A complete bibliography including publications in Polish can be found in: Mieczyslaw Omyla and Jan Zygmunt, "Roman Suszko (1919-1979): a
bibliography of the published work with an outline of his logical investigations," Studia Logica 43: 421-441 (1984).
Suszko, Roman. 1951. "Canonic Axiomatic Systems." Studia Philosophica no. 4:301-330.
———. 1955. "On the Infinite Sums of Models." Bulletin de l'Academie Polonaise des Sciences, Classe III no. 3:201-202.
Co-author: J. Los
———. 1955. "On the Extending of Models (Ii). Common Extensions." Fundamenta Mathematicae no. 42:343-347.
Co-author: Jerzy Los.
The first article: On the extending of models (I) was published by Jerzy Los in Fundamenta Mathematicae, 42, 1955 pp.
38-54; the third article: On the extending of models. III. Extensions in equationally definable classes of algebras, written by J. Slominski, was
published in: Fundamenta Mathematicae, 43, 1956 pp. 69-76
———. 1957. "On the Extending of Models (Iv). Infinite Sums of Models." Fundamenta Mathematicae no. 44:52-60.
Co-author J. Los
———. 1958. "Syntactic Structure and Semantical Reference (First Part)." Studia Logica no. 8:213-244.
"The syntactical and semantical investigations in contemporary formal logic refer always to the languages with specified syntactic structure,
as with respect to such languages one can formulate exactly and, subsequently examine with mathematical tools 1) the rules of transformation (axioms, rules of
inference) and the systems based on these rules (formalized theories), 2) the relations of semantical reference which occur between linguistic expressions and
elements of objective sphere.
Our considerations belong to that part of logical syntax and semantics which is independent of any assumptions concerning the rules of
The syntactic structure of some language L is determined 1° by the vocabulary of L i.e. by the list of simple
(undecomposable) expressions in L, and 2° by the rules of construction L of which state how the expressions of L',
especially the sentences in L are built of simple expressions.
In the first part of this paper we consider the general principles of the syntactic structure of languages. Namely, we shall formulate a
scheme of the syntactic structure of language. This scheme will he called the standard formalization and the languages which fall under this scheme
will be called the standard formalized languages (1).
The scheme of standard formalization is based on a purely syntactical classification of expressions into so called semantical
The standard formalization is an abstract from the concrete material of artificial symbolic languages which are considered in formal logic.
It is general in the following sense: every symbolic language known in formal logic - after carrying some modifications in its calligraphy -- falls directly
under the scheme of standard formalization.
In the second part of this paper we consider the fundamental properties of semantic reference. First, we introduce a classification of
objects into so called ontological categories. Further making use of some simple and quite natural connexion of conformity between semantical
categories of simple expressions and ontological categories of corresponding objects, we can introduce the general notion of a model of any standard
formalized language. Namely, for every standard formalized language L we define the family M(L ) of all models of L. Every model
of L is a totality to which the expressions of L can refer semantically and, conversely, every totality to which the expressions of
L can refer semantically, belongs to the family M(L). Thus, we obtain a general scheme of the relations of semantical reference
which is quite closely connected with the scheme of standard formalization. This shows the ideographic character of standard formalized languages.
It may be a reasonable conjecture the content of this paper to be connected with the structural inquires in linguistcs and with some problems
of the philosophy of language and of thinking. But, we do not discuss here these connexions." pp. 213-214.
(1) These terms are borrowed from A. Tarski (in collaboration with A. Mostowski and R. M. Robinson) - Undecidable Theories,
Amsterdam, 1953 p. 5.
———. 1958. "Remarks on Sentential Logics." Indagationes Mathematicae no. 20:177-183.
———. 1960. "Syntactic Structure and Semantical Reference (Second Part)." Studia Logica no. 9:63-93.
"§ 9. Introductory remarks concerning the relation of semantical reference.
We begin the considerations about semantics of standard formalized languages with some general remarks belonging to the theory of signs or
semiotic in the sense of Ch. Morris .
We consider the languages as systems of signs participating in the process of communication between persons belonging to some human group
(speech community). Communicative employment of linguistic signs in some group is intertwisted into the whole of activity of members of this group and of their
relations to the environment, and the connection between the employment of linguistic signs and the activity of persons of the given speech community grants an
intersubjective meaning to the employed signs.
The considerations about signs and languages may be conducted from a historical and descriptive point of view as well from systematical and
theoretical one. On the other hand one can distinguish in these considerations three following ranges: syntax, semantics and pragmatics [Morris 1938]. The
syntax deals with the relations which do occur between the signs alone. The principles of combination of simple signs into the composite signs are considered
by it. Generally speaking with the syntax it is investigated the syntactic structure of languages. Semantics deals with the relations of semantical reference
of signs to objects belonging to the objective sphere. These relations bind the signs with that about what the signs in the process of communication are
speaking. Finally, pragmatics take into account the role of persons employing the signs.
One may say that the division of the science of signs and languages into syntax, semantics and pragmatics is made from the point of view of
formal logic. Namely, pragmatics is strictly connected with the psychology, sociology, history of culture and other sciences dealing with members of speech
communities. On the contrary the considerations about linguistic expressions conducted in formal logic are included in the syntax and semantics.
If a language L of some syntactic structure is meaningful in some circumstances (i. e. the expressions of L are
participating in the process of communication in some human group) then the language L - as a system of expressions - semantically refers to some
complex R of objects which may be called the referent of the whole language L in the given circumstances of meaningfulness of L. I
think that the existence of this referent R and the occurence of the relations of semantical reference between the language L and the
referent R (and between the expressions of L and fragments of R) is a basis of the intersubjective meaning of expressions of
L. On the other hand the syntactic structure of the language L depends 1°) on the referent R and 2°) on the members of the given
speech community; the principle of the dual control of linguistic structure,  p. 12.
In the case of formalized languages the situation is much more simple. Firstly, in formal logic we abstract from pragmatical properties and
relations of linguistic expressions. In formal logic we consider only the syntactic structure of languages and the relations of semantical reference.
Therefore, instead of the referent of a given formalized language L (in the given circumstances of its meaningfulness) we consider here the family of
all possible referents of L which are called models of L and the principle of dual control mentioned above is reduced to the
connection between the syntactic structure and the common structure of all models of L. This is the connection of conformity of semantical
categories with the ontological categories. It will be explained later.
We do not intend here to prove the connection of conformity of categories. It will be enough to remark that this connection is fulfilled in
all semantical interpretations of artificial symbolic languages considered in formal logic. We take in our paper the connection of conformity of categories as
a fundamental principle by which are characterized the formal properties of relation of semantical reference and, consequently, it is possible to determine the
family of all models of any given standard formalized language." pp. 63-64.
Charles Morris - Foundations of the theory of signs - International Encyclopedia of Unified Sciences, vol. I, 2, Chicago, 1938, 5th
———. 1960. "On the Extending of Models (V). Embedding Theorems for Relational Models." Fundamenta Mathematicae no. 48:113-121.
Co-authors Jerzy Los and J. Slominski
———. 1961. "Concerning the Method of Logical Schemas, the Notion of Logical Calculus and the Role of Consequence Relations." Studia
Logica no. 11:185-216.
———. 1962. "A Note Concerning the Binary Quantifiers." Theoria no. 28:269-276.
———. 1965. "A Note Concerning the Rules of Inference for Quantifiers." Archiv für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung no.
———. 1966. "Noncreativity and Translatability in Term of Intensions." Logique et Analyse no. 9:360-363.
———. 1967. "An Abstract Scheme of the Development of Knowledge." In Actes Du Xi Congres International D'histoire Des Sciences.
Varsovie-Cracovie, 24-31 Août 1965, 52-55. Wroclaw: Ossolineum.
———. 1967. "An Essay in the Formal Theory of Extension and of Intension." Studia Logica no. 20:7-36.
———. 1967. "A Proposal Concerning the Formulation of the Infinitistic Axiom in the Theory of Logical Probability." Colloquium
Mathematicum no. 17:347-349.
———. 1967. "Concerning the Infinitistic Axiom in the Theory of Logical Probability." The Journal of Symbolic Logic no. 32:568.
———. 1968. "Ontology in the Tractatus of L. Wittgenstein." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 9:7-33.
"The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus of Ludwig Wittgenstein is a very unclear and ambiguous metaphysical work. Previously, like many formal
logicians, I was not interested in the metaphysics of the Tractatus. However, I read in 1966 the text of a monograph by Dr. B. Wolniewicz of the University of
Warsaw2 and I changed my mind. I see now that the conceptual scheme of Tractatus and the metaphysical theory contained in it may be reconstructed by formal
means. The aim of this paper* is to sketch a formal system or formalized theory which may be considered as a clear, although not complete, reconstruction of
the ontology contained in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
It is not easy to say how much I am indebted to Dr. Wolniewicz. I do not know whether he will agree with all theorems and definitions of the
formal system presented here. Nevertheless, I must declare that I could not write the present paper without being acquainted with the work of Dr. Wolniewicz. I
learned very much from his monograph and from conversations with him. However, when presenting in this paper the formal system of Wittgenstein's ontology I
will not refer mostly either to the monograph of Dr. Wolniewicz or to the Tractatus. Also, I will not discuss here the problem of adequacy between my formal
construction and Tractatus. I think that the Wittgenstein was somewhat confused and wrong in certain points. For example, he did not see the clear-cut
distinction between language (theory) and metalanguage (metatheory): a confusion between use and mention of expressions."
*Presented in Polish at the Conference on History of Logic, April 28-29, 1967, Cracow, Poland.
———. 1968. "A Note Concerning the Theory of Descriptions." Studia Logica no. 22:51-56.
Co-author: H. Lewandowski
———. 1968. "Formal Logic and the Development of Knowledge." In Problems in the Philosophy of Science. Proceedings of the International
Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1963. Vol. I, edited by Lakatos, Imre and Musgrave, Alan, 210-222. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Suszko's reply to W. V. Quine and J. Giedymin's discussion notes: pp. 227-230.
———. 1968. "Non-Fregean Logic and Theories." Acta Logica no. 11:105-125.
Annals of the University of Bucarest
———. 1969. "Consistency of Some Non-Fregean Theories." Notices of the American Mathematical Society no. 16:506.
———. 1970. "A Note on Abstract Logics." Bulletin de l'Academie Polonaise des Sciences, Classe III no. 18:109-110.
Co-authors: Stephen Bloom and D. J. Brown
———. 1970. "Some Theorems on Abstract Logics." Algebra i Logika no. 9:165-168.
Co-authors: Stephen L. Bloom and Donald J. Brown
"An abstract logic consists of a pair <a, cn< where a is an algebra and cn is a consequence (alias 'closure') operation on the carrier
of a. In this paper several theorems are given characterizing 'structural' and 'invariant' logics by their completeness properties. the method is a
generalization of the Lindenbaum-Tarski construction."
———. 1971. "Quasi-Completeness in Non-Fregean Logic." Studia Logica no. 29:7-14.
"The notion of quasi-completeness (or O-completeness) has been introduced by J. Los ,  into the semantics of theories in open languages
with nominal variables. An analogous notion known as Hallden-completeness ,  is applicable to sentential logics. Both notions are of the same formal
nature and can be uniformly treated when formulated with respect to W-languages which contain two kinds of variables, sentential and nominal, as well.
W-languages considered here are open, that is, not containing bound variables. The aim of this paper is to show that the main theorems of Los concerning the
quasi-completeness also hold in non-Fregean logic and semantics.
The author is indebted to Dr. Stephen L. Bloom from Stevens Institute of Technology for comments on the first draft of this paper."
 J. Los, The algebraic treatement of the methodology of elementary deductive systems, Studia Logica 2, 1955, 151-211.
 J. Los, R. Suszko, On the extending of models II, Fundamenta Mathematicae 42, 1955, 343-347.
 S. Hallden, On the semantic non-completeness of certain Lewis calculi, The Journal of Symbolic Logic 16, 1951, 127-129.
 S. A. Kripke, Semantical analysis of modal logic II, in: The Theory of Models, Amsterdam 1965, pp. 206-220.
———. 1971. "Semantics for the Sentential Calculus with Identity." Studia Logica no. 28:77-82.
Co-author: Stephen L. Bloom.
"The SCI (Sentential Calculus with Identity) is obtained from the classical sentential calculus by the addition of 1° a new binary
connective, the identity connective (denoted by =) and 2° axioms which 'say' that = means "p is identical to q" (also: "the situation p is the same as the
situation q"). The new axioms are the weakest possible; no presuppositious about the meaning of "is identical to" are included (other than p = p). We do not
attempt to say what the range of the sentential variables p, q, r, ... is. (In the classical propositional calculus, they are intended to range over a two
element set.) In this paper, a number of results about the semantics of the SCI are given without proof. The proofs of these and other results are contained in
the much longer Investigations into the Sentential Calculus with Identity."
———. 1971. "Identity Connective and Modality." Studia Logica no. 27:7-41.
———. 1971. "Sentential Variables Versus Arbitrary Sentential Constants." Prace z Logiki no. 6:85-88.
———. 1971. "Sentential Calculus with Identity (Sci) and G-Theories." The Journal of Symbolic Logic no. 36:709-710.
———. 1972. "Investigations into the Sentential Calculus with Identity." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 13 (3):289-308.
Co-author: Stephen L. Bloom
"The sentential calculus with identity (SCI) is obtained from the classical sentential calculus by the addition of a binary 'identity
connective' = and axioms which 'say' that p = q means p is identical to q. the study of the semantics of the resulting consequence operation using Tarski's
matrix method yields insights into consequence operations in general and the classical and modal consequence operations in particular. One finitely
axiomatizable SCI theory is studied. It is shown that this theory consists of those formulas valid in all topological boolean algebras."
See also the Errata - in: Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, volume 17, 1976) p. 640.
———. 1972. "Description in Theories of Kind W." Bulletin of the Section of Logic no. 1:8-13.
Co-author: Mieczyslaw Omyla
———. 1972. "Definitions in Theories of Kind W." Bulletin of the Section of Logic no. 1:14-19.
Co-author: Mieczyslaw Omyla
———. 1972. "A Note on Modal Systems and Sci." Bulletin of the Section of Logic no. 1:38-41.
———. 1972. "A Note on Adequate Models for Non-Fregean Sentential Calculi." Bulletin of the Section of Logic no. 1:42-45.
———. 1972. "Sci and Modal Systems." The Journal of Symbolic Logic no. 37:436-437.
———. 1973. "Structurality, Substitution and Completeness." The Journal of Symbolic Logic no. 38:348.
Co-authors: Stephen Bloom and D. J. Brown (Abstract).
———. 1973. "Abstract Logics." Dissertationes Mathematicae no. 102:9-41.
Co-author: D. J. Brown
———. 1973. "Adequate Models for the Non-Fregean Sentential Calculus (Sci)." In Logic, Language, and Probability. A Selection of Papers
Contributed to Sections Iv, Vi, and Xi of the Fourth International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Bucharest, September 1971,
edited by Bogdan, Radu and Niiniluoto, Ilkka, 49-54. Dordrecht: Reidel.
"This note contains the proof of the following theorem: every model, adequate for SCI, is uncountable."
———. 1974. "Dual Spaces for Topological Boolean Algebras." Bulletin of the Section of Logic no. 3:16-19.
Co-author: E. Quackenbush
———. 1974. "A Note on Intuitionistic Sentential Calculus." Bulletin of the Section of Logic no. 3:20-21.
———. 1974. "Equational Logic and Theories in Sentential Languages." Colloquium Mathematicum no. 19:19-23.
———. 1974. "Equational Logic and Theories in Sentential Language." Bulletin of the Section of Logic no. 1:2-9.
A slightly abridged version of the essay published with the same titile in Colloquium Mathematicum.
———. 1974. "Some Notions and Theorems of Mckinsey and Tarski, and Sci." Bulletin of the Section of Logic no. 3:3-5.
———. 1975. "Abolition of the Fregean Axiom." In Logic Colloquium. Symposium on Logic Held at Boston, 1972-73, edited by Parikh,
Rohit, 169-239. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
This paper was also published as a separate booklet by the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw
1972, in a series of preprints.
———. 1975. "Ultraproducts of Sci Models." Bulletin of the Section of Logic no. 4:9-14.
Co-author: Stephen L. Bloom
———. 1975. "Remarks on Łukasiewicz Three-Valued Logic." Bulletin of the Section of Logic no. 4:87-90.
———. 1975. "A Note on the Least Boolean Theory in Sci." Bulletin of the Section of Logic no. 4:136-137.
———. 1976. "Sentential Calculus of Identity and Negation." Reports on Mathematical Logic no. 7:87-106.
Co-author: Aileen Michaels
———. 1976. "En-Logic." Bulletin of the Section of Logic no. 3:13.
Co-author: Aileen Michaels.
A loose summary of: Sentential Calculus of Identity and Negation.
———. 1977. "On Distributivity of Closure Systems." Bulletin of the Section of Logic no. 6:64-66.
Co-author: Wojciech Dzik
———. 1977. "On Filters and Closure Systems." Bulletin of the Section of Logic no. 6:151-155.
———. 1977. "The Fregean Axiom and Polish Mathematical Logic in the 1920s." Studia Logica no. 36:376-380.
Summary of the talk given to the 22nd Conference on the History of Logic, Cracow (Poland), July 5-9, 1976.
———. 1979. "On the Antinomy of the Liar and the Semantics of Natural Language." In Semiotics in Poland 1894-1969, edited by Pelc,
Jerzy, 247-254. Dordrecht: Reidel.
English translation by Oligierd Wojtasiewicz of an article published in Polish in 1957.
"The antinomy of the liar has been discussed many times in formal logic. It is associated with remarkable advances in logic: the formulation
of the semantic theory of truth  and the discovery of undecidable statements and the impossibility of proofs of consistency under specified conditions (;
see also , Vol. II, pp. 256ff).
All those results make fundamental use of self-referential expressions, which were first used, in the history of logic, in the
antinomy of the liar. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate, by quite elementary methods; something that has been known since the birth of semantics, namely,
that the concept of truth and other semantic concepts are relative in nature  and that using relative semantic concepts, including the construction of
self-referential expressions, does not result in antinomies in natural language.
Semantics, and in particular the semantic theory of truth, presupposes syntax. The wealth of semantic analysis thus depends on the wealth of
syntactic information about those expressions to which semantic analyses refer. Since in this paper no systematic syntactic studies on the structure of
expressions are made, except for the construction of self-referential expressions, the set of concepts used in the semantic theory of truth discussed here is
The semantic theory of truth does not result in the antinomy of the liar if we use concepts restricted to a set of statements which does not
include statements from the theory of truth which we are studying in a given case.
It can be shown that the same applies to other parts of semantics, namely those in which the other semantic concepts (denoting, satisfying,
etc.) are used , , .
To do this it suffices to analyse other antinomies constructed with the aid of semantic concepts, and to modify them in a manner analogical
to that applied above in the case of the antinomy of the liar.
The semantic concepts which we can use in semantic research without being involved in antinomies are relative (restricted). They have a
certain reference to a type L of expressions, which includes neither those semantic terms which have a reference to L, nor statements
containing those semantic terms. Within those semantic analyses in which we use semantic concepts restricted to type L of expressions we can
construct, in accordance with general syntactic rules, an expression which can be proved not to be of type L. The proof consists in a reasoning which
changes into an appropriate antinomy if the restrictive reference to L, applied to the semantic concepts used in that case, is disregarded."
 Carnap, R., 'Die Antinomien und die Unvollstandigkeit der Mathematik', Monatshefte fiir Mathematik und Physik, 41, 1934, pp.
 Gödel, K., Ober formal unentscheidbare Sätze der "Principia Mathematica" und verwandter Systeme I', Monatshefte far Mathematik und
Physik 38, 1931, pp. 173-98.
 Hilbert, D., Bernays, P., Grundlagen der Mathematik, Berlin 1934, 1939.
 Tarski, A., 'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages', in: Tarski, A., Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, Oxford 1956.
 Tarski, A., 'The Establishment of Scientific Semantics', ibid.  Tarski, A., 'On the Concept of Logical Consequence',
———. 1979. "Normal and Non-Normal Classes in Current Languages. Studies in the Concept of Class. I." In Semiotics in Poland
1894-1969, edited by Pelc, Jerzy, 255-272. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Co-author: Zdzislaw Kraszewski.
English translation by Olgierd Wojtasiewicz of an article published in Polish in 1966.
"Russell's antinomy of the class of normal classes, i.e., the class of those classes which are not their own elements, emerged when the
current concept of class was being given more precision. It is this current concept of class which is blamed for Russell's antinomy.
The task of the present paper is to offer a fairly precise definition of the current concept of class, which has subsequently come to be
split into the collective (concretistic) concept of class and the distributive (mathematical) concept of class or set. S..Leśniewski's mereology, to which T.
Kotarbinski's concretism refers, is a theory of classes in the collective sense. The theory of classes in the distributive sense has taken the form of
mathematical set theory, which originated with E. Zermelo; other versions of the theory of classes in the distributive sense are provided by B. Russell's type
theory and S. Leśniewski's Ontology.
After making the current concept of class more precise, which will consist in a systematization of the assumptions concerning that concept,
we shall define normal and non-normal classes as well as the class of normal classes and the class of non-normal classes. Several variations of these
definitions are possible, and Russell's antinomy can be reconstructed in each case. We shall see, however, that his antinomy cannot be reconstructed in current
language, since the corresponding reasonings do not yield a contradiction. The thesis of this paper is that the current concept of class, as described below,
is not self-contradictory."
———. 1979. "Normal and Non-Normal Classes Versus the Set-Theoretical and the Mereological Concept of Class. Studies in the Concept of Class.
Ii." In Semiotics in Poland 1894-1969, edited by Pelc, Jerzy, 273-283. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Co-author: Zdzislaw Kraszewski.
English translation by Oligierd Wojtasiewicz of an article published in Polish in 1968.
°We shall concern ourselves here with the transition from the current concept of class to the distributive (set-theoretical) and the
collective (mereological) concept of class. This transition is linked to the concepts of normal and non-normal class. Preliminary remarks on that issue have
already been made in Sec. 8.
We assume here a non-existential axiom system for the current concepts of class and element, as described in Secs. 2 and 3. Consequence and
equivalence are interpreted, as before, as consequence and equivalence in the light of that axiom system."
———. 1979. "Filters and Natural Extensions of Closure Systems." Bulletin of the Section of Logic no. 8:130-132.
Co-author: T. Weinfeld
———. 1994. "The Reification of Situations." In Philosophical Logic in Poland, edited by Wolenski, Jan, 247-270. Dordrecht: Kluwer
English translation by Theodore Stazeski of an article published in Polish in 1971.
"The great task of the theory of reification is to show in what way the so-called ontological assumptions of the structure of the universe of
situations are transferred to events by reifications, and to impose an algebraic structure on them. Such an approach to the theory of reification flows from
the earlier expressed opinion that situations are primary and events are derived. One should not confuse this point of view with the false opinion, I believe,
that situations are primary in relation to all objects. It is an altogether different and difficult matter, and in this case a certain consultation of
Wittgenstein would be very useful. But the fact that situations are primary in relation to their reification is rather natural. The abstract process, of which
the formal expression is the reification of a situations, finds - I think - its fragmentary expression in ordinary language; I write `I think' since I enter
into the competence of linguists. These examples given by Slupecki are an illustration. Thus, forest fire = reification of the situation that the forest is
burning, and Matt's death = reification of the situation that Matt died. These examples do not give evidence that an explicit symbol of the reification of
situations, corresponding to the star of Slupecki of our T, exists in natural language. They are examples giving evidence that the grammatical apparatus of a
natural language can often, though certainly not always, transform sentences p (describing situations) into names x (designating particular
events) such that x = T (p), and sentences containing those names. The opposite transformation is something unnatural, and is hardly taken
into consideration by grammarians.
This observation obviously does not remove the most serious difficulties which appear in connection with situations. The principal difficulty
appears at the moment of incorporation of non-trivial theories written in natural language with help of (bound) sentence variables. Reading formulas appearing
in this theory in natural language immediately raises serious doubts for many logicians with regard to sense or correctness. There are no such difficulties, or
they are considerably less, in the reading of formulas with name variables (not sentential. It is probably the symptom of some deep, historical attribute of
our thought and natural language, whose examination and explication will certainly be prolonged and arduous.
From the rather narrow point of view of formal logic the following considerations are suggested. The difference between a sentence and a name
is not exhausted in their syntactical properties. A certain syntactic analogy even exists between the category of sentences and the category of names, which
can stretch very far (for example the rules of operations for quantifiers are formally similar in the case of sentential and name variables). The difference
between sentences and names appears first of all in that sentences, and not names, are subject to assertion, as well as that sentences are premises and
conclusions in reasoning. These distinctions on the language level are transferred in some manner to that to which the sentences and names semantically refer.
Semantical relation (reference), however, of sentences and names are also - formally - to a certain degree analogical.
Names designate and sentences describe. The difference in terminology (designate, describe) is not essential. The essential point is that we
attribute reference to something both to names and to sentences, and that this, in the case of a given name and a given sentences, is exactly one; with the
assumption, obviously, of a univocal sense of expression and with exclusion of mythological terms.
This analogy, however, is not complete, just like the analogy between sentences and names, with result that a categorial gap exists between
that which a sentence describes (a situation) and that which a name designates (an object). The fact that the expressions p = x and p x,
where on the left we have a sentence and on the right a name, are not well formed formulas, shows this profound gap.
The analogies between situation and objects as well as that between sentences and names are not complete. But it does not stop at the level
of the formation of sentences and names, not at the level of the formal operation on them in accordance with logic. What, therefore, is the cause that our
thought and natural language discriminate sentence variables to a certain degree, and particularly, general and existential sentences about situations?
The above considerations about the reification of situations show that the theory of situations and the theory of events are, in certain
manner, equivalent. Why, therefore, prefer the theory of events to the theory of situations?" pp. 249-250.