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Bibliography of Intercultural and Comparative Philosophy: L-N

Contents of this Section

This part of the section Intercultural and Comparative Philosophy includes the following pages:

Intercultural and Comparative Philosophy: An Overview

Selected bibliography on Comparative and Intercultural Philosophy:



L-N (Current page)



African Philosophy

Selected bibliography on African Philosophy

PDF version Comparative philosophy. Bibliography of the studies in English: Complete PDF Version on the website


  1. Lacertosa, Massimiliano. 2017. "For a philosophy of comparisons: the problems of comparative studies in relation with Daoism." Asian Philosophy no. 27:324-339.

    Abstract: This paper reflects on the problems of cross-cultural interpretations and translations analysing how these are rooted in theories and philosophical assumptions. Inquiring the concept of philosophy per se, the paper discusses key passages of Heidegger and the related problem of 有(you) and 無(wu). The conclusion is that to translate such terms, it is necessary to revise the coercive ontotheological assumptions of metaphysics. This can trigger a process of re-grounding grounds with the consequent possibility of language transformation, which, in turn, activates new relations between cultural diversities. Thus, philosophy itself becomes an eminently comparative dialogue between cultures. Without setting a single method for all these problems, the paper argues that comparisons themselves call for necessarily different methodological approaches. Hence, whilst Daoism helps to illuminate these issues defining one of the possibilities that a philosophy of comparisons entails, this same reasoning opens a way for another

    reading of the Daodejing ."

  2. Larson, Gerald James, and Deutsch, Eliot, eds. 1988. Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Contents: Preface VII-IX; Gerald James Larson: Introduction: The “Age-Old Distinction Between the Same and the Other” 3; Karl H. Potter: Metaphor as Key to Understanding the Thought of Other Speech Communities 19; Henry Rosemont, Jr: Against Relativism 36; Daya Krishna: Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be 71; Ben-Ami Scharfstein: The Contextual Fallacy 84; Charles Hartshorne: Sankara, Nagarjuna, and Fa Tsang, with Some Western Analogues 98; Raimundo Panikkar: What Is Comparative Philosophy Comparing? 116; Hajime Nakamura: The Meaning of the Terms ‘Philosophy’ and ‘Religion’ in Various Traditions 137; Frederick J. Streng: Mechanisms of Self-Deception and True Awareness According to C. G. Jung and the Eight-Thousand-Line Perfection of Wisdom Sutra 152; Eliot Deutsch: Knowledge and the Tradition Text in Indian Philosophy 165; Ninian Smart: The Analogy of Meaning and the Tasks of Comparative Philosophy 174; Sengfaku Mayeda: Sankara and Narayana Guru 184; Frits Staal: Is There Philosophy in Asia? 203; Wingh-Tsit Chan: Chu Hsi and World Philosophy 230; Roger T. Ames: Confucius and the Ontology of Knowing 265; A. S. Cua: Reflections on Moral Theory and Understanding Moral Traditions 280; Wm. Theodore de Bary: Neoconfuciamsm as Traditional and Modern 294; Contributors 311; Index 313-316.

  3. Leaman, Oliver. 1999. Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy . New York: Routledge.

    "The premise on which I am working here is that Eastern philosophy is philosophy, and not something special and esoteric which we need special non-philosophical tools to operate. On the other hand, there is no doubt that Eastern philosophy is closely connected with the religions of the East, and it is impossible to understand that philosophy unless one also understands something of the religions. I have tried to explain enough about the relevant religion or culture to make the context of the philosophy comprehensible. For this reason I have included some material that is far more relevant to religion than to philosophy.

    It is always difficult to know if one has gone into enough depth, and if one has spent too much time on the religion and not enough on the philosophy. This is a book on philosophy, and not on religion, and a book on religion would include far more discussion of the key religious concepts than I have done." (Introduction, p. XI)

  4. Levine, Michael. 2016. "Does Comparative Philosophy Have a Fusion Future?" Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies no. 4:208-237.

    Abstract: "This essay challenges the claim that fusion philosophy is the successor to comparative philosophy. Comparative philosophy should find itself deeply at odds with the approach to various philosophical problems and traditions that fusion philosophy is taking, and comparative philosophers will surely deny Mark Siderits (2003: xi) claim that they have been superseded. The manner then in which fusion philosophy dismisses comparativist concerns and objections is to admit that such objections are valid in some case but to deny that they are intrinsic to good fusion philosophy. Comparativists however generally do not claim that fusion philosophy is necessarily or inherently bound to make the mistakes and contribute to misunderstandings that they claim it often does. Their claim is that from the start such philosophy often does make just these kinds of problematic errors and assumptions, and that this is what comparativist philosophy must seek to avoid. By the time fusionists are done defending – actually sanitizing – fusion philosophy from comparativist objections, one is left not with fusion philosophy but with what is – from the comparativist perspective – comparative philosophy. There is no succession from comparative philosophy to fusion philosophy and no segue from one to the other."

  5. Li, Chenyang. 1999. The Tao Encounters the West: Explorations in Comparative Philosophy . Albany: State University of New York Press.

    Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction 1; Chapter 1. Being: perspective versus substance 11; Chapter 2. Truth: Confucius and Heidegger 35; Chapter 3. Pragmatic versus semantic 63; Chapter 4. Ethics: Confucian Jen and Feminist Care 89; Chapter 5. Family: duty versus rights 115; Chapter 6. Religion: multiple participation versus exclusionism 139; Chapter 7. Justice: Confucian values and democratic values 163; Concluding remarks 191; Notes 193; Bibliography 217; Index 229.

    From the Introduction: "The book may be seen as a study of Chinese and Western versions Tao. "Tao", as the word is used in Chinese, is not limited to Taoism; in all major Chinese systems it refers to the right way (the Ways or cosmic order even though different schools have different interpretations.' Chinese philosophy, therefore, may be seen as studies of various aspects of the Tao. Neither Chinese nor Western philosophy is homogeneous. There are, however, certain philosophies and philosophers who have had a defining influence within their own cultures and traditions, and I believe that a comparative study of these philosophies and philosophers can be used to demonstrate different thought patterns of the two cultures. Such a study illuminates the Chinese harmony model of life, which serves as a cornerstone of my argument for the coexistence of Confucianism and democracy.

    This book serves a dual purpose. While each chapter contributes directly or indirectly to the main thesis, each also stands on its own as a comparative study of a specific dimension of Western and Chinese philosophical and ethico-religious traditions.

    Chapter 1, "Being: Perspective versus Substance," investigates the differences between Chinese ontology and Aristotelian ontology, which is the most influential in the West. Aristotle's view of being is a substance ontology, according to which the world is composed of various individual substances. The Chinese philosopher Zhuang Zi's ' ontology, which reflects on the background of Chinese thinking in general, is a perspective ontology. According to this ontology, the being or identity of an entity is always contextually situated and perspective-dependent. These ontological differences occur at a fundamental level and thus underlie many other philosophical positions that distinguish Chinese from Western views. Communication and mutual understanding can be enhanced with a clear understanding of these differences. For example, the Chinese "contextual perspective" ontology has profound implications for people's attitudes toward many other significant aspects of life, including truth, morality, and religious practice. Because of the significance of Chinese ontology for Chinese philosophy in general, this first chapter not only provides the basis for chapter 2, on truth, it also has direct relevance to chapters 4 and 5 as the foundation of the Confucian understanding of `personhood."

    Chapter 2, "Truth: Confucius and Heidegger," investigates various concepts of truth, which is a central value in the West and in China. In the West, truth is usually understood semantically; it is a relation between language and reality. The Chinese understand it primarily as a matter of being a good person, as a way of life; being true is the way to realize one's potential for becoming fully human. Different understandings of truth in Western and Chinese philosophies affect value judgments in significant ways. Heidegger is chosen here not because he represents a typical Western understanding of truth (he does not), but because he presents a root metaphor of truth that is shared by both the Chinese and the Westerner. Through exploring Heidegger's view on truth, this chapter demonstrates how the Chinese and Western notions of truth, although sharing the same common metaphor of "unveiling (aletheia)," lead in different directions. This understanding of Chinese truth as a way of life and self-realization provides further ground for discussion in chapters 4, 5. 6, and 7." (pp. 2-3)

  6. ———. 2002. "Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies. From the Editor." APA Newsletters no. 2:19.

    "Comparative philosophy can be understood broadly as philosophizing across two or more philosophical systems or traditions. Today, when people say comparative philosophy they typically mean philosophizing across cultural traditions, even though the lines between cultures are not always easily drawn. We do not need a precise definition of comparative philosophy to see the value and benefit of doing comparative philosophy. Different philosophies may have different issues to deal with because of their respective understandings of the world and human society; they may also share same philosophical problems, even if they do not tackle these problems in the same way. As we compare, we see both differences and similarities. Seeing differences helps us better understand one another; seeing similarities makes us feel less distant from one another and enhances our human solidarity.

    Comparative philosophy, however, is not merely about seeing differences and similarities across traditions. Drawing rich resources from other traditions can help one’s own practice of philosophy become more fruitful. Philosophizing across traditions enables us to expand our horizons and to see things from different perspectives. In the contemporary world, philosophizing without looking beyond one’s own philosophical system or tradition proves increasingly impoverished and parochial."

  7. ———. 2016. "Comparative Philosophy and Cultural Patterns." Dao. A Journal of Comparative Philosophy no. 15:533-546.

    Abstract: "As a genus of philosophy, comparative philosophy serves various important purposes. It helps people understand various philosophies and it helps philosophers develop new ideas and solve problems. In this essay, I first clarify the meaning of “comparative philosophy” and its main purposes, arguing that an important purpose of comparative philosophy is to help us understand cultural patterns. This function makes comparative philosophy even more significant in today’s globalized world."

  8. Liang, Shuming. 2001. "The Cultures of the East and West and Their Philosophies." Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy no. 1:107-127.

    Translated by Andrew Covlin and Jinmei Yuan.

    "Editor's note: This is the first installment of a series of translations of selected articles from the important debate on the Cultures of the East and West which took place in China during the early twentieth century. Generally speaking, this debate involved two groups of people: Proponents of Western Culture, and proponents of Eastern Culture. The former, represented by Hu Shi, believed that traditional Chinese culture was no longer viable in the modem world and maintained that we should accept Western culture as a whole; the latter, represented by Liang Shuming, the author of the following selection, argued that Chinese culture is superior to Western culture and represents the future of world culture.

    Translated below is chapter 2 of Liang's famous book, The Cultures of the East and West and their Philosophies . It can be seen in this chapter that although Dang is a proponent of Eastern Culture, he also tries very hard to incorporate into Chinese culture what he sees as valuable aspects of Western culture, particularly Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy. The section numbers are added by translators.."

  9. Libbrecht, Ulrich. 2006. Within the Four Seas... Introduction to Comparative Philosophy . Leuven: Peeters.

    "The purpose of Part I is not to deal with the problem of globalization in depth: this is far beyond my capacities. It intends only to prove that comparative philosophy must actually be the culmination of globalism, because it studies encounters between civilizations in depth, not as commercial or political strategies. Some scholars are of the opinion that comparative thinking is nothing more than an academic diversion alienated from political, economic and social reality. ActualJy, it is a project for the future, a revival of Erasmus' dream on a worldwide scale, free from traditional Eurocentrism, and also far removed from flat commercialism." (pp. 1-2)


    "It is not the task of a comparative philosophy to blend these philosophies into a kind of world philosophy, but to bring them together in a model that enables global dialogue. Such a dialogue does not aim at a kind of ecurnene or mutual respect and tolerance in the first place, but at a philosophical act which brings out the similarities and especially the differences, because precisely the latter augment the spiritual wealth of mankind. In Part 2 we try to buld a model which makes this comparison possible. In Part 3 we shall deal with the three main philosophies themselves, restricting our analysis to the most extreme world-views: Greek rationality, Buddhist mysticism and Taoist nature philosophy.

    It is perhaps not superfluous to remind the reader that we are not dealing with religions, but only with philosophies." (p. 44)

  10. Lin, Ma, and van Brakel, Jaap. 2018. "On the Interpreter’s Choices: Making Hermeneutic Relativity Explicit." Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy no. 17:453-478.

    Abstract: "In this essay, we explore the various aspects of hermeneutic relativity that have rarely been explicitly discussed. Our notion of “hermeneutic relativity” can be seen as an extension, with significant revisions, of Gadamer’s notion of Vorurteil. It refers to various choices and constraints of the interpreter, including beliefs concerning the best way of doing philosophy, what criteria are to be used to evaluate competing interpretations, and so on. The interpreter cannot completely eliminate the guidance and constraint originating from his/her “background.” However, in principle the interpreter can “choose” to be guided by other constraints. Hence, we speak of “choices” or “commitments.” Hermeneutic relativity is the major cause for the variation of competing interpretations."

  11. Lloyd, G. E. R., and Zhao, Jingyi Jenny, eds. 2018. Ancient Greece and China Compared . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    In collaboration with Qiaosheng Dong.

    Contents: List of Figures VII; AcknowledgementsX; Notes on Editions XI; List of Contributors XIII; G.E.R. Lloyd: Introduction: Methods, Problems and Prospects 1;

    Part I Methodological issues and goals 31

    1. Nathan Sivin: Why Some Comparisons Make More Difference than Others 33; 2. Walter Scheidel: Comparing Comparisons 40; 3. Roberet Wardy: On the Very Idea of (Philosophical?) Translation 59;

    Part II Philosophy and religion 81

    4. R. A. H. King: Freedom in Parts of the Zhuangzi and Epictetus 83; 5. Jingyi Jenny Zhao: Shame and Moral Education in Aristotle and Xunzi 110; 6. Lisa Raphals: Human and Animal in Early China and Greece 131; 7. Michael Puett: Genealogies of Gods, Ghosts and Humans: The Capriciousness of the Divine in Early Greece and Early China 160;

    Part IIi Art and Literature 187;

    8. Jeremy Tanner: Visual Art and Historical Representation in Ancent Greece and China 189; 9. Yiqun Zhou: Helen and Chinese Femmes Fatales 234;

    Part IV Mathematics and Life Sciences 257

    10. Reviel Netz: Divisions, Big and Small: Comparing Archimedes and Liu Hui 259; 11. Karine Chemla: Abstraction as a Value in the Historiography of Mathematics in Ancient Greece and China: A Historical Approach to Comparative History of Mathematics 290; 12. Vivienne Lo and Eleanor Re'em: Recipes for Love in the Ancient World 326;

    Part V Agriculture, Planning and Insitutions 353

    13. Xinyi Liu, Evi Margaritis and Marin Jones: From th Harvest to the Meal in Prehistoric China and Greece: A Comparative Approach to the Social Context of Food 355; 14. Michael Nylan: On Libraries and Manuscript Culture in Western Han Chang'an and Alexandria 373;

    Michael Lowe: Afterword 410;

    Index 420-430.

  12. Lott, Tommy L. 2011. "Comparative Aspects of Africana Philosophy and the Continental-Analytic Divide." Comparative Philosophy no. 2:25-37.

    Abstract: "Critical engagement involving philosophers trained in continental and analytic traditions often takes its purpose to be a reconciliation of tensions arising from differences in style, or method. Critical engagement in Africana philosophy, however, is rarely focused on method, style, or orientation because philosophic research in this field, regardless of orientation, has had to accommodate its empirical grounding in disciplines outside of philosophy. I focus primarily on the comparative dimensions of three important strands of this research: (1) a history of ideas, (2) a problem-orientation, and (3) a sub-area specialization, to indicate why a need to reconcile tensions between continental and analytic orientations has very little currency in Africana philosophy. Socio-economic problems faced by African-descended people require multiple perspectives to accommodate the wide variety of diasporic social contexts for a given proposal. I employ a selection of cases to illustrate how Africana philosophy benefits from an interplay of many intersecting factors and that, as an interdisciplinary area of research with a commitment to the incorporation of multiple perspectives, it fosters cross-pollination and hybridization of continental and analytic traditions."

  13. Loy, David. 1988. Nonduality: A Study in Comparative Philosophy . New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Reprint: Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1997.

    "This study divides naturally into two parts. Part | extracts various claims from the major nondualist traditions, Buddhism, Vedanta, and Taoism, in order to construct a “core doctrine” of nonduality largely consistent with all three. The process of selection is unsystematic, making use of assertions and arguments that provide helpful insights while ignoring most of the rest. This yields a theory about the nature of nondual experience that also explains the apparent “delusion” of our more usual way of understanding experience. But the disagreements among the nondualist systems—especially between Mahayana Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta—cannot be lightly dismissed. So part 2 works backward, using the core theory as a perspective from which to approach and resolve the disagreements. There we shall be able to understand how the same phenomenological experience may be subjected to different and even contradictory descriptions.

    In this introduction, the term nonduality refers exclusively to the nonduality of (more narrowly) seer and seen, (more broadly) subject and object. Such nonduality is my main concern, but is by no means the only meaning of the term in the literature. At least five different meanings can be distinguished, all of them intimately related; three of those are of interest in part 1. Chapter I sets the parameters of the study by discussing the role of these three nondualities within Buddhism, Vedanta, and Taoism. It demonstrates their prevalence, importance, and relationships, dwelling particularly upon the third nonduality of subject and object, of self and nonself, of my consciousness and the world “I” find myself “in.” Each of the following chapters of part 1 investigates what such nonduality might mean in one particular mode of our experience—perceiving, acting, and thinking, respectively. How can we understand the assertion that each of these is actually nondual?" Introduction, p. 9)

  14. Lu, Mingjun. 2020. Chinese-Western Comparative Metaphysics and Epistemology: A Topical Approach . Lanham: Lexington Books.

    "A primary objective of this project is to examine the wisdom of Chinese and Western sages through a comparative analysis of their philosophical discourses. By wisdom, I refer chiefly to the metaphysical knowledge of universality, a view that draws on Aristotle’s (384–322BC) definition of wisdom in his Metaphysics . Aristotle calls metaphysics philosophia prima , the “first science” or “first philosophy” that takes “wisdom” or “truth” as its object of study (1026a28–30).2 Unlike empirical study that aims at action, Aristotle observes, the end of metaphysical inquiry is “knowledge of the truth” (993b20–21). By wisdom or truth, he means “knowledge about certain causes and principles,” especially “the first causes and principles of things” (982a1; 981b29). Since great wisdom “must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge,” Aristotle remarks, “wisdom is a science of first principles” (982a20–21; 1059a18). In his Nicomachean Ethics, he declares that wisdom of universality is “the most finished of the forms of knowledge” (NE 1141a16)." (p. 2)


    "It is a key argument of this project that Chinese wisdom or truth resides in its metaphysics of the first principle as well. As to be demonstrated in Chapter 1, the first principle also constitutes the primary hypothesis of Chinese originative metaphysics as represented in the Laozi of Laozi 老子 (c. 600–531 BC), founder of the Taoist philosophy, and the ten commentaries made by Confucius 孔子 (551–479 BC) and his followers on the Yijing 易 经, The Book of Changes .

    Laozi’s work is also called Daode Jing 道德经, The Dao and Its Virtue . The ten Confucian commentaries or “wings” are collected and give rise to the Yizhuan 易传, which will be referred to as the Yi Commentaries. Like Aristotelian metaphysics, Chinese originative metaphysics as represented in the Taoist and Confucian classics constitute the foundational framework for later philosophers to think about metaphysical and epistemological issues." (p. 3, a note omptted)

  15. Ma, Lin, and van Brakel, Jaap. 2016. Fundamentals of Comparative and Intercultural Philosophy . Albany: State University of New York Press.

    "The title of this book is “Fundamentals of Comparative and Intercultural Philosophy,” but yet we often solely use the expression “intercultural philosophy” in a broad scope, including every intercultural philosophical activity that involves translation, interpretation, and exposition of the conceptual schemes of a certain philosophical tradition in terms of the conceptual schemes of another tradition. Sometimes, we shorten this long phrase to “cross-cultural interpretation” or “interpretation across traditions.” Because intercultural and comparative have different semantic fields in philosophy, we use both in the title. However, except for a few cases,(1) we use the phrase intercultural philosophy to include comparative philosophy. In terms of “fundamentals” in the title, this book is concerned primarily with the necessary preconditions of intercultural philosophy. Occasionally we address the methodology of intercultural philosophy, but this is not our main subject. “Necessary preconditions” is more fundamental than “methodology.” (p. 1)


    "In the remaining part of this introduction we present an overview of all the chapters. In the first chapter, we provide preliminary explications concerning the central concepts of philosophy and language and introduce the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativism. After reviewing a number of views with respect to Western, Chinese, and African philosophy, we argue that philosophy is a family resemblance concept.

    Interaction across traditions does not require that the two sides employ the same concept of philosophy. Similarly, no sharp boundaries between “philosophy” and other reflective practices are needed; partitions such as those among philosophy, history, religious studies, and literature are conventional, and classifications may be different, as in the history of the Chinese traditions." (p. 5)

    (1) We may use the words compare or comparative when the author(s) whose work is discussed use such words. We use the words intercultural and cross-cultural as synonyms.

  16. ———. 2016. "On the Conditions of Possibility for Comparative and Intercultural Philosophy " Dao. A Journal of Comparative Philosophy no. 12:297-312.

    Abstract: "In this essay, we present a theory of intercultural philosophical dialogue and comparative philosophy, drawing on both hermeneutics and analytic philosophy.

    We advocate the approach of “de-essentialization” across the board. It is true that similarities and differences are always to be observed across languages and traditions, but there exist no immutable cores or essences. “De-essentialization” applies to all “levels” of concepts: everyday notions such as green and qing 青, philosophical concepts such as emotion(s) and qing 情, and philosophical categories such as forms of life and dao 道. We argue that interpretation is a holistic multi-directional process constrained by the principle of mutual attunement. It is necessary to assume that “the other” is a human being, who, in most cases, is consistent and stating that which is true or right. This is the condition of possibility for intercultural philosophical dialogue and comparative philosophy. No more necessary conditions are needed.

    There is no need to presuppose concepts or categories that are universal for all humans and their languages (such as emotion(s) and qing 情)."

  17. ———. 2016. "A Theory of Interpretation for Comparative and Chinese Philosophy." Dao. A Journal of Comparative Philosophy no. 15:575-589.

    Abstract: "Why should interpretation of conceptual schemes and practices (forms of life) across traditions work at all? In this paper we present the following necessary conditions of possibility for interpretation in comparative and Chinese philosophy: the interpreter must presuppose that there are mutually recognizable human practices; the interpreter must presuppose that “the other” is, on the whole, sincere, consistent, and right; the interpreter must be committed to certain epistemic virtues. Some of these necessary conditions are consistent with the fact that interpretation is not thwarted by the “danger” of relativism or of incommensurability. Some other conditions are suggestive of reorientations of methodologies of comparative and Chinese philosophy.."

  18. ———. 2018. "On the Interpreter’s Choices: Making Hermeneutic Relativity Explicit." Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy no. 17:453-478.

    Abstract: "In this essay, we explore the various aspects of hermeneutic relativity that have rarely been explicitly discussed. Our notion of “hermeneutic relativity” can be seen as an extension, with significant revisions, of Gadamer’s notion of Vorurteil. It refers to various choices and constraints of the interpreter, including beliefs concerning the best way of doing philosophy, what criteria are to be used to evaluate competing interpretations, and so on. The interpreter cannot completely eliminate the guidance and constraint originating from his/her “background.” However, in principle the interpreter can “choose” to be guided by other constraints. Hence, we speak of “choices” or “commitments.” Hermeneutic relativity is the major cause for the variation of competing interpretations."

  19. MacDonald, Paul. 2013. "Palaeo-Philosophy. Archaic Ideas about Space and Time." Comparative Philosophy no. 4:82-117.

    Abstract: "This paper argues that efforts to understand historically remote patterns of thought are driven away from their original meaning if the investigation focuses on reconstruction of concepts, instead of cognitive ‘complexes’. My paper draws on research by Jan Assmann, Jean-Jacques Glassner, Keimpe Algra, Alex Purves, Nicholas Wyatt, and others on the cultures of Ancient Greece, Israel, Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Etruria through comparative analyses of the semantic fields of spatial and temporal terms, and how these terms are shaped by their relation to the sphere of the sacred. It shows that there are three super-ordinate timeframes - the cyclical, the linear and the static - each of which is composed of lower-order cycles (days, lunar months, and seasons). These timeframes reflect their cultures’ ideas about the nature, scope and power of the gods, and structure the common point-of-view about the present, the past and eternity. There are also super-ordinate spatial frames which reflect their cultures’ ideas about the heavens and which structure both the sacred precinct and the profane field of action and exchange. Close analysis of texts that use words such as eternity, forever, past, present, and future, for example, do not reveal that there is anything like a general abstract concept of time in virtue of which some thing or event can be said to be in time or to have its own time. Archaic patterns of thought do not differ from our “modern” patterns in having different concepts, but in not having anything like concepts at all."

  20. MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1991. "Incommensurability, Truth, and the Conversation Between Confucians and Aristotelians about the Virtues." In Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophics Perspectives , edited by Deutsch, Eliot, 103-121. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

    "We may compare Confucianism and Aristotelianism from a Confucian standpoint, or from an Aristotelian; or we may compare both or either with some third, different, equally incompatible and incommensurable standpoint, such as that of Buddhism or of Kantianism, but we cannot find any legitimate standing ground outside the context of the points of view. And when we have undertaken comparative study in a manner which recognizes this, we shall soon find that our task is not so much that of comparing Confucianism and Aristotelianism as that of comparing Confucian comparisons of Confucianism and Aristotelianism with Aristotelian comparisons of Confucianism and Aristotelianism. The key to comparative studies is the comparison of comparisons." (p. 120)

  21. Maffie, James. 2001. "Editor's Introduction: Truth from the Perspective of Comparative World Philosophy." Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy no. 15:263-273.

    "What role does this issue of Social Epistemology play in the dialogue of comparative world philosophy? The issue’s contributors address from a variety of perspectives the theme of truth. Do all philosophical traditions possess the concept of truth, and if so, do they incorporate truth into their conceptions of epistemology and knowledge? If not, what do they use in place of truth?

    Many Western philosphers view correspondence truth as occupying the centre stage of Western epistemology’s conceptions of knowledge and justification since Plato and Aristotle." (p. 267)


    "Contemporary Western philosophy, however, standardly regards truth as applying primarily and literally to propositions alone and only derivatively and metaphorically to persons and things. Smith and Deutsch point out that this emphasis is unique to Western philosophy. In non-Western traditions, truth is typically conceived primarily as a predicate of persons or things, not propositions. Smith situates contemporary Western philosophy in historical and what he calls ‘spatial’ context: ‘To lift from the pool of truth’s total, undifferentiated meaning a single referent—propositions—and develop its meaning in that direction is our Western contribution to the subject’ (Smith, 1980, p. 425). There are different emphases in other cultures’ conceptions of truth, differences that were originally subtle but have become gradually more pronounced as each culture developed its own distinctive identity. Over time South Asia has tied truth to things; East Asia, to persons; the West, statements. In sum, conceiving truth as a predicate of propositions is a historically novel development of post-Renaissance Western philosophy; one not shared by East and South Asia.10" (p. 268)

    (10) Despite his prominence as a scholar of world religions, Huston Smith neglects to test the merits of his thesis regarding the threefold nature of truth beyond the pale of Europe, East Asia and South Asia.


    Deutsch, E., 1979, On Truth: An Ontological Theory (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press).

    Smith, H., 1980, Western and comparative perspectives on truth. Philosophy East and West , 30, 425–437.

  22. Malhotra, Ashok. 1980. "Introductory Remarks on the Symposium "The Problem of Truth"." Philosophy East and West no. 30:421-424.

    Abstract: "This article offers a brief summary of the main points raised in the four papers read in the Symposium on "East-West perspectives on truth" which was organized by the society for Asian and comparative philosophy from December 27-28, 1978 in Washington, d c. The papers covered the Chinese, Japanese, Indian and comparative perspectives on truth. The Symposium revealed that the time had come when a dialogue between Eastern and Western philosophers was not only important but necessary. the Symposium achieved its aim of broadcasting this essential message."

  23. Mall, Ram Adhar. 1998. "Philosophy and Philosophies – Cross-culturally Considered." Topoi no. 17:15-27.

    "The central thesis proposed, discussed and defended here is this: There are different philosophical traditions of cultures which can make substantial contributions to philosophy in general and to the various philosophical disciplines in particular. This they may accomplish by drawing our attention to the philosophical questions put and to the philosophical answers suggested. This is where an intercultural philosophical orientation begins, and it leads us to consider the philosophies of other cultures with a view to their contributions to the general concept of philosophy which is always a response to a felt need in the face of the problems we are confronted with in our attempt to understand and explain the world of things and beings.

    That we are all human beings makes one thing abundantly clear: in spite of cultural differences, there are fundamental similarities between different philosophical traditions. Philosophy in world context today, i.e. philosophy cross-culturally considered pleads for the thesis that the general applicability of the concept of philosophy remains unaffected by our recognition and acceptance of more than one genuine philosophical tradition. The naive dogmatism of identifying philosophy exclusively only with one particular philosophical convention amounts to some sort of ethnocentrism, and such a move is always suspect. One particular contextual and relative perspective is thereby put in an absolute universal position. The Western philosophy, backed by so many extra-philosophical factors e.g. social, economic, imperial, colonialistic and religious did universalize itself from the days of Diogenes Laertius up to say Husserl, Heidegger and even Gadamer and Rorty." (p. 15)

  24. ———. 2014. "Intercultural Philosophy: A Conceptual Clarification." Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies no. 1:67-84.

    Abstract: "In this paper I would like to show how belonging to different cultures does not impede intercultural philosophizing and instead favors it. To that end, I will first pinpoint what exactly intercultural philosophy stands for in Section II. In Section III I will sketch certain crucial features of what is in fact a hermeneutical situation. In Section IV I will develop my own theory of an interculturally-oriented »analogous hermeneutic« and then try to show in Section V that it can furnish what is necessary to do comparative philosophy. A short conclusion will follow in Section VI."

  25. Marchal, Kai. 2020. "A Few Thoughts on the Possibility of Intercultural Thinking in a Global Age." Philosophy East and West no. 70:238-246.

    Book discussion of: Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought . By Eric S. Nelson. London, Oxford, New York, New Delhi,Sydney: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017.

    "Until recently, most humanities scholars (including philosophers) in North America and Europe lived in a world where China was notable for its absence.


    Only most recently, with the changed geopolitical situation, are Chinese thinkers starting to receive more attention. In this context, Eric S. Nelson’s book Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought makes an important contribution to further opening up the West to Chinese discourses. Nelson’s book is a historical study about the reception of Chinese philosophy by German-speaking philosophers in the early twentieth century.

    The history of Western philosophy, Nelson writes programmatically in his introduction, “is historically already interculturally and intertextually bound up with non-Western philosophy” (p. 3)." (p. 238)


    "Reviewers have already highlighted the numerous strengths of this volume. It is a landmark study in intercultural philosophy that will shape the research field for years to come. In my essay, I would like to describe a few difficulties that, in my understanding, still hamper a project like Nelson’s. I want to focus on two aspects: (1) the relationship between philosophy and its history and (2) Heidegger and the “hermeneutic primacy of interpretation”." (p. 239)

  26. Masson-Oursel, Paul. 1926. Comparative Philosophy . London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.

    Reprint: London: Routledge, 2000.

    Translated from the French edition: La philosophie Comparée , Paris: Alcan, 1923.

    "Thus, although comparative philosophy ought to be universal, we have the right and the duty, by virtue of a methodological opportunity, to restrict it for the present to the study of those peoples already dowered with a history.

    For the rest, little as we are able to illuminate the historic times by the dark earlier ages, the arcana of prehistory will only be reduced by the progress of history, gradually pursued from the more to the less known. And amongst the fractions of mankind susceptible of historical investigation, only three are met with whose development has taken place in strict parallel during some three millennia; these three are precisely those of which the past has been or can be best elucidated. We refer to Europe, India, and China." (pp. 35-36)

  27. ———. 1951. "True Philosophy is Comparative Philosophy." Philosophy East and West no. 1:6-9.

    Translated from the French by Harold E. McCarthy. [Editor's note.]

    "Just as it is possible to compare religions, so it is possible to compare philosophies. Such a comparison will not take the form of a simple inventory, or the form of a pure theory, although we are familiar with both.

    Rather, comparative philosophy will be the general examination of the ways in which human beings of all races and cultures reflect upon their actions and act upon their reflections.

    The scope of comparative philosophy is universal history and the cosmos.

    But each individual is situated within his own little sphere, and each people within its own historical tradition and its own habitat. Man's dependency upon the world does not have the same significance for primitive peoples that it had for Plato and Newton, because concrete consciousness is to be located elsewhere than in astronomical time and geometrical space. In like manner, each individual lives in society without being localized there as a physical object, for he delights in residing in himself-indeed, in God. Thus, comparative philosophy is neither psychology nor sociology, but the study of modes of action which are, at one and the same time, both individual and collective, capable of becoming stabilized in structures which are certainly not eternal but are, rather, temporal and changing." (pp. 6-7)

  28. Matilal, Bimal Krishna, and Shaw, Jaysankar Lal, eds. 1985. Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective: Exploratory Essays in Current Theories and Classical Indian Theories of Meaning and Reference . Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Contents: Preface IX; Bimal K. Matilal: Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective: An Introduction 1; M. J. Cresswell: We Are All Children of God 39; Paul Gochet: The Syncategorematic Treatment of Predicates 61; William Lycan: The Paradox of Naming 81; Steven E. Boer: Substance and Kind: Reflections on the New Theory of Reference 103; Frank Jackson: The Easy Examination Paradox 151; Krister Segerberg: Models for Actions 161; Kalidas Bhattacharya: Some Problems Concerning Meaning 173; Sibajiban Bhattacharya: Abstraction, Analysis and Universals: The Navya-Nyāya Theory 189; J. N. Mohanty: Psychologism in Indian Logical Theory 203; Karl H. Potter: A Speech-Act Model for Understanding Navya-Nyāya Epistemology 213; Douglas D. Daye: Some Epistemologically Misleading Expressions: "Inference", and "Anumana ", "Perception" and "Pratyaksa " 231; Mark Siderits: The Prabhakara Mīmāṁsā Theory of Related Designation 253; Arindam Chakrabarti: Plato's Indian Barbers 299; J. L. Shaw: Proper Names: Contemporary Philosophy and the Nyāya 327; Bimal K. Matilal: Awareness and Meaning in Navya-Nyāya 373; Index 393-406.

  29. McDermott, Charlene, ed. 1983. Comparative Philosophy: Selected Essays . Lanham: University Press of America.

    "By drawing on a wide variety of views and belief systems, the prense volume makes available to the reader a rich stock of alternatives for purposes of comparison and contrast. Fundamental epistemological and metaphysical issues are introduced by means of selections from writers of the first rank — both Eastern and Western. Each selection is preceded by an explanatory essay, making it a self-contained unit. In addition, a bibliography of suggested readings is appended to each of the two principal subsections. Finally, a glossary of technical terms and a set of notes on each philosopher or philosophical school included in the anthology further serve to make the book useable with minimal burden on the reader. In this way, speculations from a far-off century of an exotic cultural milieu can be held up as a kind of ’’distant mirror"(2) in which to view critically the outline of more familiar theories and reflections with a freshness not otherwise possible." (Preface, pp. IX-X, a note omitted)

    (2) The phrase is Barbara Tuchman’s. See her A Distaf Mirror . The Calamitous 14th Century. Alfred Knopf, New York, 1978.

  30. McEvilley, Thomas. 2002. The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek and Indian Philosophies . New York: Allworth Press.

    "I will not telegraph now what my own methods and conclusions are. In the following twenty-five chapters of argument from evidence I will make a measured attempt to establish significant intrusions first from India to Greece in the pre-Socratic period, then from Greece back to India in the Hellenistic period. In addition I will continue to extend and refine the typological comparisons that scholars have been making since Jones in 1799. Perhaps other scholars will correct me on one point or another, an event which would be welcome, for this is a shared human project that deserves the involvement of many minds. Surely the relationship between ancient Greek and Indian traditions of thought is the foundational level of comparative philosophy." (Form the Foreword)


    William Jones, The works of Sir William Jones , London : G. G. and J. Robinson 1799.

  31. McWeeny, Jennifer, and Butnor, Ashby, eds. 2014. Asian and Feminist Philosophies in Dialogue: Liberating Traditions . New York: Columbia University Press.

    Contents: Eliot Deutsch: Foreword XI; Acknowledgments XIII; Ashby Butnor and Jennifer McWeeny: Feminist Comparative Philosophy: Performing Philosophy Differently 1;

    Part 1 Gender and Potentiality

    1. Hsiao-Lan Hu: Kamma , No-Self, and Social Construction: The Middle Way Between Determinism and Free Will 37; 2. Kyoo Lee: On the Transformative Potential of the "Dark Female Animal" in Daodejing 57; 3. Ranjoo Seodu Herr: Confucian Family-State and Women: A Proposal for Confucian Feminism 78;

    Part 2 Raising Consciousness

    4. Keya Maitra: Mindfulness, Anātman , and the Possibility of a Feminist Self-consciousness 101; 5. Jennifer McWeeny: Liberating Anger, Embodying Knowledge: A Comparative Study of María Lugones and Zen Master Hakuin 123;

    Part 3 Places of Knowing

    6. Xinyan Jiang: What Would Zhuangzi Say to Harding? A Daoist Critique of Feminist Standpoint Epistemology 147; 7. Vrinda Dalmiya: "Epistemic Multiculturalism" and Objectivity: Rethinking Vandana Shiva's Ecospirituality 167;

    Part 4 Cultivating Ethical Selves

    8. Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee: Confucian Care: A Hybrid Feminist Ethics 187; 9. Erin McCarthy: The Embodied Ethical Self: A Japanese and Feminist Account of Nondual Subjectivity 203; 10. Ashby Butnor: Dōgen, Feminism, and the Embodied Practice of Care 223;

    Part 5 Transforming Discourse

    11. Namita Goswami: De-liberating Traditions: The Female Bodies of Sati and Slavery 247; Chela Sandoval: Philosophy Uprising: The Feminist Afterword 271; Feminist Comparative Philosophy and Associated Methodologies: A Bibliography 279; Contributors 301; Index 305.

  32. ———. 2014. "Feminist Comparative Philosophy: Performing Philosophy Differently." In Asian and Feminist Philosophies in Dialogue: Liberating Traditions , edited by McWeeny, Jennifer and Butnor, Ashby, 1-33. New York: Columbia University Press.

    "In this introduction, we provide an initial articulation of the scope, methods, content, and aims of feminist comparative philosophy with reference to three guiding questions: 1. What is the relationship between feminist comparative philosophy and each of its namesakes—feminist philosophy and comparative philosophy? 2. How can this new methodology overcome those patterns of exclusionary vision that have frustrated its predecessors’ capacities for consistently recognizing privilege and difference? and 3. Why does it makes sense to think of feminist comparative philosophy as a liberatory practice, that is, as an activity that helps people politically and spiritually? After addressing these defining questions in the following three sections, we go on to provide summaries of the book’s themes and chapters.

    We conclude by considering the future of feminist comparative philosophy in terms of its potential for development and transformation." (p. 3)

  33. ———. 2014. "Feminist Comparative Philosophy and Associated Methodologies: A Bibliography." In Asian and Feminist Philosophies in Dialogue: Liberating Traditions , edited by McWeeny, Jennifer and Butnor, Ashby, 279-300. New York: Columbia University Press.

    "The purpose of this bibliography is to provide readers with a sense of what has already been published in the emerging fi eld of feminist comparative philosophy and to serve as an invitation to further explore its literature, history, and methodologies.

    Consistent with our present desire to render visible those philosophical inquiries that emerge jointly from the insights of feminist and Asian traditions, we have limited our list of publications in feminist comparative philosophy to those that engage Asian philosophical texts. However, as explained in this book’s introduction, we believe that many other pairings of cultural and social locations are consistent with feminist comparative practice and we hope that the future of this fi eld will blossom with a diversity of fresh juxtapositions. In regard to this bibliography’s sections on “Feminist Methodology” and “Comparative Methodology,” we have sought to list only those resources that speak to these philosophical methodologies in general and have therefore not included publications on specialized methodologies like those used to address, for example, feminist ethics or Chinese-Greek comparisons. Moreover, our accounts of feminist methodology and comparative methodology respectively refl ect those sources most relevant to the development and proliferation of feminist comparative practice, rather than to diff erent or broader understandings of feminism and comparative studies." (p. 279)

  34. Mizumoto, Masaharu, Ganeri, Jonardon, and Goddard, Cliff, eds. 2020. Ethno-Epistemology: New Directions for Global Epistemology . New York: Routledge.

    Contents: Masaharu Mizumoto: Introduction 1; 1 Jonardon Ganeri: Epistemic Pluralism: From Systems to Stances 19; 2 Masaharu Mizumoto, Shun Tsugita, and Yu Izumi: Knowing How and Two Knowledge Verbs in Japanese 43; Yngjin Xu: 3 “The Rectification of Names” as a Confucian Theory of Epistemic Justification 77; 4 Shane Ryan, Chienkuo Mi, and Masaharu Mizumoto: Testimony, Credit, and Blame: A Cross-Cultural Study of the Chicago Visitor Case 94; 5 Elin McCready: Linguistic Strategies Against Epistemic Injustice 114; 6 Cliff Goddard: Overcoming the Linguistic Challenges for Ethno-epistemology: NSM Perspectives 130; 7 Julianne Chung: Skeptical Arguments, Conceptual Metaphors, and Cross-Cultural Challenges 154; 8 Dominic Murphy: Delusions Across Cultures 184; 9 Søren Harnow Klausen: Challenges for an Anthropology of Knowledge 201; 10 Satoshi Nakagawa: How to Buy Knowledge in Ende—An Ethnoepistemology from Eastern Indonesia 216; 11 Thomas Grundmann: Conceptual Construction in Epistemology: Why the Content of Our Folk Terms Has Only Limited Significance 227; 12 Anand Vaidya and Purushottama Bilimoria: Analytical and Experimental Philosophy in the Reflection of Comparative Philosophy 248; List of Contributors 272; Index 273-281.

  35. Moeller, Hans-Georg. 2018. "On Comparative and Post-Comparative Philosophy." In Appreciating the Chinese Difference: Engaging Roger T. Ames on Methods, Issues, and Roles , edited by Behuniak, Jim, 31-45. Albany: State University of New York Press.

    "In sum, four general forms of comparative philosophy as de-barbarization developed between the seventeenth and the twentieth centuries at a time when Europe modernized and globalized itself: (1) an approach of incorporation of and improvement by Oriental philosophy à la Leibniz, (2) a “primitivist” inclusion of Chinese thought into the development of the “world spirit” à la Hegel, (3) an interpolation of European religions and philosophy into ancient Chinese texts à la Richard Wilhelm, and (4) a syncretic embrace of Chinese Philosophy as a major source for the foundation of post-Christian modern “spirituality.” (p. 36)

  36. Moore, Charles Alexander, ed. 1946. Philosophy - East and West . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Contents: Preface VII-IX; I. William Ernest Hocking: Value of the Comparative Study of Philosophy 1; II. George P. Conger: An Outline of Indian Philosophy 12; III. Chan Wing-tsit: The Story of Chinese Philosophy 24; IV. Junjiro Takakusu: Buddhism as a Philosophy of "Thusness" 69; V. Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki: An Interpretation of Zen-Experience 109; VI. Shunzo Sakamaki: Shinto: Japanese Ethnocentrism 130; VII. Chan Wing-tsit: The Spirit of Oriental Philosophy 137; VIII. Filmer S. C. Northrop,: The Complementary Emphases of Eastern Intuitive and Western Scientific Philosophy 168; IX. George P. Conger: Eastern and Western Metaphysics 235; X. Charles A. Moore: Comparative Philosophies of Life 248; Who's Who of Contributors 321; Index 323-334.

  37. ———. 1951. "Some Problems of Comparative Philosophy." Philosophy East and West no. 1:67-70.

    "At the second East-West Philosophers' Conference, held at the University of Hawaii during the summer of 1949, a great deal was accomplished in directing the attention of the philosophical world to the important area of East-West philosophy. Those who participated in the proceedings of the Conference were convinced that philosophy is now entering upon a new stage of its development, a stage that will be characterized by trans-cultural co-operation and world perspective. Although the Conference members attempted to come to some tentative conclusions in the three fields of methodology, metaphysics, and ethical theory, everyone realized the difficulties involved in formulating any con- crete conclusions at all, however tentative. It was realized in the first place that Eastern philosophies cannot be simply grouped together as a homo- geneous unit compared as such with Western philosophies similarly grouped together. It was realized, moreover, that no characterizations of either the Eastern or the Western philosophical tradition could possibly indicate more than general, and sometimes rather vague, tendencies. It was also realized that where definite conclusions could be agreed upon by Conference members such agreement would sometimes be gained only by partially ignoring important variations of interpretation." (p. 67)

  38. ———. 1951. Essays in East-West Philosophy. An Attempt at World Philosophical Synthesis . Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

    "The report of the Second East-West Philosophers' Conference, held at the University of Hawaii from June 20 to July 28, 1949."

  39. ———. 1952. "Keys to Comparative Philosophy." Philosophy East and West no. 2:76-78.

    "The problems raised in this issue by Mr. Rosan in his paper "A Key to Comparative Philosophy" are important ones.

    For the sake of better understanding, however, a few comments on behalf of the Second East-West Philosophers' Conference are in order, especially since my discussion note in this journal(1) appears to have given Mr. Rosan an incorrect impression of the work and conclusions of that Conference." (p. 76)


    "In conclusion, may I say that there are surely many keys to the study of comparative philosophy. No one key will open all the doors. The important problem is not that of finding a key of universal applicability. The crucial task is, rather, that of constructing and applying various keys in the progressive investigation of the multiplicity of problems which inevitably arise in the study of comparative philosophy." (p. 78)

    (1) "Some Problems of Comparative Philosophy," I, No. 1 (April, 1951), 67-70.

  40. ———, ed. 1962. Philosophy and Culture: East and West. East-West Philosophy in Practical Perspective . Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

    East-West Philosophy in Practical Perspective. Proceedings of the conference, held at the University of Hawaii under its sponsorship during the summer of 1959.

    "The title of this volume, Philosophy and Culture—East and West , reflects the purpose and the work of the conference which it reports, that is, the effort to achieve mutual understanding of the practical aspects of the lives of the peoples of Asia and the West by reference to their basic and underlying philosophies, in the sense that “culture is the manifestation of the human mind in human behavior.” This Preface deals exclusively with the text of the volume and not with the subject-matter or with the conference of which this is the official Report. The background of this volume, the conference itself, and its predecessors are dealt with in the Introduction.

    This volume contains the proceedings of the Third East-West Philosophers’ Conference, held at the University of Hawaii during the summer of 1959. It contains all the formal papers, in the order in which they were presented at the conference. It is divided into six major Sections, following the agenda of the conference.

    Some of the discussion which took place at the conference meetings is included as “Questions” and “Answers” at the end of some of the papers —in those cases where the authors wished to include such discussion.

    In an Appendix are included the five Public Lectures presented to general audiences during the period of the conference by representatives of the major traditions considered at the conference. (The style of these lectures, and the editing, are less formal and academic than in the case of the technical papers.)" (Preface, p. V)

  41. Mou, Bo, ed. 2001. Two Roads to Wisdom? Chinese and Analytic Philosophical Traditions . Chicago: Open Court.

    Donald Davidson: Foreword IX; Acknowledgements XI; Note on Transcriptions XIII; Introduction XV;

    Part One: Philosophy: Discipline and Methodology

    1. Nicholas Rescher: Philosophical Methodology 3; 2. Robert Cummings Neville: Methodology, Practices and Discipline in Chinese and Western Philosophy 27; 3. Adam Morton: Philosophy as Engineering 45; 4. Lik Kuen Toug: The Art of Appropriation: Towards a Field-Being Conception of Philosophy 57;

    Part Two: Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Analysis (I): Methodological Perspectives

    5: Chung-ying Chen: Onto-Hermeneutical Vision and Analytical Discourse: Interpretation and Reconstruction in Chinese Philosophy 87; 6. Shu-hsien Liu: Philosophical Analysis and Hermeneutic: Reflections on Methodology via an Examination of the Evolution of My Understanding of Chinese Philosophy 131; 7. David L. Hall: The Import of Analysis in Classical China - A Pragmatic Appraisal 153; 8. You-zheng Li: Chinese Philosophy and Semiotics 169;

    Part Three: Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Analysis (II): Test Cases

    9. Chad Hansen: Metaphysical and Moral Transcendence in Chinese Thought 197; 10. Kwong-loi Shun: Self and Self-Cultivation in Early Confucian Thought 229; 11. Yin-ming Fung: Three Dogmas of New Confucianism: A Perspective of Analytic Philosophy 245;

    Part Four: Methodological Issues in Comparative Philosophy

    12. Robert E. Allinson: The Myth of Comparative Philosophy or the Comparative Philosophy Malgré Lui 269; 13. Ji-yuan Yu and Nicholas Bunin: Saving the Phenomema: An Aristotelian Method in Comparative Philosophy 293; 14. Bryan Van Norden: Mencius and Augustine on Evil: A Test Case for Comparative Philosophy 313; 15. Bo Mou: An Analysis of the Structure of Philosophical Methodology - In View of Comparative Philosophy 337;

    Contributors 365; Index 371.

  42. ———. 2002. "Three Orientations and Four ‘Sins’ in Comparative Studies." APA Newsletters no. 2:42-46.

    "When comparative projects are critically evaluated, there seem to be four sorts of complaint. The alleged ‘sins’ are these: (1) over-simplification; 2) over-use of external resources; (3) exaggerated distinction; and (4) blurring assimilation. They, or some of them, are sometimes taken for granted in two senses: first, it is thought that any simplifying the object of study or using external resources to characterize it are doomed to be excessive and thus deserve to be charged with negative ‘over’-character; second, it is assumed that the four complaints may be made indiscriminately in evaluating any comparative project without regard to the orientation and methodological strategy of that study. A metaphilosophical examination of the four ‘sins’ will help to effectively identify the distinct character and objectives of a variety of orientations and their approaches." (p. 42)

  43. ———, ed. 2003. Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy . Aldershot: Ashgate.

    Contents: Acknowledgments VII; Notes on Transcription VIII; C'ontributors IX; Editor's Introduction XV-XXII;

    Part One Identity of Chinese Philosophy and Its Modern Studies

    1 Antonio S. Cua: Emergence of the History of Chinese Philosophy 3;

    Part Two Yi-Jing Philosophy

    2 Channg-ying Cheng: Inquiring into the Primary Model: Yi-Jing and Chinese Ontological Hermeneutics 33; 3 Robert Elliott Allinson: Hegelian, Yi-Jing , and Buddhist Transformational Models for Comparative Philosophy 60; 4 Bo Mou: Becoming-Being Complementarity: An Account of lhe Yin-Yang Metaphysical Vision of the Yi-Jing 86;

    Part Three Confucianism

    5 Bryan W. Van Norden: Virtue Ethics and Confucianism 99; 6 Robin R. Wang: The Principled Benevolence: A Synthesis of Kantian and Conf'ucian Moral Judgment 122; 7 Ruiping Fan: Social Justice: Rawlsian or Confucian? 144; 8 You-zheng Li: Towards a Minimal Common Ground for Humanist Dialogue: A Comparative Analysis of Confucian Ethics and American Ethical Humanism 169;

    9 Robert Cummings Neville: The Project of Boston Confucianism 183;

    Part Four Philosophical Daoism

    10 Chad Hansen: The Metaphysics of Dao 205; 11 Qingjie (James) Wong: "It-self-so-ing'' and "Other-ing" in Lao Zi's Concept of Zi Ran 225; 12 Bo Mou: Eternal Dao. Constant Name, and Language Engagement: On the Opening Message of the Dao-De-Jing 13 Chenyang Li: Zhuang Zi and Aristotle on What A Thing Is 263; 14 JeeLoo Liu: The Daoist Conception of Truth: Lao Zi's Metaphysical Realism vs. Zhuang Zi's lnternal Realism 278;

    Part Five Logic-Related Concerns

    15 Chuang Liu: Ming-Jia (the Logicians) and Zeno: A Comparative Study 297; 16 Yiu-ming Fung: The Thesis of Antilogic in Buddhism 307;

    Index 323-332.

  44. ———. 2010. "On Constructive-Engagement Strategy of Comparative Philosophy: A Journal Theme Introduction." Comparative Philosophy no. 1:1-32.

    Abstract: "In this journal theme introduction, first, I explain how comparative philosophy as explored in the journal Comparative Philosophy is understood and how it is intrinsically related to the constructive engagement strategy. Second, to characterize more clearly and accurately some related methodological points of the constructive-engagement strategy, and also to explain how constructive engagement is possible, I introduce some needed conceptual and explanatory resources and a meta-methodological framework and endeavor to identify adequacy conditions for methodological guiding principles in comparative studies. Third, as a case analysis, I show how the constructive-engagement reflective practice bears on recent studies of Chinese and comparative Chinese-Western philosophy, especially in the past decade, for two purposes: to illustrate the foregoing theoretic characterization of the constructive engagement strategy, and to identify and explain some constructive morals that might have general significance for comparative studies."

  45. ———. 2016. "How Constructive Engagement in Doing Philosophy Comparatively Is Possible." Synthesis Philosophica no. 62:265-277.

    Abstract: "In this article I intend, on the basis of some previous relevant works on the issue, to further examine a range of conditions for maintaining adequate methodological guiding principles concerning how to look at the relation between distinct methodological perspectives in comparative-engagement exploration in philosophy. The purpose of this paper is to explore how, in the global context, distinct approaches in philosophy can be engaged in order to constructively talk to each other and make a joint contribution to the development of philosophy and society."

  46. Nakamura, Hajime. 1964. Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India, China, Tibet, Japan . Honolulu: East-West Center Press.

    Revised English translation edited by Philip P. Wiener (Original Japanese edition 1960).

    "If we are to hazard any conclusions about Eastern peoples as a whole, it must be as a tentative hypothesis in a comparative study of the data. Generalized conclusions drawn before such individual preparatory studies have been made will perforce be hasty and dogmatic. Thus, in order to deal with the ways of thinking of Eastern peoples, it is first necessary to examine the ways of thinking of each of the peoples individually. However, such a study of all the peoples of the East is, from a practical point of view, impossible at this time. | intend to concentrate on India, China, Tibet, and Japan. My reason is that among these four peoples alone did there exist—however imperfectly—a study of traditional Buddhist logic, which came first from India to the other three areas, and then developed independently in each.

    I believe that the various other peoples of the East have nearly the same ways of thinking as one or another of these four. Specifically, one may say that Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, and western Indo-China (Cambodia and Laos) are akin to India. Central Asia and Mongolia are akin to pre-Communist Tibet. Manchuria, Korea, and eastern Indo-China (Vietnam) are akin to China. T’hus, an examination of the ways of thinking of these four is, in effect, a study of the most influential peoples of the East. It is only after such a study, if at all, that a generalized view of the ways of thinking of Eastern peoples can emerge." (p. 4)

  47. ———. 1975. Parallel Developments: A Comparative History of Ideas . New York: Harper & Row.

    Second edition with the title: A Comparative History of Ideas , New Delhi: Kegan Paul International, 1986.

  48. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. 1972. "Conditions for Meaningful Comparative Philosophy." Philosophy East and West no. 22:53-61.

    "Finally, a comparative study in depth of Eastern doctrines and Western schools can help achieve an understanding between East and West based on immutable truths, whose attainment is made possible by the spiritual experience that is accessible to qualified men, Eastern or Western. It is only intellectual intuition and the spiritual experience, of which a metaphysical doctrine is in a sense the fruit, that can make possible the attainment of that Unity which in its transcendence comprehends both the East and the West. Today many men who have been exposed to the modern world, in a sense, carry both the Orientand the Occident as two poles and tendencies within themselves. A comparative study in depth can make possible, through the removal of those current errors which together comprise the modern world, the attainment of that "light that is neither of the East nor of the West,"(15) wherein alone the East and the West can be united. To seek this noble end, which would mean the rediscovery of the immutable nature of man generally forgotten in the modern world and which is the only way possible to correct the optical illusions to which the modern world is victim, must be the purpose of all serious comparative studies of Eastern and Western doctrines and philosophies. It is a goal whose achievement the truly contemplative and intellectual elite are urgently summoned to by the very situation of man in the contemporary world. (pp. 60-61)

    (15) This is in reference to the light verse (ayat al-nur ) in the Qur'an XXIV.35."

  49. Needham, Joseph. 1969. Within the Four Seas. The Dialogue of East and West . London: George Allen & Unwin.

    "Reprinted here are some of the most significant of his essays, lectures and broadcasts on these subjects, together with some more personal thoughts stimulated by his own travels and experiences in China, including a number of poems that he has on occasion felt moved to write there."

    "For three thousand years a dialogue has been going on beween the two ends of the Old World. Greatly have they influenced each other, and very different are the cultures they have produced. We have now good reason to think that the problems of the world will never be solved so long as they are considered only from a European point of view. It is necessary to see Europe from the outside, to see European history, and European failure no less than European achievement, through the eyes of that larger part of humanity, the peoples of Asia (and indeed also of Africa)." (The Dialogue of East and West , p. 11)

  50. Nelson, Eric S. 2017. Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought . New York: Bloomsbury.

    "The chapters of this book consist of a series of philosophically oriented historical case studies, focusing primarily on the intersection between Chinese and German philosophy. They explore instances of the encounter, dialogue, and exchange—and lack and failure thereof—between “Eastern” Chinese and “Western” German thinkers and discourses. “Eastern” and “Western,” as Gihwa noted, are only relative situational concepts. The history of this already existing and ongoing communicative interaction and cultural exchange compels us to consider, more seriously than hitherto, whether a more nuanced and historically appropriate conception of philosophy can emerge through critically engaging and reflecting on the modern encounter between Western and non-Western philosophy, and articulating its intercultural and intertextual dynamics; if it proves impossible to transgress these borders, the old reductive myths of the exclusivity, exceptionality, and isolation of Western philosophy and civilization will continue to hold sway." (Introduction, p. 2)

  51. ———. 2020. "Intercultural Philosophy and Intercultural Hermeneutics: A Response to Defoort, Wenning, and Marchal." Philosophy East and West no. 70:1-13.

    "Carine Defoort, Mario Wenning, and Kai Marchal offer three ways of engaging with Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought and the philosophical, hermeneutical, and historical issues it attempted to articulate and address. This work is historical with a contemporary philosophical intent: to reexamine a tumultuous contested epoch of philosophy’s past in order to reconsider its existing limitations and alternative possibilities. One dimension of this book is the investigation of constellations and entanglements of historical forces and concepts for the sake of articulating critical models and alternatives for the present. In the book, I contested the modern self-image of philosophy as exclusively and intrinsically Occidental by genealogically tracing how philosophy is already intercultural through a series of case studies focusing primarily on early twentieth-century German philosophy in its broader historical context." (p. 1, notes omitted)

  52. Netton, Ian Richard. 2006. Islam, Christianity and Tradition: A Comparative Exploration . Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

    "This is not an Introduction to Islam, nor is it a textbook. There are many excellent introductions and textbooks in the marketplace already.


    This book is a research monograph which aims to do much more than that. It operates generally within the sphere of comparative religion and is, specifically, a comparative exploration of the role of tradition/Tradition within two distinct faiths, Islam and Christianity. Specific leitmotivs include the roles of authority, fundamentalism, the use of reason, ijtihād , and original comparisons between Islamic Salafism and Christian Lefebvrism. ‘Salafism’ refers to that strain in Islam which looks backwards to the thought, practices and traditions of the Salaf (pious ancestors); ‘Lefebvrism’ is a reference to the traditionalist thought and practices of the schismatic Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre (1905–91) who rejected much of the teaching of the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) and what he perceived as that Council’s overthrow of tradition/Tradition. It is recognised in my text that the word ‘tradition/Tradition’ in both Islam and Christianity has a variety of senses and definitions." (p. VII)

  53. Neville, Robert Cummings. 2001. "Two Forms of Comparative Philosophy." Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy no. 1:1-13.

    "Two fundamental approaches to comparison now dominate the field. For convenience, and with the proviso that the names can be defined through the discussion below as terms of art, they can be called the objectivist and normative approaches, respectively. The objectivist approach treats the positions to be compared as finished objects, takes up a perspective of distance upon them, and measures its comparative judgments in empirical ways over against the evidence of the positions. The normative approach centers first on addressing contemporary philosophical problems and looks to the historical positions as resources for contemporary thinking, bringing them into comparative perspective against the contemporary background. The normative approach thus involves reconstructing the traditions, as any living tradition does in growing to meet new philosophical situations, and does so by bringing them into comparative interaction. Just as a contemporary European philosopher can learn from both Plato andAristode in constructing a response to an issue neither Plato nor Aristotle imagined, so a contemporary philosopher in a global public can learn all the world's traditions to contribute to a philosophy for our time." (p. 2)

  54. ———. 2002. "Beyond Comparative to Integrative Philosophy." APA Newsletters no. 2:20-23.

    "The thesis of this essay is that vital and creative philosophy today needs to operate within a public that integrates reflections from as many of the world’s philosophic traditions as possible. To support this thesis I shall first make some remarks about an appropriate philosophic public for vital philosophy. Then I shall comment on some of the kinds of comparative philosophy that are helpful for the integration of the world’s philosophic traditions into a public. Finally, I shall suggest a two-tiered agenda for integrative philosophy." (p. 20)

  55. ———. 2017. "Response to Brian Bruya's "Ethnocentrism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary Philosophy"." Philosophy East and West no. 67:1019-1021.

    "So I would extend Professor Bruya’s thesis in this way. He says that we should bring currently marginalized cultural approaches to philosophy into the center of the profession, both in our teaching and in our professional organizations. Right. Nevertheless, they might still be little balkanized in-groups within departments, curricula, and professional structures. This is not enough. I say that they need to be brought into conversation with one another, inventing new ways of carrying on that conversation.

    The audience or public for our philosophical work should not be limited to those of our ethnocentric in-group. It should include considered address to anyone who might have an interest in the outcome of our work. If our work is not interesting to many different approaches to philosophy, once they get what it is about, chances are it is not interesting to any except those in our professional in-group — and there go the undergraduates, and with them go the jobs. To put the point less defensively, should we not make our work vulnerable to examination and correction by anyone from any tradition who might have something to contribute? Of course, none of us can do all that should be done in this regard. But we can build a global philosophical conversation into which each of us can enter and learn. To do so is to build the human beyond the evolutionary success, but humane limitations, of ethnocentrism." (pp. 1020-1021)

  56. ———. 2022. "Reflections on Methods of Comparative Philosophy." In Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities , edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 17-30. New York: Bloomsbury.

    Chapter summary: "Robert Neville asserts that "the critical problem for comparativephilosophy is Western bias" (18). While bias is a problem more generally for comparison, Western bias is a particular problem because of the current predominance of Western philosophical traditions across the globe-including in many historically non Western regions. Neville reviews and assesses several approaches to addressing bias, ultimately arguing in favor of what he calls "two-faced comparison," which attends to the development and ongoing correction of both comparisons and the categories that inform them. Comparative philosophy, he argues, has generally neglected the latter process, refusing to indicate explicitly the respects in which a comparison is made and rendering itself unable to assess whether the respect ofcomparison is appropriate to what is compared. As a result, it remains vulnerable to charges of excessive bias. However, if it attends adequately to the development and correction of those categories as well as how everything that is interpreted in terms of that category relates to each other, then it can move toward what he calls "objective comparison," the truth-value of which can be assessed by the broader academic community."

  57. Ng, On-cho, ed. 2008. The Imperative of Understanding: Chinese Philosophy, Comparative Philosophy, and Onto-Hermeneutics—A Tribute Volume Dedicated to Professor Chung-ying Cheng . New York: Global Scholarly Publications.

    Contents: On-cho Ng: Preface;

    The imperatives of understanding and reading

    Chung-ying Cheng: On entering the 21st century: my philosophical vision and my philosophical practice; Richard E. Palmer: Gadamer's late turn: from heideggerian ontology to an anthropology-based philosophical hermeneutics; Vincent Shen; Metaphors, narratives, and existence; Lauren Pfister: The tenets and morals of onto-hermeneutics. A philosophical-biographical profile of Chung-ying Cheng; Jesse Flemming: The onto-hermeneutics of Guan; Robert Cummings Neville: Cheng chung-Ying's constructive philosophy; Joseph Grange: A passion for unity: the philosophy of Chung-ying Cheng; Jay Goulding: Cheng chung-Ying's onto-cosmology: Chinese philosophy and hermeneutic phenomenology; Galia Patt-Shamir: From Li to Li : a pragmatist implication of Cheng chung-Ying's onto-hermeneutics;

    The dialectics of interpretations and exegeses;

    Nicholas Bunnin: Situating Xunzi; Yong Huang: The Cheng Brother's onto-theological articulation of Confucian values; John Berthrong: Re-investigating the way; Kwong-loi Shun: Wholeness in Confucian thought : Zhu Xi on Cheng, Zhong, Xin, and Jing; Richard J. Smith: Divination in late imperial China : new light on some old problems; John Allen Tucker: Confucianism and human rights in Meiji Japan.

  58. Nisbett, Richard E. 2003. The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently . . . and Why . London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing.

    "I began a series of comparative studies, working with students at the University of Michigan and eventually with colleagues at Beijing University, Kyoto University, Seoul National University, and the Chinese Institute of Psychology. The research shows that there are indeed dramatic differences in the nature of Asian and European thought processes. The evidence lends support to the claims of nonpsychologist scholars and extends those claims to many surprising new mental phenomena.

    In addition, surveys and observational research document differences in social practices that dovetail with the differences in habits of thought. The new research has provided us, as prior evidence could not, with enough information so that we can build a theory about the nature of these differences, including how they might have come about, what their implications are for perceiving and reasoning in everyday life, and how they affect relations between people from different cultures." (Introduction, p. XVIII)

  59. Note, Nicole, Fornet-Betancout, Raúl, Estermann, Josef, and Aerts, Diederik, eds. 2009. Worldviews and Cultures: Philosophical Reflections from an Intercultural Perspective . Berlin: Springer.

    Contents: Nicole Note, Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, Josef Estermann, and Diederik Aerts: Worldview and Cultures: Philosophical Reflections from an Intercultural Perspective. An Introduction 1; Jameleddine Ben Abdeljelil: Ways of the Intellect: Forms of Discourse and Rationalization Processes in the Arabic-Islamic Context 11; Ulrich Libbrecht: Comparative Philosophy: A Methodological Approach 31; Bo Mou: A Methodological Framework for Cross-Tradition Understanding and Constructive Engagement 69; Koen de Munter and Nicole Note: Cosmopraxis and Contextualising Among the Contemporary Aymara 87; Helen Lauer: A Worldly View of Worldview Metaphysics 103; Josef Estermann: Andean Philosophy as a Questioning Alterity: An Intercultural Criticism of Western Andro- and Ethnocentrism 129; Raúl Fornet-Betancourt: Intercultural Philosophy from a Latin American Perspective 149; Ricardo Salas: Hermeneutic Philosophy and Human Experience: An Intercultural Perspective of Worldviews and Life World in the Mapuche Culture 163; Dina V. Picotti C.: Towards an Intercultural Construction of Rationality 181; Rik Pinxten: Universalism and Relativism of Knowledge Dissipate. The Intercultural Perspective 181; Name Index 201; Subject Index 205-211.

  60. Nylan, Michael, and Verhoeven, Martin. 2016. "Does Comparative Philosophy have a Fusion Future? Responses

    Fusion, Comparative, "Constructive Engagement Comparative," Or What? Third Thoughts on Levine's Critique of Siderits." Journal of World Philosophies no. 1:119-127.

    Invited responses to Michael Levine’s discussion paper ‘Does Comparative Philosophy Have a Fusion Future?’ Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies , 4 (2016): 208-37.

    1. Michael Nylan, On Comparative, Constructivist, Fusion, and Diagnostic Philosophy; 2. MartinVerhoeven, Does Philosophy Have a Buddhist Future?

    Abstract: "We have been invited to contribute a short assessment of Levine's response to Siderits' position in the emerging debate between ''fusion philosophy" and "comparative philosophy." Perhaps a brief word is in order regarding our backgrounds: Michael Nylan is a student of early China, with strong interdisciplinary training and interests, who has attempted work in both philosophy and translation. Martin Verhoeven is a historian by training, a translator by avocation, and a Buddhist practitioner. Both of us have committed ourselves for decades to past traditions that can only be accessed through classical Chinese language, and that surely colors our views. At the same time, those views are not identical but stereophonic."

  61. Nzegwu, Nkiru. 2016. "Symposium: How (If at All) is Gender Relevant to Comparative Philosophy?" Journal of World Philosophies no. 1:75-118.

    Abstract: "The symposium, “How (if at all) is gender relevant to comparative philosophy,” focuses on relevance of gender as an analytic and critical tool in comparative philosophical understanding and debate. Nkiru Nzegwu argues that gender as conceived by contemporary Euro-American feminism did not exist in pre-colonial Yorùbá as well as many Native American societies, and that therefore employing gender as a conceptual category in understanding the philosophies of pre-colonial Yorùbá and other non-gendered societies constitutes a profound mistake. What’s more, doing so amounts to a totalizing Euro-American colonial imposition that does violence to nongendered societies that reject gender as an ontological category. Hence, gender is ill-suited as a universal comparative philosophical tool. Nzegwu’s three co-symposiasts, Mary I. Bockover, Maitrayee Chaudhuri, and María Luisa Femenías enrich and complicate this question by bringing to bear both conceptual, ethical and empirical considerations drawn from the United States, India, and Latin America respectively."