae. Of interest is the fact
that no such position is found in the texts of Scotus and Henry of Ghent. The texts of Soto do contain a doctrine of esse existentiae as a mode of essence but
do not describe it as a positive existential reality.
The third tradition is manifested in the texts of the sixteen men cited by Suarez as its exponents although there is a variety of formulation
as to the type of distinction of reason in question. However, this tradition is one in interpreting the real distinctions of the first two traditions to be
between duae res or a res and its mode. It is also one in rejecting these two traditions. Moreover, this third tradition is one in holding that the essence and
existence in question is the actual existing essence and esse in actu exercito. It is between these that there is only a distinction of reason. However, these
men agree that the essence abstractly conceived or essence as possible is distinguished from actual existence or actual essence as non-being from being. The
basic reason for their rejection of a real distinction is that something cannot be intrinsically constituted in the existential order by something really
distinct from it. For each is a being in its own right as distinct from the other. More basic than this is the fact that there is no esse existentiae in
addition to the esse essentiae of a creature. Existence means nothing more than the actual existing essence and in no way signifies an existential actus
essendi nor any accidental accretion. The men of this third tradition are characterized for Suarez by the fact that they are all opponents to some extent of
any kind of a Platonic realism within being which is the most manifest feature of the first two traditions on this question.
In explaining the principles behind this third tradition Suarez first lakes steps to remove any autonomous essential actuality apart from the
divine intellect since he sees very clearly that the first two traditions follow from their doctrine of the divine ideas. For them, the divine ideas are the
essences of creatures endowed with an esse essentiae in themselves as in Henry of Ghent. In Suarez' eyes this looks too much like the divine ideas enjoying
some eternal existential status apart from God or that they have been created from eternity. As his first principle, and that of the third tradition, Suarez
maintains that the essences of creatures, prior to their creation, are absolutely nothing in the sense of enjoying no real existential status. Though a critic
of this Avicennian tradition on the divine ideas, Suarez still remains within that tradition since he endows the essences of creatures in the divine intellect
with an esse possibile, an esse objectivum or an esse cognitum in much the same fashion as Duns Scotus in his critique of Henry of Ghent and as Durandus in his
critique of the same doctrine. Thus, in his critique of any Platonic realism of essence Suarez remains within the tradition of Duns Scotus and Henry of Ghent
but much farther along that doctrinal curve which leads to the nominalism of Ockham. Suarez, in his second principle, carries his critique of any realism of
essence into the created order of existing things. For, this principle states that ens in potentia and ens in actu are immediately distinguished as non-being
and being. In this Suarez counters those who maintained that ens in potentia or essence enjoys some positive mode of being, though diminished, within the
existent creature and his critique follows the pattern of the defense of his first principle.
Suarez' criticisms even carry within the tradition on the distinction of reason, rejecting all except the one which enables him to deny that
existence is of the essence of the creature. He finds this feature in what he calls a distinction of the reasoned reason -- a distinction of reason with a
foundation in reality. Because a creature has been created or is contingent it can cease to be and can found a concept of itself as non-existent. This concept
of a creature prescinded from existence outside its causes but apt to exist, unlike a chimera, is signified by essentia for Suarez. The same concept of that
creature as existing and outside its causes is signified by existentia. Existentia is denied of essentia creaturae because the concept of the possible essence
does not explicitly include what is signified by existentia or is included in the concept of the actual essence. In a word, the possible essence and the actual
essence are mentally distinguished and the concept of the actual essence as possible and the concept of the same essence as actual are likewise so
distinguished. Thus Suarez' distinction of reason is a result of a comparison between two concepts or rather, different degrees of contraction or adequation of
one concept with respect to the actual existing essence, the one more confused and obscure and less contracted than the other. It is just such a distinction
which enables Suarez lo deny existcntia of essentia creaturae. Hence, this distinction between essence and existence is said to be in the existent thing and
founded on it by extrinsic denomination from the concepts of this one existent essence.
By way of this extrinsic denomination Suarez can maintain that the existent essence has some internal metaphysical structure of essence and
existence. For, on the basis of the two concepts of essence and existence and their degrees of adequation 10 the existent essence, the concept of existence is
said to contract and be contracted by the concept of essence. In this way existence is said to be added to essence. This conceptual structure of the contracted
and the contracting is then imposed on the actual essence by extrinsic denomination from these concepts. Thus the constant insistence of Suarez on the
intrinsic constitution of the actual essence by existence does not imply any metaphysical structure within the actual existent but is a conceptual structure
imposed on this existent. Versus an order of essence within being uarez offers an order of a radically contingent essence which is being itself, impervious to
any existential co principle as it is to any distinction within it. In this struggle against the Platonic realism of essence in the first two traditions,
being, in the hands of Suarez, has lost its metaphysical dimension to the extent it has become an impenetrable, impervious, indistinct essence. Reality is only
metaphysical by extrinsic denomination and the science of metaphysics itself becomes nothing more than an analysis of concepts."
———. 1957. "The Number of Terms in the Suárezian Discussion on Essence and Being." Modern Schoolman no. 34:147-191.
———. 1962. "Suárez, Historian and Critic of the Modal Distinction Between Essential Being and Existential Being." New
Scholasticism no. 36:419-444.
———. 1979. "Old Bottles and New Wine: A Rejoinder to J. C. Doig." New Scholasticism no. 53:515-523.
"This paper is a criticism of an article in the same journal by J. C. Doig, Suárez, Descartes and the objective reality of
ideas. On the basis of primary and secondary source materials, it is made clear that Doig's exclusively extramental interpretation of Suárez's objective
concept is insensitive to the obvious intramental dimensions of that teaching. Thus Doig's claim of a doctrinal discontinuity between Suárez and Descartes is
found wanting due to a failure to consider Suárez's position on the realism of the possibles, their role in scientific knowledge in general, and the part they
play in metaphysics."
———. 1981. "Suárez on the Eternal Truths (Part I)." Modern Schoolman no. 58:73-106.
———. 1981. "Suárez on the Eternal Truths (Part II)." Modern Schoolman no. 58:159-174.
———. 1984. "Material Falsity in Descartes, Arnauld, and Suárez." Journal of Philosophy no. 22:25-50.
———. 1990. "Objective Reality of Ideas in Descartes, Caterus, and Suárez." Journal of the History of Philosophy no.
———. 1993. ""Esse Cognitum" and Suárez Revisited." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 67:339-348.
"The purpose of the work is to clarify the ambiguous use, in Suárez, of the terms "esse cognitum/esse objectivium" so
that no charge of "mentalism" can be brought while, at the same time, it can be acknowledged that "res" enjoys an intramental mode
of using, i.e., "objectively" ("conceptus objectivus") as well as an intramental "normal" mode of being
———. 1994. "Javelli and Suárez on the Eternal Truths." Modern Schoolman no. 72:13-35.
"An examination of Suárez's position on the Eternal Truths by bringing to bear upon it a controversy between Chrysostomus Javelli, O. P.
(+1538) (who is defending Harvey Nedellec, a.k.a. Hervaeus Natalis, O. P. (+1323) and Paulus Barbus Soncinas, O. P. (+1494) on the issue of efficient causality
with respect to necessary essential propositions and the distinction between a non-existential use of the copula "est" vs an existential use
———. 1994. "John Poinsot on Created Eternal Truths vs Vasquez, Suárez and Descartes." American Catholic Philosophical
Quarterly no. 68:425-446.
"An examination of John Poinsot's discussion of created eternal truths wherein he criticizes Gabriel Vasquez's interpretation of
Aquinas' position on the eternal truths. What is taken to task is Vasquez's insistence upon a positive eternal aptitudinal truth on the part of necessary as
well as contingent truths with regard to creatures. This is such that these truths are not eternal because known by God's eternal intellect. Rather, they are
eternally true (aptitudinally) in themselves apart from the divine intellect. Linkage to Suárez's and Descartes' positions on created eternal truths is also
———. 1994. "Objective Reality of Ideas in Arnauld, Descartes, and Suárez." In The Great Arnauld and Some of His Philosophical
Correspondents, edited by Kremer, Elmer J., 138-163. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
———. 1998. "Descartes and Suárez on Secondary Qualities: A Tale of Two Readings." Review of Metaphysics no.
Yela Utrilla, Juan F. 1948. "El Ente de Razón en Suárez." Pensamiento no. 4:271-303.
Zubimendi Martínez, Julián. 1984. "La teoría de las distincciones de Suárez y Descartes." Pensamiento no. 40:179-202.